





1978

L

Bibl. Mont

= 2

THE
HISTORY
OF
ANCIENT GREECE,
ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.
INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF
LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

Ἐκ μὲν τοιγὰρ τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθέσεως,
ἐτι δὲ ὁμοιοτήτος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως ἂν τις ἐφίκοιτο καὶ δυνήθειη
κατοπτρεύσας, ἅμα καὶ τὸ χρησιμὸν καὶ τὸ τερπνὸν ἐκ τῆς ἰσορροφίας
λαβεῖν.
POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

VOL. II.

BASIL:

Printed for J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. L. LEGRAND.

M D C C X C.

THE
HISTORY
OF
ANCIENT GREECE
ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
München

BY JOHN GILLES, LL.D. F.R.S.

THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION
1215 ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION
ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION
POLYMER, D. L. C.

VOL. II.

BASIL:

Printed for J. J. Tournesier; and J. L. LeGrand.

M DCCC.

CONTENTS
OF THE
SECOND VOLUME.

CHAP. IX.

Resentment of Darius against Greece. — Maritime Expedition of Mardonius. — Invasion of Greece by Datis and Artaphernes. — Battle of Marathon. — Transactions in the Interval between that Battle and Xerxes's Invasion. — The Invasion of Xerxes. — Battle of Thermopylæ. — Page 1

CHAP. X.

Sea-Fight off Artemisium. — Xerxes ravages Phocis. — Enters Attica. — Magnanimity of the Athenians. — Sea-Fight of Salamis. — Xerxes leaves Greece. — His miserable Retreat. — Campaign of Mardonius. — Battles of Plataea and Mycale. — Issue of the Persian Invasion. — 70

CHAP. XI.

Military Glory of Greece. — Enemies to whom that Country was exposed. — Foundation and Growth of Carthage. — The flourishing Condition of Magna

Græcia — *Excites the Jealousy of the Carthaginians* — *Who enter into a League with Xerxes.* — *The Object of this Alliance.* — *Causes of the singular Prosperity of Magna Græcia.* — *History of Pythagoras, and of his Philosophy.* — *The Carthaginians invade Sicily.* — *Their Disasters.* — *Glory of Gelon.* — *His Treaty with the Carthaginians.* — *Causes of the Decay of Magna Græcia.* Page 135

CHAP. XII.

Glory of Athens. — *Military Success of the Confederates.* — *Athens rebuilt and fortified* — *Extent of its Walls and Harbours.* — *The Confederates take Byzantium.* — *Conspiracy of Pausanias.* — *Banishment of Themistocles.* — *Virtue of Aristides.* — *Cimon assumes the Command.* — *His illustrious Merit and Success.* — *Revolt of Egypt.* — *War in Cyprus.* — *Peace with Persia.* — *Domestic Transactions of Greece.* — *The Athenian Greatness.* — *Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos.* — *Earthquake in Sparta.* — *Revolt of the Helots.* — *War between the Elians and Pisans.* — *The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter.* — *Dissensions in Argolis.* — *Revolt in Bæotia.* — *Truce of Thirty Years.* — *Character of Pericles.* — *Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies.* — *Spirit of the Athenian Government.* 177

CHAP. XIII.

Transition to the internal State of Athens. — *Laws of Draco* — *Solon* — *Pisistratus* — *Cleisthenes* — *Aristides* — *Pericles.* — *Final Settlement of the Athe-*

CONTENTS.

v

nian Government. — View of the Athenian Empire. — The combined Effect of external Prosperity and democratic Government on Manners — Arts — Luxury. — History of Grecian Literature and Philosophy. — Singular Contrast and Balance of Virtues and Vices. — The sublime Philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates. — The unprincipled Cautiousness of the Sophists. — The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides. — The licentious Buffoonery of Aristophanes. — The imitative Arts employed to the noblest Purposes — and abused to the most infamous. — Magnificence of public Festivals. — Simplicity in private Life. — Modest Reserve of Athenian Women. — Voluptuousness, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aspasia. Page 236

CHAP. XIV.

History of the Arts of Design. — Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts. — Causes of that Superiority — Among the Asiatic Greeks — Who communicated their Inventions to Europe. — Bathycles the Magnesian — Dipenus and Scillis — Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily. — The Athenians surpass their Masters. — Sublime Style of Art. — Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c. — Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art. — Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets — Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts. 293

CHAP. XV.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War. — Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra. — Sea-Fights. —

Insolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans. — They provoke the Resentment of the Peloponnesians — Obtain the Protection of Athens — Are defeated by the Corinthians — Who dread the Resentment of Athens. — Their Scheme for rendering it impotent. — Description of the Macedonian Coast. — It revolts from Athens. — Siege of Potidæa. — General Confederacy against Athens. — Peloponnesian Embassy. — Its Demands firmly answered by Pericles. — His Speech to the Athenians. — The Thebans surprise Plataea. — Preparations for War on both Sides. — Invasion of Attica. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet. — Plague in Athens. — Calamitous Situation of that Republic. — Magnanimity of Pericles. — Firmness of his last Advice. — His Death and Character. Page 314

CHAP. XVI.

Subsequent Events of the War. — Plataea taken — Revolt of Lesbos. — Description and History of that Island. — Nature of its political Connexion with Athens. — Address of Lesbos. — Its Capital besieged by the Athenians. — Measures of the Peloponnesians for relieving it. — Mitylenè surrenders. — Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Prisoners. — Resettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos. — The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra. — Sedition in that Island. — The contending Factions respectively supported by the Athenians and Peloponnesians — Progress, Termination, and Consequences of the Sedition. 366

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. IX.

Resentment of Darius against Greece. — Maritime Expedition of Mardonius. — Invasion of Greece by Datis and Artaphernes. — Battle of Marathon. — Transactions in the Interval between that Battle and Xerxes's Invasion. — The Invasion of Xerxes. — Battle of Thermopylae.

IN attempting to give the reader a general, but tolerably complete, view of the ancient history of Greece, it was often necessary to have recourse to very obscure materials; to arrange and combine the mutilated fragments of poets and mythologists; and to trace, by the established principles of critical conjecture, and the certain, because uniform,

CHAP.

IX.

Introduc-
tion to the
history of
the Persian
invasion.

2 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P.
IX.

current of human passions, those events and transactions which seem most curious and important. In this subsequent part of my work, the difficulty consists not in discovering, but in selecting, the materials; for the magnificent preparations, the splendid commencement, and the unexpected issue, of the Persian war, have been related with the utmost accuracy of description, and adorned by the brightest charms of eloquence. The Grecian poets, historians, and orators, dwell with complacency on a theme, not less important than extensive, and equally adapted to display their own abilities, and to flatter the pride of their country. The variety of their inimitable performances, generally known and studied in every country conversant with literature, renders the subject familiar to the reader, and difficult to the writer. Yet does the merit of those performances, however justly and universally admired, fall short of the extraordinary exploits which they describe; exploits which, though ancient, still preserve a fresh and unfading lustre, and will remain, to the latest ages, precious monuments of that generous magnanimity, which cherishes the seeds of virtue, inspires the love of liberty, and animates the fire of patriotism.

Subject divided into
three acts.
Olymp.
lxxii. 3.
A. C. 490.

The memorable tragedy (to adopt on this occasion an apt allusion of Plutarch), which ended in the eternal disgrace of the Persian name, may be divided, with propriety, into three principal acts. The first contains the invasion of Greece by

Darius's generals, Datis and Artaphernes, who were defeated in the battle of Marathon. The second consists in the expedition undertaken ten years afterwards by Xerxes, the son and successor of Darius, who fled precipitately from Greece, after the ruin of his fleet near the isle of Salamis. The third, and concluding act, is the destruction of the Persian armies in the bloody fields of Mycalé and Platea; events which happened on the same day, and nearly two years after Xerxes's triumphal entry into Greece.

C H A P.
IX.

Olymp.
lxxv. 1.
A. C. 480.

Olymp.
lxxv. 2.
A. C. 479.

The complete reduction of the insurgents on the Asiatic coast, prompted Darius to take vengeance on such Greeks as had encouraged and assisted the unsuccessful rebellion of his subjects. The proud monarch of the East, when informed that the citizens of Athens had co-operated with the Ionians in the taking and burning of Sardis, discovered evident marks of the most furious resentment; shooting an arrow into the air, he prayed that heaven might assist him in punishing the audacious insolence of that republic; and every time he sat down to table, an attendant reminded him of the Athenians, lest the delights of eastern luxury should seduce him from his fell purpose of revenge.¹

Darius's
resentment
against the
Athe-
nians.

The execution of his design was intrusted to Mardonius, a Persian nobleman of the first rank, whose personal, as well as hereditary advantages,

Unfor-
tunate ex-
pedition of
Mardo-
nius;
Olymp.
lxxi. 4.
A. C. 493.

¹ Herodot. 1, v. c. cv. et seq.

4 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P.

IX.

who loses
the greatest
part of his
fleet.

had entitled him to the marriage of Artazoftra, daughter of Darius; and whose youth and inexperience were compensated, in the opinion of his master, by his superior genius for war, and innate love of glory. In the second spring after the cruel punishment of the Ionians, Mardonius approached the European coast with an armament sufficient to inspire terror into Greece. The rich island of Thasus, whose golden mines yielded a revenue of near three hundred talents, submitted to his fleet; while his land-forces added the barbarous province of Macedon to the Persian empire. But having steered southward from Thasus, the whole armament was overtaken, and almost destroyed, by a violent storm, while endeavouring to double the promontory of mount Athos, which is connected with the Macedonian shore by a low and narrow neck of Land, but forms a long and lofty ridge in the sea. Three hundred vessels were dashed against the rocks; twenty thousand men perished in the waves. This disaster totally defeated the design of the expedition; and Mardonius having recovered the shattered remains of the fleet and army, returned to the court of Persia, where, by flattering the pride, he averted the resentment of Darius; while he represented, that the Persian forces, invincible by the power of man, had yielded to the fury of the elements; and while he described and exaggerated, to the astonishment and terror of his countrymen, the excessive cold, the violent tempests, the monstrous marine animals, which dis-

tinguish and render formidable those distant and unknown seas ².

The address of Mardonius rescued him from punishment; but his misfortunes removed him from the command of Lower Asia. Two generals were appointed in his room, of whom Datis, a Mede, was the more distinguished by his age and experience, while Artaphernes, a Persian, was the more conspicuous for his rank and nobility, being descended of the royal blood, and son to Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, whose name has frequently occurred in the present history. That his lieutenants might appear with a degree of splendor suitable to the majesty of Persia, Darius assembled an army of five hundred thousand men ³ consisting of the flower of the provincial troops of his extensive empire. The preparation of an adequate number of transports and ships of war, occasioned but a short delay. The maritime provinces of the empire, Egypt, Phœnicia, and the coasts of the Euxine and Egean seas, were commanded to fit out, with all possible expedition, their whole naval strength; the old vessels were repaired, many new ones were built, and in the course of the same year in which the preparations

IX.

Succeeded
by Datis
and Artaphernes.
Olymp.
lxxvi. 3.
A. C. 490.

Their armament
and views.

² Herodot. l. vi. c. xliii. et seq.

³ Besides Herodotus, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus, this expedition is related by Lyfias, Orat. Funeb. Isocrat. Panegy. Plato, Menex. Pausan. l. x. c. xx. Justin. l. ii. c. ix. Corn. Nepos, in Milt.

6 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. IX. commenced, a fleet of six hundred sail was ready to put to sea. This immense armament the Persian generals were ordered to employ, in extending their conquests on the side of Europe, in subduing the republics of Greece, and more particularly in chastising the insolence of the Eretrians and Athenians, the only nations which had conspired with the revolt of the Ionians, and assisted that rebellious people in the destruction of Sardis. With respect to the other nations which might be reduced by his arms, the orders of Darius were general, and the particular treatment of the vanquished was left to the discretion of his lieutenants; but concerning the Athenians and Eretrians, he gave the most positive commands, that their territories should be laid waste, their houses and temples burned or demolished, and their persons carried in captivity to the eastern extremities of his empire. Secure of effecting their purpose, his generals were furnished with a great number of chains for confining the Grecian prisoners; a haughty presumption (to use the language of antiquity) in the superiority of man over the power of fortune, which on this, as on other occasions, was punished by the just vengeance of heaven.

They reduce the Cyclades,

The Persian fleet enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the isle of Samos, from whence they were ready to proceed to the Athenian coast. The late disaster which befel the armament commanded by Mardonius, deterred them from pursuing a direct course along the shores of Thrace and Macedonia:

they determined to steer in an oblique line through the Cyclades, a cluster of seventeen small islands, lying opposite to the territories of Argos and Attica. The approach of such an innumerable host, whose transports darkened the broad surface of the Egean, struck terror into the unwarlike inhabitants of those delightful islands. The Naxians took, refuge in their inaccessible mountains; the natives of Delos, the favorite residence of Latona and her divine children, abandoned the awful majesty of their temple, which was overshadowed by the rough and lofty mount Cynthus. Paros⁴, famous for its marble; Andros⁵, celebrated for its vines; Ceos, the birth-place of the plaintive Simonides; Syros, the native country of the ingenious and philosophic Pherecydes; Ios the tomb of Homer⁶; the industrious Amorgos⁷; as well as all

IX.

⁴ The marble of Paros was superior in whiteness, and the fineness of its grain, to the hard sparkling veins of mount Pentelicus in Attica; which, from the size and brilliancy of its component particles, somewhat resembling salt, is called by the Italians *Marmo salino*. These two kinds of marble were always the most valued by the Greeks; but the marble of Paros was preferred by artists, as yielding more easily to the graving tool, and, on account of the homogeneousness of its parts, less apt to sparkle, and give false lights to the statue. The works of Parian marble, in the Farnesian palace at Rome, are mentioned by Winkelman, *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums*, l. i. c. 2.

⁵ The wines of Andros and Naxos were compared to Nectar. See Athenæus, l. i.

⁶ Strabo, l. x. et Plin. l. iv. Pausanias (in Phocic.) says, that Climenès, the mother of Homer, was a native of the isle of Ios; and Aulus Gellius, l. iii. asserts, on the authority of Aristotle, that this island was the birth-place of Homer himself.

⁷ Amorgos was long famous for the robes made there, and

8 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. IX. the other * islands which surrounded the once sacred shores of Delos, either spontaneously offered the usual acknowledgment of earth and water, as a testimony of their friendship, or submitted, after a feeble resistance, to the Persian arms *.

and Eubœa;

The invaders next proceeded westward to the isle of Eubœa, where, after almost a continued engagement of six days, their strength and numbers, assisted by the perfidy of two traitors, finally prevailed over the valor and obstinacy of the Eretrians ¹⁰.

invade Attica.

Hitherto every thing was prosperous; and had the expedition ended with the events already related, it would have afforded just matter of triumph. But a more difficult task remained, in the execution of which the Persians (happily for Europe) experienced a fatal reverse of fortune. After the reduction of Eubœa, the Athenian coasts, separated from that island only by the narrow strait

distinguished by its name. Suid. ad voc. They were died red, with a species of lichen, which abounds in that island, and which was formerly used by the English and French in dying scarlet.

* Herodot. l. vi. c. 94.

* Herodot. l. vi. c. 101. et seq.

¹⁰ The present deplorable state of these once fortunate islands may be seen in Tournefort, the most learned of Travellers. Despotism, a double superstition (the Grecian and Mahomedan), pirates, banditti, and pestilence, have not yet depopulated the Cyclades, which respectively contain three, five, ten, and the largest, twenty thousand inhabitants.

of Euripus, seemed to invite the generals of Darius to an easy conquest. They readily accepted the invitation, as the punishment of Athens was the main object which their master had in view when he fitted out his seemingly invincible armament. The measures which they adopted for accomplishing this design appear abundantly judicious; the greater part of the army was left to guard the islands which they had subdued; the useless multitude of attendants were transported to the coast of Asia; with an hundred thousand chosen infantry, and a due proportion of horse, the Persian generals set sail from Eubœa, and safely arrived on the *Marathonian shore*, a district of Attica about thirty miles from the capital, consisting chiefly of level ground, and therefore admitting the operations of cavalry, which formed the main strength of the Barbarian army, and with which the Greeks were very poorly provided. Here the Persians pitched their camp, by the advice of Hippias, the banished king of Athens¹¹, whose perfect knowledge of the country, and intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Greece, rendered his opinion on all occasions respectable.

Meanwhile the Athenians had raised an army and appointed ten generals, with equal power, chosen, as usual, from the ten tribes, into which the citizens were divided. Their obstinate and

C H A P.
IX.

The Athenians take measures for their defence.

¹¹ Thucyd. l. vi. c. lix. Herodot. ubi supra.

C H A P. almost continual hostilities with the Phocians, the
 IX. Thebans, and their other northern neighbours, prevented them from entertaining any hopes of assistance from that quarter: but, on the first appearance of the Persian fleet, they sent a messenger to Sparta, to acquaint the senate of that republic with the immediate danger which threatened them, and to explain how much it concerned the interest, as well as the honor of the Spartans, who had acquired just pre-eminence among the Grecian states, not to permit the destruction of the most ancient and the most splendid of the Grecian cities. The senate and assembly approved the justice of this demand, they collected their troops, and seemed ready to afford their rivals, whose danger now converted them into allies, a speedy and effectual relief. But it was only the ninth day of the month; and an ancient, unaccountable, and therefore the more respected, superstition prevented the Spartans from taking the field, before the full of the moon¹². When that period should arrive, they promised to march, with the utmost expedition, to the plains of Marathon.

Rein-
 forced by
 the Pla-
 tæans.

Meanwhile the Athenians had been reinforced by a thousand chosen warriors from Platæa, a small city of Bœotia, distant only nine miles from Thebes. The independent spirit of the Platæans rendered them as desirous of preserving their freedom, as they were unable to defend it against the Theban power. But that invaluable possession, which their own weakness would have made it necessary for

¹² Strabo, l. ix. p. 611 and Herodot. *ibid.*

them to surrender, the protection of Athens enabled them to maintain, and, in return for this inestimable favor, they discovered towards their benefactors, on the present as well as on every future occasion, the sincerest proofs of gratitude and respect. The Athenian army, now ready to take the field, consisted of about ten thousand freemen, and of probably a still greater number of armed slaves. The generals might certainly have collected a larger body of troops; but they seem to have been averse to commit the safety of the state to the fortune of a single engagement; neither would it have been prudent to leave the walls of Athens, and the other fortresses of Attica, altogether naked and defenceless. It had been a matter of deliberation in the assembly, whether they ought not to stand a siege rather than venture a battle. The Athenian fortifications, indeed, had not attained that strength which they afterwards acquired, yet they might have long resisted the artless assaults of the Persians; or had the latter got possession of the walls, the long, narrow, and winding streets¹³ of Athens would have enabled a small number of men to make an obstinate, and perhaps a successful defence, against a superior but less determined enemy. But all hopes from this mode of resistance were damped by the consideration, that an immense host of Persians might sur-

¹³ Aristotle informs us, that this was the ancient mode of building in all the cities of Greece. ARIST. Polit.

12 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P.

IX.

The Athenians encouraged by Miltiades to risk a battle.

His motives explained in the military character of the Athenians,

round their city on every side, intercept their supplies, and instead of conquering them by assault, reduce them by famine. At the same time Miltiades, one of the ten generals, whose patriotism and love of liberty we have already had occasion to applaud, animated his countrymen with the desire of victory and glory. This experienced commander knew the Persians; he knew his fellow-citizens; and his discerning sagacity had formed a proper estimate of both.

The Athenians were few in number, but chosen men; their daily practice in the gymnastic had given them agility of limbs, dexterity of hand, and an unusual degree of vigor both of mind and body. Their constant exercise in war had inured them to hardship and fatigue, accustomed them to the useful restraints of discipline, and familiarized them to those skilful evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of the field. Their defensive as well as offensive armor was remarkably complete; and an acknowledged pre-eminence over their neighbours, had inspired them with a military enthusiasm, which on this occasion was doubly animated, in defence of their freedom and of their country. In their pertinacious struggles with each other, for whatever men hold most precious, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, had adopted a mode of military arrangement which cannot be too highly extolled. Drawn up in a close and firm phalanx, commonly sixteen deep, the impetuous vigor of the most robust youth

held the first ranks; the last were closed by the steady courage of experienced veterans, whose resentment against cowardice seemed more terrible to their companions than the arms of an enemy. As the safety of the last ranks depended on the activity of the first, their united assaults were rendered alike furious and persevering, and hardly to be resisted by any superiority of numbers¹⁴.

¹⁴ The attention given by the Greeks to the relative disposition of the ranks, according to the respective qualities of the men who composed them, introduced certain rules in ancient tactics which would be unnecessary in the modern. To convert the rear into the front, a modern army has only to face about, because it is not very material in what order the ranks are placed. But we learn from the tactics of Arrian, that the Greeks had contrived three other ways of performing this evolution, in all of which the same front was uniformly presented to the enemy.—The first was called the *Macedonian*. In this evolution the file-leader faced to the right-about, without stirring from his place; the other men in the file passed behind him, and, after a certain number of paces, also faced about, and found themselves in their respective places.—The second was called the *Cretan*. In this the file-leader not only faced about, but paced over the depth of the phalanx. The rest followed him, and the whole found themselves in the same place as before, the ranks only reversed.—The third was called the *Lacedæmonian*, which was precisely the reverse of the first. In the Lacedæmonian evolution the bringer-up, or last man in each file, whom the Greeks called *οὐραγος*, faced about, then halted. The file-leader faced about, and paced over twice the depth of the phalanx, the rest following him; the whole thus found themselves with the same front towards the enemy, the ranks only reversed. The difference between these three evolutions consisted in this, that the Macedonian, where the file-leader stood still, and the rest went behind him, had the appearance of a retreat; since the whole line receded by the depth of the phalanx from the enemy: in the Cretan, the men preserved the same ground which they had

C H A P.

IX.

and of the
Persians.

The Persians (for under the name of Persians are comprehended the various nations which followed the standard of Datis and Artaphernes) were not deficient in martial appearance, nor perhaps entirely destitute of valor, being selected with care from the flower of the Asiatic provinces. But, compared with the regularity of the Greek battalions, they may be regarded as a promiscuous crowd, armed in each division with the peculiar weapons of their respective countries, incapable of being harmonized by general movements, or united into any uniform system of military arrangement. Darts and arrows were their usual instruments of attack; and even the most completely armed trusted to some species of missile weapon. They carried in their left hand light targets of reed or osier, and their bodies were sometimes covered with thin plates of scaly metal; but they had not any defensive armor worthy of being compared with the firm corselets, the brazen greaves, the massy bucklers of their Athenian opponents. The bravest of the Barbarians fought on horseback; but in all ages the long Grecian spear has proved the surest defence against the attack of cavalry, in-

originally occupied; but the Lacedæmonian carried the whole line, by the depth of the phalanx, forward on the enemy. Among the first military changes introduced by Philip of Macedon, historians mention his having adopted the Lacedæmonian evolution, for changing the front, in preference to that formerly used by his own countrymen.

somuch that even the Romans, in fighting against
 the Numidian horsemen, preferred the strength of
 the phalanx to the activity of the legion. The
 inferiority of their armor and of their discipline,
 was not the only defect of the Persians; they
 wanted that ardor and emulation which, in the
 close and desperate engagements of ancient times,
 were necessary to animate the courage of a soldier.
 Their spirits were broken under the yoke of a
 double servitude, imposed by the blind superstition
 of the Magi, and the capricious tyranny of Da-
 rius; with them their native country was an empty
 name; and their minds, degraded by the mean
 vices of wealth and luxury, were insensible to the
 native charms, as well as to the immortal reward
 of manly virtue.

C H A P.
 IX.

Miltiades allowed not, however, his contempt
 of the enemy, or his confidence in his own troops,
 to seduce him into a fatal security. Nothing on
 his part was neglected; and the only obstacle to
 success was fortunately removed by the disinterested
 moderation of his colleagues. The continual
 dread of tyrants had taught the jealous republicans
 of Greece to blend, on every occasion, their civil
 with their military institutions. Governed by this
 principle, the Athenians, as we already had occa-
 sion to observe, elected ten generals, who were
 invested, each in his turn, with the supreme com-
 mand. This regulation was extremely unfavor-
 able to that unity of design which ought to pervade
 all the successive operations of an army; an in-

Prudent
 conduct of
 Miltiades.

C H A P.

IX.

Generous
patriotism
of Aristi-
des.

convenience which struck the discerning mind of Aristides, who on this occasion displayed the first openings of his illustrious character. The day approaching when it belonged to him to assume the successive command, he generously yielded his authority¹⁵ to the approved valor and experience of Miltiades. The other generals followed this magnanimous example, sacrificing the dictates of private ambition to the interest and glory of their country; and the commander in chief thus enjoyed an opportunity of exerting, uncontrolled, the utmost vigor of his genius.

Disposition
of both ar-
mies.

Left he should be surrounded by a superior force, he chose for his camp the declivity of a hill, distant about a mile from the encampment of the enemy. The intermediate space he caused to be strewed in the night with the branches and trunks of trees, in order to interrupt the motion, and break the order of the Persian cavalry, which in consequence of this precaution seem to have been rendered incapable of acting in the engagement. In the morning his troops were drawn up in battle-array, in a long and full line; the bravest of the Athenians on the right, on the left the warriors of Plataea, and in the middle the slaves¹⁶, who

¹⁵ Plutarch. in Aristid. tom. ii. p. 489.

¹⁶ There is not any historian, indeed, who makes mention of this arrangement, although, by comparing the accounts of the havoc made in the centre, with the small number of Athenian citizens who were slain, it is evident that the slaves must have been the greatest sufferers in the action, and therefore posted, as is said in the text.

had

had been admitted on this occasion to the honor of bearing arms. By weakening his centre, the least valuable part, he extended his front equal to that of the enemy: his rear was defended by the hill above mentioned, which, verging round to meet the sea, likewise covered his right; his left was flanked by a lake or marsh. Datis, although he perceived the skilful disposition of the Greeks, was yet too confident in the vast superiority of his numbers to decline the engagement, especially as he now enjoyed an opportunity of deciding the contest before the expected auxiliaries could arrive from Peloponnesus. When the Athenians saw the enemy in motion they ran down the hill, with unusual ardor, to encounter them; a circumstance which proceeded, perhaps, from their eagerness to engage, but which must have been attended with the good consequence of shortening the time of their exposure to the flings and darts of the Barbarians.

C H A P.
IX.

The two armies closed; the battle was rather fierce than long. The Persian sword and Scythian hatchet penetrated, or cut down, the centre of the Athenians; but the two wings, which composed the main strength of the Grecian army, broke, routed, and put to flight the corresponding divisions of the enemy. Instead of pursuing the vanquished they closed their extremities, and attacked the Barbarians who had penetrated their centre. The Grecian spear overcame all opposition: the bravest of the Persians perished in the field; the remainder were pursued with great slaughter; and such was their terror and surprise, that they fought

Defeat of
the Per-
sians in the
battle of
Marathon;
Olymp.
lxxii. 3.
A. C. 490.

C H A P.
IX.

who sail to
Asia.

Unexpect-
ed treat-
ment of
the Ere-
trians.

for refuge, not in their camp, but in their ships. The banished tyrant of Athens fell in the engagement: two Athenian generals, and about two hundred citizens, were found among the slain: the Persians left six thousand of their best troops in the scene of action. Probably, a still greater number were killed in the pursuit. The Greeks followed them to the shore; but the lightness of the Barbarian armor favored their escape. Seven ships were taken; the rest sailed with a favorable gale, doubled the cape of Sunium; and, after a fruitless attempt to surprise the harbour of Athens, returned to the coast of Asia¹⁷.

The loss and disgrace of the Persians on this memorable occasion, was compensated by only one consolation. They had been defeated in the engagement, compelled to abandon their camp, and driven ignominiously to their ships; but they carried with them to Asia the Eretrian prisoners, who, in obedience to the orders of Darius, were safely conducted to Susa. These unhappy men had every reason to dread being treated as victims of royal resentment; but when they were conducted in chains to the presence of the great king, their reception was very different from what their fears naturally led them to expect. Whether reflection suggested to Darius the pleasure which he might derive in peace, and the assistance which he might receive in war, from the arts and arms of the Eretrians, or that a ray of magnanimity for once

¹⁷ Herodot. l. vi. c. cxi. et seq.

enlightened the soul of a despot, he ordered the Greeks to be immediately released from captivity, and soon afterwards assigned them for their habitation the fertile district of Anderica, lying in the province of Cissia, in Susiana, at the distance of only forty miles from the capital. There the colony remained in the time of Herodotus, preserving their Grecian language and institutions; and after a revolution of six centuries, their descendants were visited by Apollonius Tyaneus¹⁸, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, and were still distinguished from the surrounding nations by the indubitable marks of European extraction.

When any disaster befel the Persian arms, the great, and once independent, powers of the empire were ever ready to revolt. The necessity of watching the first symptoms of those formidable rebellions gradually drew the troops of Darius from the coast of Lesser Asia; whose inhabitants, delivered from the oppression of foreign mercenaries, resumed their wonted spirit and activity; and except in paying, conjunctly with several neighbouring provinces, an annual contribution of about an hundred thousand pounds, the Asiatic Greeks were scarcely subjected to any proof of dependence. Disputes concerning the succession to the universal empire of the east, the revolt of Egypt, and the death of Darius retarded for ten years the resolution formed by that prince, and adopted by his son and successor Xerxes, of restoring the lustre of the Persian arms,

C H A P.
IX.
Obstacles
to the
second in-
vasion of
Greece.

¹⁸ Philostrat. in Vit. Apollon.

S H A P. not only by taking vengeance on the pertinacious obstinacy of the Athenians, but by effecting the complete conquest of Europe¹⁹. We shall have occasion fully to describe the immense preparations which were made for this purpose; but it is necessary first to examine the transactions of the Greeks, during the important interval between the battle of Marathon and the expedition of Xerxes; and to explain the principal circumstances which enabled a country, neither wealthy nor populous, to resist the most formidable invasion recorded in history.

The sentiments and behaviour of the Athenians in consequence of their victory.

The joy excited among the Athenians by a victory, which not only delivered them from the dread of their enemies, but raised them to distinguished pre-eminence among their rivals and allies, is evident from a remarkable incident which happened immediately after the battle. As soon as fortune had visibly declared in their favor, a soldier was dispatched from the army to convey the welcome news to the capital. He ran with incredible velocity, and appeared, covered with dust and blood, in the presence of the senators. Excess of fatigue conspired with the transports of enthusiasm to exhaust the vigor of his frame. He had only time to exclaim, in two words, *Rejoice with the victors*²⁰, and immediately expired.

It is probable that the same spirit which animated this nameless patriot, was speedily diffused through the whole community; and the Athenian

¹⁹ Herodot. l. vii. c. i. et ii.

²⁰ Χαίρετε χαίρομεν.

institutions were well calculated to keep alive the generous ardor which success had inspired. Part of the spoil was gratefully dedicated to the gods; the remainder was appropriated as the just reward of merit. The obsequies of the dead were celebrated with solemn pomp; and according to an ancient and sacred custom, their fame was commemorated by annual returns of festive magnificence²¹. The honors bestowed on those who had fallen in the field, reflected additional lustre on their companions who survived the victory. In extensive kingdoms, the praise of successful valor is weakened by diffusion; and such too is the inequality between the dignity of the general and the meanness of the soldier, that the latter can seldom hope to attain, however well he may deserve, his just proportion of military fame²². But the Grecian republics were small; a perpetual rivalry subsisted among them; and when any particular state eclipsed the glory of its neighbours, the superiority was sensibly felt by every member of the commonwealth.

That pre-eminence, which by the battle of Marathon Athens acquired in Greece, Miltiades, by his peculiar merit in that battle, attained in Athens. His valor and conduct were celebrated by the artless praises of the vulgar, as well as by the more

Honors
bestowed
of Mil-
tiades;

²¹ Diodor. Sic. l. xi. Herodot. ubi supra.

²² Plutarch. in Cimon. p. 187. et Æschin. advers. Ctesiphont. p. 301. furnish us with examples of the jealousy of the Greeks, lest the fame due to their troops in general should be engrossed by the commanders.

C H A P.

IX.

elaborate encomiums of the learned. Before the æra of this celebrated engagement, tragedy, the unrivalled distinction of Athenian literature, had been invented and cultivated by the successful labors of Thespis, Phrynicus, and Æschylus. The last, who is justly regarded as the great improver of the Grecian drama, displayed in the battle of Marathon the same martial ardor which still breathes in his poetry. We may reasonably imagine, that he would employ the highest flights of his fancy in extolling the glory of exploits in which he had himself borne so distinguished a part; and particularly that he would exert all the powers of his lofty genius in celebrating the hero and patriot, whose enthusiasm had animated the battle, and whose superior talents had insured the victory. The name of the conqueror at Marathon re-echoed through the spacious theatres of Athens, which, though they had not yet acquired that solid and durable composition still discernible in the ruins of ancient grandeur, were already built in a form sufficiently capacious to contain the largest proportion of the citizens. The magnificent encomiums bestowed on Miltiades in the presence of his assembled countrymen, by whose consenting voice they were repeated and approved, fired with emulation the young candidates for fame, while they enabled the general to obtain that mark of public confidence and esteem which was the utmost ambition of all the Grecian leaders.

who is appointed to command the fleet;

These leaders, while they remained within the territories of their respective states, were intrusted

(as we already had occasion to observe) with only that moderate authority which suited the equal condition of freedom. But when they were appointed to the command of the fleet in foreign parts, they obtained almost unlimited power, and might acquire immense riches. To this exalted station Miltiades was advanced by the general suffrage of his country; and having sailed with a fleet of seventy galleys, the whole naval strength of the republic, he determined to expel the Persian garrisons from the isles of the Ægean; to reduce the smaller communities to the obedience of Athens, and to subject the more wealthy and powerful to heavy contributions.

The first operations of the Athenian armament were crowned with success: several islands were subdued, considerable sums of money were collected. But the fleet arriving before Paros, every thing proved adverse to the Athenians. Miltiades, who had received a personal injury from Tisagoras, a man of great authority in that island, yielded to the dictates of private resentment, and confounding the innocent with the guilty, demanded from the Parians the sum of an hundred talents (near twenty thousand pounds sterling). If the money were not immediately paid, he threatened to lay waste their territory, to burn their city, and to teach them by cruel experience the stern rights of a conqueror. The exorbitance of the demand rendered compliance with it impossible; the Parians prepared for their defence, guided however by the motives of a generous despair, rather than by any

C H A P.
IX.

Besieges
Paros un-
success-
fully.

CHAP. well-grounded hope of resisting the invaders. For
IX. twenty-six days they maintained possession of the capital of the island, which the Athenians, after ravaging all the adjacent country, besieged by sea and land. The time now approached when Paros must have surrendered to a superior force; but it was the good fortune of the islanders, that an extensive grove, which happened to be set on fire in one of the Sporades, was believed by the besiegers to indicate the approach of a Persian fleet. The same opinion gained ground among the Parians, who determined, by their utmost efforts, to preserve the place, until they should be relieved by the assistance of their protectors. Miltiades had received a dangerous wound during the siege; and the weakness of his body impairing the faculties of his mind, and rendering him too sensible to the impressions of fear, he gave orders to draw off his victorious troops, and returned with the whole fleet to Athens.

Accused
by his ene-
mies.

His conduct in the present expedition ill corresponded to his former fame; and he soon experienced the instability of popular favor. The Athenian citizens, and particularly the more eminent and illustrious, had universally their rivals and enemies. The competitions for civil offices, or military command, occasioned eternal animosities among those jealous republicans. Xantippus, a person of great distinction, and father of the celebrated Pericles, who in the succeeding age obtained the first rank in the Athenian government, eagerly seized an opportunity of depressing the character of a man which had so long overtopped

that of every competitor. Miltiades was accused of being corrupted by a Persian bribe to raise the siege of Paros; the precipitance with which he abandoned the place, so unlike to the general firmness of his manly behaviour, gave a probable color to the accusation; and the continual terror which, ever since the usurpation of Pisistratus, the Athenians entertained of arbitrary power, disposed them to condemn, upon very slight evidence, a man whose abilities and renown seemed to endanger the safety of the commonwealth. The crime laid to his charge inferred death, a punishment which his accuser insisted ought to be immediately inflicted on him. But his judges were contented with fining him the sum of fifty talents (near ten thousand pounds sterling), which being unable to pay, he was thrown into prison, where he soon after died of his wounds.

His death!

But the glory of Miltiades survived him; and the Athenians, however unjust to his person, were not unmindful of his fame. At the distance of half a century, when the battle of Marathon was painted by order of the state, they directed the figure of Miltiades to be placed in the fore-ground, animating the troops to victory: a reward which, during the virtuous simplicity of the ancient commonwealth, conferred more real honor, than all that magnificent profusion of crowns and statues²³, which in the later times of the republic were rather extorted by general fear, than bestowed by public admiration.

Honors bestowed on his memory.

²³ Æschin. p. 301. et Polybius passim.

C H A P.

IX.

His suc-
cessors in
command.

The jealousies, resentments, dangers, and calamities, which often attend power and pre-eminence, have never yet proved sufficient to deter an ambitious mind from the pursuit of greatness. The rivals of Miltiades were animated by the glory of his elevation, not depressed by the example of his fall. His accuser Xantippus, though he had acted the principal part in removing this favorite of the people, was not deemed worthy to succeed him. Two candidates appeared for the public confidence and esteem, who alternately outstripped each other in the race of ambition, and whose characters deserve attention even in general history, as they had a powerful influence on the fortune, not of Athens only, but of all Greece.

Compari-
son of Aris-
tides and
Themisto-
cles.

Aristides and Themistocles were nearly of the same age, and equally noble, being born in the first rank of citizens, though not of royal descent, like Solon and Pisistratus, Isagoras and Clisthenes, Xantippus and Miltiades, who had hitherto successively assumed the chief administration of the Athenian republic. Both had been named among the generals who commanded in the battle of Marathon. The disinterested behaviour of Aristides on this memorable occasion has been already mentioned. It afforded a promise of his future fame. But his dawning glories were still eclipsed by the meridian lustre of Miltiades. After the death of this great man, Aristides ought naturally to have succeeded to his influence, as he was eminently distinguished by valor and moderation, the two great virtues of a republican. Formed in such

schools of moral and political knowledge as then flourished in Athens, he had learned to prefer glory to pleasure; the interest of his country to his own personal glory; and the dictates of justice and humanity, even to the interests of his country. His ambition was rather to deserve, than to acquire, the admiration of his fellow-citizens; and while he enjoyed the inward satisfaction, he was little anxious about the external rewards of virtue. The character of Themistocles was of a more doubtful kind. The trophy, which Miltiades had raised at Marathon, disturbed his rest. He was inflamed with a desire to emulate the glory of this exploit; and while he enabled Athens to maintain a superiority in Greece, he was ambitious to acquire for himself a superiority in Athens. His talents were well adapted to accomplish both these purposes; eloquent, active, enterprising, he had strengthened his natural endowments by all the force of education and habit. Laws, government, revenue, and arms, every branch of political and military knowledge, were the great objects of his study. In the courts of justice he successfully displayed his abilities in defence of his private friends, or in accusing the enemies of the state. He was forward to give his opinion upon every matter of public deliberation; and his advice, founded in wisdom, and supported by eloquence, commonly prevailed in the assembly. Yet with all these great qualities, his mind was less smit with the native charms of virtue, than captivated with her splendid ornaments. Glory was the idol which he

C H A P. IX. adored. He could injure, without remorse, the general cause of the confederacy, in order to promote the grandeur of Athens²⁴; and history still leaves it as doubtful, as did his own conduct, whether, had an opportunity offered, he would not have sacrificed the happiness of his country to his private interest and ambition.

Their rivalry.

The discernment of Aristides perceived the danger of allowing a man of such equivocal merit to be intrusted with the sole government of the republic; and on this account, rather than from any motives of personal animosity, he opposed every measure that might contribute to his elevation. In this patriotic view, he frequently solicited the same honors which were ambitiously courted by Themistocles, especially when no other candidate appeared capable of balancing the credit of the latter. A rivalry thus began, and long continued between them²⁵; and the whole people of Athens could alone decide the much contested pre-eminence. The interest of Themistocles so far prevailed over the authority of his opponent, that he procured his own nomination to the command of the fleet; with which he effected the conquest of the small islands in the Ægean, and thus completed the design undertaken by Miltiades. While *he* acquired fame and fortune abroad, Aristides increased his popularity at home. The opposition to his power, arising from the splendid

²⁴ Plutarch. in Themistocle et Aristide.

²⁵ Plutarch. *ibid.* Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix.

eloquence and popular manners of his rival, was now fortunately removed, and he became the chief leader of the people. His opinion gave law to the courts of justice, or rather, such was the effect of his equity and discernment, he alone became sovereign umpire in Athens. In all important differences he was chosen arbitrator, and the ordinary judges were deprived of the dignity and advantages formerly resulting from their office. This consequence of his authority, offending the pride of the Athenian magistrates, was sufficient to excite their resentment, which, of itself, might have effected the ruin of any individual.

But their views on this occasion were powerfully promoted by the triumphant return of Themistocles from his naval expedition. The admiral had acquired considerable riches; but wealth he despised, except as an instrument of ambition. The spoils of the conquered islanders were profusely lavished in shows, festivals, dances, and theatrical entertainments, exhibited for the public amusement. His generous manners and flowing affability were contrasted with the stern dignity of his rival; and the result of the comparison added great force to his insinuation, that, since his own necessary absence in the service of the republic, Aristides had acquired a degree of influence inconsistent with the constitution, and, by arrogating to himself an universal and unexampled jurisdiction in the state, had established a silent tyranny, without pomp or guards, over the minds of his fellow-citizens. Aristides, trusting to the innocence and integrity

IX.

Aristides
banished.
Olymp.
lxxiii. 3.
A. C. 486.

C H A P. IX. of his own heart, disdained to employ any unworthy means, either for gaining the favor, or for averting the resentment, of the multitude. The contest, therefore, ended in his banishment for ten years, by a law entitled the Ostracism (from the name of the materials²⁶ on which the votes were marked), by which the majority of the Athenian assembly might expel any citizen, however inoffensive or meritorious had been his past conduct, who, by his present power and greatness, seemed capable of disturbing the equality of republican government. This singular institution, which had been established soon after the Athenians had delivered themselves from the tyranny of Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was evidently intended to prevent any person in future from attaining the same unlawful authority. At Athens, even virtue was proscribed, when it seemed to endanger the public freedom; and only four years after the battle of Marathon, in which he had displayed equal valor and wisdom, Aristides, the justest and most respectable of the Greeks, became the victim of popular jealousy²⁷; an example of cruel rigor, which will for ever brand the spirit of democratical policy.

The great
ascendant
acquired
by Them-
istocles;

The banishment of Aristides exposed the Athenians still more than formerly to the danger which they hoped to avoid by this severe measure. The removal of such a formidable opponent enabled Themistocles to govern without control. Army,

²⁶ Οστρακον, a shell.

²⁷ Plutarch. et Herodot. ibid.

navy, and revenue, all were submitted to his inspection. It happened, indeed, most fortunately for the fame of this great man, as well as for the liberty of Athens, that his active ambition was called to the glorious task of subduing the enemies of his country. The smaller islands in the Ægean were already reduced to obedience, but the possession of them was uncertain while the fleet of Ægina covered the sea, and bid defiance to that of the Athenians. This small island, or rather this rock, inhabited time immemorial by merchants and pirates, and situate in the Saronic Gulph, which divides the territories of Attica from the northern shores of Peloponnesus, was a formidable enemy to the republic; the jealousy of commerce and naval power embittered their mutual hostility; and as the inhabitants of Ægina, who were governed by a few leading men, had entered into an alliance with the Persians, there was every circumstance united which could provoke, to the utmost, the hatred and resentment of the Athenians.

A motive less powerful than the excess of republican antipathy could not probably have prevailed on them to embrace the measure which they now adopted by the advice of Themistocles. There was a considerable revenue arising from the silver-mines of Mount Laurium, which had been hitherto employed in relieving the private wants of the citizens, or dissipated in their public amusements. This annual income Themistocles persuaded them to destine to the useful purpose of building ships of war, by which they might seize or destroy the fleet

who persuaded the Athenians to augment their navy.

C H A P.

IX.

They de-
feat the
fleets of
Ægina
and Cor-
cyra.

of Ægina. The proposal was approved; an hundred gallies were equipped; the naval strength of Ægina was broken, and success animated the Athenians to aspire at obtaining the unrivalled empire of the sea. Corcyra formed the only remaining obstacle to their ambition. This island which, under the name of Phœacia, is celebrated by Homer for its amazing riches and fertility, had been still further improved by a colony of Corinthians. It extends an hundred miles along the western shores of Epirus; and the natural abundance of its productions, the convenience of its harbours, and the adventurous spirit of its new inhabitants, gave them an undisputed advantage over their neighbours, in navigation and commerce. They became successively the rivals, the enemies, and the superiors of Corinth, their mother-country; and their successful cruisers infested the coasts, and disturbed the communication of the islands and continent of Greece. It belonged to Athens, who had so lately punished the perfidy of Ægina, to chastise the insolence of the Corcyreans. The naval depredations of these islanders made them be regarded as common enemies; and Themistocles²⁸, when, by seizing part of their fleet, he broke the sinews of their power, not only gratified the ambition of his republic, but performed a signal service to the whole Grecian confederacy.

Strength
and spirit
of Athens.

Victorious by sea and land against Greeks and Barbarians, Athens might now seem entitled to

²⁸ Plutarch. in Themist. Thucyd. lib. i. Corn. Nepos, in Themist.

enjoy

enjoy the fruits of a glorious security. It was generally believed in Greece, that the late disaster of the Persians would deter them from invading, a second time, the coasts of Europe. But Themistocles, who, in the words of a most accomplished historian ²⁹, was no less sagacious in foreseeing the future, than skilful in managing the present, regarded the battle of Marathon, not as the end of the war, but as the prelude to new and more glorious combats. He continually exhorted his fellow-citizens to keep themselves in readiness for action; above all, to increase, with unremitting assiduity, the strength of their fleet; and, in consequence of this judicious advice, the Athenians were enabled to oppose the immense armaments of Xerxes, of which the most formidable tidings soon arrived from every quarter, with two hundred gallies, of a superior size and construction to any hitherto known in Greece ³⁰.

IX.

This fleet proved the safety of Greece, and prevented a country, from which the knowledge of laws, learning, and civility was destined to flow over Europe, from becoming a province of the Persian empire, and being confounded with the mass of barbarous nations. While the Athenians were led, by the circumstances which we have endeavoured to explain, to prepare this useful engine of defence, the other Grecian states afford, in their unimportant transactions, few materials for history ³¹. The Spartans had long preserved an

State of the other republics immediately preceding the invasion of Xerxes

²⁹ Thucydides, *ibid.*

³⁰ Plato, *de Leg.* l. iii.

³¹ Herodot. l. vii. Diodor. l. xi.

C H A P. unrivalled ascendant in Peloponnesus; and their
IX. pre-eminence was still farther confirmed by the unequal and unfortunate opposition of the Argives. Many bloody and desperate engagements had been fought between these warlike and high-spirited rivals: but, before the Persian invasion, the strength of Argos was much exhausted by repeated defeats, particularly by the destructive battle of Thyraea, in which she lost six thousand of her bravest citizens. The Spartans also carried on occasional hostilities against the Corinthians and Achæans, the inhabitants of Elis and Arcadia; and these several republics frequently decided their pretensions in the field; but neither their contests with each other, nor their wars with Sparta, were attended with any considerable or permanent effects. Their perpetual hostilities with foreign states ought to have given internal quiet to the Spartans; yet the jealousy of power, or the opposition of character, occasioned incurable dissension between the two first magistrates of the republic, Cleomenes and Demeratus. By the intrigues of the former, his rival was unjustly deposed from the royal dignity. Leotychides, his kinsman and successor in the throne, insulted his misfortunes; and Demaratus, unable to endure contempt in a country where he had enjoyed a crown, sought for that protection which was denied him in Greece, from the power and resentment of Persia. Cleomenes soon afterwards died by his own hand, after vainly struggling against the stings of remorse, which persecuted his ungenerous treatment of a worthy

colleague ³². He was succeeded by the heroic Leonidas, whose death (as shall be related) at Thermopylæ, was still more illustrious and happy than that of Cleomenes was wretched and infamous. During the domestic disturbances of Sparta, the other states of Peloponnesus enjoyed a relaxation from the toils of war. The Arcadians and Argives tended their flocks, and cultivated their soil. Elis was contented with the superintendence of the Olympic games. The Corinthians increased, and abused the wealth which they had already acquired by their fortunate situation between two seas, and by long continuing the centre of the internal commerce of Greece. Of the republics beyond the isthmus, the Phocians wished to enjoy, in tranquillity, the splendor and riches which their whole territory derived from the celebrated temple of Delphi. They were frequently disturbed, however, by invasions from Thessaly; the inhabitants of which, though numerous and warlike, yet being situated at the extremity of Greece, still continued, like the Etolians, barbarous and uncultivated ³³. The Thebans maintained and extended their usurpations over the smaller cities of Bœotia, and rejoiced that the ambition of the Athenians, directed to the command of the sea and the conquest of distant islands, prevented that aspiring people from giving the same minute attention as usual to the affairs of the continent. The other republics were inconsiderable, and commonly followed the fortunes

C H A P.
IX.

Of the colonies.

³² Herodot. 7. 76.³³ Thucyd. 1. i.

C H A P.

IX.

of their more powerful neighbours. The Asiatic colonies were reduced under the Persian yoke; the Greek establishments in Thrace and Macedon paid tribute to Xerxes; but the African Greeks bravely maintained their independence; and the flourishing settlements in Italy and Sicily were now acting a part which will be explained hereafter, and which rivalled, perhaps surpassed, the glory of Athens and Sparta in the Persian war³⁴.

The preparations of Xerxes for invading Greece. Olymp. lxxiv. 4. A. C. 481.

Meanwhile the reduction of revolted provinces had given employment and lustre to the Persian arms. Nine years after the battle of Marathon, and in the fourth year of his reign, Xerxes found himself uncontrolled master of the East, and in possession of such a fleet and army as flattered him with the hopes of universal empire. The three last years of Darius were spent in preparing for the Grecian expedition. Xerxes, who succeeded to his sceptre and to his revenge, dedicated four years more to the same hostile purpose. Amidst his various wars and pleasures, he took care that the artificers of Egypt and Phœnicia, as well as of all the maritime provinces of Lower Asia, should labor, with unremitting diligence, in fitting out an armament adequate to the extent of his ambition. Twelve hundred ships of war, and three thousand ships of burthen, were at length ready to receive his commands. The former were of a larger size and firmer construction than any

³⁴ Diodor. l. xi. c. xvi. et xvii.

hitherto seen in the ancient world: they carried on board, at a medium, two hundred seamen, and thirty Persians who served as marines. The ships of burthen contained, in general, eighty men, fewer being found incapable of rowing them. The whole amounted to four thousand two hundred ships, and about five hundred thousand men, who were ordered to rendez-vous in the most secure roads and harbours of Ionia. We are not exactly informed of the number of the land-forces, which were assembled at Susa. It is certain, however, that they were extremely numerous, and it is probable that they would continually increase on the march from Susa to Sardis, by the confluence of many tributary nations, to the imperial standard of Xerxes.

C H A P.
IX.

When the army had attained its perfect complement, we are told that it consisted of seventeen hundred thousand infantry, and four hundred thousand cavalry; which, joined to the fleet above-mentioned, made the whole forces amount to near two millions of fighting men. An immense crowd of women and eunuchs followed the camp of an effeminate people. These instruments of pleasure and luxury, together with the slaves necessary in transporting the baggage and provisions, equalled, perhaps exceeded³⁵, the number of the soldiers; so

Their
magni-
tude.

³⁵ A military friend has favored me with the actual return of an army serving under British officers in the East:

Officers and troops,	-	6,727
Servants and followers,	-	19,779

C H A P. IX. that according to the universal testimony of ancient historians, the army of Xerxes appears the greatest that was ever collected ³⁶.

But many circumstances serve to prove that its strength by no means corresponded to its magnitude. The various nations which composed it, were not divided into regular bodies, properly disciplined and officered. Their muster-roll was taken in a manner that is remarkable for its simplicity. Ten thousand men were separated from the rest, formed into a compact body, and surrounded by a palisade. The whole army passed successively into this enclosure, and were thus numbered, like cattle, without the formality of placing them in ranks, or of calling their names.

Xerxes
passes the
Helle-
spont.
Olymp.
lxxv. 1.
A. C. 480.

Xerxes having wintered at Sardis, sent ambassadors early in the spring to demand earth and water, as a mark of submission, from the several Grecian republics. With regard to Athens and Sparta, he thought it unnecessary to observe this ceremony, as they had treated, with the most inhuman cruelty, and in direct contradiction to their own laws of war, the messengers intrusted with a similar commission by his father Darius. The

³⁶ Herodot. l. vii. c. lxxxix. et seq. enters into a circumstantial detail of the Persian forces. His account is confirmed, with less difference than usual in such cases, by Lysias Orat. Funeb. Isocrat. Panegyri. Diodor. l. xi. p. 244. He repeatedly expresses his astonishment at the immensity of the Barbarian hosts. He appears fully sensible of the difficulties with which they had to struggle, in order to procure provisions. His account of the Grecian fleet and army is acknowledged to be faithful and exact in the highest degree; circumstances which all strongly confirm the credibility of his evidence.

slow march of his immense army, and, still more, its tedious transportation across the seas which separate Europe from Asia, ill suited the rapid violence of his revenge. Xerxes therefore ordered a bridge of boats to be raised on the Hellespont, which, in the narrowest part, is only seven stadia or seven eighths of a mile in breadth. Here the bridge was formed with great labor; but whether owing to the awkwardness of its construction, or to the violence of a succeeding tempest, it was no sooner built than destroyed. The great king ordered the directors of the work to be beheaded; and, proud of his tyrannic power over feeble man, displayed an impotent rage against the elements. In all the madness of despotism he commanded the Hellespont to be punished with three hundred stripes, and a pair of fetters to be dropped into the sea, adding these frantic and ridiculous expressions: "It is thus, thou salt and bitter water, that thy master punishes thy unprovoked injury, and he is determined to pass thy treacherous streams notwithstanding all the insolence of thy malice³⁷." After this absurd ceremony, a new bridge was made of a double range of vessels, fixed by strong anchors on both sides, and joined together by cables of hemp and reed, fastened to immense beams driven into the opposite shores. The decks of the vessels, which exceeded six hundred in number, were strewed with trunks of trees and earth, and their surface was still further smoothed by a

³⁷ Herodot. vii. 35.

C H A P.
IX.

covering of planks. The sides were then railed with wicker work, to prevent the fear and impatience of the horses; and upon this singular edifice the main strength of the army passed in seven days and nights, from the Asiatic city of Abydos to that of Sestus in Europe³⁸.

Cuts a
canal
through
the isthmus
of Sana.

But before this general transportation, a considerable part of the forces had been already sent to the coast of Macedonia, in order to dig across the isthmus which joins to that coast the high promontory of Athos. The disaster which befel the fleet commanded by Mardonius, in doubling the cape of this celebrated peninsula, was still present to the mind of Xerxes. The neck of land, only a mile and a half in breadth, was adorned by the Grecian city of Sana; and the promontory being rich and fertile, was well inhabited by both Greeks and Barbarians. The cutting of this narrow isthmus, by a canal of sufficient width to allow two galleys to sail abreast, was a matter not beyond the power of a potentate who commanded the labor of so many myriads³⁹; but it is observed by

³⁸ Herodot. l. vii. c. lvi.

³⁹ Herodot. l. vii. c. xxi. et seq. et Diodor. l. xi. c. ii. It is difficult to say, whether we ought most to condemn the swelling exaggeration with which Lyfias, Isocrates, and other writers, speak of these operations of Xerxes, which they call, "navigating the land, and walking the sea," or the impudent incredulity of Juvenal:

— creditur olim

Velificatus Athos, et quidquid Græcia mendax

Audet in historiâ; constratum classibus iisdem

Suppositumque rotis solidum mare. —

Nothing is better fitted to perpetuate error than the smart sentence of a satirist. A line of the same Juvenal has branded Cicero as a bad

Herodotus, to have been a work of more ostentation than utility, as the vessels might, according to the custom of the age, have been conveyed over land with greater expedition, and with less trouble and expense. The eastern workmen were in general so extremely unacquainted with operations of this kind, that they made the opening at the surface of the ground of the same breadth with that necessary at the bottom of the channel. In order to excite their diligence by national emulation, a particular portion of the ground was assigned to each distinction of people engaged in this undertaking. The Phœnicians alone, by giving a proper width at the top, avoided the inconvenience of submitting to a double labor. In performing this, and every other task, the soldiers of Xerxes were kept to their work by stripes and blows; a circumstance which gives us as mean an opinion of their spirit and activity, as all that has been already related, gives us of their skill and discipline.

The Persian forces were now safely conducted into Europe; and the chief obstacle to the easy navigation of their fleet along the coasts of Thrace, Macedon, and Thessaly, to the centre of the Grecian

Xerxes re-
views his
forces near
Doriscus.

poet, though that universal literary genius left admirable verses behind him, which have been transmitted to modern times. The digging of the canal of Athos is supported by the uniform testimony of all antiquity, and might be credited on the single evidence of Thucydides (l. iv. c. cix.), the most faithful, accurate, and impartial of all historians, ancient or modern; and who himself lived long in the neighbourhood of Athos, where he had an estate, and was director of the Athenian mines in Thrace; as will appear hereafter.

C H A P. IX. states, was removed by the dividing of mount Athos. Through the fertile plains of Lesser Asia the whole army had kept in a body; but the difficulty of supplies obliged them to separate into three divisions in their march through the less cultivated countries of Europe. Before this separation took place, the whole fleet and army were reviewed by Xerxes, near Doriscus, a city of Thrace, at the mouth of the river Hebrus. Such an immense collection of men assembled in arms, and attended with every circumstance of martial magnificence, gave an opportunity for seeing, or at least for supposing, many affecting scenes. The ambition of the great king had torn him from his palace of Susa, but it could not tear him from the objects of his affection, and the ministers of his pleasure. He was followed by his women, and by his flatterers⁴⁰, and all the effeminate pride of a court was blended with the pomp of war. While the great body of the army lay every night in the open air, Xerxes and his attendants were provided with magnificent tents. The splendor of his chariots, the mettle of his horses, which far excelled the swiftest racers of Thessaly, the unexampled number of his troops, and above all, the bravery of the immortal band, a body of ten thousand Persian cavalry, so named because their number was constantly maintained from the flower of the whole army, seemed sufficient, to the admiring crowd, to raise the glory of their sovereign above

His splendor,

⁴⁰ Plato de Legibus, l. iii. p. 536.

the condition of humanity ; especially since , among
 so many thousands of men as passed in review , none
 could be compared to Xerxes in strength , in beauty,
 or in stature ⁴¹.

C H A P.
 IX.

But amidst this splendor of external greatness,
 Xerxes felt himself unhappy. Having ascended
 an eminence to view his camp and fleet, his pride
 was humbled with the reflection, that no one of
 all the innumerable host could survive an hundred
 years. The haughty monarch of Asia was melted
 into tears. The conversation of his kinsman and
 counsellor, Artabanus, was ill calculated to con-
 sole his melancholy. That respectable old man,
 whose wisdom had often moderated the youthful
 ardor of Xerxes, and who had been as assiduous
 to prevent, as Mardonius had been to promote,
 the Grecian war, took notice that the misery of
 human life was an object far more lamentable
 than its shortness. " In the narrow space allotted
 them, has not every one of these in our presence,
 and indeed the whole human race, often wished
 rather to die than to live? The tumult of
 passions disturbs the best of our days; diseases
 and weakness accompany old age; and death, so
 vainly dreaded, is the sure and hospitable refuge
 of wretched mortals. "

and mi-
 fery.

Xerxes was not of a disposition steadily to con-
 template the dictates of experience and the
 maxims of philosophy. He endeavoured to divert
 those gloomy reflections which he could not

He con-
 verses with
 Demara-
 tus, the
 banished
 king of
 Sparta.

⁴¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxxiv.

C H A P. remove, by amusing his fancy with horse-races,
IX. mock-battles, and other favorite entertainments. In the intervals of these diversions, he sometimes conversed with Demaratus, the banished king of Sparta, who, as we have already mentioned, had sought refuge in the Persian court, from the persecution of his countrymen. A memorable interview between them is described by Herodotus. The Persian, displaying ostentatiously the magnitude of his power, asked the royal fugitive, Whether he suspected the Greeks would yet venture to take the field, in order to oppose the progress of his arms? Demaratus replied, that if he might speak without giving offence, he was of opinion that the Persians would meet with a very vigorous resistance. "Greece had been trained in the severe, but useful school of necessity; poverty was her nurse and her mother; she had acquired patience and valor by the early application of discipline; and she was habituated to the practice of virtue by the watchful attention of the law. All the Greeks were warlike, but the Spartans were peculiarly brave. It was unnecessary to ask their number, for if they exceeded not a thousand men, they would defend their country and their freedom against the assembled myriads of Asia⁴²."

Receives
the sub-
mission of
many Gre-
cian com-
munities.

Xerxes was rather amused than instructed by this discourse. His hopes of success seemed built on too solid principles to be shaken by the opinion of a prejudiced Greek. Every day messengers

⁴² Herodot. l. vii. c. cii. et seq.

arrived with the submission of new nations, The inhabitants of the rocky country of Doris, many tribes of Thessaly, the mountaineers of Pindus, Ossa, Pelion, and Olympus, which like a lofty rampart surround that country, offered the usual present of earth and water, as the symbol of surrendering their territories to a power which it seemed vain to resist. These districts formed only the northern frontier of Greece. But what gave peculiar pleasure to Xerxes, the Thebans who inhabited the central parts, and all the cities of Bœotia, except Thespiæ and Plataea, privately sent ambassadors to testify their good-will to his cause, and to request the honor of his friendship.

Meanwhile those Grecians, who, unmoved by the terrors of invasion, obeyed the voice of liberty and their country, had sent deputies to the isthmus of Corinth, to deliberate about the common interest. They consisted of representatives from the several states of Peloponnesus, and from the most considerable republics beyond that peninsula. By common consent, they suspended their domestic animosities, recalled their fugitives, consulted their oracles, and dispatched ambassadors, in the name of united Greece, to demand assistance from the islands of Crete, Cyprus, and Corcyra, as well as from the Grecian colonies on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. All their measures were carried on with great appearance of unanimity and concord. Even the Thebans, careful to conceal their treachery, had sent representatives to the common council. The general danger seemed to unite and

Measures
of the
Athenians
and their
confederates.

46 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. IX. harmonize the most discordant members : and although the perpetual dissensions between rival states, frequently weakened the authority of the Amphictyonic confederacy, it appeared on the present, as on many other occasions, that the Greeks acknowledged the obligation of a tacit alliance to defend each other against domestic tyrants and foreign barbarians.

The Thessalians
crave their
assistance.

The valley
of Tempé,

Before they had an opportunity of learning the will of the gods, or of discovering the intentions of their distant allies, ambassadors arrived from those communities of Thessaly which still adhered to the interest of Greece, praying a speedy and effectual assistance to guard the narrow passes which lead into their country. There is a valley near the coast of the Egean, between the lofty mountains of Ossa and Olympus, which afforded the most convenient passage from Macedon into Thessaly. This singular spot, commonly called the valley of Tempé, is about five miles in length, and, where narrowest, scarcely an hundred paces in breadth; but is adorned by the hand of nature with every object that can gratify the senses or delight the fancy. The gently-flowing Peneus ⁴³ intersects the middle of the plain. Its waters are increased

⁴³ I know not why Ovid says,

Peneus ab imo

Effusus Pindo *spumosis* volvitur undis

Metam. l. i. ver. 570.

Ælian (from whom the description in the text is taken) says, that the Peneus flows

Διηνυ σαλμα, smooth as oil.

by perennial cascades from the green mountains, and thus rendered of sufficient depth for vessels of considerable burden. The rocks are every where planted with vines and olives, and the banks of the river, and even the river itself, are overshadowed with lofty forest-trees, which defend those who sail upon it from the sun's meridian ardor. The innumerable grottoes and arbors carelessly scattered over this delightful scene, and watered by fountains of peculiar freshness and salubrity, invite the weary traveller to repose; while the musical warbling of birds conspires with the fragrant odor of plants to sooth his senses, and to heighten the pleasure which the eye and fancy derive from viewing the charming variety of this enchanting landscape; from examining the happy intermixture of hill and dale, wood and water; and from contemplating the diversified beauty and majestic grandeur of Nature under her most blooming and beneficent aspects.

This delicious valley, which an ancient writer, by a bold figure of speech, calls "a festival for the eyes," and which the bounty of the gods had formed for happy scenes of love, innocence, and tranquillity, the destructive ambition of man was ready to convert into a field of bloodshed and horror. It was natural for the Thessalians to expect that the troops of Xerxes would pass by this inlet into their territories; and hither their ambassadors entreated the allied Greeks to send an army. The proposal seemed just and useful; ships were prepared at the Isthmus; and a body of ten thousand

is occupied
by the
Greeks;

C H A P.
IX.

men were embarked under the command of Themistocles, with orders to sail through the narrow Euripus, to land in the harbours of Tempé, and to remain there in order to guard that important pass.

but soon
abandoned.

They had not continued in those parts many days, when a messenger arrived from Alexander, son of Amyntas, tributary prince of Macedonia, advising them to depart from that post, unless they meant to be trodden under foot by the Persian cavalry. It is not probable, however, that this menace could have changed their resolution. But they had already learned that there was another passage into Thessaly, through the territory of the Peræbians, near the city Gonnus in Upper Macedonia. Their army was insufficient to guard both; and the defending of one only, could not be of essential advantage to themselves, to the Thessalians, or to the common cause.

The dangers which threaten Greece become more imminent and alarming.

Meantime, the dangers which thickened over their respective republics, rendered it necessary to return southward. Their distant colonies, particularly those of Sicily, which were the most numerous and powerful, could not afford them any assistance, being themselves threatened with a formidable invasion from the Carthaginians, the cause and consequences of which we shall have occasion fully to explain. The oracles were doubtful, or terrifying. To the Spartans they announced, as the only means of safety, the voluntary death of a king of the race of Hercules. The Athenians were commanded to seek refuge within their wooden walls.

The

The responses given to the other states are not particularly recorded ; but it appears in general, that all were dark , ambiguous, or frightful. The Grecian army returned therefore to their ships, repassed the Euripus, and arrived in safety at Corinth ; while the Thessalians, thus abandoned by their allies, reluctantly submitted to the common enemy.

The terror inspired by the critical situation of affairs, rendered the presence of the leaders necessary in their respective communities. Themistocles found the Athenians divided about the meaning of the oracle, the greater part asserting, that by wooden walls was understood the enclosure of the citadel, which had been formerly surrounded by a palisade. Others gave the words a different construction, and each according to his fears or his interest ; but Themistocles asserted that all of them had mistaken the advice of the god, who desired them to trust for safety to their fleet. This opinion, supported by all the force of his eloquence, and the weight of his authority, at length prevailed in the assembly, although Epicides, a demagogue of great influence among the lower ranks of people, opposed it with the utmost vehemence ; and seizing this opportunity to traduce the character of Themistocles, insisted that he himself should be appointed general in his room. But the prudent Athenian knew the weakness of his adversary ; his great passion was avarice ; and a seasonable bribe immediately silenced his clamorous opposition. The Athenian galleys were fitted out with

IX.

The Grecian fleet sails to Artemisium.

CHAP.
IX.

all convenient speed, and being joined with those of Eubœa, Ægina, Corinth, and the maritime allies of Peloponnesus, amounted to a fleet of three hundred sail. They proceeded to the narrow sea which divides the northern shore of Eubœa from the coast of Thessaly, rendezvoused at the promontory of Artemisium, and patiently expected the arrival of the Barbarians.

The
Greeks
assemble
an army.

Besides the force necessary for manning this fleet, the confederates could raise an army of about sixty thousand freemen, besides a still greater proportion of armed slaves. As the passes leading from Thessaly to the territories of Phocis and Locris were still narrower and more difficult of access than those from Macedon into Thessaly, it seems extraordinary that they did not immediately direct their whole military strength towards that quarter: but this neglect may be explained by their superstitious veneration for oracles, the necessity of celebrating their accustomed festivals, and the dangerous delays and inactivity inherent in the nature of a republican confederacy. As they were acquainted with only one pass, by which the Persians could arrive from Thessaly, they thought that a body of eight thousand pike-men might be equally capable with a larger proportion of troops, to defend it against every invader. This narrow defile was called the Straits of Thermopylæ, in allusion to the warm springs in that neighbourhood, and was deemed the gate or entrance into Greece. It was bounded on the west by high and inaccessible precipices, which join the lofty ridge of mount

Guard the
Straits of
Thermo-
pylæ.

Oeta ; and on the east terminated by an impracticable morass , bordered by the sea. Near the plain of the Thessalian city Trachis , the passage was fifty feet broad ; but at Alpené , there was not room for one chariot to pass another. Even these passes were defended by walls , formerly built by the Phocians to protect them against the incursions of their enemies in Thessaly , and strengthened , on this occasion , with as much care as time would allow. The troops sent to Thermopylæ , which was only fifteen miles distant from the station of the Grecian fleet at Artemisium , consisted chiefly of Peloponnesians , commanded by Leonidas the Spartan king , who was prepared , in obedience to the oracle , to devote his life for the safety of his country.

Before the Grecian confederates adopted these vigorous measures for their own defence , the Persian army had marched , in three divisions , from Thracian Doriscus. They were accompanied by the fleet , which , coasting about two hundred miles along the shores of Thrace , Macedon , and Thessaly , at length reached Cape Sepias , which is twenty miles north of Artemisium. As they advanced southward , they laid under contribution Abdera **, Thasus , and Eion , the principal Grecian

** The places on the road prepared not only vast magazines of corn and other provisions for the troops , but sumptuous entertainments for Xerxes and his attendants. A saying of Megacreon of Abdera expressed the devouring rapacity of the invaders : " That the Abderites ought to thank the gods , that Xerxes feasted but once a day ; it would ruin Abdera to furnish him with both a dinner and a supper. "

C H A P.
IX.

The Per-
sian fleet
arrive near
Cape Se-
pias.

C H A P. colonies in Thrace, as well as the cities of
 IX. Torona, Olynthus, Potidæa, and other places of
 smaller note on the coast of Macedonia. The
 whole fleet anchored, after performing the most
 tedious and dangerous part of the voyage, near
 the entrance of the rivers Axius and Lydius, which
 flow into the Thermaic gulph; and, after quitting
 these harbours, spent eleven days in sailing eighty
 miles, along a smooth unbroken coast, from the
 northern extremity of this gulph to the general
 rendezvous near Cape Sepias.

Their
 army
 marches to
 the plains
 of Tra-
 chis.

The fleet was commanded by Achæmines and Are-
 abignes, sons of Darius. Xerxes, in person, headed
 his army, which made a considerable halt during the
 march at the Macedonian towns of Therma and Pel-
 la, and encamped in the Thracian plains on each side
 of the above-mentioned rivers Axius and Lydius.
 From hence they proceeded in three bodies; the
 division nearest the shore was commanded by Mar-
 donius and Masistes. Sergis, an experienced ge-
 neral, conducted the march through the higher
 parts of the country; and the great king, accom-
 panied by Smerdones and Megabyzus, who occa-
 sionally relieved him from the trouble of command,
 chose the middle passage as the safest, the most
 convenient, and the most entertaining; for hitherto
 the Persian expedition was rather a journey of
 pleasure, than an undertaking of fatigue or danger.
 Xerxes examined at leisure such objects of nature
 or art as appeared most interesting and curious.
 His fancy was amused, as he passed the various
 scenes of superstition, with the legendary tales

carefully related by his conductors. He viewed, with pleasure, the wide plains of Thessaly, which bore indubitable marks of being once an extensive lake; and contemplated, with wonder, the lofty mountains which separated that country from the rest of Greece, and which evidently appear to be rent asunder, and to have received their present form, from the terrible operation of volcanoes and earthquakes. After fully satisfying his curiosity, he joined, with the division more immediately under his command, the remainder of the army, assembled and encamped on the wide plains of Trachis, about forty miles in circumference, stretching along the shore of Thessaly, opposite to the station of the Persian fleet, and adjacent to the Straits of Thermopylæ⁴⁵.

C H A P.
IX.

For more than twelve months, Xerxes had never seen the face of an enemy. He had traversed, without resistance, the wide regions of Asia, and the countries which in ancient times were deemed most warlike in Europe. All the territories beyond Trachis acknowledged his power; and the districts of Greece, which still presented a scene of action to his invincible arms, were less extensive than the meanest of his provinces. Yet it is probable that he heard, not without emotion, that an army of Greeks, headed by the Spartan king, had taken post at Thermopylæ, in order to dispute his passage. What he had been told by Demaratus concerning the character and principles of that

Circum-
stances
that ren-
dered the
Spartans
respectable
to Xerxes.

⁴⁵ Herodot. Diodor. Plutarch. *ibid.*

C H A P. IX. heroic people, he might now, when the danger drew near, be the more inclined to believe, from the suggestions of his own memory and experience. In the warmth of generous indignation, the Spartans, as we have already observed, had put to death the Persian heralds, sent to demand their submission; but upon cool reflection, they were prompted, chiefly indeed by superstitious motives, to make atonement for a violation of the sacred law of nations. When proclamation was made in the assembly, "Who would die for Sparta?" two citizens, of great rank and eminence, offered themselves as willing sacrifices for the good of the community. Sperthies and Bulis (for these were their names) set out for Susa on this singular errand. As they passed through Lesser Asia, they were entertained by Hydarnes, the governor of that province, who actually accompanied Xerxes, as commander of the Immortal Band, to which dignity he had been raised on account of his superior merit. Hydarnes, among other discourse with the Spartans, testified his surprise, that their republic should be so averse to the friendship of the king his master, who, he observed, as they might learn by his own example, well understood the value of brave men. That if they complied with the desires of Xerxes, he would appoint them governors over the other cities of Greece. The Spartans coolly replied, "That he talked of a matter of which he was not a competent judge. With the condition and rewards of servitude he was indeed sufficiently acquainted; but as to the enjoyments

of liberty, he had never proved how sweet they were; for if he had once made that experiment, he would advise them to defend their freedom not only with lances, but with hatchets⁴⁶. ”

The same magnanimity distinguished their behaviour at Susa. The guards told them, that, when admitted into the presence of Xerxes, they must observe the usual ceremony of prostrating themselves on the ground. But the Spartans declared, “That no degree of violence could make them submit to such mean adulation: That they were not accustomed to adore a man, and came not thither for such an impious purpose.” They approached Xerxes, therefore, in an erect posture, and told him with firmness, they were sent to submit to any punishment which he might think proper to inflict on them, as an atonement for the death of his heralds. Xerxes admiring their virtue, replied, “That he certainly should not repeat the error of the Greeks, nor, by sacrificing individuals, deliver the state from the guilt of murder and impiety.” The Spartans having received this answer, returned home, persuaded that they had done their duty in offering private satisfaction; which, though not accepted, ought sufficiently to atone for the public crime⁴⁷.

The example of these distinguished patriots probably gave Xerxes a very favorable idea of the general character of their community. As he had not any particular quarrel with the Spartans, whose

C H A P.
IX.

He sends
messengers
to treat
with them.

⁴⁶ Herodot. l. vii. c. cxxxv.

⁴⁷ Idem, l. vii. c. cxxxiv. et seq.

CHAP. IX. opposition, though it could not prevent, would certainly retard, his intended punishment of Athens, he sent messengers to desire them to lay down their arms; to which they replied, "Let him come, and take them." The messengers then offered them lands, on condition of their becoming allies to the great king; but they answered, "That it was the custom of their republic to conquer lands by valor, not to acquire them by treachery." Except making these smart replies, they took not the smallest notice of the Persians; but continued to employ themselves as before their arrival, contending in the gymnastic exercises, entertaining themselves with music and conversation, or adjusting their long hair to appear more terrible to their enemies. The messengers of Xerxes, equally astonished at what they saw and heard, returned to the Persian camp, and described the unexpected event of their commission, as well as the extraordinary behaviour of the Spartans; of which Xerxes desired an explanation from their countryman Demaratus⁴⁸. The latter declared in general, that their whole carriage and demeanour announced a determined resolution to fight to the last extremity; but he found it difficult to make the Persian conceive the motives of men, who fought, at the certain price of their own lives, to purchase immortal renown for their country. — That a few individuals should be animated, on some extraordinary occasions, with this patriotic magnanimity, may easily be understood. Of this,

Magnanimity of the Spartans.

⁴⁸ Herodot. l. vii. c. ccix. et seq.

history in all ages furnishes illustrious examples; but that a whole nation should be habitually impressed with the same generosity of character, cannot readily be believed, without reflecting on the institutions and manners of the Spartans. The laws of that celebrated people prohibiting, as it has been already observed ⁴⁹, the introduction of wealth and luxury, and rigidly confining each individual to the rank in which he was born, had extinguished the great motives of private ambition, and left scarcely any other scope to the active principles of men, but the glory of promoting the interests of their republic. Their extraordinary military success, the natural fruit of their temperance and activity, had given them a permanent sense of their superiority in war, which it became their chief point of honor to maintain and to confirm; and as the law which commanded them to die, rather than break their ranks, or abandon their posts in battle, was, like all the ordinances of Lycurgus, conceived to be of divine authority, the influence of superstition happily conspired with the ardor of patriotism and the enthusiasm of valor, in preparing them to meet certain death in the service of the public.

Xerxes could not be made to enter into these motives, or to believe, as Herodotus observes with inimitable simplicity, "that the Grecians were come to Thermopylæ only as men desirous to die, and to destroy as many of their enemies as they could, though nothing was more true." He

C H A P.
IX.

Xerxes
waits four
days, in
hopes of
changing
their reso-
lution.

⁴⁹ See vol. i. p. 133.

C H A P. IX. therefore waited four days, continually expecting they would either retreat into their own country, or surrender their arms, agreeably to his message. But as they still continued to guard the passage, he ascribed this conduct to obstinacy or folly; and on the fifth day determined to chastise their insolent opposition.

Gives orders to attack them and their confederates.

The Medes and Cissians, who, next to the Sacæ and Persians, formed the bravest part of his army, were commanded to attack these obstinate Greeks, and to bring them alive into his presence. The Barbarians marched with confidence to the engagement, but were repulsed with great slaughter. The places of those who fell, were incessantly supplied with fresh troops, but they could not make the smallest impression on the firm battalions of the Greeks; and the great loss which they sustained in the attempt, proved to all, and particularly to the king, that he had indeed many men, but few soldiers. The Sacæ, armed with their hatchets, next marched to the attack, but without better success; and last of all, the chosen band of Persians, headed by Hydarnes, deigned to display their valor in what appeared to them a very unequal contest. But they soon changed their opinion when they came to close with the enemy; for, says Herodotus, their numbers were useless, as they fought in a narrow pass, and their short-pointed weapons were ill calculated to contend with the length of the Grecian spear. The Greeks had the advantage still more in the superiority of their discipline, than in the excellence of their armor.

Tired with destroying, they retreated in close order, and when pursued unguardedly by the Barbarians, they faced about on a sudden, and killed an incredible number of the Persians, with scarcely any loss to themselves. Xerxes, who was seated on an eminence to behold the battle, frequently started in wild emotion from his throne; and, fearing lest he should be deprived of the flower of his army, he ordered them to be drawn off from the attack. But as the Grecian numbers were so extremely inconsiderable, and as it seemed probable that the greatest part of them must have suffered much injury in these repeated assaults, he determined next day to renew the engagement. Next day he fought without better success than before; and after vainly endeavouring to force the pass, both in separate bodies, and with the collected vigor of their troops, the Persians were compelled to abandon the enterprise, and disgracefully to retire to their camp.

It was a spectacle which the world had never seen before, and which it was never again to behold, the persevering intrepidity of eight thousand men resisting the impetuous fury of an army composed of millions. The pertinacious valor of Leonidas, and of his little troop, opposed, and might have long retarded, the progress of the Barbarians. But it was the fate of Greece, always to be conquered rather by the treachery of false friends, than by the force of open enemies. When Xerxes knew not what measures to pursue in order to effect his purpose, and felt the inconvenience of

C H A P.
IX.

His troops
are repel-
led.

The
Greeks
betrayed
by Epial-
tes;

60 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. remaining long in the same quarters with such an
 ix. immense number of men, a perfidious Greek, induced by the hopes of reward, offered to remove his difficulties¹⁰. The name of the traitor was Epialtes, and he was a native of the obscure district of Mœlis, which separates the frontiers of Thessaly and Phocis. His experience of the country made him acquainted with a passage through the mountains of Oeta, several miles to the west of that guarded by Leonidas. Over this unfrequented path he undertook to conduct a body of twenty thousand Persians, who might assault the enemy in rear, while the main body attacked them in front. By this means, whatever prodigies of valor the Greeks might perform, they must be finally compelled to surrender, as they would be enclosed on all sides among barren rocks and inhospitable deserts.

who conducts a
 Persian detachment
 over the mountains.

The plan so judiciously concerted, was carried into immediate execution. On the evening of the seventh day after Xerxes arrived at the Straits, twenty thousand chosen men left the Persian camp, commanded by Hydarnes, and conducted by Epialtes. All night they marched through the thick forests of oak which abound in those parts; and by day-break they had advanced near to the top of the hill. But how much were they surprised to see the first rays of the morning reflected by the glittering surfaces of Grecian spears and helmets! Hydarnes was afraid that this guard, which seemed at no

¹⁰ Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxii. et seq.

great distance, had been also composed of Lacedæmonians; but a nearer approach showed that they consisted of a thousand Phocians, whom the foresight of Leonidas had sent to defend this important but unknown pass, which chance or treachery might discover to the Persians. The thick shade of the trees long concealed the enemy from the Greeks; at length the rustling of the leaves, and the tumult occasioned by the motion of twenty thousand men, discovered the imminence of danger; the Phocians with great intrepidity flew to their arms, and prepared, if they should not conquer, at least to die gallantly. The compact firmness of their ranks, which might have resisted the regular onset of the enemy, exposed them to suffer much from the immense shower of darts which the Persians poured upon them. To avoid this danger, they too rashly abandoned the pass which they had been sent to guard, and retired to the highest part of the mountain, not doubting that the enemy, whose strength so much exceeded their own, would follow them thither. But in this they were disappointed; for the Persians prudently omitting the pursuit of this inconsiderable party, whom to defeat they considered as a matter of little moment, immediately seized the passage, and marched down the mountain with the utmost expedition, in order to accomplish the design suggested by Epialtes.

Meanwhile obscure intimations from the gods had darkly announced some dreadful calamity impending on the Greeks at Thermopylæ. The appearance of the entrails, which were carefully

Alarm in
the Gre-
cian camp.

C H A P. IX. inspected by the Augur Magistias, threatened the Spartans with death; but when, or by what means, it did not clearly appear, until a Grecian deserter, a native of the city Cymé in Ionia, named Tyraſtiades, arrived with information of the intended march of the Persians across the mountain. Animated by the love of his country, this generous fugitive had no sooner discovered the treacherous design of Epialtes, than he determined, at the risk of his life, and still more at the risk of being subjected to the most excruciating tortures, to communicate his discovery to the Spartan king¹. Zeal for the safety of Greece gave swiftness to his steps, and he appeared in the Grecian camp a few hours after the Persians, conducted by Epialtes, had left the plains of Trachis. Leonidas immediately called a council of war, to deliberate upon the measures necessary to be taken in consequence of this information, equally important and alarming. All the confederates of Peloponnesus, except the Spartans, declared their opinion, that it was necessary to abandon a post, which, after the double attack announced to them should take place, it would be impossible with any hopes of success to maintain. As their exertions could not be of any avail to the public cause, it was prudent to consult their private safety; and while time was yet allowed them, to retire to the isthmus of Corinth, where joining the rest of the auxiliaries, they might be ready to defend the Grecian peninsula against the

¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxix. et seq.

fury of the Barbarians. It belonged to Leonidas to explain the sentiments of the Spartans. The other inhabitants of Peloponnesus, he observed, might follow the dictates of expedience, and return to the isthmus, in order to defend their respective territories; but glory was the only voice which the Spartans had learned to obey. Placed in the first rank by the general consent of their country, they would rather die than abandon that post of honor; and they were determined, therefore, at the price of their lives, to purchase immortal renown, to confirm the pre-eminence of Sparta, and to give an example of patriotism, worthy of being admired, if it should not be imitated, by posterity,

The dread of unavoidable and immediate death deterred the other allies from concurring with this magnanimous resolution. The Thespians alone, amounting to seven hundred men, declared they would never forsake Leonidas. They were conducted by the aged wisdom of Demophilus, and the youthful valor of Dithyrambus. Their republic was united in the strictest alliance with Sparta, by which they had often been defended against the usurpation and tyranny of the Thebans. These circumstances added force to their natural generosity of sentiment, and determined them, on this occasion, to adhere with steadfast intrepidity to the measures of their Spartan allies. As the Thespians remained at Thermopylæ, from inclination, and from principles of distinguished bravery, the Thebans were detained by the particular desire of Leonidas, who was not unacquainted with the intended treachery

C H A P.

IX.

Magnanimity of Leonidas.

Seven hundred Thespians determine to remain with Leonidas;

who detains the perfidious Thebans.

C H A P.
IX.

of their republic. The four hundred men whom that perfidious community had sent to accompany his expedition, he regarded rather as hostages than auxiliaries; nor was he unwilling to employ their doubtful fidelity in a desperate service. He thought that they might be compelled by force, or stimulated by a sense of shame, to encounter the same dangers to which the Spartans and Thespians voluntarily submitted; and without discovering his suspicion of their treachery, he had a sufficient pretence for retaining them, while he dismissed his allies of Peloponnesus, because the Theban territories, lying on the north-side of the isthmus of Corinth, would necessarily be exposed to hostility and devastation, whenever the Barbarians should pass the straits of Thermopylæ. Besides the Thespians⁵² and Thebans, the troops who remained with Leonidas consisted of three hundred Spartans, all chosen men, and fathers of sons. This valiant band, with unanimous consent, solicited their general to dedicate to the glory of Greece, and their own, the important interval yet allowed them, before they were surrounded by the Persians. The ardor of Leonidas happily conspired with the ready zeal of the soldiers. He therefore

⁵² From the narrative of Herodotus, it would seem that the Thespians alone voluntarily remained with Leonidas and the Spartans. Yet the inscription which he cites makes the whole number who fought at Thermopylæ amount to four thousand.

Μυριασιν ποτε τῇδε τριηκοσίοις ἐμάχοντο

Ἐκ Πελοποννήσου χίλιοι τετάρους.

Isocrates likewise (p. 164.) says, that some Peloponnesians remained to fight.

commanded

commanded them to prepare the last meal of their lives, and to sup like men who should tomorrow dine in Elysium. His own example confirmed the propriety of the command, for he took an abundant repast, in order to furnish strength and spirits for a long continuance of toil and danger.

C H A P.
IX.

It was now the dead of night, when the Spartans, headed by Leonidas, marched in a close battalion towards the Persian camp, with resentment heightened by despair⁵³. Their fury was terrible; and rendered still more destructive through the defect of Barbarian discipline; for the Persians having neither advanced guards, nor a watch-word, nor confidence in each other, were incapable of adopting such measures for defence as the sudden emergency required. Many fell by the Grecian spear, but much greater multitudes by the mistaken rage of their own troops, by whom, in the midst of this blind confusion, they could not be distinguished from enemies. The Greeks, wearied with slaughter, penetrated to the royal pavilion; but there the first alarm of noise had been readily perceived, amidst the profound silence and tranquillity which usually reigned in the tent of Xerxes; the great king had immediately escaped, with his

The
Greeks
surprise
the Persian
camp in
the night.

⁵³ Diodor. l. xi. p. 247. The nocturnal assault, omitted by Herodotus, is mentioned not only by Diodorus, but by Plutarch, Justin, and most other writers. The general panegyric of Plato (in Menex.), of Lyfias (Orat. Funeb.), and of Isocrates (Panegyric), required not their descending into such particulars. Yet, notwithstanding these circumstances, I should have omitted this incident, if it had appeared inconsistent with the honest narrative of Herodotus.

66 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

C H A P. favorite attendants, to the farther extremity of
IX. the encampment. Even there, all was tumult, and horror, and despair; the obscurity of night increasing the terror of the Persians, who no longer doubted that the detachment conducted by Epialtes had been betrayed by that perfidious Greek; and that the enemy, reinforced by new numbers, now co-operated with the traitor, and seized the opportunity of assailing their camp, after it had been deprived of the division of Hydarnes, its principal ornament and defence.

Battle of
 Thermopylæ.

The approach of day discovered to the Persians a dreadful scene of carnage; but it also discovered to them that their fears had multiplied the number of the enemy, who now retreated in close order to the straits of Thermopylæ. Xerxes, stimulated by the fury of revenge, gave orders to pursue them; and his terrified troops were rather driven than led to the attack, by the officers who marched behind the several divisions, and compelled them to advance by menaces, stripes, and blows. The Grecians, animated by their late success, and persuaded that they could not possibly escape death on the arrival of those who approached by way of the mountain, bravely halted in the widest part of the pass, to receive the charge of the enemy. The shock was dreadful, and the battle was maintained on the side of the Greeks with persevering intrepidity and desperate valor. After their spears were blunted or broken, they attacked sword in hand, and their short, but massy and well-tempered weapons, made an incredible havoc. Their progress

was marked by a line of blood, when a Barbarian dart pierced the heart of Leonidas. The contest was no longer for victory and glory, but for the sacred remains of their king. Four times they dispelled the thickest globes of Persians; but as their unexampled valor was carrying off the inestimable prize, the hostile battalions were seen descending the hill, under the conduct of Epialtes. It was now time to prepare for the last effort of generous despair. With close order and resolute minds, the Greeks, all collected in themselves, retired to the narrowest part of the strait, and took post behind the Phocian wall, on a rising ground, where a lion of stone was afterwards erected in honor of Leonidas. As they performed this movement, fortune, willing to afford every occasion to display their illustrious merit, obliged them to contend at once against open force and secret treachery. The Thebans, whom fear had hitherto restrained from defection, seized the present opportunity to revolt; and approaching the Persians with outstretched arms, declared that they had always been their friends; that *their* republic had sent earth and water, as an acknowledgment of their submission to Xerxes; and that it was with the utmost reluctance they had been compelled by necessity to resist the progress of his arms. As they approached to surrender themselves, many perished by the darts of the Barbarians; the remainder saved a perishing life, by submitting to eternal infamy. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians and Thespians were assaulted on all sides. The nearest of the enemy

C H A P. beat down the wall, and entered by the breaches.

IX. Their temerity was punished by instant death. In this last struggle every Grecian showed the most heroic courage; yet if we believe the unanimous report of some Theffalians, and others who survived the engagement, the Spartan Dioneceſes deſerved the prize of valor. When it was obſerved to him, that the Perſian arrows were ſo numerous, that they intercepted the light of the ſun, he ſaid it was a favorable circumſtance, becauſe the Greeks now fought in the ſhade. The brothers Alpheus and Maron are likewiſe particularized for their generous contempt of death, and for their diſtinguiſhed valor and activity in the ſervice of their country. What theſe, and other virtues, could accompliſh, the Greeks, both as individuals, and in a body, had already performed; but it became impoſſible for them longer to reſiſt the impetuofity and weight of the darts, and arrows, and other miſſile weapons, which were continually poured upon them; and they were finally not deſtroyed or conquered, but buried under a trophy of Perſian arms. Two monuments were afterwards erected near the ſpot where they fell; the inſcription of the firſt announced, the valor of a handful of Greeks⁵⁴, who had reſiſted three millions of Barbarians:

⁵⁴ Iſocrates, p. 164. makes the Spartans who fought at Thermopylæ amount to one thouſand. Diodorus, l. xi. p. 410 agrees with Herodotus, whoſe narrative is followed in the text. According to the moſt probable accounts, the Theſpians were twice as numerous as the Spartans; although the latter have carried away all the glory of this ſingular exploit.

the second was peculiar to the Spartans ; and C H A P.
IX.
contained these memorable words ; “ Go stranger,
and declare to the Lacedæmonians , that we died
here in obedience to their divine laws ” . ”

” Ω ξεινε αγγειλον Λακεδαιμονιοις οτι τηδε
κειμεθα τοις κεινων ρημοσι πειθομενοι.

Herodot. c. cxxviii.

70 THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. X.

Sea-Fight off Artemisium. — Xerxes ravages Phocis. — Enters Attica. — Magnanimity of the Athenians. — Sea-Fight of Salamis. — Xerxes leaves Greece. — His miserable Retreat. — Campaign of Mardonius. — Battles of Plataea and Mycale. — Issue of the Persian Invasion.

CHAP.

X.

Disaster of
the Persian
fleet on the
coast of
Thessaly.

DURING the military operations at Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet was stationed in the harbour of Artemisium, the northern promontory of Eubœa. That of the Persian, too numerous for any harbour to contain, had anchored in the road that extends between the city of Castanæa and the promontory of Sepias, on the coast of Thessaly. Here this formidable armada suffered the calamities foretold by the wisdom of Artabanus. In a conversation with Xerxes, that prudent old man had warned him against two enemies, the sea and the land, from whom his own rash inexperience seemed not to apprehend any danger. Yet both these enemies occasioned dreadful misfortunes to the Persians, whose numbers first exposed them to be destroyed at sea by a tempest, and afterwards to perish on land by a famine. The first line of their fleet was sheltered by the coast of Thessaly; but the other lines, to the number of seven, rode at anchor, at small intervals, with the

prows of the vessels turned to the sea. When they adopted this arrangement, the waters were smooth, the sky clear, the weather calm and serene; but on the morning of the second day after their arrival on the coast, the sky began to lour, and the appearance of the heavens grew threatening and terrible. A dreadful storm of rain and thunder succeeded; and, what was more alarming, the billows began to rise to an amazing height, occasioned by a violent Hellepontin, or north-east wind, which, when it once begins to blow in those seas with any considerable force, seldom ceases for several days. The nearest vessels were saved by hauling under the shore: of the more remote, many were driven from their anchors; some foundered at sea, others split on the promontory of Sepias, and several bulged on the shallows of Melibœa. Three days the tempest raged with unabating fury. Four hundred gallees were destroyed by its violence, beside such a number of storeships and transports, that the Persian commanders, suspecting this disaster might occasion the revolt of the Thessalians, fortified themselves with a rampart of considerable height, entirely composed of the shattered fragments of the wreck¹.

This bulwark was sufficient to protect them against the irruptions of the Greeks; but it could not defend them against the more dangerous fury of the waves. In a short time, therefore, they quitted

C H A P.
X.

The Persians sail to the Pega-sean bay.

¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxxviii. et seq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. c. xii.

C H A P. X. their insecure station at Sepias, and with eight hundred ships of war, besides innumerable vessels of burden, sailed into the Pegasean bay, and anchored in the road of Apheté, which, at the distance of a few miles, lies directly opposite to the harbour of Artemisium.

The commanders of the Grecian fleet think of retiring southward;

The Grecians had posted centinels on the heights of Eubœa to observe the consequences of the storm, and to watch the motions of the enemy. When informed of the dreadful disaster which had befallen them, they poured out a joyous libation, and sacrificed, with pious gratitude, to "Neptune the Deliverer;" but the near approach of such a superior force soon damped their transports of religious festivity. Neptune had favored them in the storm, yet he might assist their enemies in the engagement. In the council of war, called to deliberate on this important subject, it was the general opinion of the commanders, that they ought immediately to retire southward. The Eubœans, whose coasts must have thus been abandoned to the fury of invaders, were peculiarly interested in opposing this pusillanimous resolution. The passage into the continent of Greece, they observed, was still guarded by the magnanimity of Leonidas, and the bravery of the Spartans. Following this generous example, the Grecian fleet, however inferior in strength, ought to resist the Persians, and to protect the estates and families of a rich and populous island². This remonstrance had not any

² Herodot. l. viii. c. ii. et seq.

effect on the determined purpose of Euribiades the Spartan, who, on account of the ancient pre-eminence of his republic, was intrusted with the command of the fleet; an honor rather due to the personal merit of Themistocles, and the naval superiority of Athens.

To the Athenian commander the Eubœans secretly applied, and, by a present of thirty talents, engaged him to use his influence to retain the Grecian armament for the defence of their coasts. Themistocles was well pleased at being bribed into a measure which his good sense and discernment approved. By a proper distribution of only eight talents, he brought over the other captains to his opinion, and thus effectually promoted the interest, and secured the good-will, of the Eubœans, while he retained for himself an immense sum of money which might be usefully employed, on many future occasions, in fixing, by largesses and expensive exhibitions, the fluctuating favor of his fellow-citizens.

Meanwhile the Persians, having recovered from the terrors of the storm, prepared for the engagement. As they entertained not the smallest doubt of victory, they determined not to begin the attack, until they had sent two hundred of their best sailing vessels around the isle of Eubœa, to intercept the expected flight of the enemy through the narrow Euripus. In order to conceal this design, they ordered the detached ships to stand out to sea until they lost sight of the eastern coast of Eubœa, sailing behind the little island of Sciathus:

C H A P.
X.

but are prevailed on to remain at Artemisium, by the address of Themistocles.

Both sides prepare for battle.

C H A P.
X.

and afterwards shaping their course by the promontories of Caphaneus and Gereftus. The stratagem, concerted with more than usual prudence, was, however, discovered to the Greeks by Scyllias, a native of Scioné, now serving in the Persian fleet, but who had long languished for an opportunity of deserting to his countrymen. While the attention of the Barbarians was employed in the preparations necessary for their new arrangement, Scyllias availed himself of his dexterity in diving, to swim, unperceived, to a boat which had been prepared at a sufficient distance, in which he fortunately escaped to Artemisium. He immediately gained admittance to the Grecian council, where the boldness of his enterprise gave persuasion to his words. In consequence of his seasonable and important information, the Greeks determined to continue till midnight in the harbour, and then weighing anchor, to sail in quest of the fleet which had been sent out to prevent their escape. But this stratagem, by which they would have met the art of the enemy with similar address, was not carried into execution. The advice-boats, which had been immediately dispatched to observe the progress of the Persians, returned before evening, without having seen any ships approaching in that direction.

The first
sea-fight at
Artemi-
sium.

This intelligence was welcome to the Greeks, who were unwilling, without evident necessity, to abandon their present situation. The enemy, who had lately suffered so severely in the storm, were now further weakened by a considerable diminu-

tion of their fleet. The strength of the adverse parties being thus reduced nearer to an equality, the weaker seized the opportunity to display their courage in fight, and their superior skill in naval action. About sun-set they approached in a line, and offered battle to the Persians. The latter did not decline the engagement, as their ships were still sufficiently numerous to surround those of their opponents. At the first signal the Greeks formed into a circle, at the second they began the fight. Though crowded into a narrow compass, and having the enemy on every side, they soon took thirty of their ships, and sunk many more. Night came on, accompanied with an impetuous storm of rain and thunder; the Greeks retired into the harbour of Artemisium; the enemy were driven to the coast of Thessaly. As the wind blew from the south, the dead bodies and wrecks dashed with violence against the sides of their ships, and disturbed the motion of their oars. The barbarians were seized with consternation and despair; for scarcely had they time to breathe, after the former storm and shipwreck near Mount Pelion, when they were compelled to a dangerous sea-fight; after darkness put an end to the battle, they were again involved in the gloom and horrors of a nocturnal tempest. By good fortune, rather than by design, the greatest part of the fleet escaped immediate destruction, and gained the Pegasean Bay. Their calamities were great and unexpected; but the ships ordered to sail round Eubœa met with a still more dreadful disaster. They were overtaken by

C H A P. X. the storm, after they had adventured further from the shore than was usual with the wary mariners of antiquity. Clouds soon intercepted the stars, by which alone they directed their course. They were driven they knew not whither by the force of the winds, or impelled by the impetuosity of currents. In addition to these misfortunes, they were terrified by the thunder, and overwhelmed by the deluge; and after continuing during the greatest part of the night, the sport of the elements, they all perished³ miserably, amidst the shoals and rocks of an unknown coast.

The morning arose with different prospects and hopes to the Persians and Greeks. To the former it discovered the extent of their misfortunes; to the latter it brought a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships. Encouraged by this favorable circumstance, they determined again to attack the enemy, at the same hour as on the preceding day, because their knowledge of the coast, and their skill in fighting their ships, rendered the dusk peculiarly propitious to their designs. At the appointed time, they sailed towards the road of Apheté, and having cut off the Cilician squadron from the rest, totally destroyed it, and returned at night to Artemisium.

The second sea-fight at Artemisium.

The Persian commanders being deeply affected with their repeated disasters, but still more alarmed at the much dreaded resentment of their king, they determined to make one vigorous effort, for restoring the glory of their arms. By art and

³ Herodot. l. viii. c. xiii. Diodor. l. xi. c. xiii.

stratagem, and under favor of the night, the Greeks had hitherto gained many important advantages. It now belonged to the Persians to chuse the time for action. On the third day at noon, they sailed forth in the form of a crescent, which was still sufficiently extensive to infold the Grecian line. The Greeks, animated by former success, were averse to decline any offer of battle; yet it is probable that their admirals, and particularly Themistocles, would much rather have delayed it to a more favorable opportunity. Rage, resentment, and indignation, supplied the defect of the Barbarians in skill and courage. The battle was longer, and more doubtful, than on any former occasion; many Grecian vessels were destroyed, five were taken by the Egyptians, who particularly signalized themselves on the side of the Barbarians, as the Athenians did on that of the Greeks. The persevering valor of the latter at length prevailed, the enemy retiring, and acknowledging their superiority, by leaving them in possession of the dead and the wreck. But the victory cost them dear; since their vessels, particularly those of the Athenians, were reduced to a very shattered condition; and their great inferiority in the number and size of their ships, made them feel more sensibly every diminution of strength.

This circumstance was sufficient to make them think of retiring (while they might yet retire in safety) to the shores of the Corinthian Isthmus. The inclination to this measure received additional force from considering, that the Persians, however

The
Greeks
sail to the
Saronic
Gulph.

C H A P. X. unfortunate by sea, had still an immense army; whereas the principal hope of Greece centered in its fleet. While the commanders were occupied with these reflections, Abronycus, an Athenian, who had been intrusted with a galley of thirty oars, to cruise in the Malian bay, and to watch the event of the battle of Thermopylæ, arrived with an account of the glorious death of Leonidas. The engagements by sea and land had been fought on the same day. In both the Greeks defended a narrow pass, against a superior power; and in both the Persians had, with very different success, attempted, by surrounding, to conquer them. The intelligence brought by Abronycus confirmed their resolution of sailing southward; for it seemed of very little importance to defend the shores, after the enemy had obtained possession of the centre of the northern territories. Having passed the narrow Euripus, they coasted along the shore of Attica, and anchored in the strait of the Saronic Gulph, which separates the island of Salamis from the harbours of Athens⁴.

Themistocles's stratagem for making the Ionians desert their allies.

Before they left Artemisium, Themistocles, ever watchful to promote the interest of his country, endeavoured to alienate⁵ from the great king the affections of his bravest auxiliaries. Contrary to the advice of the prudent Artabanus, Xerxes had conducted the Asiatic Greeks to an unnatural expedition against their mother-country. His wise kinsman in vain persuaded him to send them back, because it appeared equally dishonorable and

⁴ Herodot. l. viii. c. xxi.

⁵ Ibid. l. viii. c. xxii.

dangerous to depend on the service of men, which could only be employed in his favor at the expense of every principle of duty, and of every sentiment of virtue. By hope and fear, by threats and promises, and chiefly by honoring them with marks of distinguished preference, Xerxes had hitherto preserved their reluctant fidelity. In order at once to destroy a connexion, which of its own accord seemed ready to dissolve, Themistocles engraved on the rocks, near the watering-place of Artemisium, the following words: "Men of Ionia, your conduct is most unjust in fighting against your ancestors, and in attempting to enslave Greece; resolve, therefore, while it is yet in your power, to repair the injury.—If you cannot immediately desert from the Persian fleet, yet it will be easy for you to accomplish this design when we come to an engagement. You ought to remember, that yourselves gave occasion to the quarrel between us and the Barbarians; and farther, that the same duties which children owe to their parents, colonies owe to their mother-country."

C H A P.
X.

When news arrived that the Grecian fleet had abandoned Artemisium, Xerxes regarded this retreat of the enemy as equal to a victory. He therefore issued orders, that his naval force, after ravaging the coasts of Eubœa, should proceed to take possession of the harbours of Athens; while,

Xerxes advances with his army towards Attica.

* This sentiment is the dictate of nature, and occurs often in the Roman as well as the Greek writers. "Quæ liberi parentibus ea coloni antiquæ patriæ debent." T. Livius.

C H A P. at the head of his irresistible army, he intended to
 X. make a victorious procession, rather than a march, into the Attic territory. The road thither from Thermopylæ passed through the countries of Phocis and Bœotia, the latter of which had already acknowledged his authority. The Phocians adhered to the cause of Greece; and were still farther confirmed in their allegiance, after the Thesſalians, their inveterate enemies, had embraced the party of Xerxes. Such were the violent animosities which divided these hostile states, that, in the opinion of Herodotus, whichever side the Theſſalians had taken, the Phocians would still have opposed them. He might perhaps have extended the observation to the other principal republics. The enthusiasm of Athens and Sparta in defending the cause of Greece, rendered the rival states of Thebes and Argos zealous in the service of Persia; and it is to be remembered, to the immortal glory of the friends of liberty and their country, that they had to struggle with domestic sedition, while they opposed and defeated a foreign invasion.

Ravages
 Phocis.

Having entered the territory of Phocis, the Persian army separated into two divisions, with a view to obtain more plentiful supplies of the necessaries of life, and to destroy more completely the possessions of their enemies. The most numerous division followed the course of the river Cephissus, which flows from the Theſſalian mountains, to the lake Copais in Bœotia. The fertile banks of the Cephissus were adorned by Charadra, Neon, Elatæa, and other populous cities, all of which were
 burned

burned or demolished by the fury of Xerxes, and the resentment of the Thessalians. Historians particularly regret the destruction of the sacred walls of Abé, a city held in peculiar respect on account of the temple of Apollo, famed for its unerring oracles, and enriched from the earliest times by the pious donations of superstition. The inhabitants had in general abandoned their towns, and taken refuge in the most inaccessible retreats, of mount Parnassus. But the natives of Abé, vainly confiding for safety in the sanctity of the place, became a prey to an undistinguishing rage, which equally disregarded things sacred and profane. The men perished by the sword, the women by the brutal lust of the Barbarians.

After committing these dreadful ravages, the principal division of the army marched into Bœotia, by the way of Orchomenus. The *smaller* part (if either portion of such an immense host may be distinguished by that epithet) stretched to the right, along the western skirts of mount Parnassus, and traced a line of devastation from the banks of the Cephissus to the temple of Delphi. Such was the fame of the immense riches collected in this sacred edifice, that Xerxes is said to have been as well acquainted with their amount as with that of his own treasury; and, to believe the adulation of his followers, he alone was worthy to possess that invaluable depository. The Delphians having learned, by the unhappy fate of Abé, that their religious employment could not afford protection, either to their property or to their person, consulted

Extraordinary
adventure of
a detachment
that
attacked
Delphi.

C H A P. the oracle, "Whether they should hide their
 X. treasures under ground, or transport them to some
 neighbouring country?" The Pythia replied, "That
 the arms of Apollo were sufficient for the defence of
 his shrine." The Delphians, therefore, confined
 their attention to the means necessary for their
 personal safety. The women and children were
 transported by sea to Achaia; the men climbed to
 the craggy tops of mount Cirphis, or descended to
 the deep caverns of Parnassus. Only sixty persons,
 the immediate ministers of Apollo, kept possession
 of the sacred city. But, could we credit the tes-
 timony of ancient historians, it soon appeared that
 the gods had not abandoned Delphi: scarcely had
 the Persians reached the temple of Minerva the
 Provident, situated at a little distance from the
 town, when the air thickened into an unusual
 darkness. A violent storm arose; the thunder and
 lightning were terrible. At length the tempest
 burst on mount Parnassus, and separated from its
 sides two immense rocks, which rolling down with
 increased violence, overwhelmed the nearest ranks
 of the Persians. The shattered fragments of the
 mountain, which long remained in the grove of
 Minerva, were regarded by the credulity of the
 Greeks as a standing proof of the miracle. But
 without supposing any supernatural intervention, we
 may believe, that an extraordinary event, happen-
 ing on an extraordinary occasion, would produce
 great terror and consternation in the Barbarian
 army, since many of the nations which composed it
 acknowledged the divinity of Apollo, and must
 therefore have been sensible of their intended

impiety, in despoiling his temple. The awful solemnity of the place conspired with the horrors of the tempest, and the guilty feelings of their own consciences. These united terrors were sufficient to disturb all the rational principles of their minds, and even to confound the clearest perceptions of their senses. They imagined, that they heard many sounds, which they did not hear; and that they saw many phantoms, which they did not see. An universal panic seized them; at first they remained motionless, in silent amazement; they afterwards fled with disordered steps and wild despair. The Delphians, who perceived their confusion, and who believed that the gods, by the most manifest signs, defended their favorite abode, rushed impetuously from their fastnesses, and destroyed great numbers of the terrified and unresisting enemy⁷. The remainder took the road of Bœotia, in order to join the main body under Xerxes, which having already destroyed the hostile cities of Thespiæ and Plataea, was marching with full expectation to inflict complete vengeance on the Athenians.

The united army arrived in the Attic territory three months after their passage over the Hellespont. They laid waste the country, burned the cities, and levelled the temples with the ground. At length they took possession of the capital; but the inhabitants, by a retreat no less prudent than magnanimous, had withdrawn from the fury of their resentment.

Xerxes in-
vades At-
tica,

⁷ Herodot. l. viii. c. xxxvii. et seqq. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 250.

C H A P.

X.

which the
Athenians
had evacu-
ated,

It was impossible for the Athenians at once to oppose the Persian army, which marched from Bœotia, and to defend the western coasts of Greece against the ravages of a numerous fleet. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus, despairing of being able to resist the enemy in the open field, had begun to build a wall across the isthmus of Corinth, as their only security on the side of the land against the Barbaric invasion. In these circumstances, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, embraced a resolution which eclipsed the glory of all their former exploits. They abandoned to the Persian rage their villages, their territory, their walls, their city itself, with the revered tombs of their ancestors; their wives and children, and aged parents, were transported to the isles of Salamis and Ægina, and to the generous city of Træzoné, on the Argolic coast, which, notwithstanding the defection of Argos, the capital of that province, steadfastly adhered to the maxims of patriotism, and the duties of friendship. The embarkation was made with such haste, that the inhabitants were obliged to leave behind them their household furniture, their statues and pictures, and in general the most valuable part of their property. But they were willing to relinquish all for the sake of their country, which they well knew consisted not in their houses, lands, and effects^s, but in that equal

^s Οὐ λιοί, ἔδε ξυλαθ ἔδε

Τεχνη τεκτονων αἱ πολεις εισιν,

Αλλ ὅπε ποτ' αν ωσιν ΑΝΔΡΕΣ

Αυτες σωζειν ειδοτες,

Ενταυθα τειχη και πολεις.

ALCÆUS. apud Aristid.

constitution of government, which they had received from their ancestors, and which it was their duty to transmit unimpaired to posterity. This constitution it was impossible for them to defend, unless they determined, at the risk of their lives, and of every thing dear to them, to maintain the general independence of the Grecian confederacy; the interest of which became doubly precious, by being thus inseparably connected with their own.

The Athenians capable of bearing arms or of handling an oar, embarked on board the fleet stationed at Salamis. The ships equipped and manned by them alone, exceeded in number those of all their allies together, although the combined force was considerably augmented by the naval strength of Epirus and Acarnania, which, formerly doubtful and irresolute, had been determined to the side of Greece by the fortunate issue of the engagements at Artemisium. The whole Grecian armament, thus increased, amounted to three hundred and eighty vessels. That of the Persians, which now took possession of the Athenian harbours, lying to the south of the strait occupied by the Greeks, had also received a powerful reinforcement. The Locrians, Bœotians, and in general every people who had submitted to their arms, readily supplying them with ships; and several of the Egean islands having at length prepared the quota which they had formerly been commanded to furnish. We are not exactly informed of the number or strength of the additional squadron; but it was supposed fully to compensate the loss occasioned

C H A P.
X.

and em-
barked in
the fleet at
Salamis.

C H A P. by storms and sea-fights, and to restore the Persian
 X. fleet to its original complement of twelve hundred
 sail^o.

Xerxes de-
 termines
 to fight
 again at
 sea.

Is power-
 fully dis-
 suaded
 from that
 measure by
 Artemisia.

Trusting to the immense superiority of his ar-
 mament, Xerxes was still desirous to make trial of
 his fortune at sea, notwithstanding his former dis-
 asters on that element. But before he came to a
 final resolution, he summoned a council of war, in
 order to hear the opinion of his maritime subjects
 or allies. The tributary kings of Tyre and Sidon,
 the leaders of the Egyptians, Cyprians, and Cili-
 cians, ever ready to flatter the passions of their
 sovereign, offered many frivolous reasons in favor
 of the alternative to which they perceived him
 inclined. But in the fleet of Xerxes there was a
 Grecian queen named Artemisia, widow of the
 prince of Halicarnassus, and who had assumed the
 government of that city and territory for the bene-
 fit of her infant son. Compelled by the order of
 Xerxes, or perhaps irritated against the Athenians,
 for some reasons which history does not record, she
 not only fitted out five ships to attend the Persian
 expedition, but took upon herself the command of
 her little squadron, and on every occasion conducted
 it with equal skill and bravery. Such vigor of
 mind, united with so delicate a form, deserved to
 excite admiration in every part of the world; but
 the manly spirit of Artemisia becomes still more
 admirable, when we consider the severe restraints
 which have been in all ages imposed on the female

^o Herodot, Diodor. ubi supra; et Plut. in Themistocle.

sex, by the manners and climate of Asia. Her superior genius recommended her to the peculiar favor of Xerxes, who was obliged to esteem in a woman the virtues which he himself wanted spirit to practise. Trusting to his advantageous opinion of her courage and fidelity, Artemisia dissented from the general voice of the allies, and even opposed the inclination of the prince. "Her former exploits on the coast of Eubœa afforded sufficient proof that her present advice was not the child of timidity. She had been ever forward to expose her person and her fame in the service of the great king; but it was impossible to dissemble the manifest superiority of the Greeks in naval affairs. Yet, were the two armaments as much on a foot of equality in point of bravery and experience, as they were unequal in numbers, what motive could induce Xerxes to venture another engagement at sea? Was he not already in possession of Athens, the great object of the war? The Spartans, who had opposed his progress at Thermopylæ, had reaped the just fruits of their temerity: those assembled at the isthmus of Corinth might easily be involved in a similar fate. The Peloponnesus might then be laid waste by fire and sword, which would complete the destruction of Greece. Instead of proceeding immediately to that peninsula, should Xerxes chuse to continue only a few weeks in the Attic territory, four hundred Grecian ships could not long be supplied with provisions from the barren rocks of Salamis. Necessity must compel them to surrender, or drive them to their

C H A P.

X.

C H A P. X. respective cities, where they would become an easy prey to the Persian arms." These judicious observations were heard without approbation; the worst opinion prevailed, being the best adapted to flatter the vanity of Xerxes.

Deliberations of the Greeks.

When the Grecian commanders observed that the enemy prepared to venture another engagement at sea, they likewise assembled to deliberate whether they should continue in the strait between Salamis and Attica, or proceed further up the gulph, towards the Corinthian isthmus. The latter proposal was generally approved by the confederates of Peloponnesus, who anxiously desired, in the present emergency, to approach as near as possible to their respective cities. Some hastened to their ships, and hoisted sail, in order to depart; and it seemed likely that their example would be soon followed by the whole fleet. On board the ship of Themistocles was Mnesiphilus, formerly mentioned as the instructor of his youth, and who now accompanied him as his counsellor and friend. The experienced wisdom of Mnesiphilus readily discerned, that should the Greeks sail from Salamis, it would be impossible to prevent the general dispersion of their armament. He therefore exhorted Themistocles, to endeavour, by all means possible, to prevent this fatal measure; and particularly to persuade the Spartan admiral, Euribiades, to alter his present intention.

Guided by the abilities of Themistocles,

Themistocles readily embraced the opinion of his friend. Having waited on Euribiades, he obtained his consent to summon a second assembly

of the confederates. After they were fully convened, the Athenian began to call their attention to the state of their affairs; but his discourse was insolently interrupted by Adimantus, the commander of the Corinthians, who had constantly discovered a particular solicitude for returning to the isthmus. Themistocles, no less prudent than brave, answered his reproaches with calmness, and then addressing himself to Euribiades, "The fate of Greece," said he, "depends on the decision of the present moment, and that decision on you; if you resolve to sail to the isthmus, we must abandon Salamis, Megara, and Ægina; we shall be compelled to fight in an open sea, where the enemy may fully avail themselves of their superior numbers; and as the Persian army will certainly attend the motions of their fleet, we shall draw their combined strength towards the Grecian peninsula, our last and only retreat. But if you determine to retain the ships in their present station, the Persians will find it impossible, in a narrow channel, to attack us at once with their whole force: we shall preserve Megara and Salamis, and we shall effectually defend Peloponnesus; for the Barbarians being, as I firmly trust, defeated in a naval engagement, will not penetrate further than Attica, but return home with disgrace." He had scarcely ended his words, when Adimantus broke forth into new invectives, affecting surprise that Euribiades should listen to a man who, since the taking of Athens, had not any city to defend: that the Athenians ought *then* to have a voice in the council,

C II A P.

X.

CHAP. X. when they could say they had a home. Themistocles replied, "that the Athenians had indeed undervalued their private estates and possessions, in comparison of their political independence, and the general safety of Greece, and gloriously abandoned their *city* in defence of their *country*. But notwithstanding this sacrifice for the public good, they had still a home far more valuable than Corinth, two hundred ships of war well armed and manned, which no nation of Greece could resist. That should the confederates persist in their present dangerous resolution, the Athenians would in these ships embark their wives and families; desert a country, which had first forsaken itself; and repair to the coast of Italy, where it was foretold by ancient oracles, that Athens should, in some future time, form a great and flourishing settlement. That the Greeks would then remember and regret the advice of Themistocles, when, abandoned by the most considerable part of their allies, they became an easy prey to the Barbarian invader." The firmness of this discourse shook the resolution of the confederates; and it was determined by the majority to continue at Salamis.

Between this important resolve and the engagement, there intervened a moment of the most anxious solicitude. The minds of men, impressed with the awful idea of the events about to be transacted, were thrown off their ordinary bias; and as the operations of nature, and the agency of invisible beings, are always fondly connected in the imagination with the momentous concerns of human

life, the Greeks felt, or believed they felt, extraordinary convulsions of the elements; they saw, or fancied they saw, hideous spectres in the air; and heard, or imagined they heard, the most terrible and threatening voices¹⁰. But all these strange and supernatural appearances, which would otherwise have been doubtful or alarming, were proved, by a clear and explicit oracle, to foretel the destruction of the Barbarians.

Notwithstanding this favorable intimation of the divine will, which was carefully improved by the wisdom and eloquence of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians were ready to return to their first determination. A vessel arriving from the Isthmus, brought advice that the fortifications there were almost completed; if the fleet retired to the neighbouring shore, the sailors might, even after a defeat at sea, take refuge behind their walls; but if conquered near the coasts of Salamis, they would be for ever separated from their families and friends, and confined, without hope or resource, within the narrow limits of a barren island. In important alternatives, when the arguments on each side are almost equally persuasive, the party which we have embraced often appears the worst, merely because we have embraced it. Any new circumstance or consideration is always capable of changing the balance, and we hastily approve what we rejected after much deliberation. Lest this propensity should, as there was much reason to fear, again

C H A P.

X.

ready to
change
their opi-
nion;

prevented
by a dar-
ing mea-

¹⁰ Lyfias Fun. Orat. Herodot. *ibid.*

C H A P. X. disconcert his measures, Themistocles determined to prevent the Greeks from the possibility of gratifying it. There commonly lived in his family a man named Sicinus, who at present accompanied him. He was originally a slave, and employed in the education of his children; but by the generosity of his patron, had acquired the rank of citizen, with considerable riches. The firmness and fidelity of this man rendered him a proper instrument for executing a stratagem, which concealed, under the mask of treachery, the enthusiasm of public virtue. Having received his instructions from Themistocles, he privately sailed to the Persian fleet, and obtaining admission into the presence of Xerxes, declared, "That he had been sent by the captain of the Athenians, who could no longer endure the insolence of his countrymen, to acquaint the great king, that the Greeks, seized with consternation at the near approach of danger, had determined to make their escape under cover of the night: that now was the time for the Persians to atchieve the most glorious of all their exploits, and, by intercepting the flight of their enemies, accomplish their destruction at once". The deceit was believed; the whole day, and the greatest part of the succeeding night, the Persians employed in securing the several passages between the islands and the adjacent coast; and that nothing might be neglected that could contribute to their success, they filled the little isle, or rather rock, of Pfyttalea,

¹¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv.

lying between Salamis and the continent, with the flower of the Persian infantry, in order to intercept the miserable remnant of the Greeks, who, after the expected defeat, would fly thither for refuge.

The first intelligence of these operations was brought to the Grecian fleet by Aristides the Athenian, who seems not to have availed himself of the general act of indemnity to return from banishment, but who readily embraced every opportunity to serve his country. Having with difficulty escaped in a small vessel from the isle of Ægina, the generous patriot immediately communicated an account of what he had seen there to his rival and enemy, Themistocles, who, meeting his generosity with equal frankness, made him the confidant of his secret. Their interview was as memorable as the occasion; and, after a continued life of opposition and hatred, they now first agreed to suspend their private animosities, in order to promote the common interest of their country. As the Peloponnesian commanders were either wavering and irresolute, or had determined to set sail, Aristides was desired to inform them of the arrangement which he had seen; the consideration of his country however rendered his evidence suspected, and it was imagined that he meant to sacrifice the general interest of the confederates to the safety of the Athenian families in Salamis. But the arrival of a vessel belonging to the isle of Tenos confirmed the veracity of his report, and the Peloponnesians

C H A P.
X.

His inter-
view with
Aristides.

C H A P. resolved to fight, because it was impossible to
X. fly ¹².

Sea-fight
off the isle
of Salamis.

Before the dawn of the day the Grecian ships were drawn up in order of battle; and the Persians, who had been surprised at not finding them attempt to escape during night, were still more surprised when morning discovered their close and regular arrangement. The Greeks began with the light their sacred hymns and pœans, which preceded their triumphant songs of war, accompanied by the animating sound of the trumpet. The shores of Attica re-echoed to the rocks of Salamis and Psyttalea. The Grecian acclamations filled the sky. Neither their appearance nor their words betokened flight or fear, but rather determined intrepidity, and invincible courage. Yet was their valor tempered with wisdom. Themistocles delayed the attack until the ordinary breeze should spring up, which was no less favorable to the experience of the Grecian mariners, than dangerous to the lofty unwieldiness of the Persian ships ¹³. The signal was then given for the Athenian line to bear down against that of the Phœnicians, which rode on the west, off the coast of Eleusis; while the Peloponnesians advanced against the enemy's left wing stationed on the east, near the harbour of the Piræus. The Persians, confiding in their number, and secure of victory, did not decline the fight. A Phœnician galley, of uncommon size and strength, was distinguished in the front of their

¹² Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix. et seqq.

¹³ Id. Ibid.

line by every circumstance of naval pomp. In the eagerness to engage, she far outstripped her companions; but her career was checked midway between the two fleets by an Athenian galley which had sailed forth to meet her. The first shock shattered her sculptured prow, the second buried her in the waves. The Athenians, encouraged by this auspicious prelude, proceeded with their whole force, animating each other to the combat by a martial song: "Advance, ye sons of Athens, save your country, defend your wives and children, deliver the temples of your gods, regain the sacred tombs of your renowned forefathers; *this day*, the common cause of Greece demands your valor." The battle was bloody and destructive, and disputed on the side of the Persians with more obstinate resistance than on any former occasion; for, from the Attic coast, seated on a lofty throne on the top of Mount Ægialos, Xerxes observed the scene of action, and attentively remarked, with a view to reward and punish, the various behaviour of his subjects. The presence of their prince operated on their hopes, and still more powerfully on their fears. But neither the hope of acquiring the favor, nor the fear of incurring the displeasure of a despot, could furnish principles of action worthy of being compared with the patriotism and love of liberty which actuated the Greeks. To the dignity of their motives, as much as to the superiority of their skill, the latter owed their unexampled success in this memorable engagement. The foremost ships of the Phœnicians were dispersed or sunk.

C H A P.

X.

The Persi-
ans totally
defeated.

Amidst the terror and confusion occasioned by their repulse, they ran foul of those which had been drawn up in two lines behind them. The Athenians skilfully encircled them around, compressed them into a narrower space, and increased their disorder; they were at length entangled in each other, deprived of all power of action, and, to use the humble, but expressive figure of an eye-witness, "caught and destroyed like fish in a net."¹⁴ Such was the fate of the right wing; while the Ionians, who, on the left, opposed the fleets of Peloponnesus and Ægina, furnished them with an opportunity to complete the victory. Many of the Asiatic Greeks, mindful of the advice given by Themistocles, abandoned the interest of the great king, and openly declared for their countrymen; others declined the engagement; the remainder were sunk and put to flight. Among those which escaped was the ship of queen Artemisia, who in the battle of Salamis displayed superior courage and conduct: she was closely pursued by an Athenian galley, commanded by Amenias, brother of the poet Æschylus. In this extremity she employed a successful, but very unwarrantable stratagem. The nearest Persian vessel was commanded by Damasthymus, a tributary prince of Calynda in Lycia, a man with whom Artemisia was at variance. With great dexterity she darted the beak of her galley against the Lycian vessel. Damasthymus was buried in the waves; and Amenias,

¹⁴ Æschylus Persæ.

deceived

deceived by this measure, equally artful and audacious, believed the vessel of Artemisia one of those which had deserted the Persian interest. The Phœnician and Ionian squadrons (for that of the Egyptians had been exceedingly weakened by the action on the coast of Eubœa) formed the main strength of the Persian armament; after these were defeated, the ships at a distance ventured not to advance, but hastily changing sail, measured back their course to the Athenian and other neighbouring harbours. The victors, disdaining to pursue them, dragged the most valuable part of the wreck to the coasts of Psyttalea and Salamis. The narrow seas were covered with the floating carcases of the dead, among whom were few Greeks, as even those who lost their ships in the engagement, saved their lives by swimming, an art which they universally learned as a necessary branch of education, and with which the Barbarians were totally unacquainted¹⁵.


Xerxes had scarcely time to consider and deplore the destruction and disgrace of his fleet, when a new spectacle, not less mournful, offered itself to his sight. The flower of the Persian infantry had taken post, as we have already observed, on the rocky isle of Psyttalea, in order to receive the shattered remains of the Grecian armament, which, after its expected defeat, would naturally take refuge on that barren coast. But equally fallacious and fatal was their conjecture concerning the event

¹⁵ Before this period it was a law at Athens and other states, *της παιδας διδασκεσθαι πρωτον νειν τε και γραμματα*; that boys first learn reading and swimming. Sam. Petit. de Leg. Att. p. 11.

C H A P. of the battle. The Greeks, disembarking from
 X. their ships, attacked, in the enthusiasm of victory,
 those astonished troops, who, unable to resist, and
 finding it impossible to fly, were cut down to a
 man. As Xerxes beheld this dreadful havoc, he
 started in wild agitation from his silver throne,
 rent his royal robes, and, in the first moment of
 his returning tranquillity, commanded the main
 body of his forces, posted along the Athenian
 coast, to return to their respective camps.

Xerxes de-
 termines to
 leave
 Greece.

From that moment he resolved to return with
 all possible expedition into Asia. Yet did his fears
 and his policy conceal, for a few days, the design,
 not only from the Grecian but from the Persian
 generals. Mardonius alone was too well acquainted
 with the genius of his master, to believe that
 his concern for the safety of his illustrious person
 would allow him to remain longer than necessary,
 in a country which had been the scene of so many
 calamities. The artful courtier availed himself of
 the important secret, to divert the storm of royal
 resentment which threatened the principal author
 of this inglorious undertaking. In his first inter-
 view with Xerxes, he exhorted him, “not to be
 too deeply affected by the defeat of his fleet: that
 he had come to fight against the Greeks, not with
 rafts of wood, but with soldiers and horses: that
 the valor of the Persians had opposed all resistance,
 and their invincible sovereign was now master of
 Athens, the main object of his ambition: that
 having accomplished the principal end of the enter-
 prise, it was time for the great king to return



from the fatigues of war to the cares of government; for with three hundred thousand chosen men he would undertake to prosecute his designs, and to complete his victory." Such is the language of adulation, too often held to princes. The other courtiers confirmed, by their approbation, the advice of Mardonius; and the Persian monarch, while he obeyed the dictates of his own pusillanimity, seemed to leave Greece in reluctant compliance with the anxious solicitude of his subjects.

The remains of the Persian fleet, frightened from the coast of Greece, returned to the harbours of Asia Minor, and afterwards assembled and rendezvoused, during the ensuing winter, in the port of Cymé. The transports were ordered to the Hellespont, on the banks of which Xerxes arrived with his troops in forty-five days, after intolerable hardships and fatigue. Famine and pestilence filled up the measure of their calamities; and, excepting the three hundred thousand chosen men committed to Mardonius, a detachment of whom guarded the royal person to the coast, scarcely a remnant was left of so many millions¹⁶. The bridge ostentatiously erected on the Hellespont would have presented, had it remained entire, a mortifying monument of past greatness. But this magnificent fabric had been destroyed by a tempest: and such is the obscurity with which Xerxes returned from Greece, compared with the blaze of

C H A P.

X.

Mardonius remains there with 300,000 men.

The miserable retreat of his army.

¹⁶ Οὐδὲν μένος ὧς εἰπὼν, says Herodotus, emphatically.

C H A P. X. grandeur in which he arrived there, that it is uncertain whether he crossed the channel in a Phœnician ship of war, or only in a fishing-boat¹⁷. Having returned to Sardis, he endeavoured to compensate for the disappointment of ambition by the gratification of sensuality, and buried himself in pleasures more infamous and degrading, and not less frightfully criminal, than all the disgrace which his pride had incurred, and all the calamities which his subjects had either inflicted or suffered¹⁸.

Measures
taken by
the Greeks
after their
victory.

When the Greeks had leisure to examine the extent and completeness of their success, they determined, in the first emotions of triumph and resentment, to pursue the shattered remains of the enemy. That no Barbarian might escape, they purposed immediately to sail northward, to destroy the Persian bridge over the Hellespont, and thus to intercept their return. This design was recommended, and chiefly supported by the Athenians, who having experienced the greatest share of the danger, felt most sensibly the joys of deliverance. But upon more mature deliberation, it occurred that the Persians were still sufficiently numerous to afford just grounds of terror. To their cowardice and inexperience, not to their want of strength, the Greeks owed all their advantages over them; but should the impossibility of retreat be added to their other calamities, they might derive courage

¹⁷ Confer. Herod. Justin. Corn. Nepos.

¹⁸ Herodot. et Diodor. ibid.

from despair, and, by efforts hitherto unexerted, C H A P.
repair the consequences of their past errors and X.
misfortunes. These considerations, first suggested,
it is said, by Euribiades the Spartan, were adopted
by Themistocles, who convinced his countrymen
that the jealousy of the Grecian gods, unwilling
that one man should be lord of Europe and Asia,
rather than their own prowess, had given them the
victory over Xerxes; a prince of such folly and
madness, that he had treated with equal irreve-
rence things human and divine, destroyed the
sacred temples, overthrown the venerable altars
and images, and impiously insulted the gods of the
Hellespont with stripes and fetters. That it was
the duty of the Athenians, after having gloriously
repelled the common enemy, to provide for the
subsistence of their wives and families, to sow their
lands, rebuild their houses, and thus to repair, by
the most industrious activity, the dreadful ravages
committed in their territories¹⁹.

Themistocles had no sooner persuaded the Athe-
nians to embrace his opinion, than he secretly dis-
patched his confidant Sicinus to acquaint the great
king with the danger which he had so nearly
escaped, and to advise him to pursue his journey
with all possible expedition. Xerxes readily be-
lieved a piece of information, which agreed with
the suggestions of his own timidity. The rapidity
of his march conspired with other circumstances
above-mentioned in proving fatal to the lives of

Bold fra-
tagem of
Themis-
tocles.

¹⁹ Herodot. l. viii. c. cviii. et seqq.

C H A P. his followers ; and the crafty Athenian, who know-
 X. ing the unstable affections of the multitude, wished to deserve the gratitude of a king, gained the double advantage of dispelling sooner than could otherwise have happened, that destructive cloud of Barbarians which hovered over his country, and of convincing their leader, that he was in part indebted for his safety to that very man whose counsels, rather than the arms of Greece, had occasioned his affliction and disgrace.

The victory at Salamis terminated the second act of the Persian expedition, which has, with much propriety, been compared to a tragedy. The Greeks soon understood that, notwithstanding the return of Xerxes, three hundred thousand men, commanded by Mardonius, were cantoned for the winter in Thrace, Macedon, and Thessaly, with a design to take the field early in the spring, and again to try the fortune of war. This intelligence deterred the Athenians from bringing home their wives and children, as they originally intended, from Trœzené, Salamis, and Ægina, because they had reason to dread that their country would experience new effects of Barbarian resentment. It appears, however, that a few citizens, more sanguine in their hopes than the rest, returned to their ancient habitations; while the greater part continued on board the fleet, or went to reside with their friends in the Peloponnesus.

Employ-
 ment of
 the Greeks
 during the
 winter.

According to modern ideas, it would be natural to expect, that, under the apprehension of another formidable invasion, the Greeks should have

employed the winter in raising contributions, levying and disciplining troops, and concerting proper measures for the public defence. But such preparations were in some degree unnecessary, because in the Grecian republics almost every citizen was a soldier; and the different states were at all times too weakly united, to agree in any uniform plan of operations. Besides, the customs and prejudices of that early age obliged them to observe many forms and ceremonies, which interfered with employments seemingly more useful, on such an important emergency. We find, accordingly, that instead of increasing or improving their military establishment, the Greeks spent the winter²⁰ in dividing the spoil; assigning to the different commanders the prizes of conduct and valor; performing the last offices to the dead; celebrating their games and festivals; and displaying, both in the multitude of their prayers, and in the magnificence of their offerings, the warmest gratitude to their protecting divinities. The dedications to the gods were intrinsically valuable. The rewards bestowed on their generals were simple tokens of public esteem. The first consisted in vases, statues, and other ornaments of gold and silver; the second in a wreath of pine, laurel, or olive: a circumstance which made Tigranes the Persian exclaim, "Heavens! against what men have we come to contend? insensible to interest, they fight only for glory!"

²⁰ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxi. et seqq.

C H A P.

X.

Of the A-
thenians
and The-
mistocles,

It is not surprising, that the institutions of Greece should have deceived an untutored Barbarian, when we consider that even the modern philosopher and historian have been too often dazzled by their splendor. Yet notwithstanding what Tigranes believed, and what, from the fond admiration of antiquity, many modern writers have asserted, the indiscriminate praise of disinterestedness by no means belonged to the Grecians. When the commanders of their several ships and squadrons assembled to regulate the distribution of naval and military rewards, each captain, with a selfishness equally indelicate and unjust, arrogated to himself the first prize of merit; though most of them acknowledged the desert of Themistocles as second to their own²¹. This general assignment of the second, while all alike assumed the first place, was equivalent to a public declaration in favor of the Athenian: and the honors which were conferred on him, both in his own country and in Sparta, sufficiently confirmed the decision. The usual marks of the public esteem were not indeed attended with any immediate profit; but their consequences were extremely beneficial. Supported by the favorable opinion of his countrymen, a commander by sea or land frequently attained an authority, the exercise of which was equally adapted to flatter pride and to gratify avarice. The behaviour of Themistocles, after he had acquired sufficient merit with the public to justify his rapacity,

²¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. xxiii.

affords one memorable example of this kind; and we shall meet with many more, in examining the subsequent events of the Grecian history. Instead of remaining at home, in order to concert a plan for repelling the danger which threatened his country, the Athenian commander sailed with a little squadron to the Cyclades, laid these unfortunate islands under an heavy contribution, and without the participation, or even knowledge of his colleagues in command, enriched himself and his favorites²².

On the approach of spring, Mardonius prepared to take the field. His army consisted of the Medes, Persians, Scythians, and Indians; and though reduced from the millions which followed Xerxes to about three hundred thousand men, it was thereby rather delivered from an useless incumbrance, than deprived of any real strength. Before marching from Thessaly, his superstition engaged him to consult the Grecian oracles, and moved probably by an erroneous explanation of their ambiguous responses, he determined to try the effect of negotiation, before he had recourse to arms. He might treat either with individuals, or with communities. By the former method, the Thebans assured him, that he might become master of Greece, without hazarding a battle. "You have only," said they, "to send money to the leading men in the several republics. In this manner you will divide each state into factions; engage them in a civil war;

C H A P.

X.

Mardo-
nius pre-
pares to
open the
campaign.

²² Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv.

C H A P.

X.

Endea-
vours to
detach the
Athenians
from their
allies ;

and, when exhausted by mutual hostilities, they will readily submit to your demands." Mardonius, instead of pursuing this judicious system, which would probably have been successful, sent Alexander, king of Macedon, to treat with such Athenians as had returned to their city. This illustrious ambassador, who boasted an Argive extraction, was the tributary prince of a barbarous country; but of a country destined, in a future age, to attain empire and renown, by the arts of Philip and the arms of his immortal son. The first Alexander was peculiarly well qualified for executing the office with which Mardonius had intrusted him, because his family had long been connected with the republic of Athens, by the sacred ties of hospitality. But his commission was as unwelcome as his visit was acceptable. The Athenians, therefore, delayed calling an assembly to hear and answer his discourse, until the Spartans (who were apprized of the intention of Mardonius) should send ambassadors to assist at the deliberation. When all parties were convened, Alexander declared, "That he was sent on the part of Mardonius, who had received a message from the great king, intimating his will to forgive their past injuries, to reinstate them in their possessions, to rebuild their houses and temples, and to receive them into the number of his friends and confederates." Mardonius then spoke for himself: "What madness, O Athenians, can impel you to maintain war against a monarch, whom you cannot expect *ever* to conquer, nor hope *always* to resist? You are acquainted with the

number and prowess of the troops under my command, which, formidable as they are, make but a small part of the unbounded resources of Xerxes. Every year he can invade you with an increasing superiority of strength; submit, therefore, to a power which it is impossible to oppose; profit, ere it be too late, of the disposition of the great king, and accept the offer of an alliance which folly alone, not fortitude and firmness, can engage you to decline." Alexander endeavoured to add weight to these considerations, by observing, "That his past conduct had uniformly proved the sincerity of his attachment to the Athenians; and that he was firmly convinced of the expedience, and even necessity of the measures now in agitation, otherwise he should not have undertaken to propose them. He therefore exhorted them to reflect on the advantages which would accrue to them from being alone, of all the Greeks, admitted into the alliance of Xerxes, to reflect also on the dreadful consequences which would attend their refusal, since their country, placed as a prize between the contending parties, would thereby be exposed to inevitable destruction²³."

As soon as Alexander had ended his discourse, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors represented to the assembly, "That they had been sent on the part of their republic, to thwart the measures of the Barbarians, with whom, in order to resent the quarrel of her Athenian allies, Sparta had engaged in a bloody and destructive war. Could the Athenians then, for whose sake alone the war which now

C H A P.
X.

but without success.

²³ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxi.

C H A P. extended over all Greece was originally undertaken,
 X. abandon their friends and confederates, whose services they had every reason to approve? Could they associate with Barbarians, whose hostilities they had every reason to resent? Sparta affectionately sympathized with their sufferings, in the loss of their houses and their harvests; yet the confederates in general had endeavoured to prevent or repair the unhappy consequences of their loss: They had maintained their wives and families, supported and educated their helpless children, cherished and sustained the declining years of their parents. Their generosity was not yet exhausted; if the Athenians should be compelled again to abandon their country, they would again find the same hospitable reception in Peloponnesus; and their families, if it became necessary, would be maintained at the common expense, during the continuance of the war. Let them not, therefore, be deceived by the specious words of the tyrant Alexander, who, at the expense of truth, endeavoured to promote the interest of a tyrant like himself. The Athenians ought to remember, that neither justice, nor honor, nor fidelity, can be expected from Tyrants and Barbarians²⁴.” Having thus spoken, the Lacedæmonians, as well as Alexander, withdrew; and the Athenians, after a short deliberation, answered both parties by the voice of Aristides, who, as archon, or chief magistrate, presided in the assembly: First, to the Macedonian they replied, “That as they were sufficiently acquainted with the strength of Xerxes, he might have spared them the insult of

²⁴ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxlii.

describing its vast superiority to their own. Yet, in defence of liberty, there was no power too great to oppose. Return then, and tell Mardonius, that the Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes, while the sun performs his annual course in the heavens; but that, trusting to the assistance of the Gods and Heroes, whose temples and images the tyrant has impiously destroyed, we will resist him to the last extremity. To conclude: Come not a second time to Athens with such messages, the insolence of which may make us forget that you are our friend, and connected with us by the sacred ties of reciprocal hospitality." The answer given to the Lacedæmonian ambassadors was delivered in a still higher strain of patriotism: "That the Barbarians, or even the peasants of Laconia, should suppose us capable of coming to an accommodation with the Persians, does not surprise us; but it is indeed surprising, that you, citizens of Sparta, should entertain the same groundless fears; you, who have so often heard by report, and who, on so many occasions, have yourselves witnessed, the disinterested magnanimity of our republic. Know then, that the richest possessions on earth, that all the treasures of the great king, are not sufficient to seduce our unalterable attachment to Greece. The laws of God and man equally forbid our ingratitude; or if all ties of *duty* were dissolved, our *resentment* against the Persians would restrain us. We must avenge our plundered altars, our prostrate images, our desolated temples. We must avenge the cause of our allies, and our own; for

C H A P. all the Greeks have the same religion, language,
x. lineage, and manners; and, while an Athenian survives, will never, with his consent, make peace with the Barbarians. We acknowledge with gratitude your proffered kindness to our families; but henceforth we hope to provide for them, without giving the confederates any trouble on their account. What we request of you is, that your army march with all possible expedition towards Bœotia, that our united resistance may stop the progress of the Barbarian, who, as soon as he is apprized of our determined hostility, will not fail to proceed southward, to invade Attica a second time²⁵."

The Peloponnesians desert the common cause.

This conjecture was justified by the event. The Persians within a few weeks marched into Bœotia, but the Athenians looked in vain for the expected arrival of their Spartan auxiliaries. To have witnessed the proceedings just described in the Athenian assembly, we should have imagined that there was a generous contest of patriotism between the two republics; and that the happiness and glory of Greece, not the interest of their particular communities, was the great object of their ambition. But the Greeks had often much patriotism in their speeches, when there was little in their hearts; and the Spartans, who had lately employed such powerful arguments to engage Athens in defence of the common cause, totally abandoned their principles whenever it suited their convenience²⁶. Instead of issuing forth in order to support their allies in Bœotia, they

²⁵ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxl. et seqq.

²⁶ Lyfias, Orat. Funeb.

remained within the isthmus, and endeavoured to fortify that inlet into their territory with such additional walls and bulwarks as might render it impenetrable. The work was now complete; and the Peloponnesians, secure, as they imagined, behind this solid rampart, equally disregarded the safety, and despised the resentment, of their northern allies.

C H A P.
X.

The Athenians, a second time forsaken by their confederates, were obliged again to desert their country. They had scarcely sailed to their families in Salamis, when Attica was invaded by the Persians. While the fugitives continued in that island, they received another embassy from Mardonius, offering them the same terms which they had formerly rejected. They still persisted in rejecting them; in consequence of which, they beheld without apparent uneasiness, from the shores of Salamis, their territories²⁷ again laid waste; their cities, and villas, and temples, devoured by the flames; and every thing that had escaped the fury of the first invasion, destroyed or consumed by the second. After committing these ravages, which, as he had already obtained complete possession of the country, deserve to be considered only as the effect of a childish resentment, Mardonius returned into Bœotia, that his troops might be supplied with provisions, and that, should the enemy offer them battle, they might engage in a country better adapted than Attica to the operations of cavalry.

Magnanimity of the Athenians.

²⁷ Herodot. l. ix. c. 1. et seqq.

C H A P.

X.

They re-
monstrate
with their
confede-
rates.

The Athenians, who had been sent from Salamis to remonstrate with the Spartan council against the delays or desertion of the Peloponnesians, were accompanied by the ambassadors of Plataea and Megara, who confirmed their arguments and complaints. With the indignation of disappointed confidence, they upbraided the indifference and lukewarmness of the Spartans in the common cause; sentiments which ill corresponded with their own generous ardor. They contrasted the base treachery of Sparta, formerly the honor, now the disgrace of Greece, with the patriotic magnanimity of Athens. The latter, they observed, compelled by necessity, or urged by resentment of the shameful dereliction on the part of her allies, would doubtless accept the terms offered by Mardonius, and then the Peloponnesians must become sensible, when it was too late, that the wall across the isthmus formed but a partial and feeble defence; and however it might secure them from inroads on the side of the land, would ill protect their coasts against the descents of the Persian, reinforced by the Athenian fleet²⁸.

Persuade
them to
take the
field.

Whether the eloquence of the ambassadors, or the returning sense of public utility, overcame the pusillanimous resolutions formerly embraced by the Spartans, it is certain that they now first determined to take the field. Five thousand Spartan pike-men were accompanied by thirty-five thousand Helots. Their Peloponnesian allies sent their

²⁸ Lyfias, Orat. Funeb.

respective contingents; so that the heavy-armed men raised in the peninsula exceeded twenty thousand, commanded by Pausanias, the guardian and kinsman of Plistarchus, son of Leonidas. Having marched beyond the isthmus, they were joined by Aristides, at the head of eight thousand Athenians, and by a superior number of their allies of Megara, Thespiæ, Plataea, Salamis, Eubœa, and Ægina. The whole heavy-armed troops amounted to nearly forty thousand; the light-armed were the thirty-five thousand Helots, attendants on the Spartans, and about as many more, one to each soldier, attended the other divisions of the army.²⁹

C H A P.
X.

Mardonius having marched into Bœotia, encamped on the banks of the Ælopus. His army of three hundred thousand men, while they waited the enemy's approach, of which they were secretly informed by the Argives, were employed in building a square fortification, about five quarters of a mile in front; a work of little utility, since it could only defend a small portion of a camp which extended many miles, from the Theban town of Erythræa, to the territory of the Platæans. The Greeks having arrived in those parts, took post at the foot of mount Citheron, directly opposite to the enemy.

Mardonius encamps on the Ælopus, in Bœotia;

the Greeks on the opposite bank.

The hostile armies remained eleven days in their encampments, during which several incidents happened, which tend to display the manners and character of those great bodies of men, who were

Incidents preceding the battle of Plataea

²⁹ Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seqq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. et Plut. in Aristid.

E H A P.
X.

soon to attempt the destruction of each other. Of the Grecians inhabiting the countries north of Attica, the Phocians, as we have already had occasion to observe, were the least disposed to embrace the cause of Mardonius. Yet as all their neighbours had submitted to his arms, they reluctantly sent to his camp a thousand soldiers, well armed, and commanded by Harmocydes, a citizen of great influence and authority. They had not continued many days in the Persian army, when an order came from Mardonius (the reason was unknown), for the Phocians to be detached from the rest, and encamped in a separate body on the plain. They had no sooner obeyed his command, than the whole Persian cavalry appeared in fight, and soon formed themselves in hostile array. It immediately occurred to the Phocians, and particularly to their prudent commander, that Mardonius, suspecting their fidelity, or yielding to the solicitations of their inveterate enemies the Thessalians, had determined their destruction. Harmocydes therefore, pointing to the cavalry, called to his companions, "You see those men, who come with an evident intention to destroy us: but let us die like Grecians, and exert ourselves with all the fury of a desperate defence, rather than tamely submit to a dishonorable fate." While he yet spoke, the Phocians seized their arms, arranged themselves in order of battle, and supporting each other in redoubled ranks, presented on every side a firm circle of protended lances. Their warlike appearance struck terror into the surrounding cloud of Barbarians, who

advanced brandishing, and a few of the nearest throwing, their javelins: but farther they ventured not to proceed; the determined countenance of the Greeks sufficed to repel them; they retired in haste to the Persian camp. A herald was then sent by Mardonius, "desiring the Phocians to take courage, nor to dread farther hostilities; that they had shown themselves to be brave men, contrary to the account which he had received of them; and, if they displayed their valor in the Persian cause, they should find it impossible to conquer either Xerxes or himself in good offices"³⁰.

The above relation tends to prove, that none of the Greeks, not even those who joined the enemy, were deficient in courage. Another incident related by the same historian proves, that notwithstanding the extreme folly of their commanders, the Persians were not universally deficient in wisdom. While they were encamped on the Æsopus, a wealthy Theban, named Attaginus, invited Mardonius, with fifty of his most distinguished officers, to a magnificent entertainment. The feast was given at Thebes, and an equal number of Bœotians were called to it. Among these was Therfander, a native of Orchomenus, and a person of the highest distinction in that city. Two of the guests were placed on each couch; and, as Therfander himself related to Herodotus, his Persian companion, after supper, entering into conversation in the Greek tongue, testified, under the seal of secrecy, his gloomy

³⁰ Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seqq.

C H A P. apprehensions concerning the event of the present
X. war. He did not even hesitate to declare his firm persuasion, that few Persians would survive an engagement. When asked by the Theban, Why he did not communicate his opinion to his general? he said, that men of plain sense and honesty had seldom much influence with the great. It appeared from the whole tenor of his discourse, that there were many people in the Persian army, who, like himself, lamented the mad ambition of Xerxes, and the fatal rashness of Mardonius; and who, while they respected their stations and dreaded their power, despised their characters, and condemned their conduct³¹. This observation it is proper to make for the honor of human nature. In absolute governments, it is said that men obey, like a flock of sheep, the voice of a despot; yet it may be said with equal truth, that amidst the obedience extorted by fear, they often see and regret the folly of their shepherd.

Skirmishes
 between
 the Greeks
 and the
 Persian
 cavalry.

In this situation, it was scarcely to be expected that the hostile camps should remain without frequent skirmishes. These preludes to the general engagement ended favorably for the Grecians. Three thousand soldiers, furnished by the rocky district of Megara, were posted on the side most exposed to the enemy's cavalry, by whose incursions they had been so much harassed, that they determined to abandon that difficult station. Before executing their design, they sent a herald to

³¹ Herodot. l. ix. c. xv.

the Grecian generals, intimating the resolution they had taken from necessity, and at the same time hinting the injustice of detaining them, from the time of the first encampment, in a post of peculiar danger, which though they had hitherto indeed maintained with singular constancy and fortitude, they now found themselves unable longer to defend. Pausanias addressed himself successively to the whole army, to know whether any division was willing to change posts with the Megarians. All were silent, or declined the proposal on frivolous pretences. The Athenians alone, actuated by that love of pre-eminence which they did not more ardently desire than they justly deserved, voluntarily offered their services on this trying occasion. They had not long occupied the important post, when the enemy's cavalry began to assault them. The assault they repelled with vigor, and Masistius the Persian general fell in the action. A terrible conflict ensued, according to ancient custom, around the body of the dead. The Athenians at length gained possession of it; though they began to give way before the general attack of the horse, yet upon being supported by a reinforcement from the main body, they again recovered their ground, and compelled the Persians to retire. When the first unwelcome messengers arrived in the camp with an account of their own defeat, and the death of the general, Mardonius and his attendants burst into tears; their lamentations were soon communicated to the troops, and diffused over the army, whose plaintive cries filled the whole land of

C. H. A. P. X. Bœotia. The Persians tore their hair, disfigured their faces, and displayed every symptom of intolerable woe; for they had lost Masistius, who in comeliness and stature was the first of their generals, and in military courage and address only second to Mardonius³².

The
Greeks
move to
Hyfia, in
the terri-
tory of
Platæa.

The Grecians having thus bravely delivered themselves from the incursions of the Persian cavalry, were now exposed to a still greater inconvenience, the scarcity of fresh water, which soon obliged them to decamp. Their late success afforded a favorable moment for executing this dangerous measure. They proceeded in arms along the foot of mount Citheron, prepared to repel the attack of the enemy, by converting the column of march into an order of battle. They arrived without opposition at the place appointed. This was a plain near the village of Hyfia, in the territory of Platæa, interspersed with many gentle eminences, adorned with a grove and temple sacred to the genius of the place, and enriched by the copious fountain Gargaphia; a necessary resource to the Greeks, as the enemy, by means of their cavalry and archers, commanded both sides of the Æfopus.

Dissensions
in the al-
lied army,

It might be expected, that men prepared to defend every thing most dear to them, should have preserved in the field perfect agreement and unanimity; especially as the Greeks, on some occasions at least, seemed sensible that mutual union was necessary for the general safety. When the allies

³² Herodot. l. ix. c. ccxxiv.

on both sides the isthmus had assembled in Attica, they vowed with common consent to the gods, and bound themselves by the most tremendous oaths, to maintain with steadfast adherence an unshaken fidelity to Greece, to prefer liberty to life, to obey the command of their leaders, and to bury their companions slain in battle. Should fortune render them victorious (which to their present ardor seemed scarcely a matter of doubt), they swore never to demolish any city whose inhabitants had concurred with the general voice on this important occasion, and never to rebuild the temples defaced by the Barbarians, but to leave them to the most distant posterity, as a monument of sacrilegious rage, and an incitement to honorable revenge. They swore also to institute an annual festival, denominated the Common Liberty³³, and to consecrate public games and sacrifices to the goddess, the great author of their union, and the venerable object of their worship. But these public-spirited sentiments continued not long to actuate them. We have already had occasion to remark several symptoms of approaching animosity. Their dissensions soon broke out into an open rupture, and prevailed, even on the eve of a battle, not only between rival republics, but in the bosom of almost every community.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Tegeans, about the command of the left wing. Both parties yielded the right, as the place of

between
the Athe-
nians and
Tegeans.

³³ Herodot. l. ix. c. viii. et seqq.

C H A P. X. greatest honor, to the Spartans. But the citizens of Tegea, in number three thousand, had been long deemed the best soldiers in Arcadia; and in all the conjunct expeditions of the Peloponnesians, they had always obtained, unrivalled, the second honors of the field. These they professed themselves unwilling to relinquish, alleging the heroic exploits of their ancient kings; and asserting, "That the actions of the Athenians, performed either during their royal or democratical government, could not bear a comparison with their own: they appealed on this subject to the Lacedæmonians, in conjunction with whom they had often fought and conquered, and whose decision in their favor they rather claimed than requested." This bold pretension the Athenians easily repelled, by the lustre of their usual eloquence. "We know," said they, "that the Greeks are here assembled, not to dispute about precedence, but to fight the Barbarian. Yet, as the Tegeans have mentioned *their* ancestors, it becomes us to maintain the immortal renown of our own. Need we mention their ancient victories over the impious Thebans; their chastisement of the insolent Eurystheus; their generous protection of the unfortunate sons of Hercules? When Greece was invaded by the warlike Amazons, and afterwards by the fiercer savages of Scythia and Thrace, the Athenians resisted and overcame the common enemy, What people fought with more bravery than they in the war of Troy? But perhaps *we*, who now address you, have degenerated from the glory of our ancestors. Let the battle of

Marathon efface the foul suspicion. There, unaided and alone, we defended the general safety, maintained the glory of Greece, and raised, by the prowess of our single republic, a trophy over forty nations. This exploit, had we no other to allege, entitles us to the rank claimed by the Tegeans, and to far higher honors. But the present is not a time for such contests; place us therefore, O Spartans! in whatever station you think fit; there, we will behave like brave men." Their words were scarcely ended, when the whole army of the Lacedæmonians cried out with one consent, "That the Athenians were far more worthy than the Tegeans, or any nation of Arcadia, to stand at the head of the left wing;" and accordingly they assumed that important post³⁴.

Meantime the Barbarian army approached. The Medes and Persians encamped on the plain, fronting the Spartans: the Grecian auxiliaries were placed in direct opposition to the Athenians. It is easy to perceive, even at this distance of time, the reason of such an arrangement. The Persians, avoided to encounter the Athenian bravery, which they had already fatally experienced in the field of Marathon; and as the Thebans were the most powerful and the warmest of their foreign allies, as well as the inveterate enemies of Athens, it was thought proper to oppose them to that side on which the Athenians were posted. Ambiguous oracles, attended by unfavorable omens and

The Persians encamp near the enemy.

³⁴ Herodot. l. ix. c. xxvi. et seqq. Plut. in Aristid.

C H A P. X. prophecies, had hitherto deterred Mardonius from venturing a general engagement; and he was at length determined to this measure, not from any auspicious³⁵ change in the admonitions of heaven, but from the apparent timidity occasioned by the real dissensions of the Greeks.

The
Greeks de-
camp a se-
cond time.

The same reasons which made Mardonius desire to preserve, made Pausanias wish to alter, the relative disposition of their respective camps. Excepting in the glorious contest at Thermopylæ, in which they devoted themselves to death for the safety of their country, the Spartans had never contended with the Medes; but they had often fought and conquered the Bœotians. Pausanias therefore desired (for, though dignified with the title of General, he could not command) the Athenians to change places with his countrymen. This request was cheerfully complied with; but other circumstances sowed dissension in the Athenian camp³⁶. The quiet likewise of the Lacedæmonians was disturbed by the quarrels between Pausanias and Anompharetus, the Spartan next in command; and conspiring with these internal animosities, the Persian horse beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and, by an unexpected incursion, destroyed their watering-place. It thus became

³⁵ The prophets consulted were Greeks, who perhaps secretly served the cause of their country. Mardonius resolved to engage the enemy, as we learn from Herodotus, without regarding their predictions. Alexander of Macedon came in the night to the Grecian camp, to give intimation of that resolution; yet Mardonius seems to have been immediately determined to attack, by the circumstances mentioned in the text.

³⁶ Plutarch, in Aristid.

necessary again to decamp. The obscurity of midnight was chosen as the most convenient time for effecting this purpose; and the destined place of retreat was a narrow slip of ground lying towards the source of the Æsopus, and confined between that river and mount Citheron. This post was at least preferred by the majority; for the Greeks were by no means unanimous: so that when the march was ordered, many of the allies abandoned their leaders; others took refuge in the neighbouring temples, to elude the pursuit of the horse, while Anompharetus the Spartan declared, "That neither he, nor the division under his command, should ever fly from the enemy:" and in consequence of its dispersion in so many different directions, the Grecian army presented next morning the appearance, not of a regular march, but of a flight or rout.

Mardonius was apprized that the Greeks had changed their order of battle. He was now informed, that they had abandoned their camp. Not doubting that fear had precipitated their retreat, he ordered his soldiers to pursue the fugitives, and to complete the victory. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians were still within his reach; the former near the foot of the mountain, the latter in the middle of the plain. Having sent his Grecian auxiliaries, amounting to fifty thousand, against the Athenians, he advanced with the bravest of the Persian troops against that portion of the enemy which had shown an anxious solicitude to avoid his arms. Never did the contrast appear greater, than

C H A P.
X.

Mardo-
nius at-
tacks
them.

C H A P. in the opposite appearance and behaviour of the
 X. hostile armies on this occasion. The Barbarians,
 ill armed, and totally ignorant of discipline, advanced without order, and with a loud insulting noise. The Lacedæmonians, carefully covered with their shields, observed in silence the result of their sacrifices. While the heavenly admonitions were unfavorable, they patiently received the darts and javelins which the enemy threw upon them. But as soon as Pausanias, casting his eyes towards a neighbouring temple of Juno, and devoutly entreating the protection of the goddess, had obtained, in the changing aspect of the victims, a propitious answer to his prayer, they proceeded with intrepidity to close with their opponents³⁷. The Persians, reinforced with the Sacæ, a Scythian tribe, sustained the attack with great bravery. Immense numbers were slain; but new numbers succeeded, crowding together in tumultuous disorder, and making an hideous outcry, as if they had intended to tear in pieces and to devour the enemy. Mardonius, mounted on a white steed of uncommon strength and swiftness, was distinguished in every part of the battle by the splendor of his appearance, but still more by deeds of signal valor. He was attended by a thousand horsemen, consisting of the flower of the Persian nobility, all alike ambitious to imitate the example, and to emulate the fame, of their leader. Had their skill been equal to their courage, or had they previously

The battle
 of Plataea.

³⁷ Herodot. l. ix. c. lxii. et seqq.

bestowed as much pains in disciplining their troops, as in improving their own agility and address, either the Greeks must have been conquered, or the battle must have remained doubtful. But the Barbarians acted without union or concert; and as they fought singly, were successively defeated. It is the nature, and the greatest disadvantage of cavalry, not to increase in force in proportion to the reduplication of their ranks. The Grecian phalanx, on the other hand, received an accession of strength from every addition to its depth; the ranks behind supported those before; no power was mispent or unexerted; and the effect might be continually augmented, till it became irresistible. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the Lacedæmonians thickened their ranks, extended their spears, sustained the shock, and penetrated the depth, of the brave Persian squadron. Mardonius fell by the fortunate arm of the Spartan Aieimnestus³⁸. The death of the general was immediately followed by the defeat of the Persians, and the defeat of the Persians by the flight of the Barbarian army. Artabazus, the Parthian chief, had from the beginning condemned the rash measures of Mardonius. He commanded forty thousand men, who were prepared on every occasion to follow the example of their leader. As soon as he

Death of
Mardo-
nius, and
defeat of
the Barba-
rians.

³⁸ Composed of two Greek words, which may be translated "of immortal memory:" an instance, among many, that the Greeks frequently gave names characteristic of persons; a custom which likewise prevailed much among the Jews. See Michaelis's Translation and Annotations on Genesis, p. 37. et passim.

C H A P. X. perceived the confusion of the Persians, he made the signal for his troops to quit the field. He conducted them through the territory of the Phocians, and arriving by hasty marches at the Hellespont, before the news of the defeat and death of Mardonius, returned in safety to the Asiatic coast, with the forces intrusted to his care ³⁹.

Defeat of
their auxi-
liaries.

The remainder of the discomfited Barbarians sought refuge in their camp, which, as we have already mentioned, had been strengthened by a considerable fortification. The Spartans pursued them with great ardor, but were unable to force their encampment. The Tegeans and other troops seconded the attack, but no impression could be made on the wall, till the arrival of the Athenians. These generous defenders of the cause of liberty had repulsed the Grecian auxiliaries, who impiously assisted the enemies of their country. The behaviour of the greater part of the traitors furnished the occasion of an easy victory; for, unable to meet the just reproaches and indignant looks of their countrymen, they soon betook themselves to flight, which, in the present case, seemed more honorable than resistance. The Thebans alone opposed with great perseverance the Athenian valor; they did not desist from hostility, till several hundreds were slain; and when compelled to quit the field, they fled towards Bœotia, and shut themselves up within the strong walls of their city. Instead of pursuing these fugitives, though their

³⁹ Herodot. l. ix. c. lxxv.

domestic and inveterate foes, the Athenians, with a laudable moderation and prudence, probably inspired by Aristides, then one of their generals, directed their march towards the Lacedæmonian forces, which had already engaged and put to flight the main strength of the enemy. The Athenians, however, came in time to complete the glory of that memorable day. They attacked with redoubled vigor the fortification, which had been in vain assailed by their allies; and having effected a breach in the wall, entered the Persian camp. They were followed by the brave soldiers of Tegea, and afterwards, by the Spartans. The Barbarians were seized with consternation at seeing so many myriads confined within a narrow space. The means of their expected safety became the principal cause of their destruction. Fear hindered them to fight; the wall hindered them to fly; the great number of the enemy made it dangerous for the victors to give quarter; resentment of past injuries prompted them to revenge; of near two hundred thousand Barbarians, not two thousand escaped the fury of the Grecian spear⁴⁰.

The Persians massacred in their camp.

The event of this bloody engagement not only delivered the Greeks from the danger of servitude, but gave them possession of greater wealth than they could ever have expected to possess. In his precipitate retreat from Greece, Xerxes left behind him all his riches and magnificence. His most valuable effects were bestowed on Mardonius, the

The valuable booty found there.

⁴⁰ Herodot. l. ix. cap. c.

C H A P. flatterer of his inclinations, and the unfortunate
 X. minister of his revenge. The rest was divided
 among his inferior favorites; and independent of
 the bounty of the prince, the tents of the Persian
 nobles furnished a wide profusion of elegance and
 splendor. Couches magnificently embroidered;
 tables of gold and silver; bowls and goblets of
 gold; stalls and mangers of brass, curiously
 wrought and ornamented; chains, bracelets, scy-
 mitars, some of solid gold, others adorned with
 precious stones; and, to crown all, many chests
 of Persian money, which began at that time, and
 continued long afterwards, to be current in Greece.
 Among the common mass of spoil, Herodotus
 reckons a great many Persian women, besides in-
 numerable horses and camels. The whole being
 collected into one place, the tenth was consecrated
 to the gods. A tenth of the remainder was be-
 stowed on the general. Peculiar presents were
 offered to the temples of Olympian Jove, Isth-
 mian Neptune, and Delphian Apollo, the favorite
 divinities of the whole Grecian name; nor did the
 Athenians forget to show particular gratitude to
 their adored Minerva. Prizes were afterwards
 distributed among the bravest of the surviving
 warriors; for though the victory had been obtained
 with little blood, yet several hundreds had fallen,
 especially of the most generous and daring; among
 whom were ninety-one Spartans, fifty-two Athenians
 and sixteen men of Tegea. Callicratides, a Spar-
 tan, the bravest and most beautiful of the Greeks,
 was slain by an arrow, before Pausanias, who had
 not

How ap-
plied.

not yet finished the sacrifice, had given the signal of engagement. As he fell, he said to those around him, that he was contented to die for Greece, but regretted dying ingloriously, having performed nothing worthy of himself or the common cause. But in the battle itself none of the warriors behaved with such distinguished bravery as Aristodemus, who alone of three hundred Spartans survived the action at Thermopylæ. This circumstance had rendered him contemptible in the eyes of his countrymen. He was continually upbraided with the base desertion of his companions. The most heroic deeds could not restore him to the good opinion of the public; and it was asserted by the Spartans, that even on the present occasion, as he had determined to seek a voluntary death in order to efface the stain of his former infamy, he was not entitled to any of those honors which are deservedly bestowed on the genuine efforts of spontaneous valor⁴¹.

The Greeks buried their dead with every circumstance of funeral pomp, erected in the field of battle conspicuous trophies of their renown, and appropriated about twenty thousand pounds for dedicating temples and statues to the tutelary deities of Platæa, the illustrious scene of victory. A few days were spent in these transactions; after which it was determined, by universal consent, to march into Bœotia, in order to chastise the perfidy of the Thebans. On the eleventh day after the

The confederate Greeks chastise the perfidy of the Thebans.

⁴¹ Herodot. l. ix. c. lxx.

C H A P. X. battle they arrived in the neighbourhood of Thebes, ravaged the territory, and made approaches to the walls. The citizens, who were not all equally guilty or equally obnoxious, escaped general destruction by surrendering the leaders of the faction which abetted the interest of the Medes. The traitors were carried to Corinth, condemned without trial, and sacrificed to the manes of their countrymen who had fallen at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, in defence of political liberty and national independence⁴².

Battle of
Mycalé in
Ionia.

The battle of Plataea was fought the twenty-second of September; and on the same day another battle, not less glorious or less decisive, was fought between the same nations at the promontory of Mycalé in Ionia, opposite to the isle of Samos. The shattered remnant of the Persian fleet, which had escaped destruction on the fatal twentieth of October of the preceding year, took refuge in the friendly ports of Asia Minor. The victorious armament had suffered too much in repeated shocks with a superior force, to engage at that late season in the pursuit of an enemy, whose strength, amounting to above four hundred vessels, was still nearly the double of their own. The little squadron of Themistocles, averse to inactivity, found occupation, as we already had occasion to notice, in laying the islands of the Ægean under contribution. The great body of the fleet rendezvoused in the harbours of Ægina. There the Grecians continued during the winter, and before the season for action approached,

⁴² Herodot. l. ix. c. lxxxv.

the command was bestowed on Xantippus the Athenian, and on Leotychides the Spartan king. To these commanders, whose abilities and influence in their respective republics we formerly had an opportunity to mention, there arrived early in the spring a secret deputation from several cities of Ionia, entreating that the valor of the European Greeks, which had been so successfully employed in their own defence, might be still farther exerted in delivering from bondage their brethren in Asia. In consequence of this invitation the fleet sailed eastward, and had scarcely reached the coast of Delos, when a second embassy came from the Samians, proposing the same measures as the first, and farther adding, that the Persian fleet, now lying in the harbour of Samos, might be attacked and defeated without danger or difficulty. The Grecians seized with eagerness the favorable opportunity of terminating the war; but before they arrived at Samos, the enemy suspecting their motions, and unwilling to hazard another engagement at sea, had retired to the Ionic coast, and according to the custom of that age, not only drawn their ships on shore, but surrounded them with a ditch and palisade, and even a stone wall of considerable strength. The vessels thus secured, the sailors amounting to forty thousand, commanded by Artayndes, formed a camp along the shore. They were reinforced by the Persian army under Tigranes, computed at sixty thousand. It appears not whether this powerful body of men made any attempt to disturb the landing of the Greeks, who at the highest computation

C H A P. could not amount to a fourth part of their
 X. number. It seems most probable that they dis-
 dained this measure, and though they acknow-
 ledged their inferiority at sea, determined to hazard
 at land a general engagement, in which the isles
 and Hellespont, as well as the flourishing cities of
 the Asiatic coast, should form the important prize
 of victory.

The
 Greeks
 victorious.

The Greeks did not decline the battle. Xan-
 tippus is said to have made use of a similar con-
 trivance with that employed by Themistocles at
 Artemisium, for depriving the enemy of their
 Grecian auxiliaries⁴³. A more probable stratagem
 is ascribed to Leotychides, who, in order to en-
 courage his troops, is said to have industriously
 spread a report that their countrymen had ob-
 tained a signal victory at Platæa. This report,
 by whatever means⁴⁴ it was raised and circulated,
 had doubtless a considerable effect in deciding the
 fortune of the day. Other circumstances, not less
 powerful, were, the general revolt of the Asiatic
 Greeks, and the silent contest of honor between
 the Spartans and Athenians. Among the Bar-
 barian troops the Persians behaved with uncom-
 mon bravery; and on the side of the Grecians,

⁴³ The story is improbable, because the Asiatic Greeks had al-
 ready declared their intention to revolt. It was not the interest of
 Xantippus, therefore, to make the Persians suspect their fidelity,
 since treacherous friends are always more dangerous than open
 enemies.

⁴⁴ Herodotus (l. ix. cap. c.) and Diodorus (l. xi. cap. xxxv.)
 differ in their accounts.

the battle of Mycalé was more bloody than any other fought in the course of the war. It deserves attention, that, in all these memorable actions, the Greeks had no resource but in victory. But the Barbarians had provided probable means of safety, even in case of a defeat. On the present occasion they had endeavoured not only to secure a retreat within a strongly fortified camp, but to acquire an undisturbed passage through the narrow defiles of Mycalé. Yet all their precautions were ineffectual against the valor and fortune of the Greeks. The Milesians, posted by the enemy to guard the passes of the mountain, prevented, instead of promoting, their escape. The Spartans pursued them with great slaughter in that direction; while the Athenians, assisted by the allies of Corinth, Sicyon, and Trœzené, advanced with undaunted bravery to attack their camp. The Asiatic Greeks, who at all times acknowledged the warlike pre-eminence of their European brethren, emulated, in the present engagement alone, in which they fought for every thing dear to them, the admired valor of their ancestors. Above forty thousand Persians perished in the field; many fell in the pursuit, or in defending their intrenchments; the remainder fled in disorder, nor thought themselves secure till they had reached the walls of Sardis. Their ships, their camp, the freedom of Ionia, and the undisturbed possession of the Asiatic coast, formed the inestimable prize of

Conclu-
sion and
confe-
quences of
the Persian
invasion.

CHAP. the victors; and thus the expedition of Xerxes,
 .X. undertaken with a view to enslave Europe, re-
 stored liberty to the fairest portion of Asia."

Herodotus, l. ix. c. xc. — c. cxiv; Diodorus Siculus, l. xi.
 c. xxxiv. — c. xxxviii.

Conclusion
 of the Persian
 invasion
 of Greece
 and
 the
 recovery of
 the Pelopon-
 nesus

CHAP. XI.

Military Glory of Greece. — Enemies to whom that Country was exposed. — Foundation and Growth of Carthage. — The flourishing Condition of Magna Græcia — Excites the Jealousy of the Carthaginians — Who enter into a League with Xerxes. — The Object of this Alliance. — Causes of the singular Prosperity of Magna Græcia. — History of Pythagoras, and of his Philosophy. — The Carthaginians invade Sicily. — Their Disasters. — Glory of Gelon. — His Treaty with the Carthaginians. — Causes of the Decay of Magna Græcia.

THE beginning of the fifth century before Christ forms the most glorious æra in the history of Greece. While the republics of Athens and Sparta humbled the pride of Asia, the flourishing settlements on the Hellespont and the Hadriatic overawed the fierce Barbarians of Europe¹; and the southern colony of Cyrené restrained, within their native limits, the savage ferocity of the Libyans². The north, south, and

CHAP.
XI.

State of
Greece.
Olymp.
lxxv. r.
A C. 480.

¹ Herodot. l. vi. Thucyd. l. i.

² Strabo, l. xvii.

C H A P. XI. east thus acknowledging the ascendant of the Grecian valor and genius, Rome still contended in the west, with the obstinacy of the Volsci³, for the rude villages of Latium: yet on this side, from which the stream of conquest was destined, in a future age, to flow over the world, the Greeks had already most danger to apprehend, and most laurels to acquire; not, however, from Rome, but from the implacable⁴ enemy of the Roman name.

The foundation and growth of Carthage,

The foundation and growth of Carthage, which have been so successfully adorned by poetical fiction, are very imperfectly explained in history. It is known, that at least eight hundred and ninety years⁵ before the Christian æra, a Phœnician colony settled on that fertile projecture of the African coast, which boldly advances into the Mediterranean, to meet, as it were, and to defy the shores of Sicily and Italy, planted in the following century by Greeks, with whom the republic of Carthage, long before the age of her great Hannibal, waged many

³ Diodor. l. xi.

⁴ With what energy does Virgil express the eternal enmity between Rome and Carthage!

Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus undas,

Imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotes. Æneid. l. iv.

⁵ B. C. 891. Petav. de Doctr. Temporum. Yet, as there is a gap in the Carthaginian history of several centuries, every man of taste will be desirous of extending the duration of this dark and unknown period, to have the pleasure of believing that Æneas and Dido were contemporaries: an opinion more probable than that of Sir Isaac Newton, who would bring down the time of Æneas and the æra of the Trojan war to the age of Dido and the foundation of Carthage.

cruel and bloody wars. For three centuries after their establishment, the Carthaginians seem to have silently but successfully availed themselves of the natural fertility of their soil, the convenience of their harbours, the skill and dexterity of their artisans, the adventurous spirit of their mariners; above all, of the profound wisdom of their government, which had been established on such admirable principles, that, from the foundation of their city till the age of the philosopher Aristotle⁶, no tyrant had oppressed the freedom, no sedition had disturbed the tranquillity of Carthage⁷.

From this peaceful and happy obscurity the Carthaginians first emerged into notice in consequence of their opposition to the naval enterprises of the Asiatic Greeks, who, about the middle of the sixth century before Christ, flying the oppressive domination of Persia, threw themselves on the western shores and islands of the Mediterranean. As a maritime and enterprising nation the Greeks were naturally the rivals of the Carthaginians; and the Phocæans, who had left the coast of Ionia to avoid the cruel tyranny of the satrap Harpalus, had landed at, or perhaps founded, Aleria in the isle of Corsica,

which opposes the naval enterprises of the Greeks.

⁶ Aristot. de Repub. l. ii. c. xi.

⁷ If Dido laid the foundation of so much prosperity and happiness, she might boast, with becoming dignity, of having secured immortal fame:

Vixi, et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi,

Urbem præclaram statui, mea mœnia vidi:

Et nunc magna mei sub terris ibit imago. VIRGIL, *ibid.*

C H A P.
XI.

before they finally settled at Velia^{*} in Italy, and Marseilles in Gaul[†]. The Carthaginians, who had already formed establishments in Corsica, regarded the whole island as a dependence of their republic, and set themselves to oppose with vigor the Grecian invaders. From a similar motive the Tuscans embraced the same design; and the most ancient naval engagement, distinctly recorded in history, was fought in the Sardinian sea, between the Phocæans with sixty sail on the one side, against the Tuscans and Carthaginians with double that number on the other^{1°}. The Greeks had the whole glory of the battle; they destroyed forty of the enemy's ships, and compelled the rest to fly. But the smallness of their numbers, greatly diminished by their desperate efforts in defence of the honor of their nation against a superior force, obliged them to abandon the project of settling in Corsica.

Hinders
them from
settling in
Corsica.

Power and
splendor
of Car-
thage.
Olymp.
lxx. i.
A. C. 500.

Though the issue of this memorable sea-fight tends to dispel the cloud of fiction concerning the remote voyages and ancient naval power of the Carthaginians, yet it cannot be doubted, that in the beginning of the following century, and before the invasion of Xerxes, they were the most powerful commercial nation in the world. The proud centre of their empire was surrounded by a cluster of colonies and tributary cities, which extended

^{*} Diodor. l. v. and Cluverius Sicil. Ant. p. 507.

[†] Thucyd. l. i. ^{1°} Id. ibid. et Herodot. l. vi.

above a thousand miles ¹¹ along the coast of Africa. They were masters of Sardinia and the northern coast of Sicily ¹². They had established colonies not only in Corsica, but in Malta and the Balearian isles. They often visited the Casseterides. They probably first discovered the Canaries, whose equable and happy temperature entitled them to the epithet of Fortunate. They had appropriated the gold mines of Spain, the Peru and Mexico of the ancient world ¹³; and all these advantages being directed by the prudent enterprise of the magistrates, consisting chiefly of merchants ¹⁴, and improved by the patient

¹¹ From the western boundary of Cyrenaica to the Straits of Gibraltar, Shaw reckons 1420 geographical miles; but this was the extent of the Carthaginian dominion in the greatest splendor of the republic. SHAW'S Travels, p. 150.

¹² Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

¹³ Auctor. apud Hendreich, Respub. Carthag. l. i.

¹⁴ In this respect the government of Carthage was very different from that of Crete, and particularly of Sparta, with both which Aristotle compares it. Isocrates (ad Nicoclem) says, that in civil affairs the Carthaginian government was aristocratical; in military, royal: this probably was the case in the earliest times. The chief magistrates were called Suffetes, which, in the Hebrew language, signifies judges (Bochart, Canaan), and might therefore be naturally translated by the word βασιλεις, in Greek. But it appears from Aristotle, that these judges or kings, who were two in number, were nothing more than annual magistrates, who convoked the senate, and presided in that assembly. When the senate and the suffetes were of one mind, the people had no vote in the management of public affairs; but when their opinions were different, it belonged to the people to decide. Aristotle regards this as an imperfection in their constitution; and time justified his opinion. In a commercial republic, where the people gradually become more rich and more licentious, such a regulation naturally tended to throw too much power into their hands. During the century which elapsed from Aristotle to Hannibal, the people of Carthage became more powerful than the senate; at Rome

C H A P. industry of the people, who knew that by gaining
 XI. wealth they must attain respect, rendered Carthage
 the centre of general commerce. From Egypt
 they imported linen and the papyrus; the coasts of
 the Red Sea furnished them with spices, perfumes,
 gold, pearls, and precious stones¹⁵. The rich car-
 pets of Persia adorned the palaces of the Cartha-
 ginian magistrates. From Spain they drew the
 precious metals necessary to facilitate their com-
 merce; and from Britain and other provinces of
 the north they derived iron, lead, tin, and copper,
 equally necessary to second all the efforts of their
 industry. The Carthaginian exports consisted part-
 ly in the produce of their fertile soil, but chiefly in
 the ingenious labors of their artificers; grains,
 fruits, honey, leather, and flax of a superior kind¹⁶;
 naval stores, particularly ropes made of a species of
 broom called spartum; household furniture, toys,
 and the materials of the highly valued *Punicean*
 color. Their mechanic arts had attained a de-
 gree of perfection which was acknowledged and
 admired by their enemies¹⁷; but the liberal arts,
 and particularly poetry and eloquence¹⁸, seem never

the senate were more powerful than the people: and to these circum-
 stances chiefly, the most judicious author of antiquity ascribes the
 very different fortune of the two nations in the ever memorable wars
 waged between them. POLYB. l. vi

¹⁵ Pliny, l. xxxviii. c. vii. tells us, that carbuncles were so
 common in Carthage, that they were generally known by the name of
 Carthaginian.

¹⁶ Xenophon, de Venatione.

¹⁷ Cato de Re Rusticâ, et Valerius Maximus, l. vii.

¹⁸ The great Hannibal was a lover of Greek learning, and composed
 several books in that language. Cornelius Nepos in Hannibal.

to have flourished or taken root in their republic; a circumstance more fatal to the renown of Carthage than all the destructive ravages of the Romans, whose immortal hate would have found it more difficult to abolish the elegant inventions of genius, than to extinguish the most splendid monuments of wealth and grandeur.

Few individuals are able to enjoy, without abusing, the gifts of fortune; and no nation ever possessed power, without aspiring at conquest. But the commercial ambition of the Carthaginians was distinguished by an exclusive and jealous spirit, which sought to stifle the activity and improvements of every people that might ever become their rival. In the end of the sixth century before Christ, and twenty-eight years before the invasion of Xerxes, they concluded a treaty with Rome, recently delivered from the tyranny of its kings, which marks the utmost solicitude to prevent the new republic from ever entering into correspondence, or ever gaining acquaintance¹⁹ with the dependences of Carthage. The Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, which, within the course of sixty years, had (for

C H A P.
XI.

The ambitious and jealous spirit of that republic.

The prosperity of Greece alarms the Carthaginians,

Silenus, another Carthaginian, wrote history in Greek. Cicer. de Divinat. Sallust speaks of *Punic books* in his history of the Jugurthine war; and we know that Mago's Treatise of Rural Oeconomy, in 28 books, was translated by order of the Roman senate, although the elder Cato had previously handled that important subject. I mention not the spurious voyage of Hanno, since better proofs of the Carthaginian literature may be found in the second and eighteenth books of Pliny. But two observations naturally present themselves, which justify what is said in the text; first, that the Carthaginians wrote rather on the useful than ornamental arts; and secondly, that their greatest writers preferred the Greek to the Punic language.

¹⁹ Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

C H A P.

XI.

who enter
into an al-
liance with
Xerxes.

reasons that will immediately be explained) received such accessions of strength and splendor, as entitled those countries to the appellation of Magna Græcia²⁰, more justly alarmed the jealousy, and provoked the envious resentment of the Carthaginian magistrates. The Greeks were already masters of the eastern isles and shores of the Mediterranean. They were not only a warlike, but an ingenious and commercial nation. The naval force of the Phocæans alone had defied and disgraced the united fleets of the Tuscans and Carthaginians. The latter therefore beheld, with the utmost satisfaction, the continual sparks of hostility that broke out between the Greeks and Persians. They learned, with admiration and delight, the mighty preparations of Xerxes; but were still more delighted when the great king, who had been accustomed to receive the presents and the adulation of the tributary princes of Asia, condescended to demand an equal alliance with their republic; probably granted them subsidies to raise troops in Spain, Gaul, and the northern parts of Italy; and only required them to join their efforts with his own, to punish, and, if possible, to extirpate the natural enemies of both. The crafty Africans greedily accepted propositions, seemingly so favorable to their interest; and, after three years preparations, had collected an armament of two thousand ships of war, and three thousand transports, to convey an army of three hundred thousand men into Magna Græcia²¹. It was determined between the confederates, that while Xerxes poured his millions into the centre of Greece,

²⁰ Strabo, l. viii. p. 339.²¹ Herodot. l. vii. et Diodor l. xi.

and rooted out the original stock of the devoted nation, the Carthaginians should cut off its flourishing branches in Italy and Sicily. The terms of the agreement were carefully observed; the combined attack was made at the time appointed; and Europe is interested in knowing to what particular causes must be ascribed the failure of expeditions, which, if successful, would probably have inverted her destiny, and deprived her of the boasted superiority which she thenceforth maintained over the other quarters of the world.

C H A P.
XI.

Their views in adopting this measure.

Whoever has observed the desolate barbarity of Calabria, or reflected on the narrow extent and present weakness of Sicily, cannot hear, without a mixture of surprise and incredulity, that five centuries before Christ, those countries contained above twenty warlike communities, several of whom could send into the field an hundred thousand fighting men. The hasty glance of impatient ignorance will confidently reject, on this subject, the evidence of antiquity, as contrary to probability and experience; the contemplative visionary will admit the fact, and deduce from it many gloomy reflections on the old age and decay of the world; but the more practical philosopher will attempt to discover the causes of the ancient and actual state of Magna Græcia, in the history and institutions of that country during the respective periods of time which are the objects of his research.

The flourishing condition of Magna Græcia.

The establishments of Eubœan Cumæ, the mother of Parthenopé, or Naples, and the foundation of a few other Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily,

History of the colonization of that country.

C H A P. XI. remounts, as already mentioned, to the heroic ages; but by far the greater number of Greek colonies in those parts were planted during the eighth century before the Christian æra²², and chiefly, 1. by the Eubœans, whose principal city, Chalcis, usually furnishing the conductor of the colony, gave the epithet of Chalcidian to the new settlements; 2. by the Achæans of Peloponnesus, who were of the Eolian tongue and lineage; and, 3. by the Dorian states of that peninsula, especially Corinth; to which city may be applied the observation of ancient republicans concerning the fathers of Cato and Brutus, that as children often derived lustre from the merit of their parents, so Corinth acquired renown from the splendor and prosperity of its children. Besides their powerful colonies in Corcyra, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, whose transactions form such an important part of the history of ancient Greece, the Corinthians founded Syracuse, which soon became, and long continued, the capital of Sicily. Seventy years after their establishment there, the inhabitants of Syracuse built Acras, and afterwards, at an equal distance of time, Camerina. Many other cities of less note owed their birth to the same metropolis; so that in the sixth century before Christ, the Syracusans had extended their settlements over all the southern coast of the island²³. We had

The Do-
rian colo-
nies most
powerful
in Sicily.
Olymp.
xi. 2.
A. C. 729.

²² Between the 10th and 30th Olympiads, and the years 737 and 777 B. C.

²³ Scymnus, v. 293. Thucyd. l. vi. et Herodot. l. vii.

already

already an opportunity to mention on what occasion the Lacedæmonians founded the city of Tarentum in Italy; thirty-nine years afterwards, Rhegium was built by the Messenians and Chalcidians, the former of whom (as we have related above) had already settled at Messenê, on the opposite shore of Sicily. The citizens of Tarentum founded Heraclea, situated on the Tarentine gulph, and perhaps gave an accession of inhabitants to Locri, which, though originally planted by the Eolians, seems early to have used the Doric dialect. The Rhodians, who were also of the Doric race, built the city of Gela in Sicily, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse²⁴; and Gela planted the flourishing colony of Agrigentum, which soon surpassed the splendor of its metropolis, and became the second city in the island.

By means of these powerful establishments, the Dorians acquired, and always maintained, an ascendant in Sicily; but the Achæan colonies, who were of the Eolian blood and language²⁵, commanded the Italian shore. Crotona, the most considerable city of the Achæans, and of all Italy in ancient times, was built seven hundred and ten years before Christ²⁶. Sybaris, its rival, was founded about the same time, and by the same nation. The former sent colonies to Tirina,

C H A P.

XI.

Olymp.

viii. 2.

A. G. 707.

Olymp.

xlix. 3.

A. G. 582.

The Eolian, in Italy.

²⁴ Thucyd. l. vi.

²⁵ Strabo, l. viii. p. 513. assures us of the latter circumstance, which is of more importance than the uncertain genealogy of the ancient Grecian tribes.

²⁶ Dionys. Halicarn. l. ii.

C H A P. Caulonia, and Pandosia; the latter built Laus,
 XI. Metapontum, and Posidonia, or Pæstum²⁷, whose
 admired ruins attest the ancient wealth and grandeur of the Greek cities of Italy.

The Ionians
 are the
 weakest in
 both countries.

In this deduction, had we followed the order of time, we ought to have mentioned, first of all, the Ionian colonies, who came from the isle of Eubœa. The inhabitants of that island built Naxos in Sicily, a year before the foundation of Syracuse²⁸; but neither that, nor their settlements at Catana, Egesta, Leontium, ever attained considerable populousness or splendor. And it deserves to be particularly remarked, that, for reasons which will appear in the sequel of this work, the Ionians, who settled chiefly near the eastern shore of Sicily, never rivalled the power and fame of their Dorian and Eolian neighbours, but fell short of those nations in Magna Græcia, as much as they surpassed them in the shores and islands of Asia.

General
 causes of
 the wealth
 and populousness of
 all these
 colonies.

Instead of fatiguing the memory of our readers with the names of less considerable states or cities, which had little influence on the general affairs of the whole country²⁹, it is of more importance to

²⁷ Scymnus, v. 245.

²⁸ Thucyd. l. vi.

²⁹ The Magna Græcia, which I always use in the sense of Strabo, cited above, to denote the Greek settlements in Sicily as well as Italy, being the most accessible part of the Grecian dominions, has been more fully described by the moderns than any other. The immense collection of the Thesaurus Siculus, and particularly vols. i. iv. vii. viii. and xiii. afford useful materials, as well as Cluverii Sicil. Antiqua, and Fazellus de Rebus Siculis, and the excellent work of Gio. Balt. Caruso, Memorie istoriche di quanto è accaduto in Sicilia dal tempo de' suoi primi abitanti fino ai Normanni.

examine the circumstances to which the inhabitants of Magna Græcia owed their flourishing situation at the period of time of which we write, when (it may be boldly affirmed) these colonies equalled, and exceeded, the wealth and power of the mother-country. We shall not insist on the well-known physical and moral causes which usually contribute to the rapid growth of newly-established colonies. It is evident, that amidst the equality of fortune, and simplicity of manners, which commonly prevail in such communities, men who have a wide country before them must naturally multiply far beyond the proportion of nations corrupted and weakened by the vices of wealth, luxury, and above all, of vanity, which perhaps is the greatest enemy to the increase of the human species. It is sufficient barely to mention the natural fertility of Magna Græcia, and particularly of Sicily, which in many places produced an hundred fold³⁰. The Greeks who sailed thither from Peloponnesus, carried with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which had early attained an high degree of perfection in their peninsula; and the exuberant soil of Sicily, improved by cultivation, soon exhibited a picture of that rich abundance, which, in later times, made that beautiful island be entitled the granary of Rome³¹.

C H A P.
XI.

Olymp.
lxx. i.
A. C. 500.

The peculiar situation of the Achæans and Dorians, from whom, chiefly, the colonies in Magna Græcia derived their origin, had a considerable

Particular
causes.
The A-
chæan
laws.

³⁰ Strabo, l. viii.

³¹ Diodorus, l. xvi,

C H. A P. XI. influence in accelerating the population and grandeur of these new establishments. The Achæans, whose republic became so famous in later times, and that in consequence of circumstances which it is necessary at present to describe, originally inhabited a long, but narrow strip of ground, not more fertile than extensive, along the Corinthian gulph, whose rocky shores were destitute of good harbours³². But the impartial and generous spirit of the Achæan laws early compensated the natural defects of their territory. They were the first, and long the only republic of Greece, who admitted strangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens³³. In *their* truly free country, no powerful capital, like Thebes in Bœotia, or Athens in Attica, domineered over the inferior towns and villages. Twelve cities, which had common laws and institutions, and afterwards common weights and measures³⁴, sent deputies to Helicé, which is distinguished by Homer³⁵ as the most considerable town of Achaia. That place being destroyed by an earthquake³⁶ three hundred and seventy-three years before Christ, Ægæ became the seat of the general congress, which regulated public affairs, and appointed annual

³² Plutarch, in Arato, p. 1031.

³³ Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

³⁴ Polybius, *ibid.* mentions this circumstance, to show how desirous they were to have every thing common and equal among them.

³⁵ Il. ii. in the catalogue.

³⁶ Strabo, l. viii. p. 589. says, the earthquake happened two years before the battle of Leuctra, which was fought 371 years before Christ.

magistrates and generals to execute their resolutions, who were accountable to the congress, or council, as the members of the council themselves were to the cities by which they had been named and constituted³⁷. This excellent system of government, which checked the ambition, while it maintained the independence of Achaia³⁸, defended that fortunate country against the convulsions which shook and overwhelmed the most powerful republics of Greece. It was then that the Achæans, who during many ages had enjoyed their equitable laws in silence, emerged from obscurity; and communicating their government on equal terms to the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, preserved the feeble spark of liberty, every where extinguished around them, for one hundred and thirty-six years, till they finally yielded to the power and policy of Rome³⁹. This short period of war and tumult has been minutely described in history, while the many happy centuries that preceded it are but occasionally glanced at by ancient writers: And were it not for the defeats and calamities which the Achæans suffered in later times, we should, perhaps, be ignorant that their ancestors anciently possessed an equitable and generous policy, which being transported with them into Magna Græcia, could not fail to promote the happiness and prosperity of that delightful country⁴⁰.

C H A P.

XI.

A. C. 281.

³⁷ Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

³⁸ Schook. Achaia, apud. Gronov. Thes. t. v.

³⁹ Polyb. Excerpt. Legat. et Titus Livius, l. xxxviii. et xxxix.

⁴⁰ Xenophon, in his Greek history, speaks of the excellence of the Achæan laws, in treating a passage of history which will be related

C H A P.

XI.

The state
of the Do-
rians at the
time of
their emi-
gration to
Magna
Græcia.

Circum-
stances fa-
vorable to
the new
settlers in
that coun-
try.

The condition of the Dorians, at the time when they planted colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not less worthy of remark. The Dorian states of Peloponnesus were then universally subject to the gentle government of limited but hereditary princes, or to magistrates chosen from the descendants of their ancient royal families ⁴¹, and who, thus adorned by birth, were sometimes still more ennobled by wisdom and virtue ⁴². It is the nature of colonies to preserve with affectionate respect the institutions of the mother-country, which often improve by transplantation, and thrive and flourish in foreign lands, when they have withered and perished in the soil which originally produced and propagated them. Time and accident, and the various causes which have been explained in the course of this history, tended to change the ancient constitution, and to diminish the strength of the Grecian states on both sides the Corinthian Isthmus. While fierce and frequent wars exhausted their population, the exclusive spirit of republican jealousy, which sternly refused strangers any participation in their government, or any in the sequel Polybius was evidently engaged to enter deeper into this subject, by the reason assigned in the text.

⁴¹ These were properly the only nobility in Greece; they were called *ευπατρίδαι*, and long held sway in all the Grecian states. S. Petitus has collected the most important passages concerning them in his commentary on the ancient Athenian law, “*Τῆς Εὐπατρίδας γινώσκειν τὰ θεία, καὶ παρεχεῖν ἀρχοντας, καὶ νόμων διδασκαλὸς εἶναι, καὶ ὅσιων καὶ ἱερῶν ἐξηγῆται.*” “That the Eupatridæ, or nobility, administer the rites of religion, fill the offices of magistracy, interpret the laws, and explain all sacred and divine matters.”

⁴² Thucyd. l. i.

protection from their laws, naturally repressed their vigor and stunted their growth. The colonies in Magna Græcia, enjoying a wide territory before them, had not the same interference of interest, and found sufficient employment in subduing the original inhabitants of that country, without commencing hostilities against each other. Nor were they more ambitious to subdue the barbarous natives, than solicitous to incorporate them into their own communities. The kings, or nobility, of Magna Græcia, secure of their own pre-eminence, felt ⁴³ nothing of the republican jealousies which prevailed in the mother-country. They received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The Barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were associated; their children received a Grecian education; and the states of Italy and Sicily thus increasing by degrees, could soon boast, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Messenê, Himera, and several other cities, which rivalled or surpassed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populousness of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta.

The wars, conquests, or oppressions, but above all, the civil dissensions, which in the sixth century before Christ disturbed and deformed the coast of

C H A P.
XI.

The oppression of the Asiatic Greeks brought

⁴³ The same policy was practised by Macedon; and, as we shall have occasion to relate, was the primary cause of the Macedonian greatness.

C H A P.

XI.

new inha-
bitants to
Italy and
Sicily;

who im-
proved
arts, and
corrupted
manners;

Ionia, and the other Grecian colonies in the islands and continent of Asia, brought frequent accessions of inhabitants to the shores of Magna Græcia. In that age the Asiatic Greeks had attained greater proficiency, both in the useful and in the agreeable arts, than any other portion of the Grecian name; but they had also sunk deeper in voluptuousness and luxury. Their poetry, which still remains, alike attests the refinement of their taste, and the corruption of their morals. The effeminate vices, for which the Ionians were thenceforth in all ages infamous⁴⁴, seem to have taken deep root in that century; and it is probable, that along with their poetry, music, and painting, they communicated also their dissolute and artificial appetites to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily.

But whether this be admitted, or whether we suppose that, according to the ordinary course of events, the inhabitants of Magna Græcia having attained opulence by industry, dissipated it in idleness and licentiousness, it is acknowledged by all writers on this part of history, that the Greek cities of Italy, and particularly Sybaris and Crotona, had degenerated from their ancient maxims, and fallen a prey to the most dangerous errors and vices, when Pythagoras came to their relief, about five hundred and fifty years before the Christian æra.

The philosophy of Pythagoras forms an important object in the history of the human mind:

which are
reformed
by Pytha-
goras.

⁴⁴ *Motus doceri gaudet Ionicas*

Matura virgo, et fingitur artibus

Ja nunc, et incestos amores

De tenero meditatur ungue.

HORACE.

and if we admit the concurring testimony of ancient authors ⁴⁵, the philosophy, or rather the legislation, of this extraordinary man, reformed and improved the manners and policy of Magna Græcia, and contributed in an eminent degree, not only to the quiet and happiness, but to the industry, power, and splendor, of that celebrated country. Lest this influence should appear too great, and even incredible, in a stranger, who is known to have studiously declined all public offices and authority, the occasion requires that we should explain the means by which such extraordinary effects were produced.

Pythagoras was born at Samos ⁴⁶, when Samos was the richest and most flourishing of all the Grecian isles. His father, Mnesarchus, being a person of distinction in his country ⁴⁷, the promising youth was carefully instructed in the learning known or valued in that early age. Music, poetry, and the gymnastic exercises, formed the principal part of his education; but the young philosopher, if we may anticipate that name, was not indifferent ⁴⁸

History of
that philo-
sopher.
Olymp.
xlv. 1.
A. C. 600.
His educa-
tion.

⁴⁵ Particularly Aristoxenus, the learned disciple of Aristotle (apud Stobæum, Serm. xli.); various ancient authors cited by Jamblicus and Porphyry, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, l. viii; to which add Justin, l. xx. and Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. de Amicitia, et de Oratore. "Pythagoras exornavit eam Græciam quæ Magna dicta est, et privatim et publice, præstantissimis et institutis et artibus." Cicero de Amicitia.

⁴⁶ Isocrates in Busrî. Titus Livius, l. i. c. xviii. Lucian. Lexiphanes. To these authorities we may add, that Pythagoras is represented on several Samian coins. Fabric. Bibl. Græca, t. i. p. 455.

⁴⁷ Mnesarchus was sent from Samos to consult the oracle of Delphi, probably on some public occasion. Jamb. in Vit. Pythag.

⁴⁸ Apollon. apud Jamblichum.

C H A P. XI. to the discoveries of Thales, the first Grecian who nearly calculated an eclipse of the sun; and he early set himself to rival the Milesian sage in his favorite studies. It is recorded, that he learned eloquence from Pherecydes of Syros⁴⁹, who resided a considerable time in the isle of Samos, and who is famous in the literary history of Greece, as the first author in prose⁵⁰. Pittacus of Lesbos, Bias of Priéné, and the other sophists, or wise men (as they were emphatically styled by their contemporaries) who then flourished in Asiatic Greece, and whose abilities and virtue had raised them, in troubled times, to the head of the several communities of which they were respectively members, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who appears to have been early animated with the desire of acquiring just renown, by promoting public happiness. In his eighteenth year he visited the continent of Greece, and gained the prize of wrestling at the Olympic games⁵¹, where his vigor, address, and beauty, were beheld with admiration by the multitude; while the opening virtues of his mind were still more admired by men of sense and discernment. In conformity with the practice of an age when the feeble rays of knowledge were scattered over a wide surface, and much pains were requisite to collect them, he withdrew himself from the applauses of his countrymen, and for a longer time than was usual with the Grecian

Travels.

⁴⁹ Diogenes apud Porph.

⁵⁰ Plin. N. H. l. vii. c. lvi.

⁵¹ Jambl. Porph. etc.

travellers. This circumstance gave occasion to CHAP.
many fables concerning the extent and variety of XI.
his voyages⁵². But it is certain that he resided

⁵² The travels of the Greek philosopher were spoken of in vague terms, and magnified even by great writers. *Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus.* Cicero de Finibus, l. iv. c. xix. We may well believe then, that such men as Hermippus (apud Joseph. advers. Appionem), Apollonius, Jamblichus, etc. would carry their exaggerations to the highest degree of incredibility on this fertile subject. The chief source of these fables, and of the supposed learning of the Magi, Chaldeans, Indians, etc. may be found in the credulous or lying writers who accompanied Alexander in his eastern expedition. At their return to Greece, they magnified the learning, as well as the power and wealth, of the nations conquered by their patron; they were solicitous to persuade their countrymen, that their ancestors had learned their philosophy from people whose names they had never before heard; and their own vanity was flattered by having visited, and familiarly known those fancied instructors of mankind. Clearchus, Onesicretus, and Callisthenes, were the most celebrated of these writers, of whom Diogenes Laertius, or rather a far superior man whom he cites, says, *Λαμβανουσι δε αυτες τα των Ελληνων καταρθωματα Βαρβαροις προσαπτοντες.* "They are mistaken, when they refer the Grecian discoveries to the Barbarians." It was natural for the Eastern nations, when they had adopted the language and learning of the Greeks, to avail themselves of Grecian authorities, to prove how much that celebrated nation owed to people whom they proudly denominated Barbarians. Hence the fables of Berofus the Chaldean, of Manetho the Egyptian, of Sanchoniathon the Phœnician. We except from this class of fabulists the Jew, Josephus, the antiquity of whose nation rests on evidence which it would be irreverent to name in such company. Had Pythagoras or Thales been acquainted with the Jewish religion, they would have learned far nobler notions of the Deity, than those which it appears they entertained. Anaxagoras, surnamed *ὁ νῦς*, the preceptor of the great Pericles, was the first Grecian philosopher who saw, by the light of reason, the natural and moral attributes of God, so sublimely described in the Psalms of David. Yet it never was said, that Anaxagoras had seen the Psalms, the Books of Moses, or any part of the sacred writings; and it may be remarked, that Josephus himself, in his first book (cont. Ap.), however zealous to prove, that the Greeks derived their knowledge from the East, can cite no author in favor of this opinion, who lived before the age of Alexander.

C H A P. XI. several years in the ancient kingdom of Egypt⁵³, which had been long familiarly known to the Grecian mariners, and where the son of Mnesarchus might probably enjoy the protection of many hereditary friends. In that country he probably made some additions to his knowledge in arithmetic and geometry; he certainly learned many traditions concerning the gods, and the human soul: but what particularly deserved his attention,

⁵³ There is a famous passage in Isocrates's panegyric of Busiris, which might seem to contradict what is said in the preceding note, if we did not reflect, that the rules of panegyric require not always a strict adherence to historical truth. In speaking of the ancient wisdom and piety of the Egyptians, and particularly of the sacerdotal order, he says, that he himself is not the first who perceived and acknowledged their merit; that many philosophers had done this before him, and particularly Pythagoras the Samian. Ὁς ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητὴς ἐκείνων γενομένου, τὴν τε ἀλλήν φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τὰς Ἑλλήνας ἐκομίσε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας τε καὶ τὰς ἀγιστείας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανεστέρον τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐσπῆδασεν. ἤγχετο, εἰ καὶ μὴδὲν αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα πλεον γίγνοιτο παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τῶν μαλίστα ἀν' εὐδοκίμῃσιν, ὅπερ αὐτῷ καὶ συνέβη. Τόσῃτον γὰρ εὐδοξία τῆς ἀλλῆς ἀπαντὰς ὑπερῆκεν, ὥστ' καὶ τῆς νεωτέρας ἀπαντὰς ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτὴ μαθητὰς εἶναι, καὶ τῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἥδιον ὄραν τῆς παιδείας τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκείνῳ συγγιγνομένης ἢ τῶν οἰκείων ἐπιμελόμενης. "Who coming to Egypt, and being instructed by the priests of that country, first introduced other kinds of learning into Greece, and particularly a more accurate knowledge of religious rites and ceremonies," (I have generalized the expression θυσίας καὶ ἀγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς,) "of which he was a careful observer, thinking that although he were entitled to no peculiar favor on that account from the gods, he would thereby, at least, procure esteem among men, which also happened to him; for he so far eclipsed the glory of all other philosophers, that all the young desired to become his disciples, and the old were better pleased to see their sons in the company of Pythagoras, than engaged in the most lucrative or honorable pursuits." If what is said in my account of the life and writings of Isocrates be considered with attention, this passage will only serve to confirm the observations in the text

was, the secret symbolic writing of the priests and the singular institutions and policy of the sacerdotal order, by which that body of men had long been enabled to govern prince and people⁵⁴. At his return from Egypt and the East, Pythagoras found his native country governed, or rather insulted, by the artful and long fortunate Polycrates; a tyrant whose power seemed so firmly established, that there remained no hopes to subvert it, and under whose jealous eye the son of Mnesarchus could neither display his talents, nor enjoy personal security: he therefore returned to European Greece, and again assisted at the Olympic games; where being saluted by the then honored name of Sophist, he modestly declined that distinction for the humbler title of Philosopher; and when asked what he precisely meant by this new appellation, he is said to have replied. "That, in the same manner as at the Olympic assembly, some men came to contend for crowns and honors, others to sell their merchandise, and a third class merely to see and examine every thing which passed in that celebrated convention; so, on the greater theatre of the world, while many struggled for the glory of a name, and many for the advantages of fortune; a few, and but a few, neither covetous of money, nor ambitious of fame, were contented with beholding the wonders of so magnificent a spectacle⁵⁵." This definition has

C H A P.
XI.

Olymp.
lvi.
A. C. 560.

⁵⁴ Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, passim; and Strabo, l. x. p. 482.

⁵⁵ Cicero (Tusc. Quæst. v. 3.) has translated a passage to this purpose from Heraclides Ponticus, the scholar of Plato; and the

C H A P.
XI.

been often cited, because it well agrees with the contemplative notions generally entertained of the Pythagorean school; but it will appear in the sequel, that the philosophy of Pythagoras was of a more practical kind.

From Olympia and the republic of Elis, he travelled to the neighbouring territory of Sparta⁵⁶, and spent a considerable time in that capital, diligently studying the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, and observing the manners and genius of the best governed, most virtuous, and most prosperous of all the Grecian states. Here he beheld a constitution of government (the wisdom of which had been long approved by experience) founded on a system of education; and combining, in his clear capacious mind, the Spartan laws and discipline with a mixture of the Egyptian craft and policy, he framed that sublime plan of legislation, which was to be far more extensive than the laws of Lycurgus; and which, at first fixing its root in a small sect at Crotona, was destined, in twenty or thirty years, to diffuse its flourishing branches over Italy and Sicily.

Causes of
his author-
ity in
Italy.

Pythagoras arrived at the capital of Italian Greece in his fortieth year, in the full vigor of mind and body⁵⁷. His fame, doubtless, preceded him; since, whoever had honorably distinguished himself in the general convention at Olympia, was speedily

original passage of Heraclitus is still preserved in Jamblichus.

⁵⁶ Porphy. Jambl. et Justin. l. xx.

⁵⁷ Aristoxen. apud Jambl.

known and celebrated in the remotest provinces of Greece. His personal acquaintances among the Italian Greeks, whose esteem, or rather respect, he had acquired in that august assembly, would naturally be loud in his praises; and the manners of the age, in which men lived together in crowds, and enjoyed their pastimes, or transacted their serious business with undisguised freedom, in temples and gymnasia, contributed to the rapid increase of his friends and admirers. Upon his arrival at Crotona, he appeared in the public places, displaying his dexterity in those exercises and accomplishments, which were the fashionable objects of pursuit, and the principal sources of honor. His skill in music and medicine, sciences which were far better understood in his native country than in Magna Græcia, procured him particular regard; nor can we hesitate to believe, that his mathematical and natural knowledge would be highly admired by the Greeks of Italy, who, having recently received the first tincture of arts and sciences from the Asiatics, cultivated them with that ardor which novelty inspires; and who seem hitherto to have gained in point of knowledge and civility, in proportion as they had lost in purity of life and manners, by an acquaintance with their Eastern brethren.

Neither the voluptuousness nor the refinement of the inhabitants of Magna Græcia, were incompatible with the hopes and fears of the most puerile superstition; and Pythagoras, who had seen and examined the rites and ceremonies employed by

C H A P.
XI.

His superior talents.

His manner of life.

C H A P. remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and
 XI. their wisdom, to avert the displeasure, or to gain
 the good-will of their invifible protectors, called
 forth the whole force of this powerful, yet danger-
 ous instrument of policy, to excite refpect for his per-
 fon, and reverence for his instructions. He carefully
 frequented, at an early hour, the temples of the gods;
 his regular purifications and facrifices announced
 fuperior fanctity of character; his food was of the
 pureft kind, that no corporeal ftain might interrupt
 his fancied communication with his celestial friends;
 and he was clothed in the linen of Egypt, which
 was the drefs⁵⁸ of the facerdotal order in that native
 land of fuperftition, as well as of the Athenian ma-
 giftrates and nobles, in the early and pious times
 of the republic⁵⁹. The refpect excited by fuch
 artifices (if we may degrade by that name the
 means ufed to deceive men into their duty and
 happinefs) was enhanced by the high renown the
 long travels, the venerable afpect, the harmonious
 voice, the animated and affecting eloquence, of
 the Samian philofopher. His hearers fometimes
 amounted to two thoufand of the principal citizens
 of Crotona; and the magiftrates of that republic
 erected, foon after his arrival among them, an ele-
 gant and fpacious edifice, which was appropriated
 to the virtuous leffons of this admired ftranger,
 who pleafed their tafte, and gratified their fancy,
 while he condemned their manners, and reproached
 their vices. Equally rapid and aftonifhing, and

The happy
 revolution
 which he
 produced
 at Crotona.

⁵⁸ Diodorus.

⁵⁹ Thucyd. l. i.

not more astonishing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in persons of every age, and of either sex, by this singular man. The women laid aside their ornaments, and resumed their modesty; the youth preferred their duty to their pleasures; the old improved their understanding, and almost neglected to improve their fortunes.

Yet this revolution of manners was not surely so instantaneous, as the concurring exaggerations of wonder and credulity were naturally inclined to represent it. The same writers, who would thus magnify the fame of Pythagoras, acknowledge, that soon after coming to Crotona, he chose a select number of his most assiduous disciples, and those chiefly persons of weight in the republic, whose temper, character, and views, best suited his own. These were formed into an association, or separate order of men, into which none were admitted who possessed not qualities and endowments worthy of that honor. In order to confirm this association, as well as to obtain the purposes for which it had been instituted, Pythagoras employed the cypher, or symbolic writing, and other secrets, which he had learned from the wisdom, or rather cunning, of the Egyptian priests: his scholars were taught certain signs or words, by which they might know each other; they could correspond, when separated by place, in an unknown character; and strangers of all countries, Greeks and Barbarians, were promiscuously admitted into the society, after undergoing

C H A P.

XI.

Its influ-
ence on
affairs of
state.

Olymp.

lvii. 3.

A. C. 550.

His great
views.His poli-
tics.

a due probation as to their dispositions and understanding. In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the sovereignty of Crotona; the influence of the new sect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily; the disciples of Pythagoras were diffused over ancient Greece, and the isles of the Ægean sea, and it seemed as if the sage of Samos whose nobler ambition declined and disdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the sublime idea of forming a school; or rather an association of men, who might govern the world, while they were themselves governed by wisdom and virtue.

Pythagoras was deeply persuaded, that the happiness of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live; and the experience of his own times, and of his own island in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendency of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other⁶⁰. He preferred, therefore,

⁶⁰ A striking example of this appeared at that time in Sicily, if we credit Jamblichus, who places the reign of Phalaris, at Agrigentum, in the age of Pythagoras. The doubtful, or rather incredible, history of this tyrant, may be comprised in few words. His reign, of about sixteen years, was distinguished by intolerable atrocities. He burned his enemies in a brazen bull; and, as lust or cruelty happened to direct, sometimes abused, and sometimes eat, boys. Phalaris, together with his mother and friends, (could such a monster have friends?) were burned, by the long-injured Agrigentines, in his own bull. This is the abominable tyrant, whose spurious letters furnished an opportunity to Dr. Bentley to display his profound erudition (see his Dissert. upon Phalaris). But that very learned man seems not to suspect that the history of Phalaris is as spurious as his epistles. It was a common artifice among Greek poets and orators (see, in vol. i. p. 367.

to all governments, a moderate aristocracy; which seems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greatest men of antiquity, since, under the administration of a senate, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and a Carthage, attained their highest prosperity and splendor. Yet he was extremely averse to arbitrary power,

the speech of Socrates the Corinthian), to exaggerate the vices of bad princes. Of this we shall find many examples in the following parts of this work. This practice began early; for Pindar says,

Τὸν δὲ ταυρῷ χαλκῷ καυτῆραι νηλεὲς νοῦν

Εχθρὰ Φαλαριν κατεχει πάντα Φατις.

PYTH. i. Επωδ. κωλ. ιε.

Aristotle mentions, *Τὸ περὶ Φαλαριν λεγόμενον*, the hear-say about Phalaris, which Aspasius explains, *Ὁ δὲ Φαλαρις λεγεται φαγεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα*. Phalaris is said to have eat his own son. In the same chapter (c. v. l. vi. Ethic. Nicom.), speaking of brutal passions, Aristotle instances Phalaris sometimes devouring boys, sometimes using them as the instruments of an absurd venereal pleasure: *Πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἀποπὸν ἡδονήν*. The philosopher does not say, that he believes these monstrous fictions, any more than Cicero, *“Ille nobilis taurus, quem crudelissimus omnium tyrannorum Phalaris habuisse dicitur;”* l. iv. in Verrem, c. xxxiii. Timæus, the historian of Sicily, who was more likely than any other writer to be well informed concerning the transactions in his own island, represents the story of Phalaris's bull as a mere fable. Polyb. Excerpt. ver. 3. p. 47. Polybius, indeed, attempts to refute Timæus, but I think, as to the main point, with little success. Nor is it surprising that this judicious writer should be carried along by the torrent. The republicans of Greece and Rome delighted in blackening the characters of tyrants; *Τραγωδῶντες δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν τροπῶν, καὶ τὴν ἀσεβείαν τῶν πράξεων;* “exaggerating, after the manner of tragedians, the fierceness of their manners, and the impiety of their actions.” For this reason, the absurd fictions concerning Dionysius of Syracuse, Alexander of Pheræ, etc. are related by many respectable writers. For this reason Hieronymus was described in the blackest colors, vide Excerpt. ex Polyb. l. vii. p. 10. And for this reason the enormous cruelties of Phalaris, which no nation, and far less the Sicilians, in that age, could have tolerated, receive countenance from some of the highest authorities of antiquity.

C H A P. XI. whatever shape it might assume; and the main aim of his institution was, to prevent oppression in the magistrates and licentiousness in the people. The dead letter of the law could never, he thought, effect that salutary purpose, until men were so trained by education and discipline, as to regard the great duties of life as its most agreeable amusement, and to consider the esteem of their fellow-citizens, and their own, as the chief source of their enjoyment. Magistrates, thus formed, would command a willing obedience, and the inhabitants of Magna Græcia must soon attain the most perfect state of which political society is susceptible.

Morality.

To explain at large the system of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatise of sublime, yet practical morality, since his conclusions are strictly founded on the nature of man. Besides the propensities common to us with inferior natures, and besides the selfish and artificial passions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breast the seeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification. The chief happiness of the mind must be sought in itself, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleasure. Our thoughts are ever, and intimately present with us; and although the bustle of external objects, and the tumult of passion, may sometimes divert their current, they can never dry up their source. The reflections on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity,

ever so totally occupy the mind of a Persian satrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happiness or misery, in the whole course of life, must chiefly depend upon the nature of their reflections on the past, and upon their hopes and fears about futurity. To strengthen this great groundwork of morality, Pythagoras employed the whole force of education and habit. Rules were laid down, to which the members of his respected order bound themselves to conform, and from which none could swerve, without being excluded from a society of which they proved themselves unworthy. The different periods of life had each its appropriated employment. The youth were carefully instructed in the gymnastic exercises, in literature⁶¹, and in science, and especially in the laws and constitution of their country. Their time was so diversified by successive study, exercise, and repose, that no leisure remained for the premature growth of dangerous passions; and it was an important maxim of the Pythagorean school, that many things

⁶¹ So I have translated *Εν γραμμασι και τοις αλλοις μαθημασι*, of Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Serm. xli. The learned reader will perceive, that I comprehend under the name of youth, the two different periods of life, or *ἡλικίαι*, which the Greeks denoted by the words *παις* and *νεανισκος*, boy, and young man. I have done this because it was not the intention of Aristoxenus to say, that the young men were not still to be employed in literature and science, or that the boys were to be kept ignorant of the laws and constitution. The rules of the Pythagorean school, and the laws of Lycurgus, often explain each other. See vol. i. p. 129, et seqq. It may be worthy of remark, that Jean Jacques Rousseau has borrowed what is rational and practical in his system of education, from these two great sources

C H A P. XI. were best learned late ⁶², especially love; from which, if possible, the youth should be restrained till their twentieth year, and after that period should rarely, and with many precautions, indulge a passion, always hurtful to the weak, and which, when injudiciously indulged, enfeebled the most vigorous. He required in those who had attained the age of manhood, that they should no longer live for themselves, but for the business of the community of which they were members. They were to employ the greatest part of the day in the duties of public spirit and patriotism; in the laborious or dangerous offices committed to their charge; and to derive their chief reward from reading, in the eyes of their admiring countrymen, the history of their generous exploits; and from beholding the happy effects of their probity, beneficence, and fortitude.

Rules for
the con-
duct of his
disciples;

The Pythagoreans were strictly enjoined, as their earliest and latest work, to review the actions of the past, and, if time permitted, of many preceding days. In the morning they repaired alone to the temples, to solitary mountains and forests; and after there conversing with themselves, joined in the conversation of their friends, with whom they assembled, in small companies, to an early and frugal meal, discussed different subjects of philosophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the ensuing day, and by the mutual strength and encourage-

⁶² Aristoxen. apud Stobæum, Serm. Ixix. This is the great principle of Rousseau in his *Emile*. The passage of Aristoxenus concerning love, is almost literally translated in that ingenious but fanciful work.

ment acquired in this select society, prepared for the tumultuous bustle of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was spent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate use of flesh and wine, from which they rigidly abstained during the day; and the whole concluded with that self-examination, which was the capital precept of the Pythagorean school.

To enter more fully into the principles of this association, would be repeating what has been formerly observed concerning the laws of Lycurgus. It is sufficient barely to mention, that, like the legislator of Sparta, Pythagoras enjoined the highest respect for age; that, like him, he raised the weaker sex from that state of inferiority in which they were ungenerously kept in all other countries of Greece; that he inured his disciples to temperance and sobriety by the same means employed by Lycurgus; and that both these great men regarded health and vigor of body as the first principle of mental soundness and energy; that the probationary silence of the Pythagoreans, which credulity has so much exaggerated, was nothing more than that prudent, recollected behaviour, required by Lycurgus, who prized higher the caution of silence than the readiness⁶³ of speech; and that the intimacy of the Spartan and Pythagorean friendships, and almost the community of goods, naturally flowed from the general spirit and genius of their respective systems⁶⁴; so that the rules of the Pythagorean order

which coincide with the institutions of Lycurgus.

⁶³ Plut. in Lycurg.

⁶⁴ See vol. i. p. 135.

C H A P. XI. were little more than a transcript of the Spartan laws, as these laws themselves were only a refinement on the generous and manly institutions of the heroic ages⁶⁵.

Origin of
the fictions
concerning
Pythagoras.

In the history of a man who entertained such just notions of human life, as did the founder of the Pythagorean school, we may at once reject, as fabulous, the tales related by the vain, lying Greeks, who lived in and after the age of Alexander, when their nation seems to have lost their love of truth along with their liberty, as well as the ridiculous wonders of the later Platonists, those contemplative visionaries, who, during the first centuries of the Christian æra, degraded ancient philosophers, by describing *their* active and useful lives, as if they had resembled their own speculative tranquillity. Yet, after all, should the least extraordinary account of the Pythagorean order still seem incredible, it need only be observed, that modern history, and even our own observation, may have made us acquainted with orders of another kind, of which the rules are more difficult to be observed than those of the Pythagoreans : and it is equally unreasonable and ungenerous, to suppose, that what our own experience teaches us may be done by the illiberal spirit of superstition, could not, in a happier age, be effected by the love of glory, of virtue, and of mankind.

War between Crotona and Sybaris.

The concurring testimony of historians assures us, that the school of Pythagoras had flourished above forty years, to the unspeakable benefit of

⁶⁵ Diodor. l. xii. p. 77, etc.

Magna Græcia, when a war arose between Crotona and Sybaris, the latter of which had ever contemptuously rejected the Pythagorean institutions. The city of Sybaris was founded (as above-mentioned) by the Achæans, on the confluence of the river Sybaris, from which the city derives its name, and the winding stream of Cratis, which descends from the Lucanian mountains. The fertility of the soil, the happy temperature of the climate, the resources of fishing, navigation, manufactures, and commerce, conspired, with the salutary effect of the Achæan laws, wonderfully to increase, in the course of two centuries, the strength and populousness of Sybaris, which was surrounded by walls nine miles in extent, commanded twenty-five subordinate cities, and, could we credit the evidence of writers often prone to exaggeration, brought three hundred thousand men into the field⁶⁷. Riches and luxury proved fatal to the Sybarites, whose effeminacy passed into a proverb⁶⁸, which has been transmitted to modern times. In a decisive battle, they were defeated by the citizens of Crotona, under the command of Milo, a favorite disciple of Pythagoras, who had already obtained universal renown by his Olympic victories⁶⁹.

But the destruction of Sybaris was almost alike fatal to Crotona. The inferior ranks of men in that city, intoxicated with prosperity, and instigated by the artful and ambitious Cylon, whose turbulent

XI.

The Sybarites conquered by Milo the Pythagorean. Olymp. lxvii. 4. A. C. 509.

Sedition in Crotona.

⁶⁷ Strabo, l. vi. p. 263. Diodor. ibid.

⁶⁸ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 518.

⁶⁹ Strabo, ibid. Pausanias, l. vi. p. 362.

C H A P. XI. manners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, into which he had repeatedly attempted to enter, became clamorous for an equal partition of the conquered territory of Sybaris; which being denied, as inconsistent with the nature of aristocratical government, they secretly conspired against their magistrates, attacked them by surprise in the senate-house, put many to death, and drove the rest from their country. Pythagoras himself died soon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum in Lucania⁷⁰. His disciples were scattered over Magna Græcia, and particularly Sicily, which, at the time of the Carthaginian invasion, was governed by men who had imbibed the sublime spirit of their illustrious master.

Proves fatal to the Pythagoreans there.

The Carthaginians invade Sicily. Olymp. lxxv. I. A. C. 480.

Gelon, who, eleven years before that event, had mounted the throne of Syracuse, was entitled, by the unanimous suffrage of his subjects, to the glorious, though often prostituted, appellation, of Father of his country⁷¹. The mildness of his government restored the felicity of the heroic ages, whose equitable institutions had much affinity (as above observed) with the political system of Pythagoras. This virtuous prince had cemented an alliance with Theron, king of Agrigentum, by accepting his daughter in marriage; and the confederacy of the two principal states of Sicily seemed to have diffused security and happiness over the whole island, when the immense armament of Carthage was beheld off the northern coast. Though

⁷⁰ Aristoxenus.

⁷¹ Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xiii. c. xxxvii. Plut. in Timol.

not absolutely destitute of naval strength, the Sicilians had nothing by which they could oppose a fleet of two thousand gallies. The enemy landed without opposition in the spacious harbour, or rather bay, of Panormus, whose name may be still recognised in the modern capital Palermo, where the Carthaginians had planted one of their most ancient colonies. Their forces were commanded by Hamilcar, who was deemed a brave and experienced leader. The first care of this general was, to fortify two camps; the one destined for his fleet, which, according to the practice of that age, was drawn on shore; the other intended as a safe retreat for his army, which immediately prepared to form the siege of Himera. Theron used proper measures to defend the second city in his dominions, until his kinsman, the intrepid Gelon, should arrive to his assistance, at the head of an army of fifty thousand foot and five thousand horse. While this numerous army advanced, by rapid marches, towards Himera, they rencountered a foraging party of the enemy, and took ten thousand prisoners. But what appeared a still more important booty to the discernment of Gelon, they seized a messenger from Selinus, a city in the neighbourhood of Agrigentum, which had entered into a treacherous correspondence with the Carthaginians. The prisoner conveyed a letter to Hamilcar, acquainting him, that the Selinuntines would not fail to send the cavalry demanded from them at the appointed time, which was likewise particularly specified. Upon this discovery, Gelon founded a stratagem, not more

C H A P. XI. daring than successful. He commanded a chosen body of troops to advance in the night towards the Carthaginian camp, and by day-break to present themselves to Hamilcar, as his Selinuntine auxiliaries; and when admitted, by this artifice, within the rampart, to assassinate the general, and set fire to the fleet⁷².

Defeated
by a stratagem.

It happened on the fatal day, that Hamilcar offered a solemn sacrifice to the bloody divinity of Carthage, who delighted in human victims. While he performed this abominable rite, the soldiers surrounded him unarmed, in the gloomy silence of their detested superstition, with which their minds were totally penetrated. The Sicilian cavalry, being admitted without suspicion, thus found no difficulty to execute their audacious design. Hamilcar, while he sacrificed an innocent and noble youth to the abhorred genius of superstition, was himself dispatched with a dagger; and next moment the Carthaginian ships were in a blaze. A chain of Sicilian sentinels, posted on the neighbouring eminences, intimated to Gelon the happy success of his stratagem; of which, in order fully to avail himself, that gallant commander immediately conducted the main body of his troops to the Carthaginian army, while it was yet agitated by surprise and terror at the sudden conflagration. The furious onset of the Sicilians made a dreadful havoc among the astonished Barbarians, who recovering, however, their faculties, began to defend

Their disasters.

⁷² Diodor. l. ix. sect. 25, et seqq. Polyæn. l. i. c. xxvii.

themselves with vigor ; when the melancholy tidings, that their ships were all burnt, and their general slain, drove them to despair and flight. Gelon commanded his troops not to give quarter to an enemy, who, though defeated, still seemed formidable by their numbers. It is reported, that an hundred and fifty thousand perished in the battle, and the pursuit. The remainder seized an eminence, where they could not long maintain themselves, for want of water and provisions. In the language of an ancient historian, all Africa seemed to be taken captive in Sicily. Gelon distributed the prisoners among the Sicilian cities, in proportion to the contingents of troops which they had respectively raised for this memorable service. The greater part falling to the share of Syracuse and Agrigentum, were employed in beautifying and enlarging those capitals⁷³, whose magnificent monuments, still conspicuous in their ruins, are supposed, with great probability, to be the effect of Carthaginian labor.

The melancholy tidings affected Carthage with consternation and despair. The inhabitants of that city, ever shamefully depressed by bad fortune, in proportion as they were immoderately elated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity, dreaded every moment to behold the victorious enemy in their harbour. To ward off this calamity their ambassadors were sent to crave a suspension of hostilities on any terms the victorious Greeks might think

C H A P.
XI.

Treaty of
peace be-
tween Ge-
lon and
the Car-
thagi-
nians.

⁷³ Cicero, Orat. iv. in Verrem.

C H A P.
XI.

proper to impose. Gelon received them with such moderation as marked the superiority of his character, and told them, that he would desist from every purpose of revenge, on condition that the Carthaginians paid two thousand talents of silver, to be distributed among the cities of Sicily, which had incurred trouble and expense by the war; that they thenceforth abstained from the abominable practice of insulting the gods by human victims; that they erected two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracuse, to preserve the memory of the war, and the articles of the peace⁷⁴.

Olymp.
lxxxii.
A. C. 449.

A. C. 504.

This honorable treaty was a prelude to that still more famous, concluded thirty years afterwards between the Athenians and the Persians. It marked a nation superior to its enemies not only in valor but humanity, and conferred more true glory than could be acquired by the most splendid series of victories. It might be expected, however, and seems much to have been desired, that a people so advantageously distinguished as were the Greeks during that age in arts and arms; a people who had repelled, defeated, and disgraced the most populous and powerful nations, and who were alike prompted, by ambition and revenge, to the attainment of distant conquest, should have united their efforts against the enemies who still made war on them, and, advancing in a rapid career of victory, have diffused, along with their dominion, their manners, knowledge, and civility over the

⁷⁴ Diodor. Sicul. ibid.

eastern world. But various events and causes, which we shall have occasion afterwards to explain, tended to detach the colonies of Magna Græcia from the affairs of the mother-country, as well as to disunite the two most powerful republics of that country by intestine discord.

C H A P.
XI.

While the fortune of Athens raised her to such power as threatened the liberty of Sicily and Greece, the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum contented themselves with the humbler glory of embellishing their capitals with barbaric spoils, and producing those wonders of art, which, in the time of Cicero and Verres, were esteemed among the most precious monuments of antiquity⁷⁵. The golden medals of Gelon, still preserved and of the highest beauty⁷⁶, justify the glowing expressions of the Roman orator.

In Italy, the citizens of Crotona had too soon cause to lament their insurrection against their magistrates, and their forsaking the discipline of Pythagoras. They who had hitherto defeated superior numbers, who had furnished so many victors in the Olympic contest, and whose country was distinguished by the epithet of healthy, on a supposition that the vigorous bodies of its inhabitants proceeded from an effect of the climate, were now totally routed and put to flight at the river Sagra, with an army of an hundred and thirty thousand men, by the Locrians and Rhegians,

Decay of
Magna
Græcia,
and de-
struction
of the Py-
thago-
reans.

⁷⁵ Cicero in Verrem, passim.

⁷⁶ Mém. de Trevoux, l'ann. 1727, p. 1449.

C H A P. XI. whose forces were far less numerous. The other Greek cities of Italy, which are said to have imitated the fatal example of Crotona, were harassed by wars against each other, or against their barbarous neighbours. In consequence of these misfortunes, the Pythagoreans again recovered their credit; and about sixty years after the death of the great founder of their order, Zaleucus and Charondas, the first in Locri, the second in Thurium, endeavoured to revive the Pythagorean institutions, which, perhaps, were too perfect for the condition of the times. In less than forty years a new persecution entirely drove the Pythagoreans from Italy, and completed, according to Polybius, the confusion and misery of that once happy country⁷⁷.

⁷⁷ Polybius, i. 203.

CHAP. XII.

Glory of Athens. — Military Success of the Confederates. — Athens rebuilt and fortified — Extent of its Walls and Harbours. — The Confederates take Byzantium. — Conspiracy of Pausanias. — Banishment of Themistocles. — Virtue of Aristides. — Cimon assumes the Command. — His illustrious Merit and Success. — Revolt of Egypt. — War in Cyprus. — Peace with Persia. — Domestic Transactions of Greece. — The Athenian Greatness. — Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos. — Earthquake in Sparta. — Revolt of the Helots. — War between the Elians and Pisans. — The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter. — Dissensions in Argolis. — Revolt in Bæotia. — Truce of Thirty Years. — Character of Pericles. — Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies. — Spirit of the Athenian Government.

FROM the battles of Mycalé and Plataea, to the memorable war of Peloponnesus, elapsed half a century, the most illustrious in the Grecian annals. A single republic, one of sixteen states, whose united possessions hardly equalled the extent of Scotland, and whose particular territory is scarcely visible in a map of the world, carried on an offensive war against the Persian empire, and, though surrounded by jealous allies or open enemies,

CHAP.
XII.

The glory
of Athens;
A. C. 479
—431.

C H A P. XII. *in arms;* prosecuted this extraordinary enterprise with unexampled success; at length, granting such conditions of peace as the pride of victory may dictate, and the weight of accumulated disasters condescend to solicit or accept. In that narrow space of time the same republic erected, on the feeble basis of her scanty population and diminutive territory, a mighty mass of empire; established and confirmed her authority over the extent of a thousand miles of the Asiatic coast, from Cyprus to the Thracian Bosphorus; took possession of forty intermediate islands¹, together with the important straits which join the Euxine and the Ægean; conquered and colonized the winding shores of Macedon and Thrace; commanded the coast of the Euxine from Pontus to the Chersonesus Taurica, or Crim Tartary; and, overawing the barbarous natives by the experienced terrors of her fleet², protected against *their* injustice and violence, but at the same time converted to the purposes of her own ambition and interest, the numerous but scattered colonies which Miletus, and other Greek cities of Asia, had at various times established in those remote regions³. Our wonder will be justly increased, if we consider that Athens obtained those immortal trophies, not over ignorant savages or effeminate slaves, but over men who had the same language and laws, the same

¹ Several of these islands had been formerly conquered by Athenian commanders, particularly Miltiades, as we have related above; but having rebelled against the severe government of Athens, they were finally subdued by Pericles.

² Plut. in Pericle.

³ Strabo, Geograph. passim.

blood and lineage, the same arts and arms, in short, C H A P.
every thing common with the victors but their XII.
audacity and fortune.

But it is the peculiar glory of the Athenians that, in arts;
during this rapid series of military and naval
triumphs, they cultivated, with a generous en-
thusiasm, the arts which adorn peace as well as
war, and improved these decorations of polished
life into such perfection as few nations have been
able to imitate, and none have found it possible to
surpass. During the administration of a single
man, more works of elegance and splendor, more
magnificent temples, theatres, and porticoes were
erected within the walls of Athens, than could be
raised during many centuries in Rome, though
mistress of the world, by the wealth and labor of
tributary provinces ⁴. In the same period of time
sculpture attained a sublimity, from which that
noble art could never afterwards but descend and
degenerate; and a republic hitherto inferior in
works of invention and genius to several of her
neighbours, and even of her own colonies, produced,
in the single lifetime of Pericles, those inestimable
models of poetry, eloquence, and philosophy ⁵,
which, in every succeeding age, the enlightened
portion of mankind hath invariably regarded as the
best standards, not merely of composition and style,

⁴ Plutarch. in Pericle.

⁵ Pericles may be considered as the contemporary of Socrates, So-
phocles, Euripides, Thucydides, etc. since, although he died before
them of the plague, these and other great men flourished during his
administration.

C H A P. but of taste and reason. The name of Greek
 XII. seemed thenceforth to be sunk in that of Athenian; Athenian writers are our surest and almost only guides in relating the subsequent transactions of the whole nation⁶; and from them we learn what is yet the most extraordinary circumstance respecting the Athenian empire, that it had been built on such stable foundations, and reared with such art and skill, as might have long defied the hostile jealousy of Greece and Persia, confederate in arms and resentment, if various causes, which human prudence could neither foresee nor prevent, had not shaken its firmness, and precipitated its downfall⁷.

Such is the subject which I have undertaken to treat in this and the two following Chapters; a subject worthy to animate the diligence, and call forth the vigor of an historian: but, if he truly deserves that respected name, he will remember that it is less his duty to amuse the fancy by general description, than to explain, with precision and perspicuity, the various transactions of this interesting and splendid theme; to give the reader a full and distinct view of the complicated matter which it involves; and to remove every adventitious circumstance that might distract or dazzle the attention, as astronomers, in viewing the sun, are careful to ward off its surrounding splendor.

⁶ I mean Thucydides and Xenophon, together with the Athenian orators, philosophers, and poets.

⁷ Thucyd. l. vii. et viii. passim.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE. 181

The military success of the Athenians ^s (which naturally forms the first branch of the subject, because it not only supplied the materials of future improvements, but awakened that energy requisite to cultivate and complete them) includes three separate actions which were carried on at the same time, and conspired to the same end, yet cannot be related in one perpetual narrative, without occasioning some confusion of ideas, alike destructive of the pleasure and of the use of history. While we endeavour to keep each series of events unbroken and distinct, we must be careful to point out its influence on the simultaneous or succeeding transactions of the times, that our relation may be at once satisfactory and faithful. In such a delineation the trophies of the Persian war justly claim the first and most conspicuous place; the hostile animosity of rival states, which continually envied and opposed, but, for reasons that will be fully explained, could neither prevent nor retard the growing superiority of Athens, shall occupy the middle of the picture; and we shall throw into the back ground the successive usurpations of that fortunate republic over her allies, colonies, and neighbours.

C H A P.
XII.

Military
success
of that re-
public.

Division of
the sub-
ject.

^s The chief materials for this portion of history consist in the first and second books of Thucydides; the eleventh and twelfth of Diodorus Siculus; Plutarch's lives of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles; Pausanias's Description of Greece, and Pliny's Natural History: scattered facts are supplied by other ancient writers, whose works will be carefully cited.

C H A P.

XII.

The Athe-
nians take
Sestos.
Olymp.
lxxv. 2.
A. C. 479.

The common fears which, notwithstanding innumerable sources of animosity, had formed, and hitherto upheld a partial confederacy of the Greeks, were removed by the decisive victories of Plataea and Mycalé. After these memorable events, it was the first care of the Athenians to bring home their wives, children, and most valuable effects from the isles of Ægina and Salamis. In the latter island they celebrated their good fortune by a national solemnity. The sublime Sophocles joined in the chorus of boys which danced, in exultation, around the Barbarian spoils⁹; the valor of his predecessor, Æschylus, had contributed to the victories by which they were obtained; and his rival, the tender Euripides, was born in the isle of Salamis¹⁰, on that important day which proved alike glorious to Greece, and fatal to Persia. But an attention to domestic concerns prevented not the Athenians from pushing the war with vigor, though deserted by the Spartans and other Peloponnesians, who sailed home before winter. The Asiatic colonies, animated by the recent recovery of freedom, seconded the Athenian ardor; and the confederates, having successfully infested the territories of the great king, besieged and took the rich city of Sestos in the Chersonesus of Thrace, the only place of strength which adhered to the Persian interest in that fertile peninsula¹¹.

⁹ Athenæus, l. i. ¹⁰ Vita Euripid.

¹¹ Herodot. l. ix. c. cvi. Diodor. l. xi. c. xxxvii.

During the two following years the war languished abroad, while the symptoms of jealousy and discord, which had already appeared in the separation of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke out with more virulence at home. The Athenians began the laborious task of rebuilding their ruined city, which the Persian spoils might contribute to enrich with uncommon magnificence, and which the acquaintance gained in the course of the war, with the graceful forms of Ionic and Doric architecture, might enable them to adorn with more beauty and elegance than had yet been displayed in Europe. But the weighty advice of Themistocles prevailed on them to suspend this noble undertaking, and engaged them, instead of decorating their capital with temples, theatres, and gymnasia, to fortify it by walls of such strength and solidity as might thenceforth bid defiance to every enemy, whether foreign or domestic. In an age when the art of attack was so rude and imperfect, that the smallest fortrefs formed an object of importance, such a design could not fail of exciting jealousy in the neighbouring republics. The measure was scarcely determined when an embassy arrived from Sparta, remonstrating against a design peculiarly dangerous and alarming to those who owed their safety to the weakness of their cities. "If the Greeks," it was said, "had possessed any town of impregnable strength, they must have found it impossible to expel the Barbarians from

C H A P.

XII.

Athens
rebuilt and
fortified.
Olymp.
lxxv. 3. 4.
A. C. 478
et 477.

Jealousy of
Sparta,

CHAP.
XII.

their country. The Athenians therefore, who had hitherto so generously maintained the cause of the confederacy, ought not only to desist from raising walls and fortifications, but even to prevent a similar design in any republic beyond the isthmus; the Peloponnesus was alone sufficient to afford, in time of danger, a secure refuge to the whole Grecian name."

discovered
by The-
mistocles ;

Themistocles easily unveiled the suspicion and hatred concealed under this specious mask of public utility, and encouraged his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by similar address. The senate of the five hundred, who gave audience to foreign ambassadors, declared that Athens would adopt no measure inconsistent with the public interest, and promised speedily to send an embassy, in their turn, which would remove all groundless apprehensions entertained on that subject. The Lacedæmonians having returned with this temporizing answer, Themistocles was immediately dispatched to Sparta, and expected, as he had previously concerted matters with his countrymen¹², to be followed, at a proper time, by Aristides, the most respected character of his age; and by Lisicles, an able orator in the senate and assembly. Meanwhile the Athenian walls arose with unexampled celerity. Not only slaves, artificers by profession, and the poorer classes of citizens, but magistrates of the

¹² Idem ibid, et in Themist. Lysias Orat. Funeb. et cont. Alcib.

first rank, the venerable fathers of the republic, wrought with their own hands, and with unceasing industry. The feeble efforts of women and children contributed to the useful labor. The most superstitious of men neglected their accustomed solemnities, and no longer acknowledged the distinction of days or seasons: nor did even the silent tranquillity of night abate the ardor of their diligence. The ruins of their city happily supplied them with a rich variety of materials; no edifice was spared, public or private, sacred or profane; the rude sculpture of ancient temples, even the mutilated tombs of their ancestors, were confounded in the common mass; and, at the distance of near a century, the singular appearance of the wall, composed of stones rough and unpolished, of various colors and unequal size, attested the rapid exertions by which the work had been constructed¹³.

Themistocles had hitherto, under various pretences, avoided declaring his commission before the Spartan senate. When urged to this measure by some of the magistrates, who began to suspect his silence, he still alleged the absence of his colleagues as a sufficient reason for delay. But a company of travellers, who had recently visited Athens, gave intelligence of the extraordinary works carrying on in that city. This information, and the resentment of the Spartans which it occasioned, must have disconcerted a man who possessed less cool

and its
effects
eluded by
his address.

¹³ Thucyd. l. i. c. lxxxix. et seqq.

C H A P. XII. boldness than the commander at Salamis and Artemisium. But Themistocles, with the address congenial to his character, asserted, that it was unworthy the gravity of Sparta to regard the vague rumors of obscure men; and that before lightly suspecting the approved fidelity of their allies, she ought to bestow some pains in discovering the truth. This declaration was enforced, it is said, by seasonable bribes to the most popular of the Ephori; and the Spartans, deluded or corrupted, agreed to dispatch a second embassy to Athens, consisting of some of their most respectable citizens. These men had no sooner arrived at their destination, than they were taken into custody, as pledges for the safe return of Themistocles and his colleagues, who by this time had brought him the welcome news, that the walls were completed. The Athenian ambassadors were now prepared to throw off the mask. They appeared in the Lacedæmonian assembly; and Themistocles, speaking for the rest, declared, that his countrymen needed not to learn from their confederates, what measures were honorable to themselves, and beneficial to the common cause; that, by his advice, they had firmly defended their city against the assaults of open enemies and jealous friends; and that if Sparta entertained any resentment of this measure, which was evidently not less conducive to the public interest, than, perhaps, displeasing to private ambition, her anger would be equally unjust and impotent, since her own citizens must remain as hostages at Athens, till his colleagues and himself should be

restored in safety to their country¹⁴. Whatever secret indignation this speech might excite, the Spartans thought proper to suppress their animosity. They allowed the ambassadors to return home; but the conduct of Themistocles laid the foundation of that unrelenting hatred with which he was persecuted by Sparta, whose intrigues engaged all Greece, not excepting Athens herself, in the destruction of this illustrious citizen. Yet his eminent services, before they were interrupted by the storm of persecution, gave an opportunity to his unworthy country to display more fully her signal ingratitude¹⁵.

C H A P.
XII.

The ancient Athenian harbour of Phalericum was small, narrow, and inconvenient. To supply its defects, Themistocles, even before the Persian invasion, had recommended the Piræus, a place five miles distant from the citadel, furnished with three natural basins, which, if properly fortified, might form a far more commodious and secure station for the Athenian navy. The foundations were laid, and the walls began to rise, when the cruel ravages of the Barbarians interrupted the undertaking. Having in the preceding year fortified the city, Themistocles thought the present a proper time to finish the new harbour¹⁶. His address, his eloquence, and his bribes, were seasonably applied to divert the resentment of Sparta, who, though thenceforth less jealous of the naval than military power of her rival, threatened, on this

Themisto-
cles builds
the Piræus.
Olymp.
lxxv. 4.
A. C. 477.

¹⁴ Plut. etc. *ibid*.

¹⁵ Diodor. l. xi. p. 437.

¹⁶ Thucyd. l. i. c. xciii. Plut. in Themist. Diodor. xi. 436.

C H A P. XII. occasion, to enter Attica with an armed force. But the artful Athenian had the skill to persuade the Spartans and their allies, that the procuring a strong and capacious harbour was a matter essentially requisite to the common interest of the Grecian confederacy. The work, meantime, was carried on at Athens with much spirit and activity, and, in less than a twelvemonth, brought to such a prosperous conclusion, as could scarcely be credited, but on the testimony of a contemporary historian of the most approved diligence and fidelity¹⁷. The new walls were sufficiently broad to admit two carriages abreast; the stones composing them were of an immense size, strongly united by bars of iron, which were fastened by melted lead. The Piræus soon grew into a town, containing many thousand inhabitants. It was joined to the city by walls begun by Cimon, but finished by Pericles, twenty years after the harbour itself had been erected.

A. C. 457. The new buildings of Cimon and Pericles are often mentioned in history under the name of the Long Walls. They extended forty stadia on either side; and when added to the circumference of the ancient city (about sixty stadia), give us for the whole circuit of the Athenian fortifications an extent of nearly eighteen English miles¹⁸.

The war
against
Persia con-
tinued by
the confe-
derates;

The altercations and animosities excited by such undertakings among the confederates at home, prevented not their united arms from assaulting the

¹⁷ Thucyd. ubi supra.

¹⁸ Pausanias, p. 20, et seq. Strabo, p. 391, et seqq. Plut. in Cimon.

dominions of the great king. Thirty Athenian, and fifty Peloponnesian ships, had been employed to expel the Persian garrisons from the sea-ports which they still occupied in the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Ægean isles. The European fleet, being seasonably joined by various squadrons from the Greek cities of Asia, scoured the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and delivered from oppression the long-enslaved island of Cyprus. Their next operation must have been at a considerable distance of time; since they had to return near two hundred leagues westward, and then to proceed almost as far towards the north, and the Bosphorus of Thrace. At the entrance of this celebrated canal, which joins the Euxine and Propontis, the city of Byzantium, destined in future ages to become the seat of empire, and long to remain the chief emporium of Europe and of Asia, had been first founded by a feeble colony of Megareans, which had gradually become populous, flourishing, and independent, but which was actually commanded and insulted by armed Barbarians. It is not probable that Xerxes, or his ministers, perceived the peculiar security of Byzantium, situate between the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, two straits, which it might occasionally shut to an hostile navy, or open to the fleets of commerce. But had they been sensible of this advantage, the misfortunes hitherto attending all their maritime enterprises must have rendered it impossible to encourage their seamen to resist a victorious enemy. They discovered, however, more than their usual

C H A P.
XII.who take
Byzan-
tium.
Olymp.
lxxvi. 1.
A. C. 476.

C H A P.
XII.

vigor, in defending, by land, a place which they regarded as the centre of very valuable possessions. The adjacent coast of Thrace forms a striking contrast with the inland parts of that country. Instead of bleak heaths, and snowy mountains, which deform the inhospitable regions of Hæmus and Rhodopé, the maritime provinces produce in abundance, vines, olives, the most useful grains, and the most delicious fruits. The climate vies with the delightful softness of the Asiatic plains; and the soil had been long cultivated by Greek colonies, who had widely extended themselves on both sides of Byzantium. The Barbarians strengthened the garrison of the place, which was well supplied with provisions, and commanded by Persians of the first distinction, among whom were several kinsmen of the great king. The siege was obstinate, but the events of it are not described in history. It is only known, that the walls were stormed, and that an immense booty, together with many Persian princes and nobles, fell into the hands of the victors¹⁹.

The con-
spiracy of
Pausanias;

Here ends the glory of Pausanias, who still commanded the forces of the confederacy; a man whose fame would rival the most illustrious names of antiquity, had he fallen in the siege of Byzantium. The rich spoils of Plataea, of which the tenth was allotted to him, as general, raised him above the equality required by the republican institutions of his country. His recent conquest still farther augmented his wealth and his ambition; a continual

¹⁹ Plut. in Aristid. Thucyd. l. i. 95, et seqq. Diodor. l. xi.
44 — 45.

flow of prosperity, which is dangerous to the best regulated minds, proved fatal to the aspiring temper of Pausanias. As he conceived himself too great to remain a subject, he was willing to become a sovereign, through the assistance of Xerxes, the inveterate enemy of his country. To this prince he made application, by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, a fit instrument for any kind of villany. To such an associate Pausanias had intrusted the noble Persians taken in Byzantium. This man escaped with his prisoners across the Bosphorus, and conveyed a letter to the great king, in which the Spartan general, having mentioned, as an indubitable proof of his sincerity, the restoring his captive kinsmen, proposed to enter into strict amity with Xerxes, to take his daughter in marriage, to second his efforts in conquering Greece, and to hold that country as a dependent province of the Persian empire. The Persian is said to have highly relished these proposals, the subjugation of Greece being the great object of his reign. It is certain that he speedily sent Artabazus, a nobleman of confidence, to confer and cooperate with the traitor.

But Pausanias himself acted with the precipitance and inconsistency of a man, who had either been deluded into treason by bad advice, or totally intoxicated by the dangerous vapors of ambition that floated in his distempered brain. Instead of dissembling his designs until they were ripe for execution, he assumed at once the tone of a master and the manners of a tyrant. He became difficult

C H A P.
XII.

ill con-
ducted.

C H A P. of access to his colleagues in command; disdained
XII. their advice in concerting measures which they were ordered to execute; he was surrounded by guards, chosen from the conquered Barbarians; and he punished the slightest offence in the allied troops with a rigor hitherto unknown to the Grecian discipline. He still managed, indeed, the fierce spirits of the Spartans, but without any degree of prudence, since the distinctions which he demanded for *them*, tended only to irritate and inflame their confederates, who were not allowed to forage, to draw water, to cut down straw for their beds, until the countrymen of Pausanias had been previously furnished with all these articles.

The allies
 reject his
 authority;
 Olymp.
 lxxvi. 1.
 A. C. 476.

This intolerable insolence disgusted and provoked the army in general, but especially the Ionians, who lamented that they had been no sooner delivered from the shackles of Persian despotism, than they were bent under the severer and more odious yoke of Sparta. By common consent, they repaired to the Athenian Aristides, and his colleague Cimon, the son of Miltiades, a youth of the fairest hopes, who had signalized his patriotism and valor in all the glorious scenes of the war. Their designs being approved by the Athenian admirals, Uliades and Antagoras, who respectively commanded the fleets of Samos and Chios, the bravest of all the maritime allies, seized the first opportunity to insult the galley of Pausanias; and when reproached and threatened by the Spartan, they desired him to thank Fortune, who had favored him at Plataea, the memory of which victory alone saved him from
 the

the immediate punishment of his arrogance and cruelty. These words speedily re-echoed through the whole fleet, and served, as soon as they were heard, for the signal of general revolt. The different squadrons of Asia and the Hellespont sailed from their stations, joined the ships of Uliades and Antagoras, loudly declared against the insolent ambition of Pausanias, abjured the proud tyranny of Sparta, and for ever ranged themselves under the victorious colors of Athens, whose generous magnanimity seemed best fitted to command the willing obedience of freemen ²⁰.

This revolution had immediate and important effects, which we shall proceed to explain, when we have punished and dismissed the unworthy Pausanias. Apprized of his malversation and treachery, the Spartan senate recalled him, to stand trial for his life. But his immense wealth enabling him to corrupt the integrity of his judges, he escaped without farther punishment than degradation from his office, and paying a heavy fine. In his stead, the Spartans substituted, not one admiral, but several captains, with divided authority, thereby to remove the odium and resentment which the insolence of unlimited command had excited among their confederates. Pausanias, though divested of his public character, having accompanied these officers to the Hellespont, in a vessel fitted out at his private expence, began to display more arrogance than ever. He disdained not only the manners and

C H A P.
XII.

and sub-
mit to the
Athe-
nians.

Pausanias
recalled by
the Spar-
tans.
Olymp.
lxxvi. 2.
A. C. 479.

Returns to
the east;

²⁰ Nepos in Pausan. Plutarch. in Aristid.

C H A P. XII. behaviour, but the dress and appearance of a Greek; carried on almost openly, his treacherous correspondence with Artabazus; increased the number of his Barbarian guards and attendants; trampled with contempt on the most revered institutions of his country; and assumed that provoking pomp of power, and that offensive ostentation of vice, which disgraced the profligate lives of the Persian satraps ²¹.

recalled by the scytalé; When the Spartan magistrates received a full account of his pride and folly, they were apprehensive lest he might refuse to return home on an ordinary summons, and therefore employed the form of the scytalé, a form reserved for the most solemn occasions. The scytalé (for opinion can give importance to any thing) was only a narrow scroll of parchment, which had been rolled on a piece of wood, and then stamped with the decree of the republic. Every Spartan, invested with authority at home or abroad, possessed a tally exactly corresponding to the rod on which the parchment had been first rolled. By applying his tally, the words of the scytalé necessarily arranged themselves in their original form, and attested the authentic command of the magistrate. As tutor to the infant king of Sparta, Pausanias had been furnished with an instrument of this kind; and such is the effect of legal formality, that a man who would probably have despised the injunction of a simple letter, returned without delay to a country which he had

²¹ Thucyd. i. 95. et 128.

betrayed, when recalled by this frivolous, but re- C H A P.
spected ceremony.

The external professions, and hypocritical pe- XII.
dantry, of Spartan virtue, were most shamefully de- and
tected and exposed in the whole affair of Pausanias. punished.
Though convicted of the most odious tyranny, ex-
tortion, and profligacy, he was still allowed to en-
joy the benefit of personal freedom; to correspond
by frequent messages with his accomplice Artaba-
zus; and, at length, to tamper with the Helots
and Messenians, those oppressed slaves, who were
ever ready to rebel against the unrelenting tyranny
of their masters. But as it exceeded even the
opulence and effrontery of Pausanias, to corrupt
and influence the whole republic, those who had
either escaped the general contagion of venality, or
who were offended at not sharing his bribes, ac-
cused him, a third time, of treason to Greece, in
consequence of an event which enabled them in
the fullest manner to make good the charge. An
unhappy youth, who lived with Pausanias as the
infamous minister of his pleasure, was destined by
that monster to become the victim of his ambi-
tion. He was charged with a letter from his master
to Artabazus, in which, after explaining the actual
state of his affairs, Pausanias hinted to him, as had
been his usual practice, to destroy the bearer. The
suspicious youth, who had observed that none of
those sent on such errands ever returned to their
country, broke open the letter, and read his own
fate. Fired with resentment, he instantly carried
the writing to the enemies of Pausanias, who

C H A P.
XII.

prudently advised the messenger to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, expecting that his master would soon follow him. Meanwhile they practised a concealment in the wall of the temple, and having acquainted the Ephori, and other chief magistrates, with their contrivance for convicting the traitor by his own words, they obtained a deputation to accompany them, to remain concealed with them in the temple, and to overhear the mutual reproaches of Pausanias and his messenger. Yet the superstition of the Spartans permitted them not to seize the criminal in that sacred edifice. He was allowed to retire in safety; and when the senate had at length determined to lay hold of him, he was privately admonished of his danger by some members of that venal assembly. Upon this intelligence, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva, from which it being unlawful to drag him, that asylum was surrounded by guards, all necessities were denied the prisoner, and he thus perished by hunger²².

Aristides
intrusted
with the
finances of
the confederates.
Olymp.
lxxvi. 2.
A. C. 475.

The late punishment of this detestable traitor could not repair the ruinous effects of his misconduct and villany. Not only the Ionians, who had first begun the revolt, but the foreign confederates in general, loudly rejected the pretensions of Dorcis and other captains whom the Spartans appointed to command them. A few communities of Peloponnesus still followed the Lacedæmonian

²² Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxviii. et seqq. Diodor. l. xi. c. xliv. et Nepos in Pausan.

standard; but the islanders and Asiatics unanimously applied to Aristides, to whose approved wisdom and virtue they not only intrusted the operations of the combined armament, but voluntarily submitted their more particular concerns; and experience soon justified their prudent choice. Pay was not yet introduced into the Grecian service, because the character of *soldier* was not separated from that of *citizen*. It had been usual, however, to raise annually a certain proportion of supplies among the several confederates, in order to purchase arms, to equip and victual the gallies, and to provide such engines of war as proved requisite in storming the fortified towns belonging to the common enemy²³. By unanimous suffrage, Aristides was appointed to new-model and apply this necessary tax, which had been imposed and exacted by the Spartans without sufficient attention to the respective faculties of the contributors. The honest Athenian executed this delicate office with no less judgment than equity. The whole annual imposition amounted to four hundred and sixty talents, about ninety thousand pounds sterling; which was proportioned with such nice accuracy, that no state found the smallest reason to complain of partiality or injustice. The common treasure was kept in the central and sacred island of Delos; and, though intrusted to the personal discretion of the Athenian commander, was soon conceived to lie at the disposition of his republic²⁴.

Their
amount!

²³ Plut. in Aristid. p. 532, et seqq.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 534. Thucyd. l. i. c. xcvi. Diodor. p. 440.

C H A P.

XII.

Merit and
persecu-
tion of
Themis-
tocles.

While the merit of Aristides thus procured his countrymen the management of the national treasury of Greece, Themistocles was equally successful in improving the internal resources of the state. By yielding more protection to strangers than they enjoyed in neighbouring cities, he augmented not only the populousness, but the wealth of Athens, as that description of men paid an annual contribution in return for their security²⁵. This, together with other branches of the revenue, he employed in building annually about sixty gallies, the addition of which to the Athenian navy abundantly compensated such losses as were sustained by the accidents of the sea in foreign parts. Notwithstanding the envy and malice of worthless demagogues, who infested the Athenian assembly and courts of justice, Themistocles was fast advancing to the attainment of the same authority at home, which Aristides enjoyed abroad, when complaints arrived from Sparta, that he had conspired with Pausanias to betray the public liberty. The known resentment of the Spartans against this extraordinary man, sufficiently explains the reason why they, who were so dilatory in their proceedings against Pausanias himself, should be so eager to bring to punishment his supposed accomplice. But it is not easy to conceive, how the Athenians could admit such an accusation against a citizen, whose singular valor and conduct had gained the decisive victory at Salamis; whose counsels and address

²⁵ Lyfias adv. Philon.

had fortified their city with impregnable strength; whose foresight and activity had procured them a fleet which no nation in the world could resist; and whose abilities and patriotism had not only saved his country from the most formidable invasion recorded in history, and which was principally directed against Athens; but amidst the terrors of this invasion, the treachery of false friends, and the violence of open enemies, had so eminently contributed to raise his republic to the first rank in the Grecian confederacy. Yet such, on the one hand, was the effect of that envy which, in republics, always accompanies excellence; and such, on the other, the influence of Spartan bribery and intrigues, that Themistocles was banished by the ostracism, a punishment inflicted on men whose aspiring ambition seemed dangerous to freedom, which required not the proof of any particular delinquency, and which had effect only during a term of years²⁶.

It is probable, that the illustrious exile would have been recalled before the expiration of the appointed time; but the persecution of Sparta allowed not his countrymen leisure to repent of their severity. Having punished Pausanias, they acquainted the Athenians. "That from the papers of that notorious traitor, complete evidence appeared of the guilt of Themistocles; that it was not sufficient, therefore, to have expelled him for a few years from Athens, by an indulgent decree, which the assembly

C H A P.
XII.

His death
and cha-
racter.
Olymp.
lxxvi. 4.
A. C. 473.

²⁶ Diodor. p. 445, et seqq. Plut. ibid.

CHAP.
XII.

might revoke at pleasure ; that crimes against the general confederacy of Greece ought to be judged by the Amphictyonic council , and punished by death , or perpetual banishment .” The Athenians shamefully complied with this demand. It appeared , indeed , that Themistocles had corresponded with Pausanias , and been privy to his designs ; but he persisted in affirming that he never had approved them. The rivalry and enmity subsisting between Sparta and Argos , had induced him to chuse the latter as the place of his retreat. There he received the news of his condemnation ; after which , not thinking himself secure in any city of Peloponnesus , he sailed to Corcyra. But his enemies still continuing to pursue him , he fled to the opposite coast of Epirus , and sought refuge among the barbarous Molossians. Soon afterwards he escaped into Persia , where his wonderful versatility of genius , in acquiring the language and manners of that country , recommended him to the new king Artaxerxes , who had lately succeeded the unfortunate invader of Greece. The suspicion of treason throws a dark shade on the eminent lustre of his abilities ; nor does the disinterestedness of his private character tend to remove the imputation. Though he carried with him to Persia his most valuable effects , yet the estimate of the property which he left behind in Athens , amounted to an hundred talents (above twenty thousand pounds sterling) , an immense sum , when estimated by the value of money in that age. The whole was confiscated to the exchequer ; and the eagerness of

Olymp.
lxxvii. 1.
A. C. 472.

the populace to seize this rich booty, serves to explain the alacrity with which all parties agreed to his destruction. A report prevailed in Greece, that Themistocles could never forgive the ingratitude of the Athenians, which he had determined to revenge at the head of a powerful army, raised by Artaxerxes. But perceiving the unexampled success of Cimon on the Asiatic coast, he despaired of being able to accomplish his design; and, in a melancholy hour, ended his life by poison at the age of sixty-five, in Magnesia, a town of Lydia, which had been bestowed on him by the liberality of the Persian monarch²⁷.

It is worthy of observation, that the three great commanders who had resisted and disgraced the arms of Xerxes, quitted the scene almost at the same time. While Pausanias and Themistocles suffered the punishment of their real or pretended crimes, Aristides died of old age, universally regretted by the affectionate admiration of his country. He, who had long managed the common treasury of Greece, left not a sufficient sum to defray the expense of his funeral. His son Lyfimachus received a present of three hundred pounds from the public, to enable him to pursue and finish his education. His daughters were maintained and portioned at the expense of the treasury. This honorable poverty well corresponded with the manly elevation of his character, whose pure and unfulled

Death of
Aristides.
Olymp.
lxxvii. 2.
A. C. 471.

His cha-
racter.

²⁷ Plut. et Nepos in Themist. Diodor. l. xi. c. liv.—lix. Thucyd. i. 135, et seqq.

C H A P. XII. splendor, in the opinion of a good judge of merit²⁸, far eclipses the doubtful fame of his daring, but unfortunate rival.

Elevation
of Cimon
to the com-
mand.

By the death of Aristides, the conduct of the Persian war devolved on his colleague Cimon, who united the integrity of that great man to the valor of Miltiades and the decisive boldness of Themistocles. But as he felt an ambition for eminence which disdains bare imitation, he not only reflected the most distinguished excellences of his predecessors, but improved and adorned them by an elegant liberality of manners, an indulgent humanity, and candid condescension; virtues which long secured him the affections of his fellow-citizens, while his military talents and authority, always directed by moderation and justice, maintained an absolute ascendant over the allies of the republic. His first operations were employed against the coast of Thrace, which the taking of Byzantium seemed to render an easy conquest. The only places in that country fitted to make an obstinate resistance, were the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, both situate on the river Strymon; the former near its junction with the Strymonic gulph, the latter more remote from the shore, but entirely surrounded by an arm of the gulph, and the principal branches of that copious river. Amphipolis, however, was taken, and planted by a numerous colony of Athenians. But Eion still opposed a vigorous resistance; Boges, the Persian governor, having

He reduces
the coast of
Thrace.
Olymp.
lxxvii. 2.
A. C. 471.

²⁸ Plato apud Plutarch. in Aristid.

determined rather to perish than surrender. After long baffling the efforts of the besiegers, by such persevering courage and activity as none of his countrymen had displayed in the course of the war, this fierce Barbarian was at length not tamed, but exasperated by hunger. His companions and attendants, equally desperate with their leader, followed his intrepid example; and mounting the ramparts with one accord, threw into the middle stream of the Strymon their gold, silver, and other precious effects. After thus attesting their implacable hatred to the assailants, they calmly descended, lighted a funeral pile, butchered their wives and children, and again mounting the walls, precipitated themselves with fury into the thickest of the flames²⁹.

With this signal act of despair ended the Persian dominion over the coast of Europe, which finally submitted to the victorious arms of Cimon; a general, who knew alike how to conquer, and how to use victory. The Athenians were eager to prolong the authority of a man, who seemed ambitious to acquire wealth by valor, only that by wealth he might purchase the public esteem; and whose affable condescension, and generous liberality, continually increased his fame and his influence both at home and abroad. The reinforcements with which he was speedily furnished by the republic, enabled him to pursue the enemy into Asia, without allowing them time to breathe, or recover strength, after their repeated defeats. The intermediate

Pursues
the enemy
into Asia.
Olymp.
lxxvii. 3.
A. C. 470.

²⁹ Plut. in Cimon. Diodor. 1. xi.

C H A P. islands ambitiously courted his protection and
XII. friendship ; and *their* feeble aid , together with
the more powerful assistance of the Ionian coast,
speedily increased his fleet to the number of three
hundred sail.

His rapid
success in
Caria and
Lycia.

He takes
Phaselis.

With this formidable armament he stretched to-
wards the coast of Caria , where his approach served
for the signal of liberty to the numerous Greek
cities in that valuable province. Seconded by the
ardor of the natives , he successively besieged and
reduced the walled towns and fortresses , several of
which were filled with powerful garrisons ; and , in
the course of a few months , totally expelled the
Persians from all their strong holds in Caria. The
victorious armament then proceeded eastward to
Lycia , and received the submission of that exten-
sive coast. The citizens of Phaselis alone , de-
fended by strong walls , and a numerous garrison,
refused to admit the Grecian fleet , or to betray their
Persian master. Their resistance was the more
formidable , because their ancient connexion with
the Chians , who actually served under the colors
of Cimon , enabled them to enter into a treacherous
correspondence with the enemy. After other means
of intercourse had been cut off , the Chians still shot
arrows over the walls , and thus conveyed intelli-
gence into the place of all the measures adopted by
the assailants. Wherever the attack was made , the
townsmen and garrison were prepared to resist : the
besiegers were long baffled in all their attempts ;
but the perseverance of Cimon finally overcame
the obstinacy of his enemies. Their vigorous

resistance was not distinguished by any memorable punishment; the mediation of the Chians, who were justly esteemed among the best sailors in the Athenian fleet, easily prevailing on the lenity of Cimon to grant them a capitulation, on condition that they immediately paid ten talents, and augmented the Grecian armament by their whole naval strength³⁰.

C H A P.
XII.

The distracted state of Persia, the intrigues of the court, the discord of the palace, and the civil wars which raised to the throne of Xerxes his third son Artaxerxes, distinguished by the epithet of Longimanus, prevented that vast but unwieldy empire from making any vigorous effort to resist the European invasion. But after Artaxerxes had at length crushed the unfortunate ambition of his competitors, and acquired firm possession of the reins of government, which he continued to hold for half a century³¹, he naturally concerted proper measures to defend his remaining dominions in Asia Minor. Having re-established the Persian authority in the isle of Cyprus, he considered that Pamphylia, being the next province to Lycia, would probably receive a speedy visit from the victorious Greeks. That he might meet them there with becoming vigor, he assembled a powerful army on the fertile banks of the Eurymedon. A fleet likewise, of four hundred sail, was collected,

The Persians prepare for defence:

A. C. 473
— 425.

³⁰ Plut. et Diodor. *ibid*.

³¹ Compare Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxxvii. and Usher Chronol. See also Petav. de Doctrin. Temp. l. x. c. xxv. who endeavours to reconcile the chronological differences between Thucydides and Plutarch in Themist.

C H A P. chiefly from Cilicia and Phœnicia, and was com-
 XII. manded to rendezvous near the mouth of that
 river.

Are de-
 feated at
 sea.
 Olymp.
 lxxvii. 3.
 A. C. 470.

The Greeks, conducted by the activity of Ci-
 mon, delayed not to undertake the enterprize which
 the prudence of Artaxerxes had foreseen. Their
 fleet, amounting to two hundred and fifty gallies,
 fell in with the Persian squadrons off the coast of
 Cyprus. The Barbarians, vainly confident in their
 superior numbers, did not decline the engagement,
 which was obstinate, fierce, and bloody. Many
 of their ships were sunk; an hundred were taken,
 the rest fled in disorder towards the shore of Cy-
 prus; but, being speedily pursued by a powerful
 detachment of the Grecian fleet, were abandoned
 by the terror of their crews, to the victors; and
 thus the mighty preparations, which the great king
 had raised with such flattering hopes, strengthened
 in one day, with about three hundred sail, the hos-
 tile navy of Greece³².

Cimon's
 valor and
 conduct.

The vigorous mind of Cimon, instead of being
 intoxicated with this flow of prosperity, was less
 elevated with good fortune, than solicitous to im-
 prove it. The captured vessels contained above
 twenty thousand Persians. The soldiers encamped
 on the Eurymedon were still ignorant of the battle.
 These circumstances instantly suggested to the
 quick discernment of Cimon a stratagem for sur-
 prising the Persian camp, which was executed on the
 evening of the same glorious day with unexampled

³² Thucyd. Plut. Diod. *ibid.*

success. The prisoners were stripped of their eastern attire; the bravest of the Greeks condescended to assume the tiara and scymitar, and thus disguised, embarked in the Persian ships, and sailed up the river Eurymedon with a favorable gale. The unsuspecting Barbarians received them with open arms into their camp, as their long-expected companions. But the Greeks had no sooner been admitted within the gates, than on a given signal, at once drawing their swords, they attacked, with the concert of disciplined valor, the defenceless security of their now astonished and trembling adversaries. Before the Persians recovered from their surprise, Cimon had advanced to the tent of their general. Consternation and despair seized this numerous but unwarlike host. The few who were least overcome by the impressions of fear and amazement, betook themselves to flight; a panic terror suspended the powers of the rest; they remained, and fell, unarmed and unresisting, by the hands of an unknown enemy.

The rich spoil of the Barbarian camp rewarded the enterprise and celerity of the Greeks, who, loaded with wealth and glory, returned home during winter, and piously dedicated to Apollo a tenth of the plunder acquired by these ever memorable achievements. A considerable portion of the remainder was employed (as mentioned above) in strengthening the fortifications of Athens. Agreeably to the Grecian custom, the general was entitled to a valuable share. Cimon received it as a testimony of the public esteem, and expended

C H A P.
XII.

Gains the
decisive
victory of
Eurymedon.

The spoil
how employed.

C H A P. XII. it for the public use; embellishing his beloved native city with shady walks, gardens, porticoes, schools of exercise, and other works of general pleasure and utility³³.

The Athenians prosecute the war;
 Olymp. lxxvii. 4.
 A. C. 469.

take money instead of ships from the allies;

After these decisive victories, the Greeks, headed by the Athenians, carried on the war during twenty-one years, rather for plunder than glory. The manifest superiority which they enjoyed on all the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, might have rendered their maritime allies sufficiently secure. But the people of Athens, whose councils began about this time to be governed by the magnanimous ambition and profound policy of Pericles, had the address to persuade their confederates that naval preparations and enterprises were still as necessary as ever. At length, however, most of those scattered islands and sea ports, which followed the colors of Athens, grew weary of perpetual hostilities, of which *they* shared the toil and the danger, while their ambitious leaders alone reaped the advantage and the glory, and became continually more anxious to enjoy the benefits of public peace, and the undisturbed comforts of domestic tranquillity. The Athenians availed themselves of this disposition, to engage such states as appeared most backward in raising their contingents for the common armament, to compound for personal service on shipboard, by an annual supply of money, which might enable Athens continually to keep in readiness a fleet of observation, to

³³ Idem, *ibid.* et Nepos in Cimon. et Thucyd. l. i.

watch and check the motions of the common enemy. This, at first voluntary, contribution soon amounted to about an hundred thousand pounds. It was gradually augmented; and, at length, raised by Pericles to three times the original sum³⁴; an immense income, considering that the proportional value of money to labor was then ten times higher than at present; and considering also the very limited revenues of the greatest monarchs of antiquity; since, from all the various provinces of the Persian empire, scarcely four millions sterling entered the royal treasury³⁵.

In their eastern expeditions, the Greeks had an opportunity of visiting the large and beautiful island of Cyprus, which, though delivered by their valor from *some* Persian garrisons, either still continued, or again became, subject to that empire. The striking advantages³⁶ of a delightful territory, four hundred miles in circumference, producing in great abundance wine, oil, with the most delicious fruits, and deemed invaluable in ancient times on account of its rich mines of brass, naturally tempted the ambition of an enterprising nation. The conquest of Cyprus was still farther recommended to the Athenians, as the sea-coast had been peopled by a Grecian colony under the heroic Teucer, who built there a city called Salamis from the name of

prepare to
undertake
an expedition
against Cy-
prus.
Olymp.
lxxvii. 3.
A. C. 466.

³⁴ Thucyd. *ibid.* et Plut. in Pericl.

³⁵ Herodot. iii. 95. In modern times the precious metals have so much increased in quantity and diminished in value, that in 1660 the revenue of Hindostan amounted to thirty-two millions sterling.

³⁶ Strabo, p. 648.

C H A P.
XII.

his native country ³⁷, which, from the earliest antiquity, had been regarded as a dependence of Attica. The Grecian inhabitants of Cyprus had hitherto attained neither power nor splendor; their settlements had been successively reduced by the Phœnicians and the great king; and they actually languished in a condition of the greatest debility ³⁸. Honor prompted the Athenians to relieve their distressed brethren; interest incited them to acquire possession of a valuable island. With two hundred ships of war they prepared to undertake this important enterprise, when an object still more dazzling gave a new direction to their arms.

Diverted
from that
measure by
the revolt
of Egypt.
Olymp.
lxxviii. 4.
A. C. 465.

Amidst the troubles which attended the establishment of Artaxerxes on the Persian throne, the Egyptians sought an opportunity to withdraw themselves from the yoke of a nation whose tyranny they had long felt and lamented. A leader only was wanting to head the rebellion. This also was at length discovered in Inarus, a bold Libyan chief, to whose standard the malecontents assembling from all quarters, gradually grew into an army, which attacked and defeated the Persian mercenaries, expelled the garrisons, banished or put to death the governors and officers of the revenue, and traversing the kingdom without control or resistance, every where proclaimed the Egyptians a free and independent nation. Nor was this the capricious revolt of short-sighted Barbarians. Inarus maintained his conquest with valor and policy; and in order to

³⁷ Isocrat. in Evagor.

³⁸ Isocrat. *ibid.*

strengthen his interest by foreign alliance dispatched an embassy to Athens, craving the assistance of that victorious republic against its most odious and inveterate enemy³⁹.

The negociation was successful; the Athenians burned with desire to share the spoils of Persia, and commanded the ships, destined for Cyprus, to sail to Egypt. They had scarcely arrived in that kingdom, when a Persian army of three hundred thousand men, commanded by Achæmenes, encamped on the banks of the Nile. A battle speedily ensued, in which the insurgents obtained a complete victory, chiefly through the valor and discipline of their Grecian auxiliaries. The vanquished sought refuge within the walls of Memphis; that capital was invested; and after becoming master of two divisions of the city, the Athenians pushed with vigor the siege of the third, called, from the color of its fortifications, the White Wall. Artaxerxes, meanwhile, neglected no possible effort, for breaking, or eluding, a tempest, that threatened to dismember his dominions. While Persian nobles of distinction conveyed immense sums of gold and silver into Greece, to rouse, by seasonable bribes, the hostility of rival states against the audacity of Athens, a new army was collected, still more numerous than the former, and intrusted to Megabazus, the bravest general in the East. Such, at least, he was deemed by his countrymen; yet we cannot perceive any very illustrious merit in forcing the Greeks to raise

C H A P.
XII.

The Athenian armament sails thither; Olymp. lxxix. 2. A. C. 463.

is victorious;

besieges Memphis.

³⁹ Thucyd. l. i. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 2794

C H A P. the siege of Memphis, the soldiers being already
XII. worn out with the fatigues of hard service, and probably enfeebled by diseases in a far distant climate, extremely different from their own.

Misfor-
tunes of
the Athe-
nians in
Egypt.
Olymp.
lxxx. 4.
A. C. 457.

Megabazus, however, had the glory of first turning against the Greeks that current of success which had run for many years so strongly in their favor. They and the revolted Egyptians were now besieged, in their turn, in a small island of the Nile called Prosopis, along the coast of which the Athenians had anchored their ships. By diverting the course of the river, Megabazus left them on dry land. This operation so much confounded the Egyptians, that they immediately laid down their arms: but their wonted magnanimity did not forsake the Greeks: with their own hands they set fire to their fleet, and exhorting each other to suffer nothing unworthy of their former fame, determined, with one accord, to resist the assailants, and, although they could not expect victory, to purchase an honorable tomb. Megabazus, intimidated by their countenance and resolution, and unwilling to expose his men to the efforts of a dangerous despair, granted them a capitulation, and, what seems more extraordinary in a Persian commander, allowed them to retire in safety. They endeavoured to penetrate through Libya to the Grecian colonies in Cyrenaica, from which they hoped to be transported by sea to their native country. But the greater part perished through fatigue or disease in the inhospitable deserts of Africa, and only a miserable remnant of men; whose bravery deserved a better fate, revisited the

shores of Greece. To complete the disaster, a reinforcement of sixty ships, which the Athenians had sent to Egypt, was attacked surrounded, and totally destroyed by the Phœnicians, near the same scene which had already proved so fatal, but so honorable, to their countrymen ⁴⁰.

These repeated misfortunes, together with the growing troubles in Greece, which we shall speedily have occasion to describe, prevented the Athenians, during seven years, from reviving their design against Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred sail was at length intrusted to Cimon, who enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the Cyprian coast. The towns of Malos and Citium opposed a feeble resistance, and the singular humanity with which Cimon treated his prisoners, would have facilitated more important conquests; but the Phœnician and Cilician fleets had again put to sea, and Cimon wisely determined to attack them as they approached the island, rather than wait their arrival, his countrymen being superior to their enemies, still more in naval than in military prowess. In the battle which soon followed, he took above an hundred gallies; the number of those sunk or destroyed is unknown; the remainder fled to the coast of Cilicia, in hopes of protection from the army of Megabazus, encamped in that province; but that slow unwieldy body was unable to afford them any seasonable or effectual relief. The Greeks, having pursued them on shore, totally destroyed *them*, as well as the

The Athenians re-
new their
designs
against
Cyprus.
Olymp.
lxxxii. 3.
A. C. 450.

Their suc-
cess in that
island.

⁴⁰ Isocrat. de Pace et Panegyri. et Thucydidi. et Diodori. ibid.

C H A P.
XII.

Persian detachments who came to their succour, and returned loaded with spoil to Cyprus. The Athenian general then prepared to form the siege of Salamis, which, though defended by a numerous Persian garrison, and well provided with all the necessaries of defence, must have soon yielded to his skill and valor, had not sickness, in consequence of a wound received before the walls of Citium, prevented him from exerting his usual activity.

The Persian monarch solicits peace. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449.

Motives which determined the Athenians to compliance.

Meanwhile Artaxerxes, who perceived that the acquisition of Salamis would naturally draw after it the conquest of the whole island, and who had been continually disappointed in expecting to prepare fleets and armies capable to contend with the Athenians, eagerly solicited peace from that people, almost on their own terms. His ambassadors were favorably heard in the Athenian assembly by those who were more solicitous about confirming their usurpations over their allies and colonies, than ambitious of extending their Asiatic conquests. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary system, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was concluded on the following conditions^{*1}: That all the Greek colonies in Lower Asia should be declared independent of the Persian empire; that the armies of the great king should not approach within three days journey of the western coast; and that no Persian vessel should appear between the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian isles, that is, in the wide extent of the Ægean and Mediterranean seas, between the northern extremity of the Thracian

^{*1} Thucyd. Plutarch. Diodor. Isocrat. etc.

Bosphorus and the southern promontory of Lycia. On such terms the Athenians and their allies stipulated to withdraw their armament from Cyprus, and to abstain thenceforward from molesting the territories of the king of Persia⁴². Such was the conclusion of this memorable war, which, since the burning of Sardis, the first decisive act of hostility, had been carried on, with little intermission, during fifty-one years. The same magnanimous republic, which first ventured to oppose the pretensions of Persia, dictated to that haughty empire the most humiliating conditions of peace; an important and illustrious æra in Grecian history, which was often celebrated with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athenian glory.

Although, for reasons which will be explained hereafter, peace was alike necessary to both parties, yet the reader, who feels a warm interest in the cause of civilization and humanity, cannot but regret that, after disgracing the arms of Persia, and breaking the power of Carthage, the Greeks had not combined in one powerful exertion, and extended their victories and their improvements over the ancient world. But the internal defects in her political constitution, which stunted the growth of Greece, and prevented her manhood and maturity from corresponding to the blooming vigor of her youth, rendered impossible this most desirable union, which, could it have taken place, would probably have left little room for the transient conquests of Alexander, or the more permanent glory

C H A P.
XII.

Obstacles
to a gene-
ral or last-
ing confe-
deracy in
Greece.

⁴² Isocrat. Panegyri.

C H A P. of the Roman arms. Instead of these imagined
XII trophies, the subsequent history of Greece presents
us with the melancholy picture of intestine discord.

Its subse-
quent his-
tory pecu-
liarly in-
teresting.

During an hundred and eleven years, which elapsed between the glorious peace with Persia, in which the Athenians, at the head of their allies, seemed for ever to have repressed the ambition of that aspiring power, and the fatal defeat at Cheronæa, in which the same people, with their unfortunate auxiliaries, submitted to the valor and activity of Philip, Greece, with short variations of domestic quiet and foreign hostility, carried on bloody wars, and obtained destructive victories, in which her own citizens, not the enemies of the confederacy, were the unhappy objects of her inglorious triumph. Yet the transactions of this distracted and miserable period, however immaterial in the history of empire, are peculiarly interesting in the still more instructive history of human nature. A confederacy of soldiers and freemen, extending their dominion over ignorant savages, or effeminate slaves, must continually exhibit the unequal combat of power, courage, and conduct on the one side, against weakness, ignorance, and timidity on the other. But amidst the domestic dissensions of Greece, the advantages of the contending parties were nicely balanced and accurately adjusted. Force was resisted by force, valor opposed by valor, and art encountered or eluded by similar address. The active powers of man, excited by emulation, inflamed by opposition, nourished by interest, and at once strengthened and elevated by

a sense of personal honor and the hope of immortal fame, operated in every direction with awakened energy, and were displayed in the boldest exertions of the voice and arm. In every field where glory might be won, men recognised the proper objects of their ambition, and aspired to the highest honors of their kind; and although the prizes were often small, and the victory always indecisive, yet the pertinacious efforts of the combatants (great beyond example, and almost beyond belief) furnish the most interesting spectacle that history can present to the rational wonder of posterity.

C H A P.
XII.

The powerful cities of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, which had long rivalled Athens and each other, could not behold, without much dissatisfaction and anxiety, the rapid growth of a republic which already eclipsed their splendor, and might some time endanger their safety. The Spartans had particular causes of disgust. The immortal victories of Cimon made them deeply regret that *they*, who had shared the first and severest toils of the war, had too hastily withdrawn from a field of action that afforded so many laurels. They were provoked at being denied the command of the maritime allies, and not less offended at being overreached by Themistocles. All these reasons had determined them, above twenty years before the peace with Persia, to make war on the Athenians, expecting to be seconded in this design by the fears of the weak, and the jealousy of the more powerful, states, on both sides the Corinthian isthmus.

Sparta,
Thebes,
and Argos,
hostile to
Athens.

C H A P.

XII.

Earth-
quake in
Sparta;
Olymp.
lxxvii. 4.
A. C. 469.

But their animosity, before it broke out into action, was diverted by a calamity equally sudden and unforeseen. In the year four hundred and sixty-nine before Christ, Sparta was overwhelmed by an earthquake⁴³. Taygetus and the neighbouring mountains were shaken to the foundation, and twenty thousand Lacedæmonian citizens or subjects perished in this dreadful disaster. But, amidst the ruins of Sparta, one description of men beheld the public misfortunes not only without horror, but with a secret satisfaction.

followed
by the re-
volt of the
Helots and
Messe-
nians;

The oppressed Spartan slaves, known by the appellations of Helots and Messenians, assembled in crowds from the villages in which they were cantoned, and took measures for delivering themselves, during the cruelty of the elements, from the not less inexorable cruelty of their unfeeling tyrants. The prudent dispositions of king Archidamus, who, foreseeing the revolt, had summoned the citizens to arms, prevented them from getting immediate possession of the capital; but they rendered themselves masters of the ancient and strong fortress Ithomé, from which they continued many years to infest the Lacedæmonian territories. The Spartans in vain exerted their utmost endeavours to expel this dangerous intestine enemy; and in the third year of the war (for this revolt is dignified in history by the name of the Third Messenian War), they had recourse to the Athenians, who, of all the Greeks, were deemed the most skilful in sieges. The Athenians, either not sufficiently acquainted with the

⁴³ Thucyd. l. i. cap. c. et seqq. Diodor. l. xi. cap. lxiii.

secret hostility of Sparta, or willing to dissemble their knowledge of it as they were then totally bent on other projects and enterprizes, sent them the required assistance. The besiegers, however, met with so little success, that the Spartans dismissed their Athenian auxiliaries, on pretence indeed that their help was no longer necessary; but, in reality, from a suspicion that they favored the interest of the rebels; and, as they retained the troops of all the other allies, the Athenians were justly provoked by this instance of distrust⁴⁴. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Pisa, who, for a reason that will be immediately explained, were highly incensed against Sparta, gave vigorous assistance to the besieged.

The place thus held out ten years: many sallies were made, several battles were fought with the fury that might be expected from the cruelty of tyrants chastising the insolence of slaves. Both parties must have been reduced to extremity, since the Helots and Messenians, though obliged to surrender the place, obtained from the weakness, a condition which they would have vainly solicited from the mercy, of Sparta, "that they should be allowed, with their wives, children, and effects, to depart, unmolested, from the Peloponnesus." The Athenians, deeply resenting the affront of suspected fidelity, determined to mortify the Spartans by kindly receiving those needy fugitives, whom they finally established in Naupactus, a sea-port on the Crissean gulph, which their arms had justly wrested

part of
whom are
settled in
Naupactus
by the
Athe-
nians.
Olymp.
lxxx. 2.
A. C. 459.

⁴⁴ Thucyd. l. i. cap. ci.

C H A P.

XII.

Their signal gratitude.

from the Locri Ozolæ; a cruel and barbarous people, whose savage manners and rapacity disgraced their Grecian extraction. The Helots and Messenians repaid, by signal gratitude, the humane protection of Athens. During the long course of the Peloponnesian war, while their neighbours on every side espoused the opposite interest, the inhabitants of Naupactus alone invariably exerted themselves, with zeal and vigor, in defence of the declining power of their magnanimous confederate and ancient benefactor.

The war between the Elians and Pisans.

The cause above alluded to, which had incensed the Pisans against Sparta, dated beyond a century⁴⁵. That people had long contended with Elis, the capital of their province, for the right of superintending the Olympic games. The Spartans enabled the Elians to prevail in the contest, who continued, without opposition, to direct that august solemnity, until the earthquake and subsequent calamities of Sparta emboldened the insolent and wealthy Pisans to renew their pretensions⁴⁶. Their attempts, however, to maintain this bold claim, especially after the removal of the Helots and Messenians, appear to have been alike feeble and unfortunate. Pifa was taken, plundered, and so thoroughly demolished, that not a vestige, and scarce the name, remained.

Sack of Pifa.
Olymp.
lxxi. i.
A. C. 456.
The temple of Olympian Jupiter.

With the valuable booty acquired in this warfare, the Elians executed a memorable undertaking; having, in the course of ten years⁴⁷, enlarged and

⁴⁵ Pausanias, l. vi. c. xxii.

⁴⁶ Strabo, l. viii. p. 545.

⁴⁷ Between the years 456 and 446, A. C.

adorned the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and erected the celebrated statue of that divinity; a work which no subsequent age could ever rival, and whose sublimity is said to have increased and fortified the popular superstition⁴⁸. This famous temple was of the Doric order, encircled with a colonnade, and built of the stone of the country resembling Parian marble. From the area, or ground, to the decoration over the gate, it reached sixty-eight feet in height; it was ninety-five feet broad, and two hundred and thirty long: thus falling short of the greatest modern temples in magnitude, as much as it excelled them in beauty and the richness of material. It was covered with Pentelican marble, cut in the form of brick tiles. At each extremity of the roof stood a gilded vase; in the middle a golden victory; below which was a shield embossed with Medusa's head, likewise of gold. Pelops and Oenomaus were represented, on the pediment, ready to begin the chariot-race before very illustrious spectators, since Jupiter himself was of the number. The vault was adorned with the battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ. The labors of Hercules distinguished the principal entrance⁴⁹.

After passing the brass gates, you discovered Iphitus crowned by his spouse Echecheiria; from thence you proceeded, through a noble portico, to the majestic creation of Phidias the Athenian, which formed the principal ornament of the

Phidias's
statue of
that divi-
nity.

⁴⁸ Aliquid receptæ religioni adjecisse fertur. PLIN.

⁴⁹ Pausan. in Eliac. p. 303, et seqq.

C. H. A. P. XII. temple, and of Greece. The god was sitting on a throne, and being sixty feet high, touched the roof with his head; and threatened, if he moved himself, to shake in pieces that noble edifice, which, lofty and spacious as it was, still appeared unworthy to contain him. This vast colossus was composed of gold, taken in the sack of Pisa, and of ivory, then almost as precious as gold, which was brought from the East by Athenian merchantmen. The god had an enamelled crown of olive on his head, an image of victory in his right hand, a burnished sceptre in his left. His robes and sandals were variegated with golden flowers and animals. The throne was made of ivory and ebony, inlaid with precious stones. The feet which supported it, as well as the fillets which joined them, were adorned with innumerable figures; among which you perceived the Theban children torn by sphynxes, together with Apollo and Diana shooting the beautiful and once flourishing family of Niobé. Upon the most conspicuous part of the throne which met the eye in entering, you beheld eight statues, representing the gymnastic exercises; and the beautiful figure, whose head was encircled with a wreath, resembled young Pantarces, the favorite scholar of Phidias, who, in the contest of the boys, had recently gained the Olympic prize. Besides the four feet, mentioned above, the throne was supported by four pillars, placed between them, and painted by Pænus, the brother of Phidias. There that admirable artist had delineated the Hesperides guarding the golden apples; Atlas painfully sustaining

the heavens, with Hercules ready to assist him; Salamine with naval ornaments in her hand; and Achilles supporting the beautiful expiring Penthefilea.

It would be tedious to describe the remaining ornaments of this celebrated statue, and still more of the sacred edifice itself: yet the temple of Olympia was much inferior in size to that of Ceres and Proserpine, at Eleusis, in Attica. The latter was built by Ictinus, the contemporary and rival of Phidias; and sufficiently capacious (could we believe the exaggerations of travellers) to contain thirty thousand persons⁵⁰. This edifice was also of the Doric order; that of Diana at Ephesus, and of Apollo at Miletus, were both of the Ionic; and the celebrated temple of Jupiter at Athens, begun by Pisistratus, and enlarged by Pericles, was finished in the Corinthian style, by Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria. These four temples were the richest and most beautiful in the world, and long regarded as models of the three Grecian orders of architecture⁵¹.

While the earthquake and the fervile war confined within a domestic sphere the activity of Sparta, Argos, the second republic of the Peloponnese, and long the most considerable principality in that peninsula, underwent such revolutions and misfortunes, as left her neither inclination nor power to oppose the Athenian greatness. Ever rivals and enemies of Sparta, the Argives had jealously

C H A P.
XII.

The Olympic temple compared with other sacred edifices in Greece.

Intestine dissensions in Argolis. Olymp. lxxviii. 1. A. C. 468.

⁵⁰ Strabo, l. ix. p. 395.

⁵¹ Vitruvius, l. vii.

C H A P.
XII.

declined the danger and glory of the Persian war, to the success of which their adversaries had so eminently contributed. This ungenerous dereliction passed not unpunished. As deserters of the common cause, the Argives incurred the hatred and contempt of their public-spirited neighbours. Mycenæ, once the proud residence of royal Agamemnon, Epidaurus, and Trœzené, which formed respectively the greatest strength and ornament of the Argive territory, threw off the yoke of a capital, whose folly or baseness rendered her unworthy to govern them. Sicyon, Nauplia, Heliæa, and other towns of less note, which were scattered at small distances over the face of that delightful province, obeyed the summons to liberty, and assumed independence. The rebels (for as such they were treated by the indignant magistrates of Argos) strengthened themselves by foreign alliance, and continued thenceforth to disdain the authority of their ancient metropolis and sovereign. At the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, they formed a respectable portion of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while Argos alone, of all the cities in the Peloponnesus, openly espoused the cause of the Athenians.

Destruc-
tion of
Mycenæ.

The ancient city of Mycenæ, which had first founded the trumpet of sedition, was the only victim of Argive resentment. The Argives seized a favorable opportunity, while the allies and adherents of Mycenæ were occupied with their domestic concerns, to lead their whole forces against the place; and having taken it by storm, they decimated

decimated the inhabitants, and demolished not only the walls, but the town⁵² itself, which was never afterwards rebuilt.

C H A P.
XII.

The desultory transactions of so many states and cities as composed the name and nation of Greece, must appear a continual maze of perplexity and confusion, unless we carefully follow the threads which should direct us in this intricate, yet not inextricable, labyrinth. But if we seriously apply ourselves to investigate the hidden causes of events, and to trace revolutions to their source, we shall be surprised by the agreeable discovery, that the history of this celebrated people is not entirely that mass of disorder which it appears on a superficial survey. The same causes which repressed the activity, and humbled the pride of Argos, operated alike fatally on Thebes, the second republic beyond the isthmus, and the only one that ever aspired to rival the power of Athens. The Thebans, for similar, or more odious reasons, than those which had restrained the Argives, had also withheld their assistance in the Persian war; and by this mean selfishness or treachery had justly provoked the indignation of the subordinate cities of Bœotia. Not only Thespiæ and Plataea, which had ever borne with impatience the Theban yoke, but the sea-ports of Aulis, Anthemon, and Larymna; Aschra, the beloved habitation of old Hesiod; Coronea, overshadowed by mount Helicon, a favorite seat of the Muses; Labadea, famous for its oracle of

The inferior cities in Bœotia reject the authority of Thebes.

⁵² Diodor. l. xi. p. 276.

CHAPTER XII. Trophonius; Delium and Alalkomené, respectively sacred to Apollo and Minerva, together with Leuctra and Chæronea, the destined scenes of immortal victories; all these cities successively rejected the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Thebes, which, during the invasion of Xerxes, had so shamefully betrayed the common interest and glory of the nation⁵³.

The Thebans obtain assistance from Sparta. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459.

Wise policy of that state.

Athens enables the Bœotians to maintain their independence.

During several years, the Thebans patiently yielded to a storm, which they found it impossible to resist. But when the Spartans began to breathe after the recovery of Ithomé, and had made a successful expedition against the Phocians, in defence of their kinsmen in Doris, the Thebans warmly solicited them to take part in their domestic quarrels, and to enable them to regain their ascendant in Bœotia; with assurance that they would employ the first moments of returning vigor to oppose the growing pretensions of the Athenians. This proposal was accepted, not only by the resentment, but by the policy, of the Spartan senate, who perceived, that it equally concerned their interest, that the neighbouring city of Argos should lose her jurisdiction over Argolis; and that Thebes, the neighbour and rival of Athens, should recover her authority in Bœotia.

They were applying themselves with vigor and success to effect this salutary purpose, when the active vigilance of Athens dispatched an army, fifteen thousand strong, to maintain the independence

⁵³ Diodor. l. xi. p. 283, et seqq. et Thucydid. l. i. p. 273.

of Bœotia. The valor and conduct of Myronides, the Athenian general, obtained a decisive victory near the walls of Tanagra, one of the few places in the province which had preserved its fidelity to the capital. This memorable battle, which no ancient writer has thought proper to describe, although it is compared to the glorious trophies of Marathon and Plataea⁵⁴, confirmed the liberty of Bœotia; nor could the Thebans, notwithstanding their partial success against several of the revolted cities, recover their authority in that province, until, about fourscore years afterwards, they emerged into sudden splendor under the conduct of their heroic Epaminondas.

C H A P.

XII.

A. C. 458

—456.

The ambitious policy of Pericles, which will be fully explained in the sequel, was eager to profit by every favorable turn of fortune. He took care to place Athenian garrisons in several Bœotian fortresses; he made the neighbouring republics of Corinth and Megara feel and acknowledge the superiority of Athens; and after sending Tolmidas, a commander endued rather with an impetuous than well regulated courage, to ravage the coast of the Peloponnesus, he sailed thither next year in person, and made the Lacedæmonians and their allies deeply regret, that they had too soon discovered their animosity against a republic, alike capable to protect its friends and take vengeance on its enemies. The measures of this daring leader were actually uncontrolled by any opposition, since his eloquence

Ambitious
measures
of Athens.

A. C. 455.

A. C. 454.

⁵⁴ Diodor, l. xi. p. 284.

C H A P. XII. had prevailed over the innocence and merit of Cimon, and procured the banishment of that illustrious commander. But Cimon was recalled in two years; and his return was signalized by a suspension of arms in Greece, which that real patriot had been as zealous to promote, as he was ambitious to pursue his Asiatic triumphs. This treaty, however, was soon broke; but an ill-concerted and unfortunate enterprise against Thebes (disapproved by Pericles himself), in which the rash Tolmidas lost his army and his life, made the Athenians again listen to terms of accommodation. They agreed to withdraw their garrisons from Bœotia; to disavow all pretensions against Corinth and Megara, pretensions which had no other effect than to exasperate those little republics against their usurping neighbour; and, on complying with these conditions, the Athenians recovered their citizens made captive in Bœotia, through the misconduct of Tolmidas⁵⁵.

The truce
of thirty
years.
Olymp.
lxxxiii. 4.
A. C. 445.

This was the famous truce of thirty years, concluded in the fourteenth year preceding the Peloponnesian war. The former treaty had been limited to a much shorter period; for it is worthy of observation, that even in their agreements of peace, the Greeks discovered that perpetual propensity to war, which was the unhappy effect of their political institutions⁵⁶.

Motives of
the Athenians for
granting
it.

The terms of this accommodation, seemingly little favorable to the interest of Athens, were

⁵⁵ Diodor. l. xii. p. 293. Thucydid. l. i. p. 71, et seqq.

⁵⁶ Idem. p. 74.

Between
the years
470 and
440, A. C.

dictated, however, rather by the ambition than the equity of that republic; a conclusion that evidently results from examining the third series of events, which (as observed above) completes the history of this memorable period. Amidst the foreign expeditions of Cimon, and the domestic dissensions of Greece, the Athenian arms and policy had been gradually, during thirty years, establishing the sovereignty of the republic over her distant colonies and confederates. This bold undertaking was finally accomplished by Pericles, whose character contributed, more than that of any one man, to the glory and greatness, as well as to the calamities and ruin of his country.

Character
of Pericles;

His father Xanthippus, who gained the illustrious victory at Mycalé, rejoiced in a son endued with the happiest natural talents, and an innate love of glory. His youth was intrusted to the learned and virtuous Damon, who concealed, under the unobnoxious title of master of rhetoric, the art of animating his pupil with an ambition to deserve the first rank in the republic, as well as of adorning him with the accomplishments most necessary to attain it. From Aristagoras of Clazomené, denominated the philosopher of mind, on account of his continual solicitude to confirm the most important and most pleasing of all doctrines, that a benevolent intelligence presides over the operations of nature, and the events of human life, Pericles early learned to control the tempest of youthful passions, which so often blast the promising hopes of manhood; to preserve an unshaken constancy in

C H A P. XII. all the vicissitudes of fortune, since all are the varied dispensations of the same wise providence; and to trample, with generous contempt, on the groveling superstition of the vulgar. Thus qualified by nature and education, he soon displayed, in the Athenian assembly, an eloquence, nourished by the copious spring of philosophy, and ennobled by the manly elevation of his character. His speeches consisted not in the unpremeditated effusions of a temporary enthusiasm; he was the first of his countrymen who, before pronouncing his discourses, committed them to writing⁵⁷: they were studied and composed with the most laborious and patient care; and being polished by repeated touches of correcting art, they rose in admiration, in proportion as they were more closely examined by the piercing eye of criticism; and acquired the epithet of Olympian, to express that permanent and steady lustre which they reflected⁵⁸.

he is suspected of usurpation;

But the superior talents of Pericles, which, in a well-regulated government, would have increased his influence, had well nigh occasioned his ruin in a turbulent and suspicious democracy. The memory of the oldest citizens faithfully recollected, and the envy or fears of the younger readily believed, that the figure, the countenance, and the voice, of the young orator, strongly resembled those of the ambitious and artful Pisistratus, whose specious virtues had subverted the liberty of his country. The alarmed jealousy of freedom, which often

⁵⁷ Suidas.

⁵⁸ Plut. in Pericl.

destroyed, in an hour, the authority established slowly, and with much labor, during many meritorious years, might be tempted to punish the imagined tyranny of Pericles; who, to escape the disgrace of the ostracism, shunned the dangerous admiration of the assembly.

The active vigor of his mind, thus withdrawn from politics, was totally directed to war; and his abilities, alike fitted to excel in every honorable pursuit, and gradually opening with every occasion to display them, carried off the palm of military renown from the most illustrious captains of the age. Cimon alone surpassed him in the object of his victories gained over Barbarians; but Pericles equalled Cimon in valor and conduct. A rivalry in warlike fame was followed by a competition for civil honors. Cimon, who had been introduced on the theatre of public life by the virtuous Aristides, regarded, like that great man, a moderate aristocracy, as the government most conducive to public happiness. The contrary opinion was warmly maintained by Pericles, who found an ostentatious admiration of democracy the best expedient for removing the prejudice excited against him, by his resemblance to Pisistratus, of aspiring, or at least of being capable to aspire, at royal power. On every occasion he defended the privileges of the people against the pretensions of the rich and noble; he embraced not only the interests, but adopted the capricious passions, of the multitude; cherishing their presumption, flattering their vanity, indulging their rapacity, gratifying

C H A P.
XII.

he courts
and cor-
rupts the
Athenian
populace;

C H A P. XII. their taste for pleasure without expence, and fomenting their natural antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the patrons of rigid aristocracy, were peculiarly obnoxious to their resentment.

encourages
their am-
bitious
preten-
sions.

The condition of the times powerfully conspired with the views and measures of Pericles, since the glory and wealth acquired in the Persian war, procured not only allies and power to the state, but industry and independence to the populace. The son of Xanthippus impelled this natural current, which ran so strongly in favor of both, when he maintained, that the citizens of Athens were entitled to enjoy equal advantages at home, to challenge a just pre-eminence in Greece, and to assume a legal dominion over their distant colonies and confederates.

Means by
which he
subdued
the Athe-
nian colo-
nies and
allies.
A. C. 470
— 440.

These unfortunate communities had unwarily forged their own chains, when they consented to raise an annual subsidy to maintain the guardian navy of Athens. They perceived not, that this temporary benevolence would be soon converted into a perpetual tribute, since, in proportion as they became unaccustomed to war, they laid themselves at the mercy of that republic, to which they had tamely intrusted the care of their defence. When the rigorous exactions of Athens speedily warned them of their error, the wide intervals at which they were separated from each other, rendered it impossible for them to afford mutual assistance, and to act with united vigor. Naxos, Thasos, Ægina, Eubœa, Samos, and other islands or cities of less importance, boldly struggled to

repel usurpation ; but fighting singly , were suc- C H A P.
cessively subdued ; while new , and more grievous, XII.
burdens were cruelly imposed on them. The least
patient again murmured , petitioned , rebelled , and
taking arms to resist oppression , were treated with
the severity due to unprovoked sedition. The pu-
nishment inflicted on them was uniformly rigorous.
They were compelled to deliver up the authors of
the revolt , to surrender their shipping , to demo-
lish their walls , or receive an Athenian garrison , to
pay the expenses of the war , and give hostages for
their future obedience ⁵⁹. It is not the business of
general history to describe more minutely the events
of this social war , which was carried on chiefly by
Pericles , and finished in the course of thirty years ,
with every success the most presumptuous ambition
of Athens could either expect or desire. Samos ,
the capital of the island of that name , made the
most vigorous resistance ; but at length surrendered
to Pericles , after a siege of nine months , in the
ninth year before the war of Peloponnesus ⁶⁰.

Historians , partial or credulous , have handed
down some atrocious cruelties committed after the
taking of Samos , which may be confidently rejected
as fictions , injurious to the fame of Pericles , who
though he approved and animated the aspiring ge-
nius of his country , and vainly flattered himself that
he could justify , by reasons of state , its most ambi-
tious usurpations , uniformly showed himself inca-

Spirit of
the Athe-
nian go-
vernment ;

⁵⁹ Thucyd. et Diodor. loc. citat.

⁶⁰ Thucyd. l. i. p. 78.

C H A P.
XII.

its exces-
sive seve-
rity to-
wards its
depend-
ences.

pable of any deliberate wickedness. It may be observed, however, that as the moderate peace with Sparta had been concluded chiefly with a view to allow the Athenians to apply their undivided attention to the affairs of their tributaries, the severities exercised over these unfortunate states were, in consequence of that event, rather increased than mitigated. Athenian magistrates and garrisons were sent to govern and command them. They were burdened with new impositions, and dishonored by new badges of servitude. The lands, which the labor of their ancestors had cultivated, were seized and appropriated by strangers, who claimed the distinction of Athenian colonies; and all these once independent and flourishing republics were thenceforth compelled to submit their mutual contests, their domestic differences, and even their private litigations, to the cognisance and decision of Athenian assemblies and tribunals⁶¹. By drawing thus closely the reins of government, Pericles, in the course of ten years, brought into the treasury of Athens the sum of near two millions sterling⁶². His vigilance seasonably displayed the terrors of the Athenian navy before the most distant enemies or allies of the republic; by alternate pliancy and firmness, by successive promises, bribes, and threats, he repressed the jealous hostility of neighbouring powers; and while his ambition and magnificence fortified and adorned the capital with

⁶¹ Isocrat. de Pace; et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

⁶² Thucyd. Diodor. Isocrat. Plut. etc.

external strength and splendor, they also laid the foundations of those internal disorders, which rendered his long administration glorious for his contemporaries, fatal to the succeeding generation, and ever memorable with posterity.

C H A P.
XII.

C H A P. XIII.

Transition to the internal State of Athens. --- Laws of Draco --- Solon --- Pisistratus --- Clisthenes --- Aristides --- Pericles. --- Final Settlement of the Athenian Government. --- View of the Athenian Empire. --- The combined Effect of external Prosperity and democratic Government on Manners --- Arts --- Luxury. --- History of Grecian Literature and Philosophy. --- Singular Contrast and Balance of Virtues and Vices. --- The sublime Philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates. --- The unprincipled Cautiousness of the Sophists. --- The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides. --- The licentious Buffoonery of Aristophanes. --- The imitative Arts employed to the noblest Purposes --- and abused to the most infamous. --- Magnificence of public Festivals. --- Simplicity in private Life. --- Modest Reserve of Athenian Women. --- Voluptuousness, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aspasia.

C H A P.
XIII.

Transition
to the in-
ternal state
of Athens.

THE taking of Samos closed the long series of Athenian conquests. During the nine subsequent years, that once fortunate people enjoyed and abused the blessings of peace and prosperity. Their ostentatious display of power increased the envy and terror of Greeks and Barbarians, and excited the obstinate and bloody war of twenty-seven years, during which the force of the

whole Grecian nation was exerted to demolish or uphold the stately edifice of empire that had been reared by the ambitious patriotism of Pericles. Assisted by feeble or reluctant allies, Athens long struggled against the combined strength of Peloponnesus, Bœotia, Macedon, Sicily, and Persia; and our curiosity must deservedly be attracted towards the internal resources and moral condition of a people, who, with few natural advantages, could make such memorable and pertinacious efforts, and who, amidst the din of arms, still cultivating and improving their favorite arts, produced those immortal monuments of taste and genius, which, surviving the destruction of their walls, navy, and harbours, have ever attested the glory of Athens, and the impotent vengeance of her enemies. In an inquiry of this kind, the science of government and laws, which gives security to all other sciences, merits the first place in our attention; nor, at this distance of time, will the enlightened reader contemplate with indifference the laws of Athens, which having been incorporated¹ into the Roman

¹ The Romans sent deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, four hundred and fifty-four years before Christ. The benefits derived from these salutary institutions were gratefully acknowledged by the liberal candor of a people, who knew how to appreciate the merit of enemies and subjects. Hear the language of Pliny (l. viii. ep. 24.) to Maximus, who in the reign of Trajan was appointed governor of the province of Achaia, or Greece: "Remember that you go to a country where letters, politeness, and agriculture itself (if we believe common report), were invented. . . . Revere the gods and heroes, the ancient virtue and glory of the nation. Respect even its fables and its vanity; remembering that from Greece we derived our laws. The right of conquest, indeed, hath

C. H. A. P.
XIII.

jurisprudence about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, served, after an interval of above sixteen hundred years, to abolish the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce justice, security, and refinement, among the modern inhabitants of Europe².

Laws and
govern-
ment.

The admirable institutions of the heroic ages were built on religion; which, as we have fully

enabled us to impose our laws on the Greeks; but that people had first given us their laws, at our solicitation, and when they had nothing to fear from the power of our arms. It would be inhuman and barbarous to deprive them of the small remnant of liberty which they still possess."

² Justinian's Pandects, it is well known, were discovered at Amalfi, in Italy, A. D. 1130. In less than half a century afterwards, the civil law was studied and understood in all the great provinces of Europe; and this study (as Mr. Hume observes, Reign of Richard the Third) tended to sharpen the wits of men, to give solidity to their judgment, to improve their taste, and to abolish the barbarous jurisprudence which universally prevailed among the Gothic nations. To this law we owe the abolition of the mode of proof by the ordeal, the corsnet, the duel, and other methods equally ridiculous and absurd. Pecuniary commutations ceased to be admitted for crimes; private revenge was no longer authorized by the magistrate; and the community was made to feel its interest in maintaining the rights, and avenging the wrongs, of all its members. See more in the admirable discourse annexed to the Reign of Richard the Third. I shall add but one observation, in Mr. Hume's own words: "The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them; and thus the last branch of ancient literature which remained uncorrupted, was happily the first transmitted to the modern world: for it is remarkable, that in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who, in other countries, are seldom models of science or politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression." Hume's Hist. 4th vol. 8vo, p. 308.

explained above, ascertained and enforced the rights and obligations of public and private life. But the abused authority of priests and oracles, and the natural depravity of man, ever solicitous to obtain the partial favor of his heavenly protectors on easier terms than the faithful discharge of his duty, gradually severed, by fraud or violence, the natural and most salutary union between religion and morality; in consequence of which separation, the former degenerated into an illiberal superstition, and the latter relaxed into licentiousness, or stiffened into pedantry. The striking comparison, or rather contrast, between the genius and character, the virtues and vices, of the Greeks, as variously described by Homer and by Solon, and which is so much to the advantage of the earlier period, must, in the progress of this discourse, naturally present itself to the reflection of the attentive reader, and will set in the clearest point of view the unhappy revolution of manners, which time and accident had produced in the wide interval between the poet and the legislator.

The very imperfect legislation of Draco³, who flourished thirty years before Solon⁴, proved that the Athenians felt the want of a science, which they knew not how to acquire or cultivate. The austere gravity of that magistrate seems to have imposed on the easy credulity of the multitude; for his ignorance or severity were alike unworthy of the important office with which he was intrusted.

³ Suidas in voce Draco. Pollux, l. viii. c. vi.

⁴ Meursius, Solon.

C H A P.
XIII.

Legisla-
tion of
Draco;
Olymp.
xxxix. 1.
A. C. 624.

C H A P. He gave laws, which, according to the lively ex-
 XIII. pression of an orator, seemed to be written⁵, not
 with ink, but with blood; since death or banish-
 ment were his ordinary penalties for the most tri-
 vial offences, as well as for the most dangerous
 crimes: and he justified this rigor, by absurdly
 observing, that the smallest disorders deserved death,
 and no severer punishment could be inflicted on the
 greatest. The laws of Draco, therefore, tended
 only to increase the evils which they were designed
 to remedy⁶; and no people ever presented a scene
 of greater confusion and misery, than did the un-
 happy Athenians, when the abilities and virtues of
 Solon were seasonably called to their relief.

of Solon.
 Olymp.
 xlv. 3.
 A. C. 594.

State of
 Athens in
 the time
 of Solon.

In relating the general revolutions of Greece, we
 had occasion to describe the important services,
 and illustrious merit, of this extraordinary man,
 whose disinterestedness, patriotism, and humanity,
 equalled his military conduct and success. His
 royal extraction (for he sprang from the race of the
 Codridæ), his experienced abilities, above all, his
 approved wisdom and equity, pointed him out for
 the noblest and most sublime employment of hu-
 manity, that of regulating the laws and govern-
 ment of a free people. Such, at least, the Athe-
 nians may be considered, when their unanimous
 suffrage rendered Solon the absolute umpire of
 their whole constitution and policy; although, prior

⁵ The orator Demades, of whom more hereafter. The observation
 has been always repeated in speaking of Draco, though his laws were
 certainly written neither with blood nor ink. Even those of Solon
 were only engraved on tables kept in the citadel.

⁶ Aristot. de Civ. l. ii. et Plut. in Solon.

to this period, they suffered the combined evils of anarchy and oppression⁷. The magistrates plundered the treasury and the temples; and often betrayed, for bribes, the interests of their country. The rich tyrannised over the poor, the poor continually alarmed the safety of the rich. The rapacity of creditors knew no bounds. They compelled the insolvent debtors to cultivate their lands, like cattle; to perform the service of beasts of burden; and to transfer to them their sons and daughters, whom they exported as slaves to foreign countries. Solon, with a laudable vanity, boasts of having recovered and restored to their native rights many of those unhappy men, whose sentiments had been debased, and language corrupted, by the infamy of Barbarian servitude⁸. The wretched populace, deriving courage from despair, had determined no longer to submit to such multiplied rigors; and before the wisdom of the lawgiver interposed, they had taken the resolution to elect and follow some warlike leader, to attack and butcher their oppressors, to establish an equal partition of lands, and to institute a new form of government⁹. But the numerous clients and retainers, who, in a country little acquainted with arts and manufactures, depended on the wealthy proprietors of the lands and mines of Attica, must have rendered this undertaking alike dangerous to both parties; so that both became willing rather to submit their differences to law, than to decide them by the sword.

⁷ Fragm. Solonis apud. Demosth. p. 234. edit. Wol.

⁸ Idem, ibid.

⁹ Plut. in Solon.

C H A P.

XIII.

His regulations concerning property.

New models the government.

The impartiality of Solon merited the unlimited confidence of his country. He maintained the ancient division of property, but abolished debts. He established the rate of interest at 12 per cent. at which it afterwards remained; but forbade, that the insolvent debtor should become the slave of his creditor, or be compelled to sell his children into servitude. After these preliminary regulations, which seemed immediately necessary to the public peace, Solon proceeded, with an impartial and steady hand, to new-model the government¹⁰; on this generous, but equitable principle, that the few ought not, as hitherto, to command, and the many to obey; but that the collective body of the people, legally convened in a national assembly, were entitled to decide, by a plurality of voices, the alternatives of peace and war; to contract or dissolve alliances with foreign states; to enjoy

¹⁰ The most correct information concerning the ancient republic of Athens, and the laws of Solon, is contained in Aristot. *Fragm. de Civit. Athen.* and in various parts of his second, fourth, and sixth books of *Politics*. 2. In Isocrat. *Areopagit. Panathen. et Panegy.* And 3. In Plut. in *Vit. Solon.* Xenophon's *Treatise* concerning the Athenian republic relates to later times, when many corruptions had crept in, as will be afterwards explained. It is remarkable, that Polybius, l. vi. has confounded the moderate institutions of Solon with the democratical licentiousness and tyranny introduced by Pericles and his successors in the administration. The palpable errors of so judicious an author prove how little accurate knowledge the Greeks possessed on the subject of their own history; and how impossible it is for a modern writer, who blindly follows such guides, not to fall into innumerable errors and contradictions. The treatise of Aristotle (*de Civitate*) above-mentioned, deserves particular attention from those who write or study the history of republics. In it we see the germ, and often more than the germ, of the political works of Machiavel, which Montesquieu has so often copied, without once acknowledging his obligation.

all the branches of legislative or *sovereign* power¹¹; and to elect, approve, and judge the magistrates or ministers intrusted, for a limited time, with the *executive* authority.

C H A P.
XIII.

In the actual state of most countries of Europe, such a form of government, as only takes place in some small cantons of Switzerland, would be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing the citizens too much from their private affairs. But in ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the slaves were four times more numerous than the freemen¹²; and of the latter we may compute that little more than one-half were entitled to any share in the sovereignty. Strangers, and all those who could not ascertain their Athenian descent, both in the male and female line, were totally excluded from the assembly and courts of justice. The regulations of Solon marked the utmost attention to preserve the pure blood of Athens unmixed and uncorrupted; nor could any foreigner, whatever merit he might claim with the public, be admitted to the rank of citizen, unless he abandoned for ever his native country, professed the knowledge of some highly useful or ingenious art, and, in both cases,

His institutions
suited the
condition
of the
times.

¹¹ The election contained a mixture of chance, since those who were named by the people cast lots to decide on whom the office should be conferred. The same practice prevails in chusing the senators of the republic of Berne. But Solon enacted, that the fortunate candidate should undergo what is called a probation; his character and merits were thus exposed to a second examination; and it seemed scarcely possible, after this severe scrutiny, that any man should attain power, who was altogether unworthy of public confidence.

¹² See my Introductory Discourse to the Orations of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 5, et seqq.

CHAPTER. had been chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six
XIII. thousand Athenians. These circumstances (especially as the Athenian people were usually convened only four times in thirty-five days) prevented their assemblies from being either so inconvenient and burdensome, or so numerous and tumultuary, as might at first sight be supposed. Yet their numbers, and still more their impetuosity and ignorance, must have proved inconsistent with good government, if Solon had not secured the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, by the two firm anchors of the Senate and the Areopagus; tribunals originally of great dignity and of very extensive power, into which men of a certain description only could be received as members.

His division of the citizens.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to the produce of their estates. The first class consisted of those whose lands annually yielded five hundred measures of liquid, as well as dry commodities; and the minimum of whose yearly income may be calculated at sixty pounds sterling; which is equivalent, if we estimate the relative value of money by the price of labor, and of the things most necessary to life, to about six hundred pounds sterling in the present age¹³. The second class consisted of those whose estates produced three hundred measures; the third, of those whose estates produced two hundred; the fourth, and by far the most numerous class of Athenians, either possessed no landed property, or at least enjoyed not a revenue in land equal to twenty-four

¹³ See Introduction to Lysias, etc. p. 14.

pounds sterling, or, agreeably to the above proportion, two hundred and forty pounds of our present currency.

C H A P.
XIII.

All ranks of citizens were alike admitted to vote in the public assembly, and to judge in the courts of justice; whether civil or criminal, which were properly so many committees of the assembly¹⁴. But the three first classes were exclusively entitled to sit in the senate, to decide in the Areopagus, or to hold any other office of magistracy. To these dignities they were elected by the free suffrages of the people, to whom they were accountable for their administration, and by whom they might be punished for malversation or negligence, although they derived no emolument from the diligent discharge of their duty.

Prerogatives of the first classes.

The senate of four hundred, which, eighty-six years after its institution, was augmented to five hundred by Clisthenes, enjoyed the important prerogatives of convoking the popular assembly; of previously examining all matters before they came to be decided by the people, which gave them a negative before debate in all public resolutions; and of making laws which had force during a year, without requiring the consent of the populace. Besides this general superintendence and authority,

Of the senate of the 500.

¹⁴ In my Introductory Discourses to the Orations of Lysias, etc. I had occasion to explain the nature of the Athenian tribunals. Since the publication of that work, the same subject, and particularly the form of civil process, has been accurately explained by Sir William Jones, in his Dissertations annexed to the translation of Isæus. Mr. Pettingal's learned work upon the use and practice of *juries* among the ancients, lately fell into my hands. Wherein my ideas and his differ, will easily appear from the text, and needs not be pointed out.

C H A P. XIII. the senate was exclusively invested with many particular branches of the executive power. The president of that council had the custody of the public archives and treasury. The senate alone built ships; equipped fleets and armies; seized and confined state-criminals; examined and punished several offences, which were not expressly forbidden by any positive law. The weight of such a council, which assembled every day, except festivals, infused a large mixture of aristocracy into the Athenian constitution. This, as we shall immediately explain, was still farther increased by the authority of the Areopagus, a court so named from the place where it was held; a hill sacred to Mars, adjoining to the citadel.

The nine
archons.

The principal magistrates in Athens were the nine archons, the first of whom gave his name to the year, and presided in the civil courts of justice, where a committee of the people, chosen promiscuously from all classes by lot¹⁵, sat as judges and jury; but where it belonged to the archon and his assessors, men appointed by suffrage, and acquainted with forms, to take what in Scotland is called a precognition, to prescribe the form of action, to give the ballot¹⁶, and to receive and declare the

¹⁵ The essential difference between the Roman and Athenian government, consisted in the different placing of the judicial power; which at Rome remained 300 years in the hands of the senate. The seditions of the Gracchi, and most of the civil dissensions which happened before the time of Augustus, had for their object or pretence, the altering of this order of things, and bringing the Roman constitution nearer the Athenian.

¹⁶ *Οι τιθέντες τον αγκωνα και την ψηφον δίδοντες*, are the words of Lysias. The same writer mentions the *παρεδροι, συνδικαι*, assessors, syndics.

verdict and sentence of the court. The archon next in dignity, who had the appellation of king, presided in causes respecting religion and things sacred, which formed the object of an important and dangerous branch of Athenian jurisprudence. The archon third in dignity, with his assessors the generals¹⁷, presided in military matters; and the six remaining, who were known by the general appellation of thesmothetæ, heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the six courts where criminal causes were examined and determined. These nine archons, or presidents of the several courts of justice, like all other Athenian magistrates, were, at the expiration of their annual office, accountable to the people; and when their conduct, after a severe scrutiny, appeared to merit public approbation and gratitude, they were received, and remained for life, members of the Areopagus, a senate invested with a general inspection over the laws and religion, as well as over the lives and manners of the citizens; and which, in dangerous emergencies, was even entitled to assume a sort of dictatorial power¹⁸.

The Areopagus.

Such is the great outline of the constitution established by Solon, according to which every Athenian citizen enjoyed the inestimable privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to

Happy tendency of Solon's plan of government.

¹⁷ Lyfias, in the second oration against Alcibiades (a military cause), not only mentions the στρατηγοί, or generals, but addresses them separately from the ἄνδρες δικάσται, or judges.

¹⁸ Isocrat. Oratio Areopagit.

C H A P. XIII. which he himself had consented. Although the legislative and judicial powers were thus lodged with the people, men of property and ability were alone intrusted with the administration of government; and as power in some measure followed property, the same expedient which served to maintain a due distinction of ranks in society, tended also to promote the industry and frugality of the multitude, that they might thereby become entitled to share those honors and offices, to which persons of a certain estate only could aspire.

Extensive
nature of
his laws.

The laws of Solon were of the most extensive nature, comprehending not only rules of right, but maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts of agriculture. To describe his institutions respecting such matters as are properly the objects of law, would be explaining those great, but familiar principles, concerning marriage, succession, testaments, the rights of *persons* and of *things*, which, through the medium of the civil law, have been conveyed into the jurisprudence of all the civilized nations of Europe. His laws concerning education and manners prove that drunkenness and unnatural love were the predominant vices of that early age. It was a particular duty of the archons, to prevent or punish offences committed in consequence of intoxication; and the regulations concerning schools¹⁹, which were not to be opened till sun-rise, which were ordered to be shut before night, and into which none but such relations of

¹⁹ Æschin. in Timarchum.

the master, as were particularly specified by law, could on any pretence be admitted, marked the utmost solicitude to root out an evil which already infected and disgraced the manners of Greece.

The education recommended by Solon nearly resembled that above described, which generally prevailed in Greece²⁰. The children of Athenian citizens, when taken from the hands of the women, were delivered to two masters, of whom the one formed the body, and the other the mind. Swimming, and the easier exercises, prepared them for the harder toils of the gymnastic. Reading, and learning by heart the lessons and examples of the poets, made way for the severer studies of eloquence and philosophy. In process of time, music, geometry, and drawing, seem to have entered into the plan of a liberal education²¹. At the age of twenty, the youth of all ranks took an oath in the temple of Agraulos (an appellation of Minerva), to obey and to maintain the laws of their country; to use their best endeavours to promote its prosperity; to follow the standard of whatever commanders might be appointed to conduct them; to sail to every part of the world, when summoned by the public service; to fight to death for their native land; and to regard wheat, barley, vines, and olives, as the only boundaries of Attica²²: a preposterous arrogance in that little republic, which already betrayed an ambition to conquer and appropriate all

C H A P.
XIII.
His system
of educa-
tion.

Duties and
employ-
ments of
the youth.

²⁰ See Chapters V. and VI.

²¹ Arist. Polit. l. vii. c. iii.

²² See Introduction to Lyfias, etc. p. 16.

C H A P. XIII. the cultivated parts of the world. When the Athenian youth were not, in consequence of this oath, engaged in military service, they were obliged by law to follow such employments as suited their respective fortunes. Agriculture, commerce, and mechanic arts, fell to the share of the poor; the rich still continued their application to gymnastic and philosophy, carefully studied the laws of the republic, examined the ancient and actual condition of their own and neighbouring states; and, at the age of thirty, appeared as candidates in the assembly for such offices of trust and honor as their regular manners, inoffensive and dutiful behaviour in all the relations of private life, temperance, œconomy, public spirit, and abilities²³, might obtain from the voluntary suffrage of the people.

Usurpation of Pisistratus.
A. C. 578.

The usurpation of Pisistratus, though it destroyed for a time the political liberty of Athens, gave stability to most of the laws and forms introduced by Solon. That extraordinary *tyrant*, for so the Greeks styled him, was not more distinguished by the loftiness of his genius than the humanity of his disposition; and had not the violence of contending factions, and the fury of his enemies, inflamed his natural love of power, the name of Pisistratus would stand the foremost in the list of Grecian patriots and heroes. His valor and conduct were signalized in the conquest of Nisæa, Salamis, Naxos, Delos, and Sigæum; and if he displayed boldness and address in acquiring sovereignty, he displayed

²³ Lyfias, *passim*.

still more moderation and virtue in administering it. He assumed, indeed, the royal dignities of priest and general, and took care that the chief offices of magistracy should be filled by his partisans. But he maintained the regular course of law and justice, not only by his authority, but by his example; having appeared in person to answer an accusation in the Areopagus. He not only enforced the laws of Solon against idleness, but endeavoured to give them more efficacy by introducing new arts and manufactures into Attica. He was the first who brought into that country the complete collection of Homer's poems, which he commanded to be sung at the Panathenæan festival; nor can we suppose that he should have been zealous to diffuse the liberal and manly sentiments of that divine poet, if his government had not resembled the moderation and equity of the heroic ages, rather than the despotism of tyrants.

His son Hipparchus imitated and surpassed the mild virtues of his father; and, amidst the turbulence of the later democracy, it was acknowledged with a sigh by the Athenians, that their ancestors were indeed happy under Solon and Pisistratus, but that the reign of the tyrant Hipparchus brought back on earth the golden days of Saturn. The father had required a tenth part of the produce of Attica, to support his guards, and the other appendages of royalty: his more generous son remitted one-half of this imposition. While he alleviated the burdens, yet encouraged the industry of his subjects, by building the temple of Olympian

C H A P.

XIII.

His moderate and wise administration;

surpassed by that of his son Hipparchus.

C H A P. XIII. Jupiter, he was solicitous to dispel their ignorance and barbarity by erecting pillars in every part of the city, engraved with elegiac verses, containing lessons of wisdom and precepts of morality. He collected the first library in Athens; and his liberal rewards, and still more his agreeable manners and winning affability, attracted to that city the most distinguished poets of the age.

His murder exasperates Hippias.

The murder of Hipparchus exasperated the temper of his brother and successor Hippias; but notwithstanding the calamities which the latter inflicted and suffered, it must be allowed that the government of Pisistratus and his family, which, with various interruptions, lasted sixty-eight years²⁴, increased the strength, and promoted the refinement of Athens²⁵.

The government changed by Clisthenes. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 510.

Yet in nothing was that usurpation more advantageous than in the animating sense of liberty which the memory of past servitude, under Hippias, excited and kept alive in Athens, after the popular government had been restored by Clisthenes and Alcibiades. We have already had occasion to relate the foreign victories of the republic, which immediately followed that event; but at the same time the constitution of government underwent a considerable change. By admitting to the rank of citizens a promiscuous crowd of strangers, fugitives, Athenians of half blood, and perhaps slaves, the tribes were augmented from four to ten; and

²⁴ Between 578 and 510. B. C.

²⁵ See the treatise of Meursius, entitled *Pisistratus*, one of the few satisfactory performances in the immense collection of Gronovius.

the senators from four to five hundred. The ostracism was likewise established; a law by which any citizen whose influence or abilities seemed dangerous to liberty, might be banished ten years, without the proof or allegation of any positive crime.

In this condition the republic continued thirty years, until the glorious victories of Salamis, Plataea, and Mycalé, encouraged the lowest but most numerous class of citizens, by whose valor those memorable exploits had been achieved, to make further invasions on the prerogatives of their superiors. The sudden wealth, which the rich spoils of the Barbarians had diffused among all ranks of men, increased the *census* of individuals, and destroyed the balance of the constitution. Aristides, who perceived it to be impossible to resist the natural progress of democracy, seasonably yielded to men who had arms in their hands, and firmness in their hearts; and proposed, with apparent satisfaction, but much secret reluctance²⁶, a law by which the Athenian magistrates should be thenceforth promiscuously elected from the four classes of citizens. This innovation paved the way for the still greater changes begun twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution of which the consequences were not immediately felt, but which continually became more sensible, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens and of Greece.

The general reasons which prevailed on the equity and discernment of Pericles to espouse, with

C H A P.

XIII.

Important
alteration
made by
Aristides.
Olymp.
lxxv. 2.
A. C. 479.

The de-
mocracy
completed

²⁶ Ἐκὼν ἀεχόντι δὲ θυμῷ, cited on this occasion by Plutarch, well expresses the forced generosity of Aristides to the populace.

C H A P. undue warmth, the cause of the populace, have
 XIII. in the preceding chapter been sufficiently explained.
 by Peri- Yet whatever partial motives of interest and ambi-
 cles. tion²⁷ might warp the views of this illustrious statef-
 Olymp. man, it must be acknowledged, that the foreign
 lxxxii. 4. tranfactions and fuccefs of the republic, and parti-
 A. C. 449. cularly the new fituation in which the Athenians
 found themfelves placed with regard to their diftant
 allies and colonies, might naturally fuggelt and
 occafion very important alterations in the Athenian
 constitution. The ancient and facred law, which
 obliged every citizen, without fee or reward, to
 take arms in defence of his country, could not
 eafily be extended to the obligation of protecting,
 without a proper recompence, the interest of
 foreign communities. The fcanty population of
 Attica fufficed not to anfwer the demands of fo
 many diftant expeditions. It became neceffary to
 hire troops wherever they might be found; and,
 as this neceffity introduced pay into the Athenian
 armies, a fimilar, though not equally cogent, rea-
 fon eftablifhed fees and falaries for all the different
 orders of judges and magiftrates. The fame prin-
 ciple of duty and public fpirit, which obliged every
 freeman to fight without pay, likewise obliged him
 gratuitoufly to judge, confult, and deliberate, for

Introduc-
 tion of pay
 to the
 troops;

of fees and
 falaries to
 the magif-
 trates.

²⁷ Plutarch (in Pericle) mentions a particular reason which engaged Pericles to counteract the aristocracy, and to abridge the power of the Areopagus. Although he had been often *named* for the office of archon, the *lot* had never fallen on him; so that he could not be received as a member of that respected court. If this observation be well founded, it shows how little real weight the annual magistracies had at Athens; since Pericles, though he never attained the dignity of archon, governed the republic many years with unrivalled authority.

the benefit of his country. But when the con-
tested interests of foreign, though dependent com-
munities, were agitated and adjusted in the tribu-
nals of Athens, it seemed reasonable for those who
spent their time in an employment, to which no
natural obligation called them, to demand a pro-
per reward for their useful services. At first, there-
fore, a *small* sum, but which gradually increased
with the power of the people, was regularly dis-
tributed among the citizens, for every deliberation
which they held, and for every cause which they
determined.

C H A P.
XIII.

The desire of reaping this profit made the popu-
lace anxious to draw all causes and deliberations
before their own tribunals and assemblies. This
design was successfully accomplished by Ephialtes²⁸,
an artful and daring demagogue, whom Pericles
employed as a proper instrument to effect such in-
vidious measures as were most obnoxious to the
rich and noble. While his patron extended the
renown of Athens by his foreign victories, and gra-
dually reduced into subjection the colonies and
allies of the republic, the obsequious Ephialtes
zealously promoted his domestic measures; and by
undermining the authority of the senate and of
the Areopagus²⁹, the firmest bulwarks of the

These
circum-
stances
totally un-
hinge the
govern-
ment
established
by Solon.

²⁸ Plut. in Pericle.

²⁹ Authors have not described in what particular respects, or by
what particular means, Ephialtes effected his purpose: yet we may
collect, from obscure hints on this subject, that he not only brought
before the inferior tribunals causes hitherto confined to the Areopagus,
but took from that court its general inspection and superintendence
over the religion and laws; which offices he bestowed on the popular
court of the *ἡλιαία* and the *νομοφυλάκες*, who were appointed, and

6 H A P.
XIII.

aristocracy, obtained a signal victory over the laws of Solon. The assassination of Ephialtes proved only the weakness of his enemies; and we shall find, in the subsequent history of Athens, that most matters of deliberation came, thenceforth, in the first instance, before the popular assembly; that the wise institutions of Solon were reduced to an empty form; and that the magnanimity of Pericles, the extravagance of his immediate successors, the patriotism of Thraſybulus and Conon, the integrity of Phocion, the artifices of Æschines, and the eloquence of Demosthenes, successively swayed, at will, a wild and capricious democracy.

External
and do-
mestic
prosperity
of the re-
public.
Olymp.
Ixxxv. I.
A. C. 440.

The revolution which immediately followed, in the manners, character, and conduct of the Athenians, was the natural consequence of the change of government, combined with other circumstances inseparably connected with their domestic and external prosperity. In the course of a few years, the success of Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, had tripled the revenues, and increased, in a far greater proportion, the dominions of the republic. The Athenian gallies commanded the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen had engrossed the traffic of the adjacent countries; the dismissed, at the will of the people. He likewise rendered the *probation* for becoming an *Areopagite* less severe than formerly. Persons crept into this order, whose characters disgraced it. The *Areopagites* became equally accessible to presents and to beauty; and their decisions fell into contempt. See the discourse of Isocrates upon reforming the government of Athens, and Athenæus, l. ix. That Ephialtes, or Pericles himself, likewise weakened the authority of the senate (although it is not remarked by any ancient author), appears from all the subsequent history of Athens.

maga-

magazines of Athens abounded with wood, metal, ebony, ivory, and all the materials of the useful as well as of the agreeable arts; they imported the luxuries of Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and Peloponnesus; experience had improved their skill in working the silver mines of mount Laurium; they had lately opened the valuable marble veins in mount Pentelicus; the honey of Hymettus was more esteemed, in proportion as it became better known to their neighbours, the culture of their olives (oil being long their staple commodity, and the only production of Attica, which Solon allowed them to export) must have improved with the general improvement of the country in arts and agriculture, especially under the active administration of Pericles, who liberally let loose the public treasure to encourage every species of industry³⁰.

Effect of
this, com-
bined with
the change
of govern-
ment, on
manners
and arts.

But if that minister promoted the love of action, he found it necessary at least to comply with, if not to excite, the extreme passion for pleasure, which then began to distinguish his countrymen. The people of Athens, successful in every enterprise against their foreign as well as domestic enemies, seemed entitled to reap the fruits of their dangers and victories. For the space of at least twelve years preceding the war of Peloponnesus, their city afforded a perpetual scene of triumph and festivity. Dramatic entertainments, to which they were passionately addicted, were no longer performed in slight

³⁰ Isocrat. Areop. de Pace, et Panegyri. Xenoph. et Aristot. de Repub. Athen.

C H A P.
XIII.

unadorned edifices, but in stone or marble theatres, erected at great expense, and embellished with the most precious productions of nature and of art. The treasury was opened, not only to supply the decorations of this favorite amusement, but to enable the poorer citizens to enjoy it, without incurring any private expense; and thus, at the cost of the state, or rather of its tributary allies and colonies, to feast and delight their ears and fancy with the combined charms of music and poetry. The pleasure of the eye was peculiarly consulted and gratified in the architecture of the theatres and other ornamental buildings; for, as Themistocles had strengthened, Pericles adorned his native city; and unless we had the concurring testimony of antiquity, as well as the immortal remains of the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva, which still excite the admiration of travellers, it would be difficult to believe that in the space of a few years, there could have been created those inestimable wonders of art, those innumerable temples, theatres, statues, altars, baths, gymnasia, and porticoes, which, in the language of ancient panegyric, rendered Athens the eye and light of Greece ³¹.

Luxury
and vices
of Athens.

Pericles was blamed for thus decking one favorite city, like a vain, voluptuous harlot, at the expense of plundered provinces ³²; but it would have been fortunate for the Athenians if their extorted wealth had not been employed in more perishing, as well as more criminal, luxury. The

³¹ Isocrat. et Aristid. in Panegyri.

³² Plutarch in Pericle;

pomp of religious solemnities, which were twice as numerous and as costly in Athens as in any other city of Greece; the extravagance of entertainments and banquets, which on such occasions always followed the sacrifices; the increase of private luxury, which naturally accompanied this public profusion, exhausted the resources, without augmenting the glory, of the republic. Instead of the bread, herbs, and simple fare recommended by the laws of Solon, the Athenians, soon after the eightieth Olympiad, availed themselves of their extensive commerce to import the delicacies of distant countries, which were prepared with all the refinements of cookery³³. The wines of Cyprus were cooled with snow in summer; in winter³⁴ the most delightful flowers adorned the tables and persons of the wealthy Athenians. Nor was it sufficient to be crowned with roses, unless they were likewise anointed with the most precious perfumes³⁵. Parasites, dancers, and buffoons, were an usual appendage of every entertainment³⁶. Among the weaker sex, the passion for delicate birds, distinguished by their voice or plumage, was carried to such excess as merited the name of madness³⁷. The bodies of such youths as were not peculiarly addicted to hunting and horses, which began to be a prevailing taste³⁸, were corrupted

³³ Aristoph. Nubes, ver. 50. et Lysistrat. passim.

³⁴ Athen. l. xi. 3. et Xenoph. Memorabilia, l. ii.

³⁵ Xenoph. ibid. ³⁶ Athenæus, l. i. et Xenoph. Symp.

³⁷ Ορνιθεμανια, Athen. l. xi. 34 ³⁸ Aristoph. Nubes, passim.

C H A P. XIII. by the commerce of harlots, who had reduced their profession into system³⁹; while their minds were still more polluted by the licentious philosophy of the sophists. It is unnecessary to crowd the picture, since it may be observed, in one word, that the vices and extravagances, which are supposed to characterize the declining ages of Greece and Rome, took root in Athens during the administration of Pericles, the most splendid and most prosperous in the Grecian annals.

Contrast
and balance of
virtues and
vices, advantages
and disadvantages.

This paradox, for such it must appear, may be explained by considering the singular combination of circumstances, which, in the time of that statesman, gave every poison its antidote, and rendered the partial evils, already described, only the thorn that ever accompanies the rose. The Grecian history of those times affords a more striking contrast than ever appeared in any other age or country, of wisdom and folly, of magnanimity and meanness, of liberty and tyranny, of simplicity and refinement, of austerity and voluptuousness. The sublime philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates was accompanied, as with a shadow, by the dark unprincipled captiousness of the sophists; the pathetic and moral strains of Sophocles and Euripides were parodied by the licentious buffoonery of Aristophanes; painting and sculpture, which, under geniuses of the first order like Phidias, served as handmaids to religion and virtue, degenerated under inferior artists into mean hirelings of vice and

³⁹ Alexis apud Athenæum, l. xiii.

disorder; the modesty of Athenian matrons was set off as by a foil, when compared with the dissoluteness of the school of Aspasia; and the simple frugality of manners, which commonly prevailed in private families, even of the first distinction, was contrasted with the extravagant dissipation of public entertainments and festivals. To examine the parallel links of this complicated chain will illustrate the character of a people whose subsequent transactions form one principal object of Grecian history.

Philosophy, which in Greece alone deserves the peculiar attention of the historian, arose about the beginning of the sixth century before Christ, and in a hundred and fifty years attained the highest degree of perfection, and sunk into the lowest degeneracy and corruption, to which the use or abuse of the human intellect could raise or plunge it. Lesser Asia, to which Europe and America owe the inestimable benefits of their religion and letters, produced and nourished the tender plant of philosophy; and the flourishing Greek colonies on that delightful coast, communicated to their mother-country this precious offspring of their soil. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Cleobulus of Lindus in the isle of Rhodes, and the other wise men, as they were emphatically styled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and assistance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but restrained their vices by wholesome laws, improved their manners by useful lessons of morality, and extended their knowledge by

C H A P.
XIII.

Parallel
links of
this chain
examined.

History of
Greek phi-
losophy.

The seven
Sages.

C H A P. XIII. important and difficult discoveries ⁴⁰. But the first attempt towards moral philosophy, as independent on, and unconnected with religion, seems to have been the fables of Æsop, which, to men in an early period of society, must have appeared a very serious and important species of composition. The sphere of history was narrow; the examples of the gods, amidst the continual corruptions of superstition, had become too flagitious for imitation; and men, whose rustic simplicity of life afforded them continual opportunities to observe the instinctive sagacity of certain animals, might derive many useful lessons from those humble instructors. In the early ages of Greece and Rome, and of all other nations whose history is recorded, fables were told and in some degree believed, in the assembly and senate-house, on the most important occasions; for in the infancy of society men are children; and the delusion, which the belief of a fable supposes, is not more gross and improbable than many of those errors into which (as we have already proved ⁴¹) their lively fancy had often hurried them. The same romantic cast of imagination which had animated woods and winds, mountains and rivers, which had changed heroes into gods, and gods into frail men, might endow animals with reason, and even speech.

The gnomonic poets.

The next step towards moral science was of a more refined and abstract kind, consisting of the

⁴⁰ Plutarch. Sympos. et de Placit. Philosoph. Plato in Protagor. Diogen. Laert. passim.

⁴¹ See above, Chapter II.

sentences of the gnomonic poets ⁴², and in those detached precepts or proverbs which, in all countries, have preceded any systematic account of morality. Each of the seven sages, as they were called, had his favorite maxims ⁴³, which he engraved in temples and other places of public resort; but at this distance of time it is impossible, amidst the differences of authors, to discover what belongs to each; nor is the search important, since all their maxims or proverbs, whatever efforts of generalization they might cost their inventors, now appear extremely simple and familiar.

These respectable fathers of Grecian philosophy, who silently diffused light through the gloom of a barbarous age, are said to have maintained a correspondence ⁴⁴ with each other, as well as with Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth; men who, in imitation of their eastern brethren, chiefly cultivated such practical knowledge as qualified them to be the legislators, magistrates, and generals of their respective countries.

Thales the Milesian, alone, quitted the ordinary pursuits of civil and military renown; and although he composed verses, promulgated moral sentences, and, on some particular emergencies, gave seasonable advice to his countrymen, yet he established his fame on a basis more broad and

C H A P.
XIII.

The discoveries of Thales the Milesian.

⁴² See the Sentences of Theognis, which are evidently a collection, not the work of one man.

⁴³ Aristot. Rhet. ii. 21. Stobæus, Serm. p. 44, etc.

⁴⁴ Plut. Symp.

C H A P. permanent than the fluctuating interests of perishing communities. Many of the elementary propositions of geometry, afterwards collected by Euclid, were first discovered⁴⁵ by Thales, who directed the acuteness of his mind with equal success to astronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones; discovered the equinoxes and solstices; remarked the Ursa Minor; observed, and nearly predicted, eclipses. The division of the year into three hundred and sixty-five days was already known to the Egyptians; but although Thales might borrow this, and perhaps other discoveries, from that ancient people, among whom he sometime resided; it appears, even from those authors who are ever prone to exaggerate the wisdom of Egypt, that he owed much less to that country, than to the native sagacity and penetration of his clear comprehensive mind⁴⁶.

His school
and successors,

Thales founded the Ionic school, in which he was succeeded by Anaximander and Anaximenes, who were followed by Anaxagoras, the instructor of Pericles, and Archelaus, who is called by ancient writers the master of Socrates. About fifty years after Thales, the same speculations which he had introduced were pursued by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus and Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Ephesus. These ingenious men discovered many useful truths; yet all of them, not

⁴⁵ Proclus in Euclid.

⁴⁶ Hieronym. apud Laert. l. i. c. xxvii. Plin. l. xxxviii. c. xvii.

excepting Thales himself, likewise busied themselves with subjects that will for ever excite and elude human curiosity. Their doctrines were equally liable to objection, whichever of the elements they assumed as the first principle of nature; they universally agreed in asserting the fallacy of the senses, and the unworthiness of the vulgar superstition; but their various opinions concerning the origin and destruction of worlds, the magnitudes and distances of heavenly bodies, the essence of matter and spirit⁴⁷, deserve only to be considered as the dreams of inquisitive men, whose ambition of knowledge carried them beyond the sphere of experience, and the clear deductions of reason. The system of Leucippus, the most famous of them all, was improved by Democritus of Abdera⁴⁸, and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whose philosophy is sufficiently explained in the extraordinary work of Lucretius, the boldest monument which the world is ever likely to behold, of learning, genius, and impiety.

degenerate
into athe-
ism.

But it is particularly worthy of observation, that at the same time Democritus assailed the celestial mansions, and unveiled, with a daring hand, the feeble majesty of Grecian superstition, Anaxagoras of Clazomené revealed a new and infinitely more august spectacle, by first announcing to the heathen world, a self-existent, all perfect mind, as the great

The sub-
lime phi-
losophy of
Anaxago-
ras.

⁴⁷ See Diogen. Laert. l. i. Aristot. Metaph. passim. et Plut. de Placit. Philosoph.

⁴⁸ Laert. l. ix. Aristot. Physic. l. viii.

C H A P. XIII. cause and author of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with such of their disciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted spirit as a constituent principle of the universe; but they had so intimately blended mind and matter, that these dissimilar substances seemed to make an indissoluble compound, as the soul and body constitute but one man. According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and sovereign intelligence was to be carefully distinguished from the soul of the world, which he seems to have regarded merely as a poetical expression for the laws which the Deity had impressed on his works. The great Ruler of the universe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and perishing terms; his nature was pure and spiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture⁴⁹.

The discovery and diffusion of this-luminous and sublime principle, which was naturally followed by an investigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and persevering labors of Socrates and his followers, if the tendency of this divine philosophy had not been counteracted, not only by the gross prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophists.

⁴⁹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* l. i. c. iii. Plato in *Cratylus*, et Plut. in *Pericle*.

The same spirit of inquiry, which leads to the discovery of truth, will ever promote the propagation of error; and unfortunately for Greece, in the middle of the fifth century before Christ, errors were propagated, so congenial to the condition of the times, that they could not fail to take deep root, and flourish in a soil which was peculiarly well prepared to receive them. The glorious victories over the Carthaginians and Persians had increased the wealth and security, called forth the invention and industry, but, at the same time, multiplied the wants, and inflamed the passions, of the Greeks. The more powerful cities, and particularly Athens and Syracuse, had attained a pitch of prosperity which exceeded their most sanguine hopes; elated by the bloom of health and the pride of riches, they continually sighed for new and unknown enjoyments, while both individuals and communities were ever ready to listen to such instructors as justified their vices, and taught them to abuse the gifts of fortune.

In this situation of affairs appeared the Sophists⁵⁰, whose name, still familiar in the languages of Europe, pretty faithfully expresses their character. Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontium, with many inferior names, preserved in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Isocrates, started up about the same time, and exhibited a new phenomenon in Greece. The Olympic, and other public assem-

C H A P.

XIII.

Its tendency counteracted by the Sophists.

History of the Sophists. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

⁵⁰ Vid. Philostrat. de Vit. Sophist.

C H A P. blies, furnished them with an opportunity to display their specious accomplishments to the admiring spectators. They frequented the great cities, particularly Athens, and acquired the friendship of the rich, and the applause of the multitude. They professed the knowledge of every science, and of every art, which they taught publicly, for a stipulated price; and, as they really possessed the art of persuasion, their disciples continually increased among the rich and the voluptuous, the idle and the vain.

Their character and views.

Their influence on philosophy and manners.

Their language was glowing and harmonious, their manners elegant, their life splendid. When it served their interest, and pleased the taste of their hearers, they could paint virtue in the warmest and most alluring colors; but the capricious will of their scholars, whose passions they were ever careful to gratify, served as the only standard of their principles; and engaged them, for the most part, to deck out the barren doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus with the meretricious arts of the rhetorician. Their morality supplied the springs with which Epicurus watered his gardens; and their captious logic furnished the arguments by which Pyrrho attempted to justify his scepticism⁵¹. It would be easy to trace up to the Sophists that quibbling metaphysic, which being embodied in the Greek language, thenceforth adhered too closely to the philosophical writings of that people, and

⁵¹ See the note on the Sophists, in my translation of Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, p. I, et seqq.

which totally disfigures many otherwise valuable compositions of antiquity. But our present business is only to remark the destructive effects immediately resulting from their tenets, which, while they undermined, without openly opposing, the ancient and popular superstition, boldly set at defiance all those useful maxims of conduct, and all those salutary discoveries of reason, which, amidst the insolence of the Greek democracies, fomented by prosperity, appeared essentially requisite to restrain the intemperance, injustice, and violence, of individuals and communities.

In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to display their talents, practise their artifice, and to promote their fame and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates⁵², whose philosophy forms an important æra in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus was born at Athens, forty years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The smallness of his patrimony, amounting only to three hundred pounds, and his original profession of a statuary⁵³, have encouraged an opinion of the obscurity of his birth, among writers who did not reflect on the narrowness of Athenian fortunes, and who forgot to consider, that as hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded in the Grecian republics,

Opposed
by Socrates.

⁵² To avoid prolixity in the account of Socrates and his philosophy, I cite not particular passages, but give the general result of my reading in Plato and Xenophon.

⁵³ Laert, l. ii. art. Socrat.

C H A P. XIII. a solid and permanent lustre was naturally derived from the practice of ingenious arts, which could not be cultivated, as in ancient Rome, and sometimes in modern Europe, by servile or mercenary hands, but only by the first class of freemen and citizens. Whatever reputation or advantage Socrates might have acquired by the exercise of a profession, which was peculiarly encouraged by the taste of the times, and the magnificent spirit of Pericles, he readily sacrificed to the natural bent of his mind, which concealed, under an external form worthy to represent the voluptuous Silenus⁵⁴, the fruitful seeds of every amiable and manly sentiment, and determined him, by an irresistible impulse, to the study of wisdom and virtue.

His education and character.

In his early youth he heard the physics of Archelaus, and learned the geometry of Theodorus⁵⁵; and from these, and other teachers, acquired such an acquaintance with the fashionable theories concerning the formation of the universe, the original principles of things, the hidden powers of matter, as enabled him to regard with just contempt, and occasionally to deride with inimitable humor, the vanity of those useless and shadowy speculations. He acknowledged with the pious Anaxagoras, the superintending mind, whose providence regulated the operations of nature, as well as the affairs of human life. He denied not the existence of those inferior intelligences, which formed the only

⁵⁴ Plato et Xenoph. in Symp.

⁵⁵ Plato in Theætet. et in Menon.

objects of popular adoration; he allowed the divine origin of dreams and omens; he was exemplary in all the religious duties of his country; and were we to judge the Athenian sage by the standard of ordinary men, we should be inclined to believe that he had not entirely escaped the contagion of superstition; since he professed to be accompanied by a dæmon, or invisible conductor, who often restrained his passions, and influenced his behaviour⁵⁶. If this assertion was not an effect of that refined *irony* familiar to Socrates, we must allow his temper to have been tinged with credulity: yet, whoever seriously reflects on a life of seventy years, spent in the service of mankind, uniformly blameless, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the unjust laws of his country; whoever considers attentively the habitual temperance, the unshaken probity, the active usefulness, the diffusive benevolence, the constant equanimity and cheerfulness of this singular man, will admit a degree of enthusiasm, rather as the ornament, than defect, of such an extraordinary character. Men of learning and genius, who, examining the matter still more deeply, have observed the important revolution produced by the life and death of Socrates, on the principles and sentiments of his contemporaries, and of posterity, are disposed to believe that such an extraordinary phænomenon could not have appeared in the moral world, without the particular interposition of heaven. The cheerful serenity of his last

⁵⁶ Plut. de Genio Socratis.

C H A P. moments⁵⁷, and still more, the undeviating tenor
XIII. of his active virtue, justified the hardest maxims of Lycurgus and Pythagoras; while the main aim of his speculations was to establish the sublime morality of those ages on the clearest deductions of reason and experience.

**His philo-
sophy.**

From the perfections of the supreme intelligence he deduced his just government of the universe, which implied the immortality of the human soul. But the great object of his research was to discover the general laws by which, even in this life, the superintending providence had variously dispensed to men good and evil, happiness and misery. These laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly ascertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; since nothing but the most shortsighted folly could risk incurring the divine displeasure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, sickness or death; far less to acquire perishing gratifications, which leave a sting behind them. Reasoning on such principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced, with admirable perspicuity, the interests and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of society. The actions of men furnished the materials, their instruction formed the object, their happiness was the end of his discourse. Wherever his lessons might be most generally useful, there he was always to be found; frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other

⁵⁷ This subject will be treated hereafter.

public *Gymnasia*; punctually attending the forum at mid-day, the hour of full assembly; and in the evening joining, without the affectation of austerity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Ilyssus. As a husband, a father, a citizen, and a soldier, the steady practice of his duty continually illustrated his doctrines. The conversation and example of this truly practical philosopher (and this is his highest panegyric) persuaded many of his fellow-citizens sincerely to embrace a virtuous course of life; and even those who, like Critias and Alcibiades, allowed the current of their passions to prevail over the conviction of their sober hours, were still charmed with the wonderful extent, as well as the singular accuracy, of his various knowledge; with the acuteness and penetration of his arguments; the beauty, vivacity, and persuasiveness of his style; which, whether he assumed the tone of reason or of ridicule, surpassed whatever had been deemed most eloquent⁵⁸.

Its influence.

Yet, how great soever might be the personal influence of Socrates, the triumph of his philosophy, became more illustrious and complete, after his principles were embraced by those who cultivated the imitative arts, and directed the public amusements, which in all countries, but particularly in Greece, have ever produced immediate and powerful effects on the national opinions and character. In Greece alone, the theatre was regarded as an

Assisted by
the tragic
poets.

⁵⁸ Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. c. xv. Laert. l. ii. c. xix. et seqq. et Cicero de Orat. iii. 15.

C H A P. object of the first importance and magnitude ; it
 XIII. formed an essential , and by far the most splendid ,
 part of religious worship ; the expence of support-
 ing it exceeded that of the army and navy toge-
 ther ; and this celebrated entertainment , which
 united the tragedy and opera of the moderns , was
 carried to perfection by a favorite disciple of So-
 crates , whose works were so universally admired in
 Greece , that (as we shall have occasion to relate
 in the Sicilian war) the Syracusans released from
 captivity those Athenians , and those only , who had
 learned to repeat the verses of Euripides . This
 admired poet rendered the Grecian tragedy com-
 plete , by perfecting the chorus ⁵⁹ the principal
 distinction between the ancient and the modern
 drama , and which , when properly conducted , ren-
 dered the former more regular , yet more varied ;
 more magnificent , and at the same time more af-
 fecting ; above all , more interesting and more in-
 structive .

particular-
 ly Euripi-
 des ;

who per-
 fected the
 chorus .

From the prevailing manners of the times , when
 the principal citizens lived together in crowds , and
 daily frequented the public halls , the *gymnasia* , the

⁵⁹ In this part of the drama , the philosophy of Euripides excels
 the loftiness of Æschylus , and the richness of Sophocles . It is suffi-
 cient to compare the works of the three rivals , to perceive that the
 chorus in Euripides most faithfully answers the description of Horace :

Ille bonis faveatque , et consilietur amicis ,

Et regat iratos , et amet peccare timentes .

Ille dapes laudet mensæ brevis , ille salubrem

Justitiam , legesque , et apertis otia portis ;

Ille tegat commissa ; deosque precetur et oret ,

Ut redeat miseris , abeat fortuna superbis .

forums, and temples, it was natural to expect that the action of a Grecian tragedy should consist in some great public event, which interested the whole body of the people. The scene was usually the portico of a temple, the gate of a palace, the wide expanse of a forum, or market-place. In such places many spectators must be supposed present, who would naturally take part in an action which concerned the public interest and happiness⁶⁰. On this principle was introduced the ancient chorus, consisting of such persons as most properly suited the occasion, and who, though not immediately or principally concerned in the catastrophe, had such general and indirect interest, as kept them continually on the scene, and made them approve or condemn, promote or oppose, the sentiments and measures of the actors. The chorus, never quitting the stage, necessarily introduced the unity of place; and as their songs and dances between the acts expressed the feelings excited by the representation, they connected the preceding act with that which immediately followed it, and rendered the whole spectacle uninterrupted and continuous.

⁶⁰ In the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the chorus is composed of priests, senators, Theban youths, etc. Creon says to Oedipus,

Εἰ τῶνδε χρῆζεῖς πλησιάζοντων κλυεῖν

Ἐτοιμος εἶπεν, εἴτε καὶ σεῖχεῖν ἐσώ

The answer is,

Ες πάντας αὐδᾷ τῶνδε γὰρ πλεον Φερῶ,

Πενθος ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς περὶ.

CREON. Shall I speak in presence of this numerous assembly? or shall we retire?

OEDIPUS. Speak before all present; for the public distress afflicts me more than my own danger.

C H A P. XIII. The music of the chorus was more rich and various, and the poetry more elevated and glowing, than what could be admitted into the acts, or ordinary dialogue, which was confined to the iambic measure; circumstances which, together with the numbers, the dresses, the dances, and gestures, of these fancied spectators, equally increased the magnificence and variety of the entertainment. They likewise rendered it more affecting; since nothing is more proper to interest us in any scene, than the beholding a great number of persons deeply engaged by it, and expressing their feelings by natural tones and movements. But the principal advantage of the chorus was to furnish the poet with an opportunity (without loading the dialogue, and rendering it too sententious) of enforcing, by all the power of fancy and of numbers, that moral instruction, which was occasionally attempted by Æschylus and Sophocles, but which forms the continual end and aim of Euripides, who had a soul to feel, and a genius to express, whatever is most lovely and most excellent in sentiment and character. It is unnecessary to mention the affecting delicacy of Admetus and his attendants towards his guest Hercules; the lively emotions of gratitude in that hero; the friendship of Pylades and Orestes; the amiable picture of conjugal affection in the character of Alcestes; since the whole remains of that inestimable writer prove his unceasing labors to warm his countrymen with all the virtues and charities that adorn private life, as well as to keep alive an ardent love of the republic, and a generous passion for its glory

and liberty; while, in several passages, he describes and refutes the philosophy of Epicurus⁶¹ (which, as we have already observed, was chiefly borrowed from the licentious maxims of the Sophists) with such fulness and accuracy as entitled him to the appellation of the Philosophic Tragedian.

That Euripides, though ten years older than Socrates, owed the characteristic excellences of his works to the conversation and friendship of that unrivalled moralist, is universally acknowledged by antiquity⁶²; though the character and intentions

His views counteracted by the authors of the old comedy.

⁶¹ See particularly *Alcest.* ver. 732, etc. and ver. 960, etc.

Euripides flourished near an hundred years before Epicurus and Zeno, the respective founders of the Epicurean and Stoical philosophy. Yet we find the tenets of both sects in the tragedian; which may be easily explained, by considering that those opposite kinds of philosophy arose from different aspects of nature, which must often present themselves to an observing eye; and as the doctrines of the Sophists laid the foundation for the moral system of Epicurus, so the moderate doubt of Socrates, and the old academy, was corrupted into different degrees of scepticism, according to the fancy of their successors; and his rational preference of virtue to all other objects, degenerated into a pretended contempt for these objects, as things totally indifferent, the insensibility and pedantry of the Stoics.

⁶² *Εδοκεῖ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδῃ.* Diogen. Laert in Vit. Socrat. The comic poets, who envied and hated Euripides, as the darling of the public, pretended that Socrates had even composed all the finest passages in his tragedies. Soon after the representation of the *Troes*. Mnesilochus parodied it in a farce, which he called *Φρυγες*, Phrygians, probably to have an opportunity of playing on the word *Φρυγανον*, fuel.

Φρυγεις εστι καινον δραμα τῆς Εὐριπίδῃς

Ὡ και Σωκράτης τα Φρυγανα ὑποτίθησι.

"The Phrygians is a new play of Euripides, to whom Socrates furnishes the fuel." But the pun cannot be translated. The same Mnesilochus calls Euripides a sort of hammerman to Socrates,

Εὐριπίδης Σωκρατογομφεύς.

C H A P. XIII. both of the poet and the philosopher were grossly misrepresented by some of their contemporaries. Before the commencement, and during the continuance of the Peloponnesian war, there flourished at Athens a class of men who were the declared enemies, not only of Socrates and his disciples, but of all order and decency. The reader will easily perceive, that I allude to Aristophanes, and the other writers of the old licentious comedy; an entertainment which was never carried to the same vicious excess in any other age or country. Yet this hideous spectre was the sister of Tragedy, whose angelic sweetness and dignity were long accompanied by this odious and disgusting form; but to understand the natural connexion between objects seemingly so different, it is necessary to remount to their source.

History of
that licen-
tious
entertain-
ment.

Tragedy, the song of the goat⁶³, and Comedy, the song of the village, sufficiently indicate, by the meanness of their ancient names, the humility of their first original. They arose amidst the sacrifices and joyous festivity of the vintage, in a country which seldom adopted the amusements, any more than the arts and institutions, of others, but which was destined to communicate her own to all

⁶³ A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly sacrificed to Bacchus, whose praises composed the song. In the *Antigoné* of Sophocles, v. 1127,

Πολυννυμε Καδμείας

Νυμφας αγαλμα, και Διος

Βαρυερεμετα γενος, etc.

we have a specimen of what formed the first business of tragedy.

the civilized portion of mankind. During the C H A P.
entertainments of a season peculiarly dedicated to XIII.
recreation and pleasure, the susceptible minds of
the Greeks naturally yielded to two propensities
congenial to men in such circumstances, a dispo-
sition to exercise their sensibility, and a desire to
amuse their fancy. Availing himself of the former,
the sublime genius of Æschylus ⁶⁴ improved the
song of the goat into a regular dramatic poem,
agreeing with the Iliad and Odyssey in those unal-
terable rules of design and execution which are
essential to the perfection of every literary perform-
ance, yet differing from those immortal archetypes
of art, in a circumstance naturally suggested by the
occasion for which tragedies were composed. It
had been usual with the Athenians, when they cele-
brated in the spring and autumn the great festivals
of Bacchus, to personate the exploits and fables
handed down by immemorial tradition concerning
that bountiful divinity; this imitation was considered
as a mark of gratitude due to the beneficence of the
god, to whose honors they associated the kindred
worship of Pan, Silenus, and their attendant fawns
and satyrs. When Æschylus represented, therefore,

⁶⁴ Æschylus is said by Aristotle (de Arte Poeticâ) to have introduced
interlocutors, dialogue, etc. which is acknowledging him the father of
tragedy. We know little of Thespis, but from Horace:

Ignotum tragicæ genus invenisse camæanæ

Dicitur, et plaustris vexisse poemata Thespis.

The plaustrum, however, has a more direct reference to comedy;
since λαλεῖν ὡς ἐξ ὀμαξῆς, to speak as from a cart, was a common
Greek expression for reviling with gross indecent insolence.

E H A T. instead of simply reciting, the real history, or
 XIII. agreeable fictions, of antiquity, he only adopted
 a mode of imitation already practised in the religi-
 ous ceremonies of his country; a mode of imitation
 more powerful than the epic, since, instead of
 barely describing the deeds of gods and heroes, it
 shows those distinguished personages on the scene,
 makes them speak and act for themselves, and
 thus approaching nearer to reality, is still more
 forcible and affecting.

Its charac-
 teristics, as
 distin-
 guished
 from tra-
 gedy;

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the
 more serious spectacles of the Dionysian festival, so
 comedy, which soon followed it, was owing to the
 more light and ludicrous parts of that solemnity⁶⁵.
 Tragedy is the imitation of an important and
 serious action, adapted to affect the sensibility of the
 spectators, and to gratify their natural propensity
 to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Comedy is the
 imitation of a light and ludicrous action, adapted
 to amuse the fancy, and to gratify the natural
 disposition of men to laughter and merriment.
 Terror and pity have in all ages been regarded as
 the main springs of tragedy, because the laws of

⁶⁵ Horace is authentic, and the most agreeable authority:

Agricolæ prisci, fortes, parvoque beati

Condita post frumenta, levantes tempore festo

Corpus, et ipsum animum spe finis dura ferentem,

Cum sociis operum, pueris, et conjuge fidâ,

Tellurem porco, Silvanum lacte piabant,

Floribus et vino Genium, memorem brevis ævi.

Fescennina per hunc invecta licentia morem

Versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit, etc. etc.

and still more directly, *Ars Poetic.* v. 220, etc.

sensibility, founded solely in nature, are always the same. Comedy has been infinitely varied by the innumerable modes of wit, humor, and ridicule, which prevail in different ages and countries, and which agree scarcely in any one particular, unless it may be reckoned an agreement, that men have seldom indulged them, except at the expense of their good-nature, and often of their virtue. The Grecian comedy was uncommonly licentious; the profligate characters of Aristophanes and his contemporaries, Mnesilochus, Callias, Eupolis, and Cratinus, contributed, doubtless, to this deformity; yet these poets could not easily have rendered their new entertainment agreeable to the taste⁶⁶ and prejudices of the public, without incorporating in them the substance of the *phallic* songs⁶⁷, which constituted an ancient and essential part of the amusements of the vintage. The fond admirers of antiquity have defended the abominable strains of these licentious poets, by pretending, that their intention was to reform vice, not to recommend it; an apology which, if admitted, might tend to exculpate the writers, but could never justify their performances, since it is known by experience,

⁶⁶ Horace has expressed, with his usual felicity, the situation of the spectators, and the fatal necessity of humoring it;

— Asper

Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit; eo quod

Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus.

Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus et exlex!

⁶⁷ Φαλλός. Priapus ξύλον επιμηκές έχων εν τῷ ακρῷ σκυτινον αἰδοιον. Suidas. This was carried in procession, accompanied with the Φαλλικα ασματα.

C H A P.
XIII.

and from
modern
comedy.

that lewd descriptions prove a poison rather than a remedy; and instead of correcting manners, tend only to corrupt them.

Besides the general licentiousness of the ancient comedy, its more particular characteristics resulted from the peculiar circumstances of the Athenians, during the time of its introduction and continuance. The people of all ranks at Athens were then too deeply engaged in the military and political transactions of their country, to enjoy any amusement which did not either directly flatter their passions, or bear an immediate relation to the great and important interests of the republic. It was during the confusion and calamities of the Peloponnesian war, that all the comic pieces which remain were originally represented; a period too disorderly and tumultuous to relish comedies, such as are now written, or such as were composed in Greece by Menander, in an age of greater moderation and tranquillity. The elegant and ingenious, the moral and instructive strains of Moliere or Menander, may amuse the idleness of wealth, and the security of peace. But amidst the fermentation of war and danger, amidst civil dissensions and foreign invasions, the minds of men are too little at ease to enjoy such refined and delicate beauties, which then appear lifeless and insipid. In such turbulent circumstances, the reluctant attention must be excited by real, instead of imaginary characters; by a true, instead of a fictitious event; by direct and particular advice concerning the actual state of their affairs, instead of vague or abstract lessons of wisdom

and virtue. Coarse buffoonery may often force them to laugh; delicate ridicule will seldom engage them to smile; they may be affected by the sharpness of personal invective, but will remain impenetrable to the shafts of general satire.

By combining the different parts of this description, we may form a tolerably exact notion of the writings of Aristophanes, which commonly conceal, under a thin allegorical veil, the recent history of some public transaction, or the principal features of some distinguished character, represented in such a ludicrous light, as reflects on those concerned, unexpected, and often unmerited, but not therefore the less striking, flashes of insolent ridicule. Such was the nature, and such the materials of the ancient comedy, which, in its form, agreed entirely with tragedy, having borrowed from this entertainment (which was already in possession of the theatre) the distribution of the whole, as well as the arrangement of the several parts; the music, the chorus, the dresses, decorations, and machinery; all of which were so modified and burlesqued as suited the purposes of the comic writer, and often rendered his pieces little else than parodies of the more fashionable tragedies of the times.

This singular species of drama, which, in its less perfect state, had long strolled the villages of Attica, was simply tolerated at Athens, until the profusion of Pericles, and his complaisance for the populace, first supplied from the exchequer the necessary expenses for the representation of comedies, and proposed prizes for the comic, as well as for

C H A P.
XIII.

General
notion of
the pieces
of Aristophanes.

He and his
associates
encouraged at
Athens by
Pericles.

C H A P
XIII.

the tragic, poets and actors. But, by this injudicious encouragement, he unwarily cherished a serpent in his bosom. Aristophanes and his licentious contemporaries having previously ridiculed virtue and genius, in the persons of Socrates and Euripides, boldly proceeded to avail themselves of the natural malignity of the vulgar, and their envy against whatever is elevated and illustrious, to traduce and calumniate Pericles himself; and though his successors in the administration justly merited (as we shall have occasion to relate) the severest lashes of their invective, yet, had their characters been more pure, they would have been equally exposed to the unprovoked satire of those insolent buffoons, who gratified the gross appetites of the vulgar, by an undistinguished mass of ridicule, involving vice and virtue, things profane and sacred, men and gods.

The Gre-
cian festi-
vals;

Dramatic entertainments formed an essential part of the festivals consecrated to the bountiful author of the vine. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was deemed far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Jupiter enjoyed his appropriated honors; but more commonly, as is attested by Athenian medals, the worship of the father of the gods was associated with that of his wise and warlike daughter. We shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the festival and mysteries of Ceres, who taught the Athenians the important knowledge of agriculture, which they were supposed to have diffused over the

ancient world. It would be endless to mention the institutions in honor of the crowd of inferior or less propitious divinities, which rendered the festivals at Athens twice more numerous than in any other Grecian city. Nor did their frequency abate any thing of the expensive splendor which accompanied them. The shops and courts of justice were shut; the mechanic quitted his tools, the husbandman ceased from his labors, the mourner intermitted his sorrow. The whole city was dissolved in feasting and jollity; the intervals of which were filled up by pompous shows and processions, by concerts of music, by exhibitions of painting; and at several festivals, particularly the Panathænan, by hearing and judging the noblest productions of eloquence and poetry⁶⁸. We shall have occasion to mention some particular ceremonies of a more melancholy cast; but the general character of the Grecian religion was as cheerful and attractive, as the superstition of the Egyptians, from whom they are ignorantly supposed to have borrowed it, was gloomy and forbidding. Even the Egyptian hymns consisted in dismal complaints and lamentations⁶⁹; the Grecian solemnities concluded with songs of joy and exultation. The feasts which followed the sacrifices were enriched by all the delicacies and luxuries of the ancient world; and, to use the words of Aristotle, many persons thought it their duty, at those religious entertainments, to get drunk in honor of the gods⁷⁰.

⁶⁸ Isocrat. Panegy. et Panathen.

⁶⁹ Apuleius de Genio Socratis.

⁷⁰ Aristot. Ethic. ad Nichom. l. viii. c. iii.

C H A P.
XIII.

the splen-
dor with
which they
were cele-
brated.

C H A P.

XIII.

Manners
of the
Athenians
in private
life.

It seems extraordinary, that the revenues of Athens, notwithstanding their improvement by Pericles, should have sufficed for this multitude of expenses. But we must consider, that the general simplicity of manners in private life, formed a striking contrast with the extravagance of public festivals and amusements. The houses and tables of the most wealthy Athenians were little distinguished above those of their poorest neighbours. Pericles himself, though never suspected of avarice, lived with the exactest œconomy; and the superabundance of private wealth, which would have created envy and danger to the owner, if he had employed it for his particular convenience and pleasure, procured him public gratitude and esteem, when expended for the satisfaction of the multitude.

Condition
of the fe-
male sex.

For reasons which will immediately appear, we have not hitherto found it necessary to describe the manners and influence of the Grecian women; but the character and condition of the fair sex will throw light on the preceding observations in this chapter, and present the most striking contrast of any to be met with in history. If we knew not the consideration in which women were anciently held in Greece, and the advantages which they enjoyed at Sparta, after the laws of Lycurgus had revived the institutions of the heroic ages⁷¹, we should be apt to suspect that the ungenerous treatment of the feebler sex, which afterwards so universally prevailed, had been derived from the

⁷¹ Aristot. Politic. l. ii. p. 105.

Egyptian and Asiatic colonies, which early settled in that part of Europe. Excluded from social intercourse, which nature had fitted them to adorn, the Grecian women were rigorously confined to the most retired apartments of the family, and employed in the meanest offices of domestic œconomy. It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unless to attend a procession, to accompany a funeral⁷², or to assist at certain other religious solemnities. Even on these occasions, their behaviour was attentively watched, and often malignantly interpreted. The most innocent freedom was construed into a breach of decorum; and their reputation, once sullied by the slightest imprudence, could never afterwards be retrieved. If such unreasonable severities had proceeded from that absurd jealousy which sometimes accompanies a violent love, and of which a certain degree is nearly connected with the delicacy of passion between the sexes, the condition of the Grecian women, though little less miserable, would have been far less contemptible. But the Greeks were utter strangers to that refinement of sentiment⁷³, which, in the ages of chivalry, and which still, in some southern countries of Europe, renders women the objects of a suspicious, but respectful passion, and leads men to gratify their vanity at the expense of their freedom. Married or unmarried, the Grecian females were kept in equal restraint; no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, agreeable members of society; and their education was

⁷² Lyfias, p. 420.⁷³ Idem, p. 435.

C H A P. XIII. either entirely neglected, or confined at least to such humble objects, as, instead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to narrow and to debase it. Though neither qualified for holding an honorable rank in society, nor permitted to enjoy the company of their nearest friends and relations, they were thought capable of superintending or performing the drudgery of domestic labor, of acting as stewards for their husbands, and thus relieving them from a multiplicity of little cares, which seemed unworthy their attention, and unsuitable to their dignity. The whole burden of such mercenary cares being imposed on the women, their first instructions and treatment were adapted to that lowly rank, beyond which they could never afterwards aspire⁷⁴. Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from those servile occupations in which it was intended that their whole lives should be spent; no liberal idea was presented to their imagination, that might raise them above the ignoble arts in which they were ever destined to labor; the smallest familiarity with strangers was deemed a dangerous offence; and any intimacy or connexion beyond the walls of their own family, a heinous crime; since it might engage them to embezzle the household furniture and effects committed to their care and custody. Even the laws of Athens confirmed this miserable degradation of women, holding the security of the husband's property a matter of greater importance

⁷⁴ Xenoph. Memorab. l. v. passim, particularly Socrates's Discourse with Ischomachus.

than

than defending the wife's person from outrage, and protecting her character from infamy⁷⁵. By such illiberal institutions were the most amiable part of the human species insulted, among a people in other respects the most improved of all antiquity. They were totally debarred from those refined arts and entertainments, to which their agreeable qualities might have added a new charm. Instead of directing the taste, and enlivening the pleasures of society, their value was estimated, like that of the ignoblest objects, merely by profit or utility. Their chief virtue was reserve, and their point of honor, œconomy.

C H A P.
XIII.

The extreme depression of women levelled the natural inequalities of their temper and disposition; the prude, the coquette, with the various intermediate shades of female character, disappeared; and all the modest and virtuous part of the sex (if virtue and modesty can ever be the effects of restraint) were reduced to humble imitation and insipid uniformity. But, in the time of Pericles, there appeared and flourished at Athens a bolder class of females, who divested themselves of the natural modesty, disdained the artificial virtues, and avenged the violated privileges of their sex. Asia, the mother of voluptuousness, produced this dangerous brood, whose meretricious arts and occupations met with no check or restraint from the laxity of Ionian morals, and were even promoted and encouraged by the corruptions of Pagan superstition.

Grecian
courte-
zans;

⁷⁵ See the laws quoted by Lyfias, explained in my Introductory Discourse to that orator, p. 100.

C H A P.
XIII.

Their arti-
fices and
influence.

In most of the Greek colonies of Asia, temples were erected to the *earthly* Venus; where courtezans were not merely tolerated, but honored, as priestesses of that condescending divinity⁷⁶. The wealthy and commercial city of Corinth first imported this innovation from the East; and such is the extravagance of the human mind, that after the repulse of Xerxes, the magistrates of that republic ascribed the safety of their country to the powerful intercession of the votaries of Venus, whose portraits they caused to be painted at the public expence, as the Athenians had done those of the warriors who gained the battle of Marathon⁷⁷. The fame of all those accomplished, but mercenary beauties, though highly celebrated by the poets and historians of the times, was eclipsed by the splendor of Aspasia of Miletus, who settled at Athens under the administration of Pericles, and is said to have embarked in the fleet with which that fortunate commander subdued the powerful and wealthy island of Samos. The personal character of Aspasia gave temporary lustre to a profession, which, though exalted by the casual caprices of superstition, must naturally have fallen into contempt; since later writers among the Greeks⁷⁸ acknowledge, that though she carried on a very dishonorable commerce in female virtue, yet her wit and eloquence, still more than her beauty, gained her extraordinary consideration among all ranks in the republic. The susceptible

⁷⁶ Athenæus, l. xiii. et Plutarch, p. 637.

⁷⁷ Simonides apud Athen. l. xiii.

⁷⁸ Plutarch. in Pericle.

minds of the Athenians were delighted with what their absurd institutions rendered a novelty, the beholding the native graces of the sex, embellished by education. Aspasia is said to have acquired a powerful ascendant over Pericles himself; she certainly acquired his protection and friendship; which is less extraordinary than that her conversation and company should have pleased the discernment of the sage Socrates. She is accused (as we shall afterwards have an opportunity to mention) of having excited, from motives of personal resentment, the war of Peloponnesus; yet, calamitous as that long and obstinate conflict proved to Greece, and particularly to Athens, it may be suspected that Aspasia occasioned still more incurable evils to both. Her example, and still more her instructions, formed a school at Athens, by which her dangerous profession was reduced into system. The companions of Aspasia served as models for painting and statuary, and themes for poetry and panegyric. Nor were they merely the objects, but the authors of many literary works, in which they established rules for the behaviour of their lovers, particularly at table; and explained the art of gaining the heart, and captivating the affections⁷⁹; which would have been an imprudence, had they not considered, that the mysteries of *their* calling alone lose little by being disclosed, since men may often perceive the snare, without having courage to avoid it. The dress, behaviour, and artifices of this class of women, became continually more

⁷⁹ Athenæus. *ibid.*

C H A P. seductive and dangerous; and Athens thenceforth
XIII. remained the chief school of vice and pleasure, as well as of literature and philosophy.

It has been already hinted, that the fine arts, and particularly painting, were prostituted to the honor of harlots, and the purposes of voluptuousness. Licentious pictures are mentioned by ancient writers as a general source of corruption, and considered as the first ambush that beset the safety of youth and innocence⁸⁰. Yet this unhappy effect of the arts was only the vapor that accompanies the sun; since painting, architecture, and above all, statuary, attained their meridian splendor in the age of Pericles; and shed peculiar glory on this period of Athenian history, not only by the powers of genius which they displayed, but by the noble purposes to which they were directed. But the arts of design form so important a subject, that they merit to be examined apart, in the following chapter.

⁸⁰ Euripid. in Hippolyt.

CHAP. XIV.

History of the Arts of Design, — Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts. — Causes of that Superiority — Among the Asiatic Greeks — Who communicated their Inventions to Europe. — Bathycles the Magnesian — Dipenus and Scillis — Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily. — The Athenians surpass their Masters. — Sublime Style of Art. — Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c. — Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art. — Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets — Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts.

THAT the history of arts has been less cultivated than that of arms and politics, is a general and just complaint, to which writers will seldom be inclined to pay regard, because they will always find it an easier task to relate wars and negotiations, debates and battles, than to describe the gradual and almost imperceptible progress of genius and taste, in works of elegance and beauty.

The origin of the imitative¹ arts (so congenial is imitation to man) reaches beyond the limits of

¹ Concerning the arts of the Greeks, the most copious materials are furnished by Pausanias throughout; and by the 34th and 35th books of Pliny. The best modern guides are Winckelman and Lessing in German, and Caylus in French. Many important errors of Winckelman are detected by the learned professor Heine, in his *Antiquarische Abhandlungen*.

CHAP.
XIV.

History of
the arts of
design.

C H A P. XIV. profane history; and to dispute who were their inventors, is only to examine what nation is the most ancient. In this respect, the Egyptians and Phœnicians merit, doubtless, the pre-eminence. From the earliest ages of Heathen antiquity, both these nations seem to have cultivated the arts of design. In the remotest periods of their history, the Egyptians engraved on precious stones, and strove to render their public transactions immortal, by recording them in hieroglyphics, on the hardest bazaltes; nor can we sufficiently admire the perfection to which the patience of that laborious people had carried the mechanical part of sculpture, before the Persian conquest, and the reign of Cambyfes. But beauty, the essence and the end of art, was never studied by the natives of either Phœnicia or Egypt, who faithfully copied their national features, without attempting to improve them; until the traces of Grecian conquest and colonization appeared in the medals of the Ptolemies, particularly those with the head of Jupiter Ammon.

Superiority of the Greeks in those arts.

Allowance, doubtless, must be made for the prejudices of national vanity, when Euripides, Aristotle, and Epicurus, endeavour to persuade us, that the clear skies and happy temperature of Greece engendered a peculiar aptitude for arts, letters, and philosophy. The testimony, however, of modern travellers confirms the evidence of antiquity, that the shores and islands of the Archipelago produce more elegant and liberal forms, and features more animated and expressive, with fewer individual imperfections, and more of general

nature, than can be found in any other divisions of the world². Yet whatever the Greeks owed to their skies and climate, they were probably not less indebted to their active laborious education and way of life, and to the manly spirit of their religious, civil, and military institutions. Long before the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian sculpture was distinguished by an air of majesty peculiar to itself³; and the awful images of the gods, as yet rudely finished, displayed a grandeur and sublimity of expression, that delighted and astonished the best judges, in the most refined ages of art⁴.

This singularity might be expected from the description already given of the religion and manners of Greece, and from the inimitable excellence of its poets. The divinities of Greece being imagined of the human form, though incomparably more noble and perfect, artists would naturally begin, at a very early period⁵, to exalt and generalize their conceptions. The bold enthusiasm of poetry served to elevate and support their flight, and the native country of Homer was the first scene of their success, the happy climate of Ionia rendering frequent and *natural*, in that delightful region,

C H A P.
XIV.

Causes of
that super-
iority,

² Belon. Observat. l. ii. 34.

³ Pausan. Corinth. l. ii. 34.

⁴ Plato et Aristot. passim.

⁵ We omit the fabulous accounts of Dedalus the Athenian, who is said to have flourished in the time of Hercules and Theseus, and forty years before the Trojan war. It has been already proved that, during the heroic ages, the Greeks paid no adoration to statues. Athenian writers, who lived a thousand years after that period, might easily confound the supposed works of the ancient Dedalus with those of Dedalus of Sicyon, especially since the error was extremely flattering to their national vanity.

C H A P. XIV. those beautiful and lovely forms which are elsewhere merely *ideal*, while other circumstances concurred to accelerate the progress of invention and genius in that highly-favored country.

among the
Asiatic
Greeks;

In the eighth century before the Christian æra, the Asiatic colonies, as we already had occasion to explain, far surpassed their mother-country in splendor and prosperity. For this pre-eminence, they were indebted to the superior fertility of their soil, the number and convenience of their harbours, the advantages of their situation and climate, the vicinity of the most wealthy and refined nations in Asia; above all, to their persevering diligence and ingenuity, by which they not only improved and ennobled the arts derived from the Lydians and Phrygians, but invented others long peculiar to themselves, particularly painting, sculpture in marble, together with the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture.

who communicated
their inventions to
Europe.

In the seventh century before Christ, the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Apollo received from the superstition or vanity of the Lydian kings, were the productions, not of Egyptian or Phœnician, but of Ionian artists; and, during both that and the following century, the Ionians diffused the elegant inventions of their country through the dominions of their ancestors in Europe. Alarmed by the inroads of the Cimmerians, and disturbed by the continual hostility of Lydia, many Eastern artists sought refuge in the commercial cities of Ægina, Sicyon, and Corinth, where the peaceful spirit of the inhabitants,

comparatively wealthy and luxurious, afforded the Ionian artists both encouragement and security.

The Asiatic fugitives, however, did not confine themselves to these secondary republics. Bathycles, a native of Ionian Magnesia, a place early celebrated for painting⁶, fixed his abode in Sparta, the most considerable community in Greece. By order of the magistrates of that illustrious republic, he made the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, the statue of Diana Leucophryné, the figures of the Graces and Horæ, and all the other gifts and ornaments enclosed within the consecrated ground surrounding the temple of Amyclæ. The statue of Apollo, thirty cubits high, seemed to be the work of an ignorant sculptor, and probably was the production of a far earlier age than that of Bathycles. But whoever considers the colossean bulk of the principal figure, the base of which was formed into an altar, containing the tomb of Hyacinth, must admire the proportional magnitude of his throne, both sides of which were adorned with sculpture⁷. Among these ornaments, many subjects of history

C H A P.
XIV.

Bathycles,
the Mag-
nesian.

The throne
of Amy-
clæan
Apollo.

⁶ Plin. l. xxxv. I call it Ionian Magnesia, to distinguish it from other places of the same name. Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. tom. i. p. 167. et tom. iii. p. 136. 139. et 255.

⁷ Winkelmann, who scarcely mentions the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, though undoubtedly the greatest ancient monument in Greece, confounds Bathycles the Magnesian, with a later artist of the same name, who made the celebrated cup which the seven sages modestly sent one to the other, as most worthy of such a present, and which was finally consecrated to Delphian Apollo. Diogenes Laertius, speaking on this subject, says, Βαθυκλεα τινα Αρκαδα; and that he was an Arcadian appears also from Plut. in Solon. et Casaubon, ad Athenæum, l. xi. 4.

C H A P. XIV. or fable are mentioned by Pausanias, which bear no known relation to Apollo or Hyacinth, to Bathycles or the Spartans; but the top of the throne contained a chorus of Magnesians, supposed to represent the artists who assisted in the execution of this stupendous work. The altar represented a celestial group, Minerva, Venus, Diana, and several other divinities, conveying Hyacinth to the skies. Its sides were adorned with the combat of Tyndareus and Eurytus; the exploits of Castor and Pollux; and the extraordinary scene between Menelaus and the Egyptian Proteus, as described in the *Odyssey*⁸. Nor was this the only subject copied from the divine bard. It was easy to distinguish his favorite Demodocus singing among a chorus of Phæacians; a circumstance confirming our observations in a former part of this work, that the poems of Homer were generally known in Sparta long before they had been collected by the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus.

Dipenus
and Scillis.

Almost six centuries before the Christian æra, the Cretans, Dipenus and Scillis, adorned many Grecian cities in Europe as well as in Asia; and about fifty years afterward, the Chians, Bupalus and Anthermus, diffused over Greece those precious works in Parian marble, which were highly admired in the age of Augustus⁹. About the same time, Polydorus of Samos, who seems to have been much employed by Cræsus, the last king of Lydia, made the famous ring for the

⁸ Pausan. Lacon. p. 196, et seqq.

⁹ Vid. Plin. l. xxxvi. § 4.

Samian tyrant Polycrates, which is extolled by Pliny ¹⁰ as a master-piece of art.

The production of those Eastern artists were imitated with successful emulation by their disciples in ancient Greece, and likewise by the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; as sufficiently appears from the medals of those last-mentioned countries. These more durable monuments, however, can afford but an imperfect idea of the innumerable statues which were formed of tuf or gravel stone ¹¹, and of various kinds of wood. The most esteemed were made of ivory, which, like the teeth of other animals, calcines under ground; an unfortunate circumstance for the arts, since, before the invasion of Xerxes, Greece could boast an hundred ivory statues of the gods, all of a colossean magnitude, and many of them covered with gold ¹². The white marbles of Paros, together with those of Cyprus and Ægina, furnished the chief materials for sculpture, before the Athenians opened the hard sparkling veins of mount Pentelicus. Ebony, cypress, and other materials, were gradually brought into use, in consequence of the more general diffusion of the art, which was destined not only to represent gods and heroes, but to commemorate the useful merit of illustrious citizens ¹³. At the four sacred festivals common to the Grecian name, the victors in the gymnastic exercises, as well as in the musical and poetical entertainments, were frequently distinguished by the honor of a statue. The scenes of

C H A P.

XIV.

Their
works imi-
tated in
Greece,
Italy, and
Sicily.

¹⁰ L. xxxvii. § 4.

¹¹ Plut. in Vit. Andoc.

¹² Pausanias.

¹³ Lucian. Imagin.

C H A P. those admired solemnities thus became the principal repositories of sculpture ; and the cities of Delphi and Olympia, in particular, long surpassed the rest of Greece in the number and value of their statues, as well as in the splendor and magnificence of all their other ornaments ¹⁴.

The Athenians surpass their masters.

But the time approached when those cities themselves were to be eclipsed by the lustre of Athens, which, in the course of forty years, became the seat not only of opulence, power, and politics, but of literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, and thenceforth continued to be regarded as the sovereign of Greece, rather than as the capital of the narrow and unfruitful territory of Attica. During that memorable period, the Athenians, whose circumstances had hitherto proved little favorable to the progress of taste and elegance, acquired unrivalled power and renown. Having disgraced the arms, they plundered the wealth of Persia. Their valor gave them possession of those maritime provinces of Lower Asia, which were justly regarded as the cradle of the arts. Their magnanimity and firmness commanded respect abroad, and ensured pre-eminence in Greece; while, by a rare felicity, their republic, amidst this uninterrupted flow of external prosperity, produced men capable to improve the gifts of valor or fortune to the solid and permanent glory of their country.

Athenian artists,

It is difficult to determine whether the discerning encouragement of Pericles was more useful in

¹⁴ Pausanias Phocic. and Eliac.

animating the industry of Phidias, or the genius of Phidias in seconding the views of his illustrious protector. Their congenial minds seemed as happily formed for each other, as both were admirably adapted to the flourishing circumstances of their country. In the language of Plutarch ¹⁵, this great *minister*, whose virtues gradually rendered him the *master* of the republic, found Athens well furnished with marble, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypress, together with all the other materials fitted to adorn a city, which, having raised to the glory of empire, he wished likewise to render the model of elegance. According to the popular principles which he professed, he deemed it the duty of a statesman to provide not merely for the army, the navy, the judges, and others immediately employed in the public service; the great body of the people he regarded as the constant and most important object of his ministerial care. The immense revenues of the state, which had hitherto been chiefly squandered in shows and festivals, in gaudy ostentation and perishing luxury, he directed to objects more solid and durable, which, while they embellished the city might exercise the industry and display the talents of the citizens. Guided by such motives, he boldly opened the treasury, and expended about four thousand talents; a sum which then might command as much labor as six or seven millions sterling in the present age. By this liberal encouragement, he animated every art, excited every hand,

conspire
with the
views of
Pericles.

¹⁵ Plut. in Pericle.

C H A P. enlivened every exertion, and called forth into the
XIV. public service the whole dexterity, skill, and genius
of his countrymen; while the motives of gain or
glory which he proposed, allured from all quarters
the most ingenious strangers, who readily transported
their talents to Athens, as to the best market,
and most conspicuous theatre.

Sublime
style of
art,

But it was the peculiar felicity of Pericles, to
find Athens provided not only in all the materials of
art, but in artists capable of employing them to
the best advantage. In the inaccurate, but often
expressive, language of Pliny, sculpture and paint-
ing then first arose, under the plastic hands of
Phidias and his brother Panæus. Both arts,
however, are known to have flourished at an earlier
period; but in the age of Pericles, they assumed
more elevation and majesty. The inventive genius
of man tried a new and nobler flight. The supe-
riority of Phidias and his contemporaries obscured,
and almost obliterated, the memory of their prede-
cessors, and produced that sublime style of art,
which, having flourished about an hundred and
fifty years, decayed with the glory of Greece, and
disappeared soon after the reign of Alexander.

compared
with that
preceding
it.

It appears from the gems and medals, and the
few remains in marble, preceding the age of Pe-
ricles, that the mechanical part of engraving and
sculpture had already attained a high degree of
perfection. In many of those works, the minutest
ornaments are finished with care, the muscles are
boldly pronounced, the outline is faithful; but the
design has more hardness than energy, the attitudes

are too constrained to be graceful, and the strength of the expression distorts, and for the most part destroys, beauty. The sculptors Phidias, Polycletus, Scopas, Alcamenes, and Myron, together with the contemporary painters, Panæus, Zeuxis, and Parrhasius, softened the asperities of their predecessors¹⁶, rendered their contours more natural and flowing, and by employing greater address to conceal the mechanism of their art, displayed superior skill to the judgment, and afforded higher delight to the fancy, in proportion as less care and labor appeared visible to the eye. In the works of those admired artists, the expression was skilfully diffused through every part, without disturbing the harmony of the whole. Pain and sorrow were rather concentrated in the soul than displayed on the countenance; and even the more turbulent passions of indignation, anger, and resentment, were so tempered and ennobled, that the indications of them became consistent with the sublimest grace and beauty. But the triumph of art consisted in representing and recommending the social affections; for, setting aside the unwarranted assertions of Pliny, in his pretended epochs of painting, it appears from much higher authority, that as early as the age of Socrates, painters had discerned and attained that admired excellence of style, which has been called in modern times the manner of Raphael; and had learned to express, by the outward air, attitude, and features, whatever (in the words of

¹⁶ Plut. in Pericl. et Quintilian, l. xii. c. x. p. 578.

C H A P. XIV. Xenophon ¹⁷) is most engaging, affectionate, sweet, attractive, and amiable, in the inward sentiments and character. Of these Grecian paintings, indeed, which were chiefly on wood, and other perishing materials, no vestige remains; but the statuary of that celebrated age, while it displays its own excellence, is sufficient to redeem from oblivion (as far at least as invention, expression, and ideal beauty, are concerned) the obliterated charms of the sister art.

The works
of Phidias.
Olymp.

lxxxiii. 4.

A. C. 445.

In statuary, the superior merit of Phidias was acknowledged by the unanimous admiration of independent and rival communities. Intrusted by Pericles with the superintendence of the public works, his own hands added to them their last and most valuable ornaments. Before he was called to this honorable employment, his statues had adorned the most celebrated temples of Greece. His Olympian Jupiter we had already occasion to describe. In the awful temple of Delphi, strangers admired his bronze statues of Apollo and Diana. He likewise made for the Delphians a group of twelve Grecian heroes, surrounding a figure of brass, that represented the Trojan horse. His admired statue of the goddess Nemesis, or Vengeance, was formed from a block of marble, which the vain confidence of the Persians transported to Marathon for a trophy of victory, but which their disgraceful and precipitate flight left for a monument of their cowardice on the Marathonian shore. The grateful piety of Greece adored his Venus Urania, and Parthenopean Apollo. His three Minervas were

¹⁷ See the conversation of Socrates with the painter Parrhasius, in Memorab. l. iii.

respectively

respectively made for the Pallenians, Platæans, and Lemnians, and all three presented by those tributary states to their Athenian protectors and sovereigns. These inimitable works silenced the voice of envy. The most distinguished artists of Greece, sculptors, painters, and architects, were ambitious to receive the directions, and to second the labors, of Phidias, which were uninterruptedly employed, during fifteen years, in the embellishment of his native city.

During that short period he completed the Odeum, or theatre of music; the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva; the Propylæa or vestibule, and porticoes belonging to the citadel, together with the sculptured and picturesque ornaments of these and other immortal works; which, when new (as Plutarch finely observes), expressed the mellowed beauties of time and maturity, and when old, still preserved the fresh charms and alluring graces of novelty. The Parthenon, which still remains, attests the justice of this panegyric. It is two hundred and seventeen feet nine inches long, composed of beautiful white marble, and acknowledged by modern travellers¹⁸ to be the noblest piece of antiquity existing in the world. It appears at first sight extraordinary, that the expense of two thousand talents should have been bestowed on the Propylæa¹⁹. But we must consider, that this extensive name comprehended the temple of Minerva, the treasury, and other public edifices.

C H A P.
XIV.

A. C. 459
—430.

The Ode-
um, Par-
thenon,
and Pro-
pylæa.

¹⁸ Sir George Wheeler's Travels, etc.

¹⁹ Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demosth. p. 71.

C H A P.

XIV.

Works of
Panæus,
Polygno-
tus, and
Micon.

The Pœcile, or diversified portico, which was painted by Panæus, the brother of Phidias, assisted by Polygnotus and Micon, must have been a work of great time and expense. Its front and ceilings were of marble, like those of all the other porticoes leading to the citadel, which still remained in the time of Pausanias, and were regarded, both on account of the workmanship and materials, as superior to any thing extant. In the Pœcile, those great painters, whose merit Pliny²⁰ forgets in his inaccurate epochs of art, had represented the most illustrious events of Grecian history; the victory of Theseus over the Amazons, the sacking of Troy, and particularly the recent exploits against the Persians. In the battle of Marathon, the Athenian and Platæan heroes were drawn from the life, or more probably from the innumerable statues which preserved the faithful lineaments of those illustrious patriots. The whole extent of the Acropolis, above six miles in circumference, was so diversified by works of painting and statuary, that it became one continued scene of elegance and beauty.

The Mi-
nerva in
the Aero-
polis.

But all these ornaments were surpassed by one production of Phidias, which probably was the last of that great master; his admired statue of Minerva, the erecting of which served to consecrate the Parthenon, was composed of gold and ivory, twenty-six cubits high, being of inferior dimensions

²⁰ He places the first epoch of great painters in the 90th Olymp.
A. C. 420.

to his Minerva Poliades of bronze, the spear and crest of which was seen from the promontory of Sunium²¹, at twenty-five miles distance. Parrhasius had painted the ornaments of the latter²², Phidias himself adorned every part of the former; and the compliment which, in this favorite work, he took an opportunity of paying to the merit of Pericles, occasioned (as we shall have occasion to explain²³) his own banishment, a disgrace which he seems not to have long survived. Cicero, Plutarch, Pliny, and Pausanias, had seen and admired this invaluable monument of piety, as well as genius, since the Minerva of Phidias increased the devotion of Athens towards her protecting divinity. It belongs only to those who have seen and studied, to describe such master-pieces of art; and as they exist no more, it will better suit the design of this history, to confine ourselves to such works as we ourselves have seen, and which are generally acknowledged to bear the impression of the Socratic age, when philosophy gave law to painting and sculpture, as well as to poetry and eloquence.

Were it allowed to make the melancholy supposition, that all the monuments of Grecian literature had perished in the general wreck of their nation and liberty, and that posterity could collect nothing farther concerning that celebrated people, but what appeared from the Apollo Belvedere, the groups of the Laocoon and Niobé, and other statues, gems, or medals, now scattered over Italy and

C H A P.
XIV.

Charac-
teristic ex-
cellence of
Grecian
art.

²¹ Pausanias Attic.

²² Idem, *ibid.*

²³ Plutarch. in Pericl. et Thucyd. l. ii.

C H A P. XIV. Europe, what opinion would mankind form of the genius and character of the Greeks? would it correspond with the impressions made by their poets, orators, and historians? which impression would be most favorable? and what would be the precise difference between them? The solution of these questions will throw much light on the present subject.

Circumstances in which it agreed with poetry and eloquence.

The first observation that occurs on the most superficial, and that is strongly confirmed by a more attentive, survey of the ancient marbles, is, that their authors perfectly understood proportion, anatomy, the art of clothing, without concealing the naked figure, and whatever contributes to the justness and truth of design. The exact knowledge of form is as necessary to the painter or statuary, whose business it is to represent *bodies*, as that of language to the poet or historian, who undertakes to describe *actions*. In this particular, it would be unnecessary to institute a comparison between Grecian writers and artists, since they are both allowed as perfect in their respective kinds as the condition of humanity renders possible.

The expression of passions, sentiments and character, in the works of poets and orators;

But when we advance a step farther, and consider the expression of passions, sentiments, and character, we find an extraordinary difference, or rather contrariety. Homer, Sophocles, and Demosthenes, are not only the most original, but the most animated and glowing, of all writers. Every sentence is energetic; all the parts are in motion; the passions are described in their utmost fury, and expressed by the boldest words and gestures. To

keep to the tragic poet, whose art approaches the nearest to painting and sculpture, the heroes, and even the gods of Sophocles, frequently display the impetuosity of the most ungoverned natures; and, what is still more extraordinary, sometimes betray a momentary weakness, extremely inconsistent with their general character. The rocks of Lemnos resound with the cries of Philoctetes; Oedipus, yielding to despair, plucks out his eyes; even Hercules, the model of fortitude, sinks under the impressions of pain or sorrow.

Nothing can be more opposite to the conduct of Grecian artists. *They* likewise have represented Philoctetes; but, instead of effeminate tears and lamentations, have given him the patient concentrated woe of a suffering hero. The furious Ajax of Timomachus was painted, not in the moment when he destroyed the harmless sheep instead of the hostile Greeks, but after he had committed this mad deed, and when his rage having subsided, he remained, like the sea after a storm, surrounded with the scattered fragments of mangled carcases, and reflecting with the silent anguish of despair on his useless and frantic brutality. The revenge of Medea against her husband was not represented, as in Euripides, butchering her innocent children, but while she was still wavering and irresolute, agitated between resentment and pity. Even Clytemnestra, whose unnatural, intrepid cruelty, poets and historians had so indignantly described and arraigned, was not deemed a proper subject for the pencil, when embruing her hands in the blood of

in those of
painters
and statua-
ries.

C H A P. Agamemnon. And although this may be referred
 XIV. to a rule of Aristotle, "that the characters of
 women should not be represented as too daring or
 decisive;" yet we shall find on examination that it
 results from principles of nature, whose authority
 is still more universal and indispensable. The con-
 sideration of the Apollo, Niobé, and Laocoon,
 whose copies have been infinitely multiplied, and
 are familiarly known, will set this matter in the
 clearest point of view.

illustrated
 by the
 Apollo
 Belvedere;

The Apollo Belvedere is universally felt and ac-
 knowledged to be the sublimest figure that either
 skill can execute, or imagination conceive. That
 favorite divinity, whom ancient poets seem pecu-
 liarly fond of describing in the warmest colors²⁴,
 is represented in the attitude of darting the fatal
 arrow against the serpent Pytho, or the giant Ti-
 tyus. Animated by the noblest conception of hea-
 venly powers, the artist has far outstepped the per-
 fections of humanity, and (if we may speak with-
 out irreverence) made the corrupt put on incor-
 ruption, and the mortal immortality. His stature
 is above the human, his attitude majestic; the Ely-
 sian spring of youth softens the manly graces of his
 person, and the bold structure of his limbs. Dis-
 dain sits on his lips, and indignation swells his
 nostrils; but an unalterable serenity invests his
 front, and the sublime elevation of his aspect aspires
 at deeds of renown still surpassing the present ob-
 ject of his victory.

²⁴ Horace, b. iii. ode 4. ver. 60.

The irascible passions are not represented with more dignity in the Apollo, than are those of fear, terror, and consternation, in the Niobé. This group contained Niobé and her husband Amphion, with seven sons, and as many daughters. Their melancholy story, which is too well known²⁵ to be related here, required the deepest expression; and the genius of the artist has chosen the only moment when this expression could be rendered consistent with the highest beauty; a beauty not flattering the senses by images of pleasure, but transporting the fancy into regions of purity and virtue. The excess and suddenness of their disaster, occasioned a degree of amazement and horror, which, suspending the faculties, involved them in that silence and insensibility, which neither breaks out in lamentable shrieks, nor distorts the countenance, but which leaves full play to the artist's skill to represent motion without disorder, or, in other words, to render expression graceful.

The Laocoon may be regarded as the triumph of Grecian sculpture; since bodily pain, the grossest and most ungovernable of all our passions, and that pain united with anguish and torture of mind, are yet expressed with such propriety and dignity, as afford lessons of fortitude superior to any taught in the schools of philosophy. The horrible shriek which Virgil's Laocoon²⁶ emits, is a proper circumstance for poetry, which speaks to the fancy

C H A P.

XIV.

by the
group of
Niobé;and by that
of the Lao-
coon.

²⁵ Ovid. Metamorph. l. vi 146 ver. 146, et seqq.

²⁶ Æneid, l. ii. ver. 222.

C H A P.
XIV.

by images and ideas borrowed from all the senses, and has a thousand ways of ennobling its object; but the expression of this shriek would have totally degraded the statue. It is softened, therefore, into a patient sigh, with eyes turned to heaven in search of relief. The intolerable agony of suffering nature is represented in the lower part, and particularly in the extremities, of the body; but the manly breast struggles against calamity. The contention is still more plainly perceived in his furrowed forehead; and his languishing paternal eye demands assistance, less for himself, than for his miserable children, who look up to him for help.

Different
impression
made by
the same
objects as
exhibited
by poets
and paint-
ers.

If subjects of this nature are expressed without appearing hideous, shocking, or disgusting, we may well suppose that more temperate passions are represented with the greatest moderation and dignity. The remark is justified by examining the remains or imitations of Grecian art; and were we to deduce from these alone the character of the nation, it would seem at first sight, that the contemporaries of Pericles must have been a very superior people in point of fortitude, self-command, and every branch of practical philosophy, to the Athenians who are described by poets and historians.

founded in
the differ-
ent nature
of their re-
spective
arts.

But when we consider the matter more deeply, we shall find that it is the business of history to describe men as they are; of poetry and painting, to represent them as may afford most pleasure and instruction to the reader or spectator. The aim of these imitative arts is the same, but they differ widely in the mode, the object, and extent, of

their imitation. The poet who describes *actions* in *time*, may carry the reader through all the gradations of passion, and display his genius most powerfully in its most furious excess. But the painter or statuary, who represents *bodies* in *space*, is confined to one moment, and must chuse that which leaves the freest play to the imagination. This can seldom be the highest pitch of passion, which leaves nothing beyond it; and in contemplating which, the sympathy of the spectator, after his first surprise subsides, can only descend into indifference. Every violent situation, moreover, is felt not to be lasting; and all extreme perturbation is inconsistent with beauty, without which no visible object can long attract or please²⁷.

²⁷ This subject is admirably treated in Lessing's *Laocoon*, in which he traces the *bounds* of painting and poetry; a work which, it is much to be regretted, that great genius did not finish.

C H A P. XV.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War. — Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra. — Sea Fights. — Insolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans. — They provoke the Resentment of the Peloponnesians — Obtain the Protection of Athens — Are defeated by the Corinthians — Who dread the Resentment of Athens. — Their Scheme for rendering it impotent. — Description of the Macedonian Coast. — It revolts from Athens. — Siege of Potidæa. — General Confederacy against Athens. — Peloponnesian Embassy. — Its Demands firmly answered by Pericles. — His Speech to the Athenians. — The Thebans surprise Plataea. — Preparations for War on both Sides. — Invasion of Attica. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet. — Plague in Athens. — Calamitous Situation of that Republic. — Magnanimity of Pericles. — Firmness of his last Advice. — His Death and Character.

C H A P.

XV.

Pericles
summons
to Athens
deputies
from all
the Gre-
cian re-
publics.

BY the lustre of the elegant arts, the magnificence of Pericles had displayed and ennobled the military glory of his country; and the pre-eminence of Athens seemed immoveably established on the solid foundation of internal strength, adorned by external splendor. But this abundant measure of prosperity satisfied neither the active ambition of the republic, nor the enterprising genius of

its minister. The Greeks beheld and admired, but had not yet formally acknowledged, the full extent of Athenian greatness. In order to extort this reluctant confession, than which nothing could more firmly secure to him the affectionate gratitude of his fellow-citizens, Pericles dispatched ambassadors to the republics and colonies in Europe and in Asia, requiring the presence of their deputies in Athens, to concert measures for rebuilding their ruined temples, and for performing the solemn vows and sacrifices promised, with devout thankfulness, to the immortal gods, who had wonderfully protected the Grecian arms, during their long and dangerous conflict with the Persian empire. This proposal, which tended to render Athens the common centre of deliberation and of union, was readily accepted in such foreign parts as had already submitted to the authority of that republic. But in neighbouring states, the ambassadors of Pericles were received coldly, and treated disrespectfully; in most assemblies of the Peloponnesus they were heard with secret disgust, and the pride of the Spartan senate openly derided the insolence of their demands. When, at their return home, they explained the behaviour of the Spartans, Pericles exclaimed, in his bold style of eloquence, that he “beheld war advancing with wide and rapid steps from the Peloponnesus¹.”

Such was the preparation of materials which the smallest spark might throw into combustion. But

Introduc-
tion to the
history of

¹ Plut. in Pericle.

C H A P.

XV.

the Peloponnesian war.

before we relate the events which immediately occasioned the memorable war of twenty-seven years, it is impossible (if the calamities of our own times have taught us to compassionate the miserable) not to drop a tear over the continual disasters which so long and so cruelly afflicted the most valuable and enlightened portion of mankind, and whose immortal genius was destined to enlighten the remotest ages of the world. When rude, illiterate peasants are summoned to mutual hostility, and, unaffected by personal motives of interest or honor, expend their strength and blood to gratify the sordid ambition of their respective tyrants, we may lament the general stupidity and wretchedness of human nature; but we cannot heartily sympathize with men who have so little sensibility, nor very deeply and feelingly regret, that those should suffer pain, who seem both unwilling and incapable to relish pleasure. Their heavy unmeaning aspect, their barbarous language, and more barbarous manners, together with their total indifference to the objects and pursuits which form the dignity and glory of man; these circumstances, interrupting the ordinary course of our sentiments, divert or repel the natural current of sympathy. Their victories or defeats are contemplated without emotion, coldly related, and read without interest or concern. But the war of Peloponnesus presents a different spectacle. The adverse parties took arms, not to support the unjust pretensions of a tyrant, whom they had reason to hate or to despise, but to vindicate their civil rights, and to maintain their political

independence. The meanest Grecian soldier knew the duties of the citizen, the magistrate, and the general ². His life had been equally divided between the most agreeable amusements of leisure, and the most honorable employments of activity. Trained to those exercises and accomplishments which give strength and agility to the limbs, beauty to the shape, and grace to the motions, the dignity of his external appearance announced the liberal greatness of his mind; and his language, the most harmonious and expressive ever spoken by man, comprehended all that variety of conception, and all those shades of sentiment, that characterize the most exalted perfection of human manners.

Ennobled by such actors, the scene itself was highly important, involving not only the states of Greece, but the greatest of the neighbouring kingdoms; and, together with the extent of a foreign war, exhibiting the intenseness of domestic sedition. As it exceeded the ordinary duration of human power or resentment, it was accompanied with unusual circumstances of terror, which, to the pious credulity of an unfortunate age, naturally announced the wrath of heaven, justly provoked by human cruelty. While pestilence and famine multiplied the actual sufferings, eclipses and earthquakes increased the consternation and horror of

C H A P.
XV.

Magni-
tude and
import-
ance of the
subject.

² Such is the testimony uniformly given of them in the panegyric of Athens by Isocrates, and confirmed by the more impartial authority of Xenophon, in the expedition of Cyrus. Their exploits in that wonderful enterprise justify the highest praise; and yet the national character had rather degenerated than improved, in the long interval between the periods alluded to.

C H A P. XV. that lamentable period ³. Several warlike communities were expelled from their hereditary possessions; others were not only driven from Greece, but utterly extirpated from the earth; some fell a prey to party-rage, others to the vengeance of foreign enemies; some were slowly exhausted by the contagion of a malignant atmosphere, others overwhelmed at once by sudden violence; while the combined weight of calamity assailed the power of Athens, and precipitated the downfall of that republic from the pride of prosperous dominion, to the dejection of dependence and misery ⁴.

Rupture
between
Corinth
and its co-
lony Cor-
cyra.
Olymp.
lxxxv. 2.
A. C. 439.

The general, but latent hostility of the Greeks, of which we have already explained the cause, was first called into action by a rupture between the ancient republic of Corinth, and its flourishing colony Corcyra. The haughty disdain of Corcyra, elated with the pride of wealth and naval greatness, had long denied and scorned those marks of

³ Thucyd. l. i. p. 16, et seqq.

⁴ For the Peloponnesian war we have not, indeed, a full stream of history, but a regular series of annals in Thucydides, and Xenophon; authors, of whom each might say,

Quæque ipse miserrima vidi,

Et quorum pars magna fui: —

Many material circumstances may likewise be learned from the Greek orators, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the comedies of Aristophanes, the twelfth and two following books of Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lyfander, and Agesilaus. It is remarkable, that the heavy compiler, as well as the lively biographer, have both followed the long lost works of Ephorus and Theopompus, in preference to those of Thucydides and Xenophon; a circumstance which strongly marks their want of judgment, but which renders their information more interesting to posterity.

deference and respect which the uniform practice of Greece exacted from colonies towards their mother-country. At the Olympic and other solemn festivals, they yielded not the place of honor to the Corinthians; they appointed not a Corinthian high-priest to preside over their religion; and when they established new settlements on distant coasts, they requested not, as usual with the Greeks, the auspicious guidance of a Corinthian conductor⁵.

While the ancient metropolis, incensed by those instances of contempt, longed for an opportunity to punish them, the citizens of Epidamnus, the most considerable sea-port on the coast of the Adriatic, craved assistance at Corinth against the barbarous incursions of the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who, having united with a powerful band of Epidamnian exiles, greatly infested that territory, and threatened to storm the city. As Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, its distressed inhabitants had first sought protection there; but although their petition was preferred with respectful deference, and urged with the most affecting demonstrations of abasement and calamity, by ambassadors who long remained under the melancholy garb of supplicants in the temple of Corcyrean Juno, the proud insensibility of these intractable islanders showed not the smallest inclination to relieve them; partly restrained, it is probable, by the secret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, consisting of some

C H A P.
XV.

The Co-
rinthians
protect
Epidam-
nus.

⁵ Schol. in Thucyd. ad locum. He mentions the other circumstances which I have melted into the text, and which will afterwards be confirmed by more classic authority.

C H A P. of the principal and richest families of that maritime
 xv. republic. The Corinthians readily embraced the cause of a people abandoned by *their* natural protectors, and *their own* inveterate enemies; and immediately supplied Epidamnus with a considerable body of troops, less with a view to defend its walls against the assaults of the Taulantii, than in order irrecoverably to detach and alienate its inhabitants from the interest of Corcyra.

Are defeated at
 sea by the
 Corcyreans.
 Olymp.
 lxxxvi. 2.
 A. C. 435.

The indignation of the Corcyreans was inflamed into fury, when they understood that those whom they had long affected to consider as aliens and as rivals, had interfered in the affairs of their colony. They instantly launched a fleet of forty sail, proceeded in hostile array to the harbour of Epidamnus, summoned the inhabitants to re-admit their exiles, and to expel the foreign troops. With such unconditional and arbitrary demands, the weakest and most pusillanimous garrison could scarcely be supposed to comply. The Epidamnians rejected them with scorn; in consequence of which their city was invested and attacked with vigor, by land and sea. The Corinthians were now doubly solicitous, both to defend the place, and to protect the troops already thrown into it, consisting partly of their Leucadian and Ambracian allies, but chiefly of Corinthian citizens. A proclamation, first published at Corinth, was industriously disseminated through Greece, inviting all who were unhappy at home, or who courted glory abroad, to undertake an expedition to Epidamnus, with assurance of enjoying the immunities and honors

honors of a republic whose safety they had ventured to defend. Many exiles and military adventurers, at all times profusely scattered over Greece, obeyed the welcome summons. Public assistance, likewise, was obtained, not only from Thebes and Megara, but from several states of the Peloponnese. In this manner the Corinthians were speedily enabled to fit out an armament of seventy-five sail; which, directing its course towards Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulph, near the friendly harbour of Actium, where, in a future age, Augustus and Antony decided the empire of the Roman world. Near this celebrated scene of action, the impetuous Corcyreans hastened to meet the enemy. Forty ships were employed in the siege of Epidamnus. Twice that number sailed towards the Ambracian gulph. The hostile armaments fought with equal animosity; but the Corcyreans far surpassed in bravery and skill. Fifteen Corinthian vessels were destroyed; the rest escaped in disorder, and the decisive battle was soon followed by the surrender of Epidamnus. By a clemency little expected from the victors, the ancient inhabitants of the place were allowed their lives and liberties; but the Corinthians were made prisoners of war, and their allies condemned to death.

Epidamnus surrenders to the conquerors.

The Corcyreans thanked their gods, and erected a conspicuous trophy of victory on the promontory Leucimné, whose lofty ridges overlooked the distant scene of the engagement. During the two following years they reigned undisturbed masters of the neighbouring seas; and though a

Their insolence and cruelty, A. C. 434 — 433.

C H A P. principle of fear, or perhaps a faint remnant of re-
XV. spect towards their ancient metropolis, prevented them from invading the territory of Corinth, they determined to make the confederates of that republic feel the full weight of their vengeance. For this purpose they ravaged the coast of Apollonia; plundered the city Ambracia; almost desolated the peninsula, now the island of Leucas; and, emboldened by success, ventured to land in the Peloponnesus, and set fire to the harbour of Cyllene, because in the late sea-fight the Elians, to whom that place belonged, had supplied Corinth with a few gallies⁶.

which provoked the Peloponnesians.

The southern states of Greece, highly provoked by this outrage to the peaceable Elians, whose religious character had long commanded general respect, were still farther incensed by the active resentment of the Corinthians, who, exasperated at the disgrace of being vanquished by one of their own colonies, had, ever since their defeat, bent their whole attention, and employed the greatest part even of their private fortunes, to hire mercenaries, to gain allies, and especially to equip a new fleet, that they might be enabled to chastise the impious audacity (as they called it) of their rebellious children⁷.

The Corcyreans and Corinthians send ambassadors to Athens.

The magistrates of Corcyra saw and dreaded the tempest that threatened to burst on them, and which the unassisted strength of their island was totally unable to resist. They had not taken part

⁶ Thucyd. l. i. p. 22, et seqq.

⁷ Idem, Ibid.

in the late wars; they had not acceded to the last treaty of peace; they could not summon the aid of a single confederate. In this difficulty they sent ambassadors to Athens, well knowing the secret animosity between that republic and the enemies by whom their own safety was endangered. The Corinthians likewise sent ambassadors to defeat their purpose. Both were allowed a hearing in the Athenian assembly; but first the Corcyreans, who, in a studied oration, acknowledged, "that having no previous claim of merit to urge, they expected no success in their negociation, unless an alliance between Athens and Corcyra should appear alike advantageous to those who proposed, and to those who accepted it. Of this the Athenians would immediately become sensible, if they reflected that the people of Peloponnesus being equally hostile to both (the open enemies of Corcyra, the secret and more dangerous enemies of Athens), their country must derive a vast accession of strength by receiving, without trouble or expense, a rich and warlike island, which, unassisted and alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy; and whose naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever render that republic sovereign of the seas. If the Corinthians complained of the injustice of receiving their colony, let them remember, that colonies are preserved by moderation, and alienated by oppression; that men settle in foreign parts to better their situation, not to submit their liberties; to continue the equals, not to become the slaves of their less adventurous fellow-citizens. If they

C H A P. pretended, that the demand of Corcyra was incon-
 XV. sistent with the last general treaty of peace, let the words of that treaty confound them, which expressly declare every Grecian city, not previously bound to follow the standard of Athens or of Sparta, at full liberty to accede to the alliance of either of those powers^{*}. But it became the dignity of Athens to expect honor and safety, not from the punctilious observance of a slippery convention, but from the manly and prompt vigor of her councils. It suited the renowned wisdom of a republic, which had ever anticipated her enemies, to prevent the fleet of Corcyra from falling a prey to that confederacy, with whose inveterate envy she herself must be soon called to contend; and to merit the useful gratitude of an island possessing other valuable advantages, and most conveniently situate for intercepting the Sicilian and Italian supplies, which, in the approaching and inevitable war, would otherwise so powerfully assist their Doric ancestors of Peloponnesus."

Speech of
 the Corin-
 thians.

The Corinthians indirectly answered this discourse by inveighing, with great bitterness, against the unexampled insolence and unnatural cruelty of Corcyra: "That infamous island had hitherto declined connexion with every Grecian state, that she might carry on her piratical depredations unobserved, and alone enjoy the spoil of the unwary mariners who approached her inhospitable shores.

^{*} Εἰρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολιῶν ἥτις μηδὲ μὲ ξυμμαχεῖ, εἶναι παρ' ὁποτέρῳις ἀν ἀρεσκηται εἰλθεῖν. The ὁποτέρῳις justifies the paraphrase in the text.

Rendered at once wealthy and wicked by this inhuman practice, the Corcyreans had divested themselves of all piety and gratitude towards their mother-country, and embrued their parricidal hands in their parent's blood. Their audacity having provoked a late vengeance, which they were unable to repel, they unseasonably sought protection from Athens, desiring those who were not accomplices of their injustice to participate their danger, and deluding them through the vain terror of contingent evil, into certain and immediate calamity; for such must every war be regarded, its event being always destructive, often fatal. The Corcyreans vainly chicaned as to *words*; Athens, it was clear, must violate the *sense* and *spirit* of the last treaty of peace, if she assisted the enemies of any contracting power. These fierce islanders acknowledged themselves a colony of Corinth, but pretended that settlements abroad owe nothing to those who established them, to those whose fostering care reared their infancy, from whose blood they sprung, by whose arms they have been defended. We affirm, on the contrary (and appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted so many colonies), that the mother-country is entitled to that authority which the Corcyreans have long spurned, to that respect which their insolence now refuses and disdains: that it belongs to us, their metropolis, to be their leaders in war, their magistrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppose our just pretensions, and protect our rebellious colony, without setting an example most dangerous to yourselves."

C H A P.

XV.

The Athenians enter into a treaty of defence with the Corcyreans.

Second sea-fight between the Corinthians and Corcyreans.

Olymp. lxxxvii. 1.
A. C. 432.

These sensible observations made a deep impression on the moderate portion of the assembly; but the speech of the Corcyreans was more congenial to the ambitious views of the republic, and the daring spirit of Pericles. He wished, however, to avoid the dishonor of manifestly violating the peace, and therefore advised his countrymen to conclude with Corcyra, not a general or complete alliance, but only a treaty of defence, which, in case of invasion, obliged the two states reciprocally to assist each other.

This agreement was no sooner ratified than ten Athenian ships reinforced the fleet of Corcyra, stationed on the *eastern* coast of the island; because the Corinthians, with their numerous allies, already rendezvoused on the opposite shore of Epirus. The hostile armaments met in line of battle, near the small islands Sibota, which seem anciently to have been separated from the continent by the impetuosity of the deep and narrow sea between Epirus and Corcyra. The bold islanders, with an hundred and ten sail, furiously attacked the superior fleet of the Corinthians, which was divided into three squadrons; the Megareans and Ambracians on the right, the Elians and other allies in the centre, their own ships on the left, which composed the principal strength of their line. The narrowness of the strait, and the immense number of ships (far greater than had ever assembled in former battles between the Greeks), soon rendered it impossible, on either side, to display any superiority in sailing, or any address in

manœuvre. The action was irregular and tumultuous, and maintained with more firmness and vigor than naval skill. The numerous troops, both heavy and light-armed, who were placed on the decks, advanced, engaged, grappled, and fought with obstinate valor; while the ships, continuing motionless and inactive, made the sea-fight resemble a pitched battle. At length, twenty Corcyrean gallies, having broke the left wing of the enemy, and pursued them to the coast of Epirus, injudiciously landed there to burn or plunder the Corinthian camp.

The Cor-
cyreans de-
feated.

This inessential service too much weakened the smaller fleet, and rendered the inequality decisive. The Corcyreans were defeated with great slaughter, their incensed adversaries disregarding plunder and prisoners, and only thirsting for blood and revenge. In the blindness of their rage they destroyed many of their fellow-citizens, who had been captured by the enemy in the beginning of the engagement. Nor was their loss of ships inconsiderable; thirty were sunk, and the rest so much shattered, that when they endeavoured to pursue the feeble remains of the Corcyrean fleet, which had lost seventy gallies, they were effectually prevented from executing this design by the small Athenian squadron, which, according to its instructions from the republic, had taken no share in the battle, but, agreeably to the recent treaty between Athens and Corcyra, hindered the total destruction of their allies, first by hostile threats, at length by actual resistance.

C H A P.

XV.

Arrival of
an Athe-
nian squa-
dron.

The Corinthians having dragged up their wreck, and recovered the bodies of their slain, refitted on the coast of Epirus, and hastened to Corcyra; considerably off which they beheld the enemy reinforced, and drawn up in line of battle, in order to defend their coast. They advanced, however, with intrepidity, till, to their surprise and terror, they perceived an unknown fleet pressing towards them. This new appearance shook their resolution, and made them change their course. The Corcyreans, whose situation at first prevented them from seeing the advancing squadron, were astonished at the sudden retreat of the enemy; but when they discovered its cause, their uncertainty and fears, increased by their late afflicting calamity, made them prefer the safest measure. *They* also turned their prows; and, while the Corinthians retired to Epirus, pressed in an opposite direction to Corcyra. There, to their inexpressible joy, not unmixed with shame, they were joined by the unknown fleet, consisting of twenty Athenian gallies; a reinforcement which enabled them, next morning, to brave the late victorious armament off the coast of Sibota, a deserted harbour of Epirus, opposite to the small islands of the same name.

The Co-
rinthians
remon-
strate a-
gainst the
proceed-
ings of the
Atheni-
ans.

The Corinthians, unwilling to contend with the unbroken vigor of their new opponents, dispatched a brigantine with the following remonstrance: "You act most unjustly, men of Athens! in breaking the peace, and commencing unprovoked hostilities. On what pretence do you hinder the Corinthians from taking vengeance on an insolent

foe? If you are determined to persist in iniquity and cruelty, seize us who address you, and treat us as enemies." The words were scarcely ended when the Corcyreans exclaimed, with a loud and unanimous voice, "Seize, and kill them." But the Athenians answered with moderation: "Men of Corinth, we neither break the peace, nor act unjustly. We come to defend our allies of Corcyra: sail unmolested by us to whatever friendly port you deem most convenient; but if you purpose making a descent on Corcyra, or on any of the dependences of that island, we will exert our utmost power to frustrate your attempt⁹."

C H A P.
XV.
Their answer.

This menace, which prevented immediate hostility, did not deter the Corinthians from surprising, as they sailed homeward, the town of Anactorium, on the Ambracian gulph, which, in the time of harmony between the colony and parent state, had been built at the joint expense of Corinth and Corcyra. From this sea-port they carried off two hundred and fifty Corcyrean citizens, and eight hundred slaves. The former, added to the captives saved during the fury of the sea-fight, by the clemency or the avarice of a few Corinthian captains, made the whole prisoners of war amount to twelve hundred and fifty; a capture which, as we shall have occasion to relate, produced most important and lamentable consequences on the future fortune of Corcyra.

The Corinthians surprise Anactorium, and take many Corcyrean prisoners.

The Corinthians, having chastised the insolence of their revolted colony, had reason to dread the

Their scheme for defeating

⁹ Thucyd. p. 37.

C H A P.

XV.

the ven-
geance of
Athens.
Olymp.
lxxxvii. I.
A. C. 432.

Descrip-
tion of the
Macedo-
nian coast.

vengeance of its powerful ally. Impressed with this terror, they labored with great activity and with unusual secrecy and address, to find for the Athenian arms an employment still more interesting than the Corcyrean war. The domestic strength of Athens defied assault; but a people who, on the basis of a diminutive territory and scanty population, had reared such an extensive fabric of empire, might easily be wounded in their foreign dependences, which, for obvious causes, were ever prone to novelty and rebellion. The northern shores of the Ægean sea, afterwards comprehended under the name of Macedon, and forming the most valuable portion of that kingdom, reluctantly acknowledged the stern authority of a sovereign whom they obeyed and detested. This extensive coast, of which the subsequent history will deserve our attention, composed, next to the Ægean islands and colonies of Asia, the principal foreign dominions of the Athenian republic. The whole country (naturally divided by the Thermaic and Strymonic gulphs into the provinces of Pieria, Chalcis, and Pangæus) stretched in a direct line only an hundred and fifty miles; but the winding intricacies of the coast, indented by two great, and by two smaller bays, extended three times that length; and almost every convenient situation was occupied by a Grecian sea-port. But neither the extent of above four hundred miles, nor the extreme populousness of the maritime parts, formed the chief importance of this valuable possession. The middle division, called the region of Chalcis, because originally

peopled by a city of that name in Eubœa, was C H A P.
 equally fertile and delightful. The inland country, XV.
 continually diversified by lakes, rivers, and arms
 of the sea, afforded an extreme facility of water-
 carriage; Amphipolis, Acanthus, Potidæa, and
 many other towns, furnished considerable marts of
 commerce for the republics of Greece, as well as
 for the neighbouring kingdoms of Thrace and Ma-
 cedon; and the constant demands of the merchant
 excited the patient industry of the husbandman.
 This beautiful district had, on one side, the black
 mountains of Pangæus, and on the other, the green
 vales of Pieria. The former, extending ninety
 miles towards the east and the river Nessus,
 abounded neither in corn nor pasture, but produced
 variety of timber proper for building ships; and
 the southern branches of the mountain contained
 rich veins of gold and silver, which were succes-
 sively wrought by the Thasians and the Athenians,
 but of which the full value was first discovered by
 Philip of Macedon, who annually extracted from
 them the value of two hundred thousand pounds
 sterling ¹⁰. The last and smallest division, Pieria,
 extended fifty miles along the Thermaic gulph to
 the confines of Thessaly and Mount Pindus. The
 towns of Pydna and Methoné enriched the shore
 with the benefits of arts and commerce. Nature
 had been peculiarly kind to the inland country,
 whose shady hills, sequestered walks and fountains,
 lovely verdure, and tranquil solitude, rendered it,
 in the fanciful belief of antiquity, the favorite

¹⁰ Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 514.

C H A P. XV. haunt of the Muses; who borrowed from this district their favorite appellation of *Pierides*. According to the same poetical creed, these goddesses might well *envy* the mortal inhabitants, who led a pastoral life, enjoyed happiness, and are scarcely mentioned in history.

That
country re-
volts from
Athens.

Such was the nature and such the divisions of a territory, which the policy and resentment of Corinth encouraged to successful rebellion against the sovereignty of Athens. Several maritime communities of the Chalcidicé¹¹ took refuge within the walls of Olynthus, a town which they had built and fortified, at the distance of five miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure situation, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnius, which flow into the lake Bolyce, the inmost recess of the Toronaic gulph. The neighbouring city of Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, and governed by annual magistrates sent from the mother-country, yet like most establishments in the Chalcidicé, a tributary confederate¹² of Athens, likewise strengthened its walls, and prepared to revolt. But the Athenians anticipated this design, by sending a fleet of thirty sail, which having entered the harbour of Potidæa,

¹¹ In using the name of Chalcidicé I have followed the analogy of the Greek language rather than complied with custom; yet that part of the Macedonian coast, usually called the region of Chalcis, gave name to the province of Chalcidicé in Syria, as Strabo mentions in his sixteenth book; wherein he explains how the principal divisions of Syria, as well as Mesopotamia, came to be distinguished, after the conquests of Alexander, by Grecian appellations, borrowed from the geography described in the text.

¹² Συμμαχος ὑποτελής. Thucyd. id.

commanded the citizens to demolish their fortifications, to give hostages as security for their good behaviour, and to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates. The Potidæans artfully requested that the execution of these severe commands might be suspended until they had time to send ambassadors to Athens, and to remove the unjust suspicions of their fidelity.

The weakness or avarice of Ancesthratus, the Athenian admiral, listened to this deceitful request, and, leaving the coast of Potidæa, directed the operations of his squadron against places of less importance, not sparing the dependences of Macedon. Meanwhile the Potidæans sent a public but illusive embassy to Athens, while one more effectual was secretly dispatched to Corinth, and other cities of the Peloponnesus, from which they were supplied with two thousand men, commanded by the Corinthian Aristeus, a brave and enterprising general. These troops were thrown into the place during the absence of the Athenian fleet; and the Potidæans, thus reinforced, set their enemies at defiance. Alarmed by this intelligence, the Athenians fitted out a new fleet of forty sail, with a large body of troops, under the command of Callias; who, arriving on the coast of Macedon, found the squadron of Ancesthratus employed in the siege of Pydna. Callias judiciously exhorted him to desist from that enterprise, comparatively of little importance, that the united squadrons might attack Potidæa by sea, while an Athenian army of three thousand citizens, with a due proportion of allies, assaulted it by land. This measure was adopted;

C H A P.
XV.

The Athenians besiege Potidæa.
Olymp.
lxxxvii. 2.
A. C. 432.

C H A P.
XV.

but the spirit of the garrison soon offered them battle, almost on equal terms, though with unequal success. Callias however was slain, and succeeded by Phormio; who, conducting a fresh supply of troops, desolated the hostile territory of Chalcis and Pieria; took several towns by storm; and, having ravaged the adjoining district, besieged the city of Potidæa.

The Corinthians
endeavour
to exasperate the
Lacedæmonians
against
Athens.

While those transactions were carrying on in the north, the centre of Greece was shaken by the murmurs and complaints of the Corinthians and their Peloponnesian confederates, who lost all patience when their citizens were blocked up by an Athenian army. Accompanied by the deputies of several republics beyond the isthmus, who had recently experienced the arrogance of their imperious neighbour, they had recourse to Sparta, whose actual power and ancient renown justly merited the first rank in the confederacy, but whose measures¹³ were rendered slow and cautious by the foresight and peaceful counsels of the prudent Archidamus. When introduced into the Spartan assembly, the representatives of all the states inveighed, with equal bitterness, against the injustice and cruelty of Athens, while each described and exaggerated the weight of its peculiar grievances. The Megareans

¹³ Plutarch (in Pericl.) ascribes the backwardness of the Spartans to engage in war to the advice of their principal magistrates, bribed by Pericles, who wished to gain time for his military preparations; a report as improbable as another calumny, that they were bribed by their allies to take arms against Athens (Aristoph. in Pace). The cause of their irresolution, assigned in the text, is confirmed by the subsequent behaviour of Archidamus.

complained that, by a recent decree of that stern C H A P. unfeeling republic, they had been excluded from XV. the ports and markets of Attica¹⁴; an exclusion which, considering the narrowness and poverty of their own rocky district, was equivalent to depriving them of the first necessities of life. The inhabitants of Ægina explained and lamented that, in defiance of recent and solemn treaties, and disregarding the liberal spirit of Grecian policy, the Athenians had reduced their unfortunate island into the most deplorable condition of servitude.

When other states had described their particular sufferings, the Corinthians last arose, and their speaker thus addressed the Lacedæmonian assembly: "Had we come hither, men of Lacedæmon! to urge our private wrongs, it might be sufficient barely to relate the transactions of the preceding, and present, years. The revolt of Corcyra, the siege of Potidæa, are facts which speak for themselves;

Speech of
the Corin-
thians;

¹⁴ The Megareans were accused of ploughing some consecrated lands: they were accused of harbouring the Athenian slaves, fugitives, and exiles; other causes of complaint might easily have been discovered or invented by their powerful neighbours, who were provoked that such a small community on their frontier should uniformly spurn their authority. But the malignity of the comic writers of the times ascribed the severe decree against Megara to an event equally disgraceful to the morals of their country, and injurious to the honor of Pericles. The following verses are translated from the Acharnenses of Aristophanes:

Juvenes profecti Megaram ebrij auferunt

Simætham ex scortatione nobilem:

Megarensis hinc populus dolore perictus

Furatur Aspasiæ duo scorta haud impiger;

Hinc initium belli prorupit

Universis Græcis ob tres meretriculas.

C H A P.
XV.

but the thoughts of this assembly should be directed to objects more important than particular injuries, however flagrant and enormous. The *general* oppressive system of Athenian policy, — it is this which demands your most serious concern; a system aiming at nothing less than the destruction of Grecian freedom, which is ready to perish through your supine neglect. That moderation and probity, men of Sparta! for which your domestic counsels are justly famous, render you the dupes of foreign artifice, and expose you to become the victims of foreign ambition; which, instead of opposing with prompt alacrity, you have nourished by unseasonable delay; and, in consequence of this fatal error, are now called to contend, not with the infant weakness, but with the matured vigor of your enemies, those enemies, who, ever unsatisfied with their present measure of prosperity, are continually intent on some new project of aggrandizement. How different from *your* slow procrastination is the ardent character of the Athenians! Fond of novelty, and fertile in resources, alike active and vigilant, the accomplishment of one design leads them to another more daring. Desire, hope, enterprise, success, follow in rapid succession. Already have they subdued half of Greece; their ambition grasps the whole. Rouse, then, from your lethargy, defend your allies, invade Attica, maintain the glory of Peloponnesus, that sacred deposit, with which being intrusted by your ancestors, you are bound to transmit unimpaired to posterity."

Several

Several Athenians, then residing on other business at Sparta, desired to be heard in defence of their country. Equity could not deny the request of these voluntary advocates, who spoke in a style well becoming the loftiness of their republic¹⁵. With the pride of superiority, rather than the indignation of innocence, they affected to despise the false aspersions of their adversaries; and, instead of answering directly the numerous accusations against their presumptuous abuse of power, described, with swelling encomiums, “the illustrious and memorable exploits of their countrymen; exploits which had justly raised them to a pre-eminence, acknowledged by their allies, uncontested by Sparta, and felt by Persia. When it became the dignity of Greece to chastise the repeated insults of that ambitious empire, the Spartans had declined the conduct of a distant war; Athens had assumed the abandoned helm, and, after demolishing the cruel dominion of Barbarians, had acquired a just and lawful sway over the coasts of Europe and of Asia. The new subjects of the republic were long treated rather as fellow-citizens, than as tributaries and slaves. But it was the nature of man to revolt against the *supposed* injustice of his equals, rather than against the *real* tyranny of his masters. This circumstance, so honorable to Athenian lenity, had occasioned several unprovoked rebellions, which the republic had been compelled to punish with an exemplary severity. The apprehension of future

¹⁵ Thucyd. l. xliii. et seqq.

C H A P. commotions had lately obliged her to hold, with
 XV. a firmer hand, the reins of government, and to maintain with armed power, an authority justly earned, and strictly founded in nature, of which it is an unalterable law, that the strong should govern the weak. If the Spartans, in violation of the right of treaties, thought proper to oppose this immoveable purpose, Athens well knew how to redress her wrongs, and would, doubtless, uphold her empire with the same valor and activity by which it had been established."

Pacific ad-
 vice of
 king Ar-
 chidamus;

Having heard both parties, the assembly adjourned, without forming any resolution. But next day, it appeared to be the prevailing opinion, that the arrogance and usurpation of Athens had already violated the peace, and that it became the prudence as well as the dignity of Sparta, no longer to defer hostilities. This popular current was vainly opposed by the experienced wisdom of king Archidamus, who still counselled peace and moderation, though his courage had been conspicuously distinguished in every season of danger. He exhorted his countrymen "not to rush blindly on war, without examining the resources of the enemy and their own. The Athenians were powerful in ships, in money, in cavalry, and in arms; of all which the Lacedæmonians were destitute, or, at least, but feebly provided. Whatever provocation, therefore, they had received, they ought in prudence to dissemble their resentment, until they could effectually exert their vengeance. The present crisis required negociation; if that failed, the silent preparation of a few years would enable them to take the field

with well-founded hopes of redressing the grievances of their confederates." Had this moderate language made any impression on such an assembly, it would have been speedily obliterated by the blunt boldness of Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who closed the debate. "Men of Sparta! Of the long speeches of the Athenians I understand not the drift. While they dwell with studied eloquence on their own praises, they deny not their having injured our allies. If they behaved *well* in the Persian war, and now *otherwise*, their degeneracy is only the more apparent. But then, and now, we are still the same; and if we would support our character, we must not overlook their injustice. They have ships, money, and horses; but we have good allies, whose interests we must not abandon. Why do we deliberate, while our enemies are in arms? Let us take the field with speed, and fight with all our might." The acclamations of the people followed, and war was resolved.

This resolution was taken in the fourteenth year after the conclusion of the general peace; but near a twelvemonth elapsed before the properest measures for invading Attica could be finally adjusted among the discordant members of so numerous a confederacy. It consisted of all the seven republics of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achaia, the first of which from ambition, and the second perhaps from moderation¹⁶, preserved, in the

C H A P.

XV.

opposed by
Sthenelai
des, one of
the Ephori.

War de-
termined.
Olymp.
lxxxvii. 2.
A. C. 431.

General
confede-
racy
against
Athens;

¹⁶ The ambition of Argos is confirmed by the subsequent measures of that republic; the moderation of Achaia is suspected, from the nature of the Achaean laws, which will afterwards be described.

C H A P. beginning of the war, a suspicious neutrality. Of the
 XV. nine northern republics, Acarnania alone declined joining the allies, its coast being particularly exposed to the ravages of the Corcyrean fleets. The cities of Naupactus and Plataea, for reasons that will soon appear, were totally devoted to their Athenian protectors; whose cause was likewise embraced by several petty princes of Thessaly. But all the other states beyond the isthmus longed to follow the standard of Sparta, and to humble the aspiring ambition of their too powerful neighbour.

sends a
 menacing
 embassy to
 that re-
 public;

The representatives of these various communities having, according to the received practice of Greece, assembled in the principal city of the confederacy, were strongly encouraged by the Corinthians, who, as their colony of Potidæa was still closely besieged, labored to accelerate reprisals on Attica, by exhibiting the most advantageous prospect of the approaching war. They observed, "That the army of the confederacy, exceeding sixty thousand men, far out-numbered the enemy, whom they excelled still more in merit, than they surpassed in number. The one was composed of national troops, fighting for the independence of those countries in whose government they had a share; the other chiefly consisted in vile mercenaries, whose pay was their government and their country. If supplies of money were requisite, the allied states would doubtless be more liberal and forward to defend their interest and honor, than the reluctant tributaries of Athens to rivet their servitude and chains: and if still more money

should be wanted, the Delphic and Olympic treasures afforded an inexhaustible resource, which could not be better expended than in defending the sacred cause of justice and of Grecian freedom." In order to gain full time, however, for settling all matters among themselves, the confederates dispatched to Athens various overtures of accommodation, which they well knew would be indignantly rejected. In each embassy they rose in their demands, successively requiring the Athenians to raise the siege of Potidæa; to repeal their prohibitory decree against Megara; to withdraw their garrison from Ægina; in fine, to declare the independence of their colonies¹⁷.

These last demands were heard at Athens with a mixture of rage and terror. The capricious multitude, who had hitherto approved and admired the aspiring views of Pericles, now trembled on the brink of the precipice to which he had conducted them. They had hitherto pushed the siege of Potidæa with great vigor, but without any near

which
alarms the
Atheni-
ans.

¹⁷ Besides complying with the demands mentioned in the text, the Athenians were required "to expel the descendants of those impious men who had profaned the temple of Minerva." This alluded to an event which happened the first year of the 45th Olympiad, or 598 years before Christ. Cylon, a powerful Athenian, having seized the citadel, and aspiring at royalty, was defeated in his purpose by Megacles, a maternal ancestor of Pericles, who having decoyed the associates of Cylon from the temple of Minerva, butchered them without mercy, and with too little respect for the privileges of that venerable sanctuary. The whole transaction is particularly related by Plutarch in his life of Solon. The renewal of such an antiquated complaint, at this juncture, pointed particularly at Pericles, and showed the opinion which the Spartans entertained of his unrivalled influence and authority.

C H A P. prospect of success. They must now contend with
 XV. a numerous confederacy, expose their boasted grandeur to the doubtful chance of war, and exchange the amusements and pleasures of the city for the toils and hardships of a camp. Of these discontented murmurs the rivals and enemies of Pericles greedily availed themselves, to traduce the character and administration of that illustrious statesman. It was insinuated, that, sacrificing to private passion the interest of his country, he had enacted the imperious decree, of which the allies so justly complained, to resent the personal injury of his beloved Aspasia, whose family had been insulted by some licentious youths of Megara¹⁸. Diopetides, Dracontides, and other demagogues, derided the folly of taking arms on such a frivolous pretence, and as preparatory to the impeachment of Pericles himself, the courts of justice were fatigued with prosecutions of his valuable friends.

Clamor
 excited
 against Pericles.

Persecution of his friends.

The philosopher Anaxagoras, and Phidias the statuary, reflected more lustre than they could derive from the protection of any patron. The mixed character of Aspasia was of a more doubtful kind. To the natural and sprightly graces of Ionia, her native country, she added extraordinary accomplishments of mind and body; and having acquired in high perfection the talents and excellences of the other sex, was accused of being too indifferent to the honor of her own. Scarcely superior in modesty to Phryné, Thais, or Erigone¹⁹, her wit, her knowledge, and her eloquence,

¹⁸ See above, p. 335.

¹⁹ See above, p. 289.

excited universal admiration or envy ²⁰, while the beauty of her fancy and of her person inspired more tender sentiments into the susceptible breast of Pericles. She was reproached, not with entertaining free votaries of pleasure in her family (which in that age was regarded as a very allowable commerce), but of seducing the virtue of Athenian matrons; a crime severely punished by the laws of every Grecian republic. But we have reason to conclude her innocent, since the arguments and tears of her lover saved her from the fury of an enraged populace, at a crisis when his most strenuous exertions could not prevent the banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

C H A P.
XV.

The former was accused of propagating doctrines inconsistent with the established religion; the latter, of having indulged the very pardonable vanity (as it should seem) of representing himself, and his patron, on the shield of his admired statue of Minerva. There, with inimitable art, Phidias had engraved the renowned victory of the Athenians over the warlike daughters of the Thermodon ²¹; he had delineated himself in the figure of a bald old man raising a heavy stone (an allusion to his skill in architecture), while the features of Pericles were distinguished in the countenance of an Athenian chief, bravely combating the queen of the Amazons, though his elevated arm hid part of the face, and in some measure concealed the resemblance ²². For this fictitious crime, Phidias was

Banish-
ment of
Anaxago-
ras and
Phidias.

²⁰ Plato in Menex.

²¹ Lyfias Orat. Funeb.

²² Plut. in Pericl. et Aristot. de Mund.

C H A P. driven from a city which had been adorned by the
 XV. unwearied labors of his long life, and debarred
 beholding those wonders of art which his sublime
 genius had created.

Accusa-
 tion of
 Pericles.

The accusation of the principal friends of Pericles paved the way for his own. He was reproached with embezzling the public treasure; but, on this occasion, plain facts confounded the artifices of his enemies. It was proved, that his private expenses were justly proportioned to the measure of his patrimony; many instances were brought of his generous contempt of wealth in the service of his country; and it appeared, after the strictest examination, that his fortune had not increased since he was intrusted with the exchequer. This honorable display of unshaken probity, which had ever formed the basis of the authority²³ of Pericles, again reconciled to him the unsteady affections of his countrymen, and gave irresistible force to that famous and fatal speech, which unalterably decided the war of Peloponnesus.

²³ This testimony, which is given by the impartiality of Thucydides, destroys at once the numerous aspersions of the comic poets of the times, which have been copied by Plutarch, and from him transcribed by modern compilers. Pericles, it is said, raised the war of Peloponnesus, merely for his own convenience and safety; and was encouraged to this measure by the advice of his kinsman Alcibiades, then a boy; who, calling one day at his house, was refused admittance, "because Pericles was occupied in considering how he might best state his accounts." "Let him rather consider," said the sagacious stripling, "how to give no account at all." Pericles took the hint, and involved his country in a war, which allowed no time for examining the public expenditure. Such anecdotes may amuse those who can believe them.

“Often have I declared, Athenians! that we must not obey the unjust commands of our enemies. I am still firmly of that mind, convinced as I am of the dangerous vicissitudes of war and fortune; and that human hopes, designs, and pursuits, are all fleeting and fallacious. Yet, in the present crisis, necessity and glory should alike fix us to this immoveable resolution. The decree against Megara, which the first embassy required us to repeal, is not the cause of that hostile jealousy which has long secretly envied our greatness, and which has now more openly conspired our destruction. Yet that decree, of which some men have spoken so lightly, involved the honor of our councils and the stability of our empire. By pusillanimously repealing it, we should have emboldened that malignant enmity, which, notwithstanding our proper firmness in the first instance, has yet successively risen to higher and more arbitrary demands; demands which merit to be answered, not by embassies, but by arms.

“The flourishing resources, and actual strength, of the republic, afford us the most flattering prospect of military success. Impreguably fortified by land, our shores are defended by three hundred gallies; besides a body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, together with two thousand archers, we can immediately take the field with thirteen thousand pikemen, without draining our foreign garrisons, or diminishing the complete number of sixteen thousand men who defend the walls and fortresses in Attica. The wealthy sea-ports

C H A P.

XV.

He justifies his measure, and maintains the necessity of the war;

explains the strength and resources of the republic;

C H A P. of Thrace and Macedon; the flourishing colonies of Ionia, Eolia, and Doria; in a word, the whole extensive coast of the Asiatic peninsula, acknowledge, by annual contributions, the sovereignty of our guardian navy, whose strength is increased by the ships of Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, while the smaller islands furnish us, according to their ability, with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thousand ²⁴ tributary republics, and notwithstanding the expenses incurred by the siege of Potidæa, and the architectural ornaments of the city, she possesses six thousand talents in her treasury.

which he contrasts with the weakness of the enemy.

“The situation of our enemies is totally the reverse. Animated by rage, and emboldened by numbers, they may be roused to a transient, desultory assault; but destitute of resources, and divided in interests, they are totally incapable of any steady, persevering exertion. With sixty thousand men they may enter Attica; and if our unseasonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle; but unless our rash imprudence assists and enables them, they cannot possibly prosecute a successful war. Indeed, Athenians! I dread less the power of the enemy, than your own ungovernable spirit. Instead of being seduced from your security, by a vain desire to defend, against superior numbers, your plantations and villas in the

²⁴ Aristoph. Vesp. He says, that twenty thousand Athenians might live as in the Elysian fields, if each tributary city undertook to provide for twenty citizens. V. 705, etc.

open country, you ought to destroy these superfluous possessions with your own hands. To you who receive the conveniences of life from so many distant dependences, the devastation of Attica is a matter of small moment; but how can your enemies repair, how can they survive, the devastation of the Peloponnesus? How can they prevent, or remedy, this fatal, this intolerable calamity, while the squadrons of Athens command the surrounding seas? If these considerations be allowed their full weight; if reason, not passion, conducts the war, it seems scarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Yet let us answer the Peloponnesians with moderation, "that we will not forbid the Megareans our ports and markets, if the Spartans, and other states of Greece, abolish their exclusive and inhospitable laws: that we will restore independent governments to such cities as were free at the last treaty of peace, provided the Spartans engage to follow our example: that we are ready to submit all differences to the impartial decision of any equitable tribunal; and that, although these condescending overtures be rejected, we will not commence hostilities, but are prepared to repel them with our usual vigor²⁵." The assembly murmured applause; a decree was proposed and

C H A P.
XV.

Dictates
a reply
to the
Pelopon-
nesians,

which is
taken for
a declara-
tion of
war.

²⁵ In examining the speech ascribed to Pericles, on this occasion, by Thucydides, the attentive reader will perceive that it supposes the knowledge of several events omitted in the preceding narrative of that historian, but which are carefully related in the text. The English speech is shorter than the Greek, but contains more information, collected from Plutarch, Diodorus, Aristophanes, and the 2d book of Thucydides himself.

C H A P. XV. ratified; the ambassadors returned home with the reply dictated by Pericles; which, moderate as it seemed to the Athenian statesman, sounded like an immediate declaration of war to the Spartans and their allies.

The The-
bans sur-
prise Pla-
tæa.
Olymp.
lxxxvii. 2.
A. C. 431.
May the
7th.

Six months after the battle of Potidæa, the Thebans, who were the most powerful and the most daring of these allies, undertook a military enterprise against the small but magnanimous republic of Platæa. Though situate in the heart of Bœotia, amidst numerous and warlike enemies, the Platæans still preserved an unshaken fidelity to Athens, whose toils and triumphs they had shared in the Persian war. Yet even this feeble community, surrounded on every side by hostile Bœotians, was not exempted from domestic discord. Naucrides, the perfidious and bloody leader of an aristocratical faction, engaged to betray the Platæan gates to a body of foreign troops, provided they enabled him to overturn the democracy, and to take vengeance on his political adversaries, whom he regarded as his personal foes. Eurymachus, a noble and wealthy Theban, with whom, in the name of his associates, this sanguinary agreement had been contracted, entered Platæa with three hundred of his countrymen, at the first watch of the night; but, regardless of their promise to Naucrides, who expected that they would break tumultuously into the houses, and butcher his enemies, the Thebans formed regularly in arms, and remained quietly in the market-place, having issued a proclamation to invite all the citizens indiscri-

minately to become allies to Thebes. The Plataeans readily accepted a proposal, which delivered them from the terror of immediate death. But while they successively ratified the agreement, they observed, with mixed shame and joy, that darkness and surprise had greatly augmented the number of the conspirators. Encouraged by this discovery, they secretly dispatched a messenger to Athens; and, while they expected the assistance of their distant protector, determined to leave nothing untried for their own deliverance.

The night was spent in an operation not less daring than extraordinary. As they could not assemble in the streets without alarming suspicion, they dug through the interior walls of their houses, and fortified the outward in the best manner the time would allow, with their ploughs, carts, and other instruments of husbandry. Before day-break the work was complete; when, with one consent, they rushed furiously against the enemy, the women and children animating with horrid shrieks and gestures the efforts of their rage. It was night, and a storm of rain and thunder augmented the gloomy terrors of the battle. The Thebans were unacquainted with the ground; above an hundred fell; near two hundred fled in trepidation to a lofty, and spacious tower adjoining the walls, which they mistook for one of the gates of the city. In the first movements of resentment, the Plataeans prepared to burn them alive; but a moment's reflection deterred them from this dangerous cruelty. Meanwhile, a considerable body of Thebans

C H A P.
XV.

Daring
enterprise
of the Pla-
taeans.

C H A P. advanced towards Platæa, to co-operate with
XV. their countrymen. Their progress would have been hastened by a fugitive who met them, and related the miscarriage of the enterprise, had not the heavy rain so much swelled the Asopus, that an unusual time was spent in crossing that river. They had scarcely entered the Platæan territory, when a second messenger informed them, that their unfortunate companions were all killed or taken prisoners. Upon this intelligence they paused to consider, whether, instead of proceeding to the Platæan walls, where they could not perform any immediate service, they ought not, as an easier enterprise, to seize the citizens of that place, who were dispersed over their villages in the open country.

Their stratagem for destroying the Thebans, without danger to themselves.

But while they deliberated on this measure, a Platæan herald arrived, complaining of the unjust and most unexpected infraction of the peace, by a daring and atrocious conspiracy; commanding the Thebans immediately to leave the territory of Platæa, if they hoped to deliver their fellow-citizens from captivity; and denouncing, if they refused compliance, that their countrymen would inevitably be punished with a cruel death. This stratagem, not less audacious than artful, prevailed on the enemy to repass the Asopus, while the Platæans lost not a moment to assemble within their walls the scattered inhabitants of their fields and villas; and braving the Theban resentment, the immediate effects of which they had rendered impotent, massacred the unhappy prisoners, to the number of an

hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the chief promoter of the expedition. After this signal act of vengeance, they strengthened the works of the place; transported their wives and children to the tributary islands of Athens; and, that they might more securely sustain the expected siege, required and received from that republic a plentiful supply of provisions, and a considerable reinforcement of troops.

The sword was now drawn, and both parties seemed eager to exert their utmost strength. The Spartans summoned their confederates to the Isthmus; demanded money and ships from their Italian and Sicilian colonies; and solicited assistance from the Persian monarch Artaxerxes, and from Perdiccas king of Macedon; both of whom naturally regarded the Athenians as dangerous neighbours, and ambitious invaders of their coasts. The people of Athens also condescended to crave the aid of Barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalces, the warlike chief of the Odrysians, who formed the most powerful tribe in Upper Thrace. They required at the same time an immediate supply of cavalry from their Thesalian allies, while their fleet already cruised along the coast of Peloponnesus, to confirm the fidelity of the surrounding islands; an object deemed essential to the successful invasion of that territory. The unexperienced youth, extremely numerous in most republics of Greece, rejoiced at the prospect of war. The aged saw and dreaded the general commotion, darkly foretold, as they thought, by

C H A P.
XV.

Prepara-
tions for
war on
both sides.
A. C. 431.

C H A P. ancient oracles and prophecies, but clearly and
XV. recently announced, by an earthquake in the
 sacred, and hitherto immoveable island of Delos.
 Such was the ardor of preparation, that only a
 few weeks after the surprize of Plataea, the Lace-
 dæmonian confederates, to the number of sixty
 thousand, assembled from the north and south, at
 the Corinthian Isthmus. The several communities
 were respectively commanded by leaders of their
 own appointment; but the general conduct of
 the war was intrusted to Archidamus, the Spartan
 king.

Archida-
 mus ad-
 dresses the
 confede-
 rates.

In a council of the chiefs, that prince warmly
 approved their alacrity in taking the field, and
 extolled the greatness and bravery of an army, the
 most numerous and best provided that had ever
 followed the standard of any Grecian general. Yet
 their preparations, however extraordinary, were
 not greater than their enterprize required. They
 had waged war with a people not less powerful,
 than active and daring; who had discernment to
 perceive, and ability to improve, every opportunity
 of advantage; and whose resentment would be as
 much inflamed, as their pride would be wounded,
 by the approach of invasion and hostility. It seemed
 probable, that the Athenians would not allow their
 lands to be wasted, without attempting to defend
 them. The confederates, therefore, must be always
 on their guard; their discipline must be strict,
 regular, and uniform; to elude the skill, and to
 oppose the strength of Athens, demanded their
 utmost vigilance and activity.

Archidamus,

Archidamus, after leading his army into Attica, seems blamable in allowing their martial ardor to evaporate in the fruitless siege of Oenoë, the strongest Athenian town towards the southern frontier of Bœotia. This tedious and unsuccessful operation enabled the Athenians to complete, without interruption, the singular plan of defence so ably traced by the bold genius of Pericles. They hastened the desolation of their own fields; demolished their delightful gardens and villas, which it had been their pride to adorn; and transported, either to Athens or the isles, their valuable effects, their cattle, furniture, and even the frames of their houses. The numerous inhabitants of the country-towns, and villages, where the more opulent Athenians commonly spent the greater part of their time, flocked to the capital, which was well furnished with the means of subsistence, though not of accommodation, for such a promiscuous crowd of strangers, with their families, slaves, or servants. Many people of lower rank, destitute of private dwellings, were obliged to occupy the public halls, the groves and temples, the walls and battlements. Even persons of distinction were narrowly and meanly lodged; an inconvenience severely felt by men accustomed to live at large in the country, in rural ease and elegance. But resentment against the public enemy blunted the sense of personal hardship, and silenced the voice of private complaint.

Meanwhile, the confederate army, having raised the siege of Oenoë, advanced along the eastern

The confederates
ravage At-
tica.

C H A P.

XV.

Olymp.

lxxxvii. 2.

A. C. 431.

frontier of Attica; and, within eighty days after the surprise of Plataea, invaded the Thriasian plain, the richest ornament of the Athenian territory. Having wasted that valuable district with fire and sword, they proceeded to Eleusis, and from thence to Acharnæ, the largest borough in the province, and only eight miles distant from the capital. There they continued an unusual length of time, gradually demolishing the houses and plantations, and daily exercising every act of rapacious cruelty, with a view either to draw the enemy to a battle, or to discover whether they were unalterably determined to keep within their walls; a resolution, which, if clearly ascertained, would enable the invaders to proceed with more boldness and effect, and to carry on their ravages with security, even to the gates of Athens.

The Athenians re-
tort their
injuries.

The Athenians, hitherto intent on their naval preparations, had exerted an uncommon degree of patience and self-command. But their unruly passions could no longer be restrained, when they learned the proceedings in Acharnæ. The proprietors of that rich and extensive district boasted that they alone could send three thousand brave spearmen into the field, and lamented, that they should remain cooped up in dishonorable confinement, while their possessions fell a prey to an hostile invader. Their animated complaints inflamed the kindred ardor of the Athenian youth. It appeared unworthy of those, who had so often ravaged with impunity the territories of their neighbours, patiently to behold the desolation of their

own. Interested priests announced approaching calamity; seditious orators clamored against the timid councils of Pericles; the impetuous youth required their general to lead them to battle. Amidst this popular commotion, the accomplished general and statesman remained unmoved, bravely resisting the storm, or dexterously eluding its force. Though determined not to risk an engagement with the confederates, he seasonably employed the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry to beat up their quarters, to intercept their convoys, to harass, surprise, or cut off their advanced parties. While these enterprises tended to divert or appease the tumult, a fleet of an hundred and fifty sail ravaged the defenceless coast of Peloponnesus. A squadron, less numerous, made a descent on Locris. The rebellious inhabitants of Ægina were driven from their possessions, and an Athenian colony was settled in that island. The wretched fugitives, whose country had long rivalled Athens itself in wealth, commerce, and naval power, received the maritime district of Thyrea²⁶ from the bounty of their Spartan protectors.

Intelligence of these proceedings, and still more the scarcity of provisions, engaged the confederates to return to their respective republics. Having advanced by the eastern, they retired along the western, frontier of Attica; every place in their line

The confederates evacuate Attica.

²⁶ This district lay on the frontier of the Argive and Lacedæmonian territory, and was long an object of contention between these republics. See vol. i. p. 322, 323.

C H A P. of march experiencing the fatal effects of their
 XV. resentment or rapacity. Soon after their retreat, Pericles, towards the beginning of autumn, led out the Athenians to ravage the neighbouring and hostile province of Megara. The invading army was accidentally observed by the fleet, while it returned from the coast of Peloponnesus. The sailors hastened to share the danger and plunder. The whole Athenian force thus amounted to near twenty thousand men; a number far more than sufficient to deprive the industrious Megareans of the hope of a scanty harvest, earned with infinite toil and care, in their narrow unfruitful territory.

Pericles
 invades
 Megara.

The winter was not distinguished by any important expedition on either side. The Corinthians, long enured to the sea in all seasons, carried on indecisive hostilities against the Athenian allies in Acarnania. During this inactive portion of the year, the Athenians, as well as their enemies, were employed in celebrating the memory of the dead, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valor²⁷; in distributing the

²⁷ This mournful solemnity, as practised by the Athenians, is described by Thucydides, l. ii. p. 120, et seqq. The bones of the deceased were brought to a tabernacle previously erected for receiving them. On the day appointed for the funeral, they were conveyed from thence in cypress coffins, drawn on carriages, one for each tribe, to the public sepulchre in the Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city. The relations of the dead decked out the remains of their friends, as they judged most proper (See Lysias against Agoratus). One empty bier was drawn along in honor of those whose bodies had not been recovered. Persons of every age, and of either sex, citizens and strangers, attended this solemnity. When the bones were deposited in the earth, some citizen of dignity and merit, named

prizes of merit among the surviving warriors; in confirming their respective alliances; and in fortifying such places on their frontier as seemed most exposed to military excursions, or naval descents.

The return of summer brought back into Attica the Peloponnesian invaders; but it likewise introduced a far more dreadful calamity. A destructive pestilence, engendered in Æthiopia, infected Egypt, and spread over great part of the dominions of the king of Persia. History does not explain by what means this fatal disorder was communicated to Greece. The year had been in other respects remarkably healthful. As the disease first appeared in the Piræus, the principal Athenian harbour, we may be allowed to conjecture, that it was imported from the east, either by the Athenian merchantmen, or by the ships of war, which annually sailed to that quarter, in order to levy money on the tributary cities. When its miserable symptoms broke out in the Piræus, the inhabitants suspected that the enemy had poisoned their wells. But it soon extended over the adjoining districts, and raged

C H A P.
XV.

The
plague
breaks out
in Athens.
A. C. 430.

by the state, mounted a lofty pulpit, and pronounced the panegyric of the deceased, of their ancestors, and the Athenian republic. On this occasion, Pericles himself had been appointed to that solemn office. He performed it with great dignity. His speech, containing almost as many ideas as words, is incapable of abridgment; nor does its nature admit the insertion of it entire in the present history, in which eloquence is merely considered as an instrument of government, and such speeches only introduced as influenced public resolutions and measures. It is, however, worthy of observation, that his magnificent display of the advantages, the security, and the glory of Athens, forms a striking contrast with the unexpected calamities which soon overwhelmed his unhappy country.

C H A P. with peculiar violence in the populous streets
XV. which surrounded the citadel.

Descrip-
tion of that
malady.

The malady appeared under various forms, in different constitutions; but its specific symptoms were invariably the same. It began with a burning heat in the head; the eyes were red and inflamed; the tongue and mouth had the color of blood. The pain and inflammation descended to the breast with inexpressible anguish; the skin was covered with ulcers; the body of a livid red; the external heat not sensible to the touch, but the internal so violent, that the slightest covering could not be endured. An insatiable thirst was an universal symptom; and, when indulged, increased the disorder. When the bowels were attacked, the patient soon perished through debility. Some lived seven or nine days, and died of a fever, with apparent remains of strength. The life was saved, when the internal vigor diverted the course of the disease towards the extremities. Those who once recovered were never dangerously attacked a second time, from which they conceived a vain hope of proving thenceforth superior to every bodily infirmity. The disorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of spirits, often impaired the judgment, as well as the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed in vain to stop the progress of this fatal contagion. The miserable crowds expired in the temples, preferring unavailing prayers to the gods. A shocking spectacle was seen round the sacred fountains, where multitudes lay dead, or perished in agonizing

Its effects
on the
mind.

torture. At length all medical assistance was despised ²⁸, and all religious ceremonies neglected. Continually suffering or apprehending the most dreadful calamities, the Athenians became equally regardless of laws human and divine. The fleeting moment only was theirs. About the future they felt no concern, nor did they believe it of concern to the gods, since all alike perished, guilty or innocent. Decency no longer imposing respect, the only pursuit was that of present pleasure. To beings of an hour, the dread of punishment formed no restraint; to victims of misery, conscience presented no terrors. Athens thus exhibited at once whatever is most afflicting in wretchedness, and most miserable in vice, uniting to the rage of disease the more destructive fury of unbridled passions.

C H A P.
XV.
on morals

While the city fell a prey to these accumulated evils, the country was laid waste by an implacable enemy. On the present occasion, the confederates advanced beyond Athens; they destroyed the works of the miners on Mount Laurium; and, having

Devastation of Attica.
Olymp. lxxxvii. 3.
A. C. 430.

²⁸ The supposed decree of the Athenians in favor of Hippocrates, says, that his scholars showed the means both of preventing and curing the plague. *Τισι χρη θεραπεΐαις ασφαλως διαφευξασθαι τον λοιμον*; and again, *Οπως τε ιατρικη δοθειτα ασφαλως σωζει τας καμνοντας*. Hippocrates, p. 1290. This decree therefore, as well as the letters of Hippocrates, mentioning the plague at Athens, are unquestionably spurious. The malady is minutely described by Thucydides, l. ii. c. xlvii. by Lucretius, l. vi. ver. 1136, et seqq. Diodorus, l. xii. differs widely from them both, probably having copied from Ephorus and Theopompus. Hippocrates has several cases of the plague from Thasos, Abdera, etc. but not one from Athens. See Hippocrat. de Morbis Epidem.

C H A P. XV. ravaged all that southern district, as well as the coast opposite to Eubœa and Naxos, they traced a line of devastation along the Marathonian shore, the glorious scene of an immortal victory, obtained by the valor of Athens, in defence of those very states by which her own territories were now so cruelly desolated.

Magnanimity of Pericles.

If conscious wisdom and rectitude were not superior to every assault of fortune, the manly soul of Pericles must have sunk under the weight of such multiplied calamities. But his fortitude still supported him amidst the flood of public and domestic woe. With decent and magnanimous composure, he beheld the unhappy fate of his numerous and flourishing family, successively snatched away by the rapacious pestilence. At the funeral of the last of his sons, he dropped, indeed, a few reluctant tears of paternal tenderness. But, ashamed of this momentary weakness, he bent his undejected mind to the defence of the republic. Having collected an hundred Athenian, together with fifty Chian or Lesbian vessels, he sailed through the Saronic gulph, and ravaged the unprotected coasts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. While this armament weighed anchor in the Piræus, there happened an eclipse of the sun ²⁹, which terrified the superstitious mariners, whose minds were already clouded by calamity. The pilot of the admiral galley betrayed the most unmanly cowardice, when

²⁹ Plutarch. in Pericle. But as Thucydides mentions no such eclipse that summer, although extremely attentive in recording such phenomena, I would not warrant the chronology of Plutarch.

Pericles, throwing a cloak before his eyes, asked, “whether the obscurity surpris’d him?” the pilot answering him in the negative, “Neither,” rejoined Pericles, “ought an eclipse of the sun, occasioned by the intervention of a revolving planet, which intercepts its light.”

C H A P.
XV.

Having arrived on the Argolic coast, the Athenians laid siege to the sacred city Epidaurus, whose inhabitants gloried in the peculiar favor of Æsculapius. The plague again breaking out in the fleet, was naturally ascribed to the vengeance of that offended divinity. They rais’d the siege of Epidaurus; nor were their operations more successful against Trœzené, Hermioné, and other Peloponnesian cities. They took only the small fortress of Prasîæ, a sea-port of Laconia; after which they returned to the Piræus, afflicted with the pestilence, and without having performed any thing that corresponded to the greatness of the armament, or the public expectation.

His unfor-
tunate ex-
pedition to
the Pelo-
ponnesus.
Olymp.
lxxxvii. 3.
A. C. 430.

The Athenian expedition into Thrace was still more unfortunate. Into that country Agnon conducted a body of four thousand men, to co-operate with Phormio in the siege of Potidæa. But in the space of forty days, he lost one thousand and fifty men in the plague; and the only consequence of his expedition was, to infect the northern army with that melancholy disorder.

Athenians
equally
unfortu-
nate in
Thrace.

These multiplied disasters reduced the Athenians to despair. Their sufferings exceeded example and belief, while they were deprived of the only expected consolation, the pleasure of revenge. The

Pericles
traded.

C H A P. XV. bulk of the people desired peace on any terms. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but not admitted to an audience. The orators clamored, and traduced Pericles. The undiscerning populace ascribed their misfortunes to the unhappy effect of his councils; but his magnanimity did not yet forsake him, and, for the last time, he addressed the assembly: “Your anger, Athenians! occasions no surprise, because it comes not unexpected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the miserable. Yet as you mistake both the cause and the measure of your present calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, and, if not speedily corrected, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often had occasion to explain: it is just that you, who have protected and saved, should govern Greece; it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, not your honor only, but your safety, depends. The sovereignty of Greece cannot, like an empty pageant of grandeur, be taken up with indifference, or without danger laid down. That well-earned dominion, which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically, must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit, without resource, to the resentment of your injured allies, and the animosity of your inveterate enemies. The hardships, to which you were exposed from the latter, I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence, that sudden and improbable disaster, it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture; yet great

The magnanimous firmness of his last advice to the Athenians.

and unexpected as our calamities have been, and continue, they are still accidental and transitory, while the advantages of this necessary war are permanent, and its glory will be immortal. The greatness of that empire which we strive to uphold, extends beyond the territories of our most distant allies. Of the two elements, destined for the use of men, the sea and the land, we absolutely command the one, nor is there any kingdom, or republic, or confederacy, that pretends to dispute our dominion. Let this consideration elevate our hopes; and personal afflictions will disappear at the view of public prosperity. Let us bear, with resignation, the strokes of providence; and we shall repel, with vigor, the assaults of our enemies. It is the hereditary and glorious distinction of our republic, never to yield to adversity. We have defied danger, expended treasure and blood; and, amidst obstinate and formidable wars, augmented the power, and extended the fame, of a city unrivalled in wealth, populousness, and splendor, and governed by laws and institutions worthy its magnificence and renown. If Athens must perish, (as what human grandeur is not subject to decay?) let her never fall, at least, through *our* pusillanimity; a fall that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and destroy at once that edifice of glory which it has been the work of ages to rear. When our walls and harbours are no more; when the terror of our navy shall have ceased, and our external magnificence fallen to decay, the glory of Athens shall remain. This is the prize which

C H A P. I have hitherto exhorted, and still exhort you to
 XV. defend, regardless of the clamors of sloth, the
 suspicions of cowardice, or the persecution of envy."

Death and
 character
 of Peri-
 cles.
 Olymp.
 lxxxvii. 4.
 A. C. 429.

Such were the sentiments of Pericles, who, on this occasion, declared to his assembled countrymen, with the freedom of conscious merit, that he felt himself inferior to none in wisdom to discover, and abilities to explain and promote, the measures most honorable and useful; that he was a sincere and ardent lover of the republic, unbiassed by the dictates of selfishness, unseduced by the allurements of partiality, and superior to the temptations of avarice. The anger of the Athenians evaporated in imposing on him a small fine, and soon after they re-elected him general. The integrity and manly firmness of his mind restored the fainting courage of the republic. They rescued the dignity of Pericles from the rage of popular frenzy; but they could not defend his life against the infectious malignity of the pestilence. He died two years and six months after the commencement of the war. The character which he draws of himself is confirmed by the impartial voice of history, which adds a few circumstances fitted to confirm the texture of a virtuous and lasting fame. During the first invasion of the Peloponnesians, he declared that he would convey his extensive and valuable estate to the public, if it should be excepted from the general devastation, by the policy or the gratitude of Archidamus, his hereditary guest and friend³⁰. Yet this generous patriot lived

³⁰ Thucyd. p. 108.

with the most exemplary œconomy in his personal and domestic expense. His death-bed was surrounded by his numerous admirers, who dwelt with complacency on the illustrious exploits of his glorious life. While they recounted the wisdom of his government, and enumerated the long series of his victories by sea and land, "You forget," said the dying statesman and sage, "you forget the only valuable part of my character: none of my fellow-citizens was ever compelled, through any action of mine, to assume a mourning robe³¹." He expired, teaching an invaluable lesson to human kind, that in the last important hour, when all other objects disappear, or lose their value, the recollection of an innocent life is still present to the mind, and still affords consolation more valuable than Pericles could derive from his nine trophies erected over the enemies of his country, from his long and prosperous administration of forty years, the depth of his political wisdom, the perfection of his military and naval skill, and the immortal fame of his unrivalled eloquence.

³¹ Plut. in Pericl.

C H A P. XVI.

Subsequent Events of the War. — Plataea taken. — Revolt of Lesbos. — Description and History of that Island. — Nature of its political Connexion with Athens. — Address of Lesbos. — Its Capital besieged by the Athenians. — Measures of the Peloponnesians for relieving it. — Mitylené surrenders. — Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Prisoners. — Resettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos. — The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra. — Sedition in that Island. — The contending Factions respectively supported by the Athenians and Peloponnesians — Progress, Termination, and Consequences of the Sedition.

C H A P.

XVI.

Events of
the four
following
years of
the war.

Olymp.

lxxxvii. 4.

A. C. 429.

—425.

THE dignity and vigor of the republic seemed to perish with Pericles, and several years elapsed scarcely distinguished by any event that tended to vary the uniformity, much less to decide the fortune of the war. While the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, the Athenian fleet annually ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. In vain the inhabitants of that country, little accustomed to the sea, collected ships, and used their utmost endeavours to contend with the experienced skill of the Athenian mariners. They were always defeated, and often by an inferior force; one proof among many, that naval superiority is slowly acquired

and slowly lost. Neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians derived any effectual assistance from their respective alliances with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The former, reinforced by many independent tribes of Thrace, who were allured to his standard by the hopes of plunder, poured down an hundred and fifty thousand men on the Macedonian coast. But a hasty agreement between the two kings dissipated that numerous and defultory band with the same rapidity with which it had been collected¹.

One benefit, indeed, the Athenians received from Sitalces, if that can be reckoned a benefit, which enabled them to commit an action of atrocious cruelty: he put into their hands Aristæus, the Corinthian, a bold and determined enemy of their republic; and actually travelling through Thrace into Persia, to solicit money from Artaxerxes to support the war against them. Both Aristæus and his colleagues in the embassy suffered a painful and ignominious death.

The success of the adverse parties was equally balanced in the sieges of Potidæa and Plataea. The former, having surrendered on capitulation, was occupied by new inhabitants. The expelled citizens retired to Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, where they strengthened and exasperated the foes of Athens. Plataea also capitulated, after a long and spirited resistance during five years. Notwithstanding the warm and affecting remon-

Taking of
Potidæa:
Olymp.
lxxxvii. 4.
A. C. 429.

Of Plataea.
Olymp.
lxxxviii. 2.
A. C. 427.

¹ Thucyd. p. 167—170.

CHAP. strances of the citizens who had acted such an
 XVI. illustrious part in the Persian war, when the The-
 bans behaved most disgracefully, the capitulation
 was shamefully violated by the Spartans, who sa-
 crificed to the resentment of Thebes, the eternal
 enemy of Plataea, two hundred brave men, whose
 courage and fidelity merited a better fate. But
 the youth of Plataea still flourished in the bosom
 of Athens, and were destined, in a future age, to
 reassume the dignity of independent government,
 which always formed the highest ambition of their
 small but magnanimous community.

Revolt of
 Lesbos.

Among the transactions of this otherwise unim-
 portant period, happened the revolt of Lesbos,
 and the sedition of Corcyra. Both events deeply
 affected the interest of Athens; and the former is
 distinguished by such circumstances as serve to
 explain the political condition of the times, while
 the latter exhibits a striking but gloomy picture of
 Grecian manners.

Descrip-
 tion and
 history of
 that island.

The island of Lesbos, extending above an hun-
 dred and fifty miles in circumference, is the largest,
 except Eubœa, in the Ægean sea. Originally
 planted by Eolians, Lesbos was the mother of
 many Eolic colonies. They were established on
 the opposite continent, and separated from their
 metropolis by a strait of seven miles, which ex-
 pands itself into the gulf of Thebe, and is beauti-
 fully diversified by the Hecatonnesian and Argi-
 nussian isles, of old sacred to Apollo. The happy
 temperature of the climate of Lesbos conspired
 with the rich fertility of the soil to produce those
 delicious

delicious fruits, and those exquisite wines, which are still acknowledged by modern travellers to deserve the encomiums so liberally bestowed on them by ancient writers ². The convenience of its harbours furnished another source of wealth and advantage to this delightful island, which, as early as the age of Homer, was reckoned populous and powerful, and, like the rest of Greece at that time, governed by the moderate jurisdiction of hereditary princes. The abuse of royal power occasioned the dissolution of monarchy in Lesbos, as well as in the neighbouring isles. The rival cities of Mitylené and Methymna contended for republican pre-eminence. The former prevailed; and having reduced Methymna, as well as six cities of inferior note, began to extend its dominion beyond the narrow bounds of the island, and conquered a considerable part of Troas. Meanwhile the internal government of Mitylené was often disturbed by sedition, and sometimes usurped by tyrants. The wise Pittacus, contemporary and rival of Solon, endeavoured to remedy these evils by giving his countrymen a body of laws, comprised in six hundred verses, which adjusted their political rights, and regulated their behaviour and manners. The Lesbians afterwards underwent those general revolutions, to which both the islands and the continent of Asia Minor were exposed from the Lydian and Persian power. Delivered from the yoke of Persia

² Mons. de Guys, Tournefort, etc. agree with Horace (*passim*) and Strabo, l. xiii. p. 584—657. from which the following particulars, in the text, concerning Lesbos, are extracted.

C H A P. by the successful valor of Athens and Sparta,
XVI. the Lesbians, as well as all the Greek settlements around them, spurned the tyrannical authority of Sparta and Pausanias, and ranged themselves under the honorable colors of Athens, which they thenceforth continued to respect in peace, and to follow in war.

Nature of
 its politi-
 cal con-
 nexion
 with
 Athens.

In the exercise of power the Athenians displayed principles totally different from those by which they had attained it. The confederacy between Athens and Lesbos was still supported, however, by mutual fear rather than by reciprocal affection. During peace, the Lesbians dreaded the navy of Athens; the Athenians feared to lose the assistance of Lesbos in war. Besides this, the Athenians were of the Ionic, the Lesbians of the Eolic, race; and the latter justly regretted that the allies of Athens should be successively reduced to the condition of subjects. They perceived the artful policy of that republic in allowing the Chians and Lesbians alone to retain the semblance of liberty. While the Chians and Lesbians, still free in appearance, assisted in subduing the other confederates of Athens, that ambitious republic was always furnished with a plausible justification of her general oppression and tyranny; since it was natural to imagine that men, left to the unrestrained liberty of choice, should, in matters indifferent to themselves, prefer the cause of justice to that of usurpation. But even the apparent freedom which the Lesbians enjoyed had become extremely precarious. They felt themselves under the disagreeable necessity to

footh, to bribe, and to flatter the Athenian demagogues, and in all their transactions with that imperious people, to testify the most mortifying deference and submission. Notwithstanding their watchful attention never designedly to offend, they were continually endangered by the quarrelsome humor of a capricious multitude, and had reason to dread, lest, in consequence of some unexpected gust of passion, they should be compelled to demolish their walls, and to surrender their shipping, the punishments already inflicted on such of the neighbouring islands as had incurred the displeasure of Athens.

This uneasy situation naturally disposed the Lesbians, amidst the calamities of the second Peloponnesian invasion, heightened by the plague at Athens, to watch an opportunity to revolt. The following year was employed in assembling the scattered inhabitants of the island within the walls of Mitylené, in strengthening these walls, in fortifying their harbours, in augmenting their fleet, and in collecting troops and provisions from the fertile shores of the Euxine sea. But in the fourth year of the war, their design, yet unripe for execution, was made known to the Athenians by the inhabitants of Tenedos, the neighbours and enemies of Lesbos, as well as by the citizens of Methymna, the ancient rival of Mitylené, and by several malecontents in the Lesbian capital. Notwithstanding the concurrence of such powerful testimonies, the Athenian magistrates affected to disbelieve intelligence which their distressed circumstances rendered

Measures
of the Lesbians pre-
vious to
their re-
volt.

Olymp.
lxxxviii. 1.
A. C. 428.

C H A P. XVI. peculiarly alarming. The Lesbians, it was said, could never think of forsaking the alliance of a country, which had always treated them with such distinguished favor, how powerfully soever they might be urged to that measure by the Thebans, their Eolian brethren, and the Spartans, their ancient confederates. Ambassadors, however, were sent to Lesbos, desiring an explanation of rumors so dishonorable to the fidelity and gratitude of the island.

Activity of
Athens.

The ambassadors having confirmed the report, Athens equipped a fleet of forty sail, intending to attack the enemy by surprise, while they celebrated, with universal consent, the anniversary festival of Apollo, on the promontory of Malea. But this design was rendered abortive by the diligence of a Mitylenian traveller, who, passing from Athens to Eubœa, proceeded southward to Geraiatos, and, embarking in a merchant-vessel, reached Lesbos in less than three days from the time that he undertook this important service. His seasonable advice not only prevented the Mitylenians from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear, at the arrival of the enemy, in a tolerable posture of defence. This state of preparation enabled them to obtain from Cleippidas, the Athenian admiral, a suspension of hostilities, until they dispatched an embassy to Athens, to remove, as they pretended, the groundless resentment of the people, and to give ample satisfaction to the magistrates.

Address of
Lesbos.

On the part of the Lesbians, this transaction was nothing more than a contrivance to gain time.

They expected no favor or forgiveness from the Athenian assembly; and while this illusive negotiation was carrying on at Athens, other ambassadors went secretly to Sparta, requesting that the Lesbians might be admitted into the Peloponnesian confederacy, and thus entitled to the protection of that powerful league. The Spartans referred them to the general assembly, which was to be soon held at Olympia, to solemnize the most splendid of all the Grecian festivals. After the games were ended, and the Athenians, who little expected that such matters were in agitation, had returned home, the Lesbian ambassadors were favorably heard in a general convention of the Peloponnesian representatives or deputies, from whom they received assurance of immediate and effectual assistance.

This promise, however, was not punctually performed. The eyes of the Athenians were at length opened; and while the Peloponnesians prepared or deliberated, their more active enemies had already taken the field. Various skirmishes, in which the islanders showed little vigor in their own defence, engaged the neighbouring states of Lemnos and Imbros to send, on the first summons, considerable supplies of troops to their Athenian confederates; but as the combined forces were still insufficient completely to invest Mitylené, a powerful reinforcement was sent from Athens; and before the beginning of winter, the place was blocked up by land, while an Athenian fleet occupied the harbour.

The unfavorable season, and still more, that dilatoriness which so often obstructed the measures

C H A P.

XVI.

Olymp.

lxxxviii. 1.

A. C. 428.

Mitylené
besieged.

Measures
of the
Pelopon-

C H A P.

XVI.

Peloponnesians for
relieving
it.

of the confederates, prevented timely aid from arriving at Mitylené. But in order to make a diversion in favor of their new allies, the Peloponnesians assembled a considerable armament at the isthmus, intending to convey their ships over land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might thus infest the Athenian shores with their fleet, while the army carried on its usual ravages in the central parts of Attica. The activity of the Athenians defeated this design. Notwithstanding their numerous squadrons on the coasts of Peloponnesus, Thrace, and Lesbos, they immediately fitted out an hundred sail to defend their own shores. The Peloponnesian sailors, who had been hastily collected from the maritime towns, soon became disgusted with an expedition, attended with unforeseen difficulties; and, as autumn advanced, the militia from the inland country grew impatient to return to their fields and vineyards. During winter, the Mitylenians were still disappointed in their hope of relief. They were encouraged, however, to persevere in resistance, by the arrival of Salæthus, a Spartan general of considerable merit, who having landed in an obscure harbour of the island, travelled by land towards Mitylené; and, during the obscurity of night, passed the Athenian wall of circumvallation, by favor of a breach made by a torrent. Salæthus gave the besieged fresh assurances that a powerful fleet would be sent to their assistance early in the spring; and that, at the same time, the Athenians should be harassed

by an invasion more terrible and destructive than any which they had yet experienced.

The latter part of the promise was indeed performed. The Peloponnesians invaded Attica. Whatever had been spared in former incursions, now fell a prey to their fury. But after the spring was considerably advanced, the long-expected fleet was looked for in vain. The same procrastination and difficulties still retarded the preparations of the confederates; and when at length forty sail were collected, the command was bestowed on the Spartan Alcidas, a man totally devoid of that spirit and judgment essential to the character of a naval commander. Instead of sailing directly to the relief of Mitylené, he wasted much precious time in pursuing the Athenian merchantmen, in harassing the unfortified islands, and in alarming the defenceless and unwarlike inhabitants of Ionia, who could scarcely recover from their astonishment, at seeing a Peloponnesian fleet in those seas. Many trading vessels, that sailed between the numerous islands and harbours on that extensive coast, fell into the hands of Alcidas; for when they descried his squadron, they attempted not to avoid it; many fearlessly approached it, as certainly Athenian. In consequence of this imprudence, Alcidas took a great number of prisoners, whom he butchered in cold blood at Myonesus.

This barbarity only disgraced himself, and injured the Spartan cause in Asia, many cities of which were previously ripe for revolt. Before he attempted to accomplish the main object

C H A P.

XVI.

Imprudent
conduct
of Alcidas.

Olymp.

lxxxviii. 2.

A. C. 427.

Mitylené
surrenders.

Olymp.

lxxxviii. 2.

A. C. 427.

CHAP. of his expedition, the opportunity was for ever
 XVI. lost by the surrender of Mitylené. Despair of assistance, and scarcity of provisions, had obliged Salæthus, who began himself by this time to suspect that the Peloponnesians had laid aside all thoughts of succouring the place, to arm³ the populace, in order to make a vigorous assault on the Athenian lines. But the lower ranks of men, who in Lesbos, as well as in all the Grecian isles, naturally favored the cause of Athens, the avowed patron of democracy, no sooner received their armor, than they refused obeying their superiors, and threatened, that unless the corn were speedily brought to the market-place, and equally divided among all the citizens, they would instantly submit to the besiegers. The aristocratical party prudently yielded to the torrent of popular fury, which they had not strength to resist; and justly apprehensive, lest a more obstinate defence might totally exclude them from the benefit of capitulation, they surrendered to Paches, the Athenian commander, on condition that none of the prisoners should be enslaved or put to death, until their agents, who were immediately sent to implore the clemency of Athens, should return with the sentence of that republic.

Terror of
 the Lesbian
 captives.

The terms were accepted and ratified; but such were the furious resentments which prevailed in that age, such the dark suspicions, and such the

³ He gave the populace, who were before light armed, heavy armor. Thucyd. p. 188. English cannot imitate his expression: ὅπλιζαι τον δημον προτερον ψιλον οντα.

total disregard to all laws of justice and humanity, that the Athenian army had no sooner taken possession of the place, than the chief authors and abettors of the revolt, judging it imprudent to trust their safety to the faith of treaties, and the sanctity of oaths, flew for protection to their temples and altars. This unseasonable diffidence (for Paches appears to have united uncommon humanity with a daring spirit, and great military abilities) discovered conscious guilt, and enabled the Athenians to distinguish between their friends and enemies. The latter were protected by Paches, and prevailed on to withdraw from their sanctuaries. He afterwards sent them to the isle of Tenedos, until their fate, as well as that of their fellow-citizens, should be finally determined by the Athenian republic.

Immediately after the arrival of the Mitylenian ambassadors, the people of Athens had assembled to deliberate on this important subject. Agitated by the giddy transports of triumph over the rebellious ingratitude and perfidy of a people, who, though distinguished by peculiar favors, had abandoned and betrayed their protectors in the season of danger, the Athenians doomed to death all the Mitylenian citizens, and condemned the women and children to perpetual servitude. In one day the bill was proposed, the decree passed, and the same evening a galley was dispatched to Paches, conveying this cruel and bloody resolution. But the night left room for reflection; and the feelings of humanity were awakened by the stings of remorse. In the morning, having assembled,

C H A P.
XVI.

They are
doomed to
death by
an Athe-
nian de-
cree.

C H A P. as usual, in the public square, men were surprised and pleased to find the sentiments of their neighbours exactly corresponding with their own. **XVI.** Their dejected countenances met each other; they lamented, with one accord, the rashness and ferocity of their passion, and bewailed the unhappy fate of Mitylené, the destined object of their misguided frenzy. The Mitylenian ambassadors availed themselves of this sudden change of sentiment; a new assembly was convened, and the question submitted to a second deliberation.

Character
of Cleon.

A turbulent impetuous eloquence had raised the audacious profligacy of Cleon, from the lowest rank of life, to a high degree of authority in the Athenian assembly. The multitude were deceived by his artifices, and pleased with his frontless impudence, which they called boldness, and manly openness of character. His manners they approved in proportion as they resembled their own; and the worst of his vices found advocates among the dupes of his pretended patriotism. This violent demagogue, whose arrogant⁴ presumption so unworthily succeeded the enlightened magnanimity of Pericles, had, in the former assembly, proposed and carried the sanguinary decree against Mitylené. He still persevered in supporting that atrocious measure, and upbraided the weak and wavering

⁴ The character of Cleon, sketched in miniature by Thucydides, pp. 193 and 266. is painted at full length by Aristophanes, in his comedy of the *Ἰππείης*, "The Horsemen." Yet we could not safely trust the description of the angry satirist, who bore a personal grudge to Cleon, unless the principal strokes were justified by the impartial narrative of Thucydides.

counfels of his countrymen, liable to be shaken by every gult of paffion, and totally incapable of that ftability effential in the management of great affairs, and particularly indifpenfable in the government of diftant dependences.

“ Such a temper of mind (he had often ventured to declare, and would repeat the fame difagreeable truth as often as their folly obliged him) was alike unworthy, and incapable, of command. That a democracy was unfit for fovereign rule, paff experience convinced him, and the prefent inftance now confirmed his opinion. The empire of Athens could not be maintained without an undivided attachment, an unalterable adherence, to the intereft and honor of the republic. But the mafters of Greece were the flaves of their own capricious paffions; excited at will by the perfidious voice of venal fpeakers, bribed to betray them. Lulled to a fatal repofe by the foftnefs of melodious words, they forgot the dignity of the ftate, and reftained their perfonal refentment againft multiplied and unprovoked injuries. What was ftill more dangerous, they invited, by an ill-judged lenity, the imitation and continuance of fuch crimes as muft terminate in public difgrace and inevitable ruin. What elfe can be expected from pardoning the aggravated guilt of Mitylené? Encouraged by this weaknefs, muft not the neighbouring cities and iflands, whole refources form the principal vigor of the republic, greedily feize the firft opportunity of fhaking off the yoke, which they have long reluctantly borne; and follow the example of a revolt, which, without

C H A P.
XVI.

Cleon en-
forces that
decree.

C H A P.

XVI.

Deodatus
opposes it
with equal
address
and spirit.

presenting them with the fear of danger, promised them the hope of deliverance? ”

This sanguinary speech was answered by Deodatus, a man endowed with an amiable moderation of character, joined to a profound knowledge of government, and a deep insight into human nature. In the former assembly, this respectable orator had ventured, almost single and alone, to plead the cause of the Mitylenians, and to assert the rights of humanity. He observed, “that assemblies were liable to be misled by the fury of resentment, as well as by the weakness of compassion; and that errors of the former kind were often attended by consequences not less destructive, and always followed by a far more bitter repentance. Against vague slanders and calumny no man is secure; but a true patriot must learn to despise such unmanly reproaches. Undaunted by opposition, he will offer good counsel, to which there are no greater enemies than haste and anger. For my part, I stand up neither to defend the Mitylenians, nor to waste time in fruitless accusations. They have injured us most outrageously, yet I would not advise you to butcher them, unless *that* can be proved expedient; neither were they objects of forgiveness, would I advise you to pardon them⁵, unless that were conducive to the public interest, the only point on which our present deliberation turns. Guided by vulgar prejudices, Cleon has

⁵ This is speaking like an orator. It will appear in the sequel, that Deodatus by no means considered the innocence or guilt of the Mitylenians as things indifferent.

loudly asserted, that the destruction of the Mitylenians is necessary to deter neighbouring cities from rebellion. But distant subjects must be kept in obedience by the mildness of discretionary caution, not by the rigor of sanguinary examples. What people were ever so mad as to revolt, without expecting, either through their domestic strength, or the assistance of foreign powers, to make good their pretensions? Men who have known liberty, how sweet it is, ought not to be punished too severely for aspiring at that inestimable enjoyment. But their growing disaffection must be watched with care, and anticipated by diligence; they must be prevented from taking the first steps towards emancipation; and taught, if possible, to regard it as a thing altogether unattainable.

“ Yet such is the nature of man, considered either individually or collectively, that a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Of all crimes that any reasonable creature can commit, Desire is the forerunner, and Hope the attendant. These invisible principles within, are too powerful for all external terrors; nor has the increasing severity of laws rendered crimes less frequent in latter times, than during the mildness of the heroic ages, when few punishments were capital. While human nature remains the same, weakness will be distrustful, necessity will be daring, poverty will excite injustice, power will urge to rapacity, misery will sink into meanness, and prosperity swell into presumption. There are other

C H A P. contingencies, which stir up the mutiny of pas-
 XVI. sions, too stubborn for control. The authority
 of government can neither change the combina-
 tion of events, nor interrupt the occasions of for-
 tune. Impelled by such causes, the selfish desires
 of men will hurry them into wickedness and vice,
 whatever penalties await them. The imagination
 becomes familiar with one degree of punishment,
 as well as with another; and, in every degree,
 hope renders it alike ineffectual and impotent;
 since neither individuals nor communities would
 be guilty of injustice, if they believed that it must
 infallibly subject them to punishment, small or great.
 When individuals commit crimes, they always
 expect to elude the vengeance of law. When
 communities rebel, they expect to render their re-
 volt not the occasion of triumph to their enemies,
 but the means of their own deliverance and
 security.

“The severe punishment of Mitylené cannot,
 therefore, produce the good consequences with
 which Gleon has flattered you. But this cruel
 measure will be attended with irreparable prejudice
 to your interest. It will estrange the affections of
 your allies; provoke the resentment of Greece;
 excite the indignation of mankind; and, instead
 of preventing rebellion, render it more frequent
 and more dangerous. When all hopes of success
 have vanished, your rebellious subjects will never
 be persuaded to return to their duty. They will
 seek death in the field rather than await it from
 the hand of the executioner. Though reduced

to the last extremity, they will spurn submission, and gathering courage from despair, either repel your assaults, or fall an useless prey, weak and exhausted, incapable of indemnifying you for the expense of the war, or of raising those subsidies and contributions, which rendered their subjugation a reasonable object either of interest or ambition.

“ The revolt of Mitylené was the work of an aristocratical faction, fomented by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. The great body of the people were no sooner provided with arms, than they discovered their affection for Athens. It would be most cruel and most ungrateful, to confound the innocent with the guilty, to involve friends and foes in undistinguished ruin. Yet this odious measure would show more weakness than cruelty, more folly than injustice. What advantage could the enemies of Athens more earnestly desire? What boon could the aristocratical factions, so profusely scattered over Greece, more anxiously request from Heaven? Furnished with your sanguinary decree against Mitylené, they might for ever alienate from the republic the affections of her subjects and confederates; for having once seduced them to revolt, they might unanswerably convince them, that safety could only be purchased by persevering in rebellion, and that to return to duty was to submit to death. ”

The moderation and good sense of Deodatus (such was the influence of Cleon) were approved only by a small majority of voices. Yet it remained uncertain, whether this late and reluctant

His opinion prevails.

C H A P. XVI. repentance would avail the Mitylenians, who, before any advice of it arrived, might be condemned and executed in consequence of the former decree. A galley was instantly furnished with every thing that might promote expedition. The Mitylenian deputies promised invaluable rewards to the rowers. But the fate of a numerous, and lately flourishing community, still depended on the uncertainty of winds and currents. The first advice-boat had failed, as the messenger of bad news, with a slow and melancholy progress. The second advanced with the rapid movement of joy. Not an adverse blast opposed her course. The necessity of food and sleep never restrained a moment the labor of the oar: And her diligence was rewarded by reaching Lesbos in time to check the cruel hand of the executioner.

Narrow
escape of
the Mity-
lenians.

The bloody sentence had been just read, even the orders had been issued for its execution, when the critical arrival of the Athenian galley converted the lamentable outcries, or gloomy despair of a whole republic, into expressions of admiration and gratitude.

Resettle-
ment of
affairs in
Lesbos.
Olymp.
lxxxviii. 2.
A. C. 427.

The punishment, however, of Mitylené was still sufficiently severe, even according to the rigorous maxims of Grecian policy. The prisoners, who had been sent to Tenedos, were transported to Athens. They exceeded a thousand in number, and were indiscriminately condemned to death. Salæthus, the Spartan general, shared the same fate, after descending to many mean contrivances to save his life. The walls of Mitylené were

were demolished, its shipping was sent to Athens, and its territory divided into three thousand portions, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods, and the rest distributed by lot among the people of Athens. The Lesbians were still allowed to cultivate, as tenants, their own fields, paying for each share an annual-rent of about six pounds nine shillings sterling ⁶.

Merit and
persecu-
tion of
Paches.

The activity and judgment of Paches thus effected an important conquest to his country. Though the affairs of Lesbos might have required his undivided attention, he no sooner was apprized of the appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet, than he immediately put to sea, protected the allies of Athens, and chased the enemy from those shores. During the whole time of his command, he behaved with firmness tempered by humanity. But, at his return to Athens, he met with the usual reward of superior merit. He was accused of misconduct; and finding sentence ready to be pronounced against him, his indignation rose so high, that he slew himself in court ⁷.

Instructions
of the Co-
mmis-
sioners
with the
Comman-
dants

The Spartan admiral, Alcidas, met, on the other hand, with a reception (such is the blindness of popular prejudice!) far better than his behaviour deserved. The Peloponnesian fleet of forty sail, imprudently intrusted to his command, retired ingloriously, after a most expensive and fruitless expedition, to the protection of their friendly harbours. A northerly wind, however, drove them

Opera-
tions of
the Spar-
tan fleet.

⁶ Thucyd. p. 173 — 206. ⁷ Plutarch. in Nicias, et in Aristid.

CHAP. on the shores of Crete; from whence they drop-
 XVI. ped in successively to the port of Cyllené, which
 had recovered the disaster inflicted on it by the
 Corcyreans at the beginning of the war, and be-
 come the ordinary rendezvous of the Peloponne-
 sian fleet. In this place, Alcidas found thirteen
 galleys, commanded by Brasidas, a Spartan of
 distinguished valor and abilities, purposely chosen
 to assist the admiral with his counsels. This small
 squadron had orders to join the principal armament;
 with which the confederates, as their design had
 miscarried at Lesbos, purposed to undertake an
 expedition to Corcyra, then agitated by the tu-
 mult of a most dangerous sedition.

Intrigues
 of the Co-
 rinthians
 with the
 Corcyrean
 prisoners,

Among the hostilities already related between
 the republics of Corinth and Corcyra, we described
 the enterprises by which the Corinthians took above
 twelve hundred Corcyrean prisoners. Many of
 these persons were descended from the first families
 in the islands; a circumstance on which the policy
 of Corinth founded an extensive plan of artifice
 and ambition. The Corcyreans, instead of feel-
 ing the rigors of captivity, or experiencing the
 stern severity of republican resentment, were treat-
 ed with the liberal and endearing kindness of Gre-
 cian hospitality. Having acquired their confidence
 by good offices, the Corinthians insinuated to them,
 in the unguarded hours of convivial merriment,
 the danger as well as the disgrace of their connec-
 tion with Athens, the universal tyrant of her al-
 lies; and represented their shameful ingratitude in
 deserting Corinth, to which the colony of Corcyra

owed not only its early happiness and prosperity, but its original establishment and existence. These arguments, seasonably repeated, and urged with much address, at length proved effectual. The Corcyreans recovered their freedom, and returned to their native country; and, while they pretended to be collecting the sum of eight hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling) to pay their ransom, they left nothing untied to detach Corcyra from the Athenian interest.

Their first expedient for accomplishing this purpose was, to traduce the popular leaders, who were the most steadfast partisans of that republic. Accusations, impeachments, all the artifices and chicane of legal persecution, were directed and played off against them. The demagogues, who were not of a temper to brook such injuries, retorted on their antagonists with equal ingenuity, and far superior success. Peithias, the most distinguished advocate of the Athenian or democratic party, accused five ringleaders of the opposite faction of having destroyed the fence which enclosed the grove of Jupiter; a trespass estimated by the Corcyrean law at a severe pecuniary punishment⁸. In vain the persons accused denied the charge; in vain, after conviction before the senate, they fled as supplicants to the altars. They could obtain no mitigation of the amercement. The

excite dangerous
factions in
Corcyra.

⁸ The fine was, for every pale a stater (one pound and nine pence sterling). Such causes were frequent in other parts of Greece, as we learn from the oration of Lysias in defence of a citizen accused of cutting down a consecrated olive. See the translation of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 377.

C. II A. P. XVI. demagogue was inflexible; and his influence with his colleagues in the senate, of which he happened that year to be a member, determined them to execute the law in its utmost rigor.

Assassina-
tion of the
dema-
gogues.

Exasperated by this severity, and not doubting that during the administration of the present senate, many similar prosecutions would be raised against them, the aristocratical party entered into a conspiracy for defending themselves and their country against the oppressive injustice of Athens and Athenian partisans. On this emergency they acted like men who knew the danger of delay. Having fortified their cause with a sufficient number of adherents, they armed themselves with concealed daggers, suddenly rushed into the senate-house, and assassinated Peithias, with sixty of his friends. This boldness struck their opponents with terror. Such persons as felt themselves most obnoxious to the conspirators, immediately fled to the harbour, embarked, and sailed to Athens.

Sedition in
Corcyra.
Olymp.
Ixxxviii. 2.
A. C. 427.

The people of Corcyra, thus deprived of their leaders by an event equally unexpected and atrocious, were seized with such astonishment as suspended their power of action. Before they had sufficiently recovered themselves to take the proper measures for revenge, or even for defence, the arrival of a Corinthian vessel, and a Lacedæmonian embassy, encouraged their opponents to attempt their destruction. The attack was made at the hour of full assembly; the forum, or public square, presented a scene of horror; the streets of Corcyra streamed with blood. The unguarded citizens

were incapable of making resistance against such sudden and unforeseen fury. They fled in trepidation from the forum, and the more spacious streets. Some took possession of the citadel; others of the Hillæan harbour; and in general occupied, before evening, the higher and more remote parts of the town. Their adversaries kept possession of the market-place, around which most of their houses stood, or assembled in the principal harbour, that points towards Epirus, from which they expected succour. The day following was spent in doubtful skirmishes, and in summoning from the country the assistance of the peasants, or rather slaves, by whom chiefly the lands of the island were cultivated. These naturally ranged themselves on the side of the people: The Corcyrean women zealously embraced the same party, and sustained the tumult with more than female courage. One inactive day intervened. The partisans of aristocracy were reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent of Epirus. But in the succeeding engagement, the numbers and fury of the slaves, who seized the present opportunity to resent the barbarous cruelty of their respective masters, and the generous ardor of the women, rendered the friends of liberty completely victorious. The vanquished fled towards the forum and the great harbour. Even these posts they soon despaired of being able to maintain; and, to escape immediate death, set fire to the surrounding houses, which being soon thrown into a blaze, presented an impervious obstacle to the rage of the assailants.

C H A P.
XVI.

AN ALPHABETICAL
INDEX OF THE
WORKS OF
THE AUTHOR
OF THE HISTORY OF GREECE

C H A P. XVI. The most beautiful part of Corcyra was thus destroyed in one night; the houses, shops, magazines, and much valuable merchandise, were totally consumed; and had an easterly wind aided the conflagration, the whole city must in a short time have been reduced to ashes. Amidst this scene of confusion and horror, the Corinthian galley, together with the auxiliaries from Epirus, retired in consternation from a place that seemed doomed to inevitable destruction.

An Athenian squadron arrives at Corcyra.

Next day twelve Athenian galleys arrived from Naupactus, containing, besides their ordinary complement of men, five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. Nicostratus, who commanded this armament, had, upon the first intelligence of the sedition, hastened with the utmost celerity to support the cause of Athens and democracy. He had the good fortune not only to anticipate the Peloponnesian squadron, which was so anxiously expected by the enemy, but to find his friends triumphant. They had obtained, however, a melancholy triumph over the splendor of their country, which, if its factions were not speedily reconciled, was threatened with total ruin. Nicostratus omitted nothing that seemed proper to heal the wounds of that afflicted commonwealth. By authority, entreaties, and commands, he persuaded the contending parties to accommodate matters between themselves, and to renew their alliance with Athens. Having happily terminated this business, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers for the people proposed, that he should leave five

of his ships with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh commotion, and take in exchange five of theirs, which should be instantly manned to attend him on his station. With this proposal he complied; and the Corcyreans selected the mariners destined to sail with Nicostratus. Those named for this service were, to a man, partisans of the oligarchy and Lacedæmon: a circumstance which created in them just alarm, lest they should be transported to Athens, and, notwithstanding the faith of treaties, condemned to death. They took refuge in the temple of Castor and Pollux: the assurances of Nicostratus could scarcely remove them from this sanctuary; and all his declarations and oaths were incapable to prevail on them to embark. The opposite party asserted, that this want of confidence betrayed not only the consciousness of past, but the fixed purpose of future, guilt; and would have immediately dispatched them with their daggers, had not Nicostratus interposed. Terrified at these proceedings, the unhappy victims of popular malice and suspicion assembled, to the number of four hundred, and retired with one accord, as supplicants, to the temple of Juno. From this sanctuary they were persuaded to arise, and transported to a neighbouring island, or rather rock, small, barren, and uninhabited. There they remained four days, supplied barely with the means of subsistence, and impatiently waiting their fate.

In this posture of affairs a numerous fleet was seen approaching from the south. This was the long-expected squadron of fifty-three ships

C H A P.

XVI.

The Peloponnesian fleet appears off the coast.

C H A P.
XVI.

commanded by Alcidas and Brasidas. With the unfortunate slowness inherent in all the measures of the confederacy, this armament arrived too late to support the ruined cause of their friends. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, might still expect to take an useless but agreeable vengeance on their enemies. To accomplish this design they prepared to attack the harbour of Corcyra, while all was hurry and confusion. The islanders had sixty vessels fit for sea, in which they embarked with the utmost expedition, and successively sailed forth as each happened to be ready. Their ardor and impatience disdained the judicious advice of Nicostratus, who alone, calm and unmoved amidst a scene of unexpected danger, exhorted them to keep the harbour until they were all prepared to advance in line of battle, generously offering, with his twelve Athenian gallies, to sustain the first assaults of the enemy.

A sea fight,
in which
the Peloponnesians
prevail.

The Peloponnesians, observing the hostile armament scattered and unsupported, divided their own fleet into two squadrons. The one, consisting of twenty gallies, attacked the Corcyreans; the other, amounting to thirty-three, endeavoured to surround the Athenians. But the address of the Athenian mariners frustrated this attempt. Their front was extended with equal order and celerity. They assaulted, at once, the opposite wings of the Peloponnesian fleet, intercepted their motion, and skilfully encircled them around, hoping to drive their ships against each other, and to throw them into universal disorder. Perceiving these manœuvres,

the ships which followed the Corcyreans left off the pursuit, and steered to support the main squadron: and now, with their whole embodied strength, they prepared to pour on the Athenians. These prudently declined the shock of superior force: but the glory of their retreat was equal to a victory. They seasonably shifted their helms, slowly and regularly gave way, and thus covered the retreat of their Corcyrean allies, who, having already lost thirteen vessels, were totally unable to renew the engagement.

Having reached the harbour, the Corcyreans still feared lest the enemy, in pursuance of their victory, should make a descent on the coast, and even assault the city. But the manly counsels of Brasidas, who strongly recommended the latter measure, were defeated by the timidity and incapacity of Alcidas. The Corcyreans seized, therefore, the present opportunity to remove the supplicants from the uninhabited island to the temple of Juno, as less exposed there, to be discovered and taken up by the Peloponnesian fleet. Next day they entered into accommodation with these unhappy men, and even admitted several of them to embark in thirty vessels, which they hastily equipped, as the last defence of the island. The Peloponnesians, meanwhile, still prevented, by the dastardly counsels of Alcidas, from attacking the capital, wrecked their resentment on the adjacent territory. But before the dawn of the succeeding day, they were alarmed by lights on the northern shore of Leucadia, which, by their number and

C H A P.

XVI.

The mis-
conduct of
Alcidas
saves Cor-
cyra.

C H A P.
XVI.

The Athenians reinforced.

The Peloponnesians retire from Corcyra.

Massacre of the Lacedæmonian partisans.

disposition, signified the approach of an Athenian fleet of sixty sail.

The situation of the invaders was now extremely dangerous. If they stretched out to sea, they might be obliged to encounter the unbroken vigor of the Athenians: if they cruised off the coast, they would be compelled to contend, not only with the power of Athens, but with the resentment of Corcyra. One measure alone promised the hope of safety: it was immediately adopted. Having crept along the shore to Leucadia, they carried their vessels across the isthmus⁹, afterwards buried in the sea, but which then joined the peninsula, now the island of Leucas, to the adjacent coast of Acarnania. From thence sailing through the narrow seas, which separate the neighbouring isles from the continent, they escaped without discovery, and safely arrived in the harbour of Cyllené.

The democratical party in Corcyra soon perceived the flight of the enemy, and descried the approach of the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon. These fortunate events, which ought in generous minds to have effaced the dark impressions of enmity and revenge, only enabled the Corcyreans to display the deep malignity of their character. They commanded the thirty gallies, recently manned, to pass in review, and in proportion as they discovered their enemies, punished them with immediate death. Fifty of the principal citizens, who still clung to the altars in the temple

⁹ D'Anville considers the ancient Leucadia as an island; Ptolemy speaks of it as a peninsula.

of Juno, they seduced from their asylum, and instantly butchered.

Politics and party formed the pretence for violence, while individuals gratified their private passions, and wrecked vengeance on their personal foes. The sedition became every hour more fierce: the confusion thickened; the whole city was filled with consternation and horror. The altars and images of the gods were surrounded by votaries, whom even the terrors of a superstitious age could no longer protect. The miserable victims were dragged from the most revered temples, whose walls and pavement were now first stained with civil blood. Many withdrew themselves by a voluntary death from the fury of their enemies. In every house, and in every family, scenes were transacted too horrid for description. Parents, children, brothers, and pretended friends, seized the desired moment for gratifying their latent malignity, and perpetrating crimes without a name. The unfeeling Eurymedon (whose character, as will shortly appear, was a disgrace to human nature) showed neither ability nor inclination to stop the carnage. During the space of six days that his fleet continued in the Corcyrean harbour, the actors in this lamentable tragedy continually aggravated the enormity of their guilt, and improved in the refinement of their cruelty. A dreadful calm succeeded this violent agitation. Five hundred partisans of aristocracy escaped to the coast of Epirus; and the Athenian fleet retired.

C H A P.

XVI.

Malignant
passions of
the Corcy-
reans.

C H A P.
XVI.

The aristocratical party receive assistance from Epirus.

The fugitives, instead of rejoicing in their safety, thought only of revenge. They sent agents to Lacedæmon and Corinth. By describing their sufferings to the astonished Epirots, they excited their compassion, and acquired their assistance. The severity of the prevailing party in Corcyra increased the number of outlaws; who, at length, finding themselves sufficiently powerful to attack and conquer the island, which, from the moment of their banishment, they had infested by naval descents, sailed with their whole strength for that purpose in boats provided by the Barbarians. In landing at Corcyra, the rowers drove with such violence against the shore, as broke many of their vessels in pieces; the rest they immediately burned, disdaining safety unless purchased by victory. This desperate measure deterred opposition: they advanced, seized, and fortified, Mount Istoné; a strong post in the neighbourhood of the city, from which they ravaged the territory, and subjected their enemies to the multiplied evils of war and famine.

The Athenians again arrive in the island. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

An epidemical disorder increased the measure of their calamities. The flames of civil discord, which had never been thoroughly extinguished, again broke out within the walls. The misery of the Corcyreans was verging to despair, when an Athenian fleet of forty sail appeared off the coast. This armament was commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was principally destined against Sicily, as we shall have occasion to relate, but ordered in its voyage thither to touch at Corcyra, and regulate the affairs of that island. This unex-

pected assistance enabled the besieged to become the besiegers. The outworks and defences of Mount Istoné were successively taken, the parties who defended them gradually retiring to the more elevated branches, and, at length, to the very summit, of the mountain. They were on the point of being driven from thence, and of falling into the hands of enemies exasperated by innumerable injuries suffered and inflicted. Alarmed by this reflection, they called out to the Athenians for quarter, and surrendered to Eurymedon and Sophocles, on condition that their fate should be decided by the people of Athens. They were sent prisoners to the small island of Ptychia, till it should be found convenient to transport them to Athens, and commanded not to make any attempt to stir from thence under pain of annulling the capitulation which had been granted them.

If the malignity of the Corcyrean populace had not exceeded the ordinary standard of human pravity, their resentment must have been softened by the sudden transition wrought by accident in their favor. But their first concern was to intercept the precarious clemency of Athens, and to assure the destruction of their adversaries. This atrocious design was executed by a stratagem equally detestable, uniting, by a singular combination, whatever is savage in ferocity, and base in perfidy. By means of proper agents dispatched secretly to Ptychia, the leaders of the popular faction acquainted those of the prisoners, with whom, in peaceable times, they had respectively lived in some

Perfidious
cruelty of
the Cor-
cyreans;

C H A P. habits of intimacy, that the Athenians had deter-
 XVI. mined to give them up indiscriminately to the fury
 of the populace. Pretending much regret that
 persons in whom they once had so tender a con-
 cern, should share the common calamity, they ex-
 horted them, by all possible means, to contrive
 their escape, and offered to provide them with
 a bark for that purpose. The known cruelty of
 Eurymedon made the artifice succeed. The bark
 was already launched from the island; the terms
 of the capitulation were thus infringed; the de-
 luded victims were apprehended in the very act of
 departure, seized, bound, and delivered into the
 hands of their inexorable enemies.

and of the
 Athenian
 command-
 ers, Eury-
 medon and
 Sophocles.

The Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and
 Sophocles, favored the deceit, because, as they
 were themselves obliged to proceed towards Sicily,
 they envied the honor that would accrue to their
 successors in conducting the captives to Athens.
 To gratify this meanness of soul without example,
 they permitted barbarities beyond belief.

Unexam-
 pled bar-
 barities
 commit-
 ted in Cor-
 cyra.

The unhappy prisoners were first confined in a
 dungeon. Dragged successively from thence, in
 parties of twenty at a time, they were compelled
 to pass in pairs, their hands tied behind their
 backs between two ranks of their enemies, armed
 with whips, prongs, and every instrument of licen-
 tious and disgraceful torture. The wretches left
 in prison were long ignorant of the ignominious
 cruelty inflicted on their companions; but, as soon
 as they learned the abominable scenes transacted
 without, they refused to quit their confinement,

guarded the entrance, and invited, with one consent, the Athenians to murder them. But the Athenians wanted either humanity or firmness to commit this kind cruelty. The Corcyrean populace ventured not to force a passage from despair. They mounted the prison walls, uncovered the roof, and overwhelmed those below with stones, darts, and arrows. These weapons were destructive to many, and furnished others with the means of destroying themselves, or each other. They laid down their heads, opened their breasts, exposed their necks, mutually soliciting, in plaintive or frantic accents, the fatal stroke. The whole night (for the night intervened) was spent in this horrid scene; and the morning presented a spectacle too shocking for description. The obdurate hearts of the Corcyreans were incapable of pity or remorse; but their relenting eyes could not bear the sight; and they commanded the bodies of their fellow-citizens, now breathless or expiring, to be thrown on carts, and conveyed without the walls.

Thus ended the sedition of Corcyra¹⁰; but its consequences were not soon to end. The contagion of that unhappy island engendered a political malady, which spread its baneful influence over Greece. The aristocratical, and still more, the popular governments of that country, had ever been liable to faction, which occasionally blazed into sedition. But this morbid tendency, congenial to the constitution of republics, thenceforth assumed a more dangerous appearance, and

The consequences of the sedition permanent.

¹⁰ Thucyd. p. 220 — 225.

C H A P. betrayed more alarming symptoms. In every repub-
 XVI. lic, and almost in every city, the intriguing and
 ambitious found the ready protection of Athens,
 or of Sparta, according as their selfish and guilty
 designs were screened under the pretence of main-
 taining the prerogatives of the nobles, or asserting
 the privileges of the people. A virtuous and mo-
 derate aristocracy, an equal impartial freedom,
 these were the colorings which served to justify
 violence and varnish guilt. Sheltered by the
 specious coverings of fair names, the prodigal as-
 sassin delivered himself from the importunity of
 his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty,
 punished the licentious extravagance of his son:
 the son avenged, by parricide, the stern severity of
 his father. The debates of the public assembly
 were decided by the sword. Not satisfied with
 victory, men thirsted for blood. This general
 disorder overwhelmed laws human and divine.
 The ordinary course of events was reversed: senti-
 ments lost their natural force, and words their
 usual meaning¹¹. Dulness and stupidity triumphed
 over abilities and refinement; for while the crafty
 and ingenious were laying fine-spun snares for
 their enemies, men of blunter minds had imme-
 diate recourse to the sword and poniard. This
 successful audacity was termed manly enterprise;
 ferocity assumed the name of courage; faction and
 ambition passed for patriotism and magnanimity;
 perfidy was called prudence; cunning, wisdom;
 every vice was clothed in the garb of every virtue:

¹¹ Thucyd. p. 227, et seqq.

while justice, moderation, and candor, were branded as weakness, cowardice, meanness of soul, and indifference to the public interest. Such was the perversion of sentiment, and such the corruption of language, first engendered amidst the turbulence of Grecian factions, and too faithfully imitated, as far as the soft effeminacy of modern manners will permit, by the discontented and seditious of later times — Wretched and detestable delusions, by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public and themselves.

C H A P.
XVI.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

VOL. II.

Dd




THE HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN

while justice, moderation, and candour, were
as weakness, cowardice, and timidity, and
indifference to the public interest. Such was the
perfection of sentiment, and such the perfection of
language, that it seemed almost the perfection
of Cicero's orations, and too faintly painted,
as for the loft enthusiasm of modern manners
will permit, by the disinterested and dispassionate
fact, that it was touched and decorated with
by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public
and themselves.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME

D 1

Vol. II.







Gillies, John, 1747-1836

<<The>> History Of Ancient Greece, Its Colonies, And Conquests; From the
Earliest Accounts till the Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East

Bd.: 2

Basil (1790)

Bibl.Mont. 1978-2

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10718374-1

VD18 80394868-001